上市公司关联交易形成机制与治理研究
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摘要
现阶段,大量非公允关联交易行为严重损害了中小股东利益,危及到整个资本市场的诚信建设,导致了投资者投资意愿淡薄,影响了稀缺资源的有效配置,不利于整个证券市场以及国民经济的健康发展。因此,关联交易也就成为公司治理关注的重点。为了保护投资者的利益尤其是中小投资者的利益,规范上市公司运作,促进证券市场健康发展,需要对上市公司的关联交易进行全面的治理监管,而这一切是建立在对上市公司的关联交易问题进行深入的分析基础之上。
关联交易尤其是非公允关联交易引起了学术界的普遍重视,相关研究从多个角度对关联交易的有关问题进行了研究。但目前的研究,更多的是从关联交易的单个层面进行研究,较少从全局性、综合性的角度来研究关联交易问题。同时现阶段的研究更多的是从公司内部治理机制研究关联交易,对关联交易外部治理与监管的关注较少,对关联交易与利益相关者的关系研究还不够透彻。同时,随着2005-2007年我国上市公司股权分置改革的进行,上市公司无论是从股权结构、交易行为、还是控股人类型都发生了较大的变化,这种变化也导致了关联交易行为新的变化,这必然也导致对关联交易研究视角的新变化。基于此,本研究将对中国上市公司关联交易的产生原因、现状、影响及其治理进行深入探讨,并结合股权分置改革的进行提出相应的政策建议,以期对中国上市公司关联交易的治理与规范以及中国资本市场的健康发展有所裨益。
本研究内容分主要包括以下几部分：
第一部分,制度变迁视角下的关联交易形成机制研究。制度变迁是关联交易形成的重要原因。制度变迁是随着企业规模扩大与经营模式的变化而发生的,规模的扩大意味着企业不可能将所有的内部交易成本最小化。同时由于控制权结构金字塔模式的形成,这造成了控制权收益与现金流收益的分离,两权的分离与层级制形成的结果必然就是内部关联交易的大量出现,这是一种不可避免的趋势。现阶段,由于政府监管的增强,控股股东通过产品购销等有形的关联交易获得收益越来越难,无形的关联交易越来越普遍。本文通过构建一个模型说明,无形的关联交易尤其是股权交易对上市公司获得控制权收益来讲是一种隐蔽的获益方式,这应当引起有关监管部门的注意。
第二部分,上市公司关联交易的隐性化：基于隐性化成本的分析。不完全契约的存在是关联交易发生的重要因素,但这种关于关联交易的不完全契约存在实际上是建立在经济世界中的不完全信息的命题之上。信息不对称是契约理论中的核心概念,也是交易契约设计的最基本原因。这种不全完信息的存在导致了关联交易隐性化的存在,而关联交易隐性化在中国上市公司的特殊制度背景下具有自己的特殊性：集团内部的关联交易降低了隐性交易成本,却增加了中小股东的成本,因此很难将关联交易从规范研究的角度进行区分。隐性成本对关联交易的隐性化具有更强的影响力,隐性成本增加了代理成本,但这种隐性成本和关联交易规模的关系是不确定的。若同时考虑关联交易的机会成本,在进行分析的时候,实际上关联交易的成本往往会增加。
第三部分,股权分置改革下上市公司关联交易实证研究：以对外关联担保为例。股权分置改革对上市公司的关联交易产生了重要影响,该背景也变得重要起来。通过对上市公司数据的收集,建立一组股权分置前后上市公司对外关联担保影响因素的计量模型以及上市公司关联交易与公司价值、治理监管之间关系的计量模型。研究发现,股权分置改革带来上市公司对外关联担保新的变化,同时,公司治理机制对对外关联担保影响显著,对外关联担保和公司治理机制共同影响了公司的价值。
第四部分,上市公司关联交易的选择性规制及其规制效率分析。在制度分析的基础上,对关联交易持何种态度,这是一个具有现实意义的重要问题。通过借鉴前人研究成果,结合现阶段的实践,本文通过模型推导证明对关联交易的监管只能采取选择性监管而不能采取禁止性监管。另外通过构建模型,将大股东的利益侵占行为仅仅局限于通过非公允关联交易进行,在它们的基础上,加入了内部监督权与剩余股权结构等因素进行分析。研究发现,监管部门的努力程度的提高、控制性股东持股比例的提升通过对关联交易对公司价值边际影响下降；集中的控股结构与内部监管的结合会降低非公允关联交易对公司价值的边际影响；法律保护制度的提高,控制性股东持股比例的提高通过非公允关联交易对公司价值的边际负效应降低。
第五部分,上市公司关联交易治理监管的博弈分析。在对关联交易的治理监管中,控股股东、其他大股东、监管当局和中小股东的行为方式是不同的,他们之间存在一定的联系和相互作用,这种相互作用反过来又会影响到监管的实际效果。因此,考察分析这些行为方式及其联系是必要的,它有利于正确评价一项治理监管制度的实际效果。研究发现,对关联交易的治理监管是一个多个关联方博弈的结果,不能单纯地突出某一方的作用。
第六部分,比较视角下的中国上市公司监管体系构建。通过对欧美发达国家、香港地区、台湾地区对上市公司公司关联交易治理监管的比较与借鉴,得出了相关的启示。并在对国外经验的比较与借鉴的基础上,提出了构建中国上市公司关联交易监管的体系。这种体系从内外部公司治理机制进行全面构建,既强调内部治理机制的进一步优化,同时借鉴规制理论的有关研究成果,强调外部的规制监管是上市公司关联交易有效监管的一个重要手段。单独的一种治理模式都很难取得最佳效果,唯有综合治理才能最大程度地降低关联交易的危害性,加大其有利的一面。
本研究的主要创新点为：(1)提出了在上市公司关联交易治理监管中必须考虑隐性交易成本。当考虑隐性交易成本的时候,许多类型的关联交易存在就变得合理。(2)通过对上市公司关联交易的多方利益相关者的博弈发现：单一的关联交易是无效的,对关联交易的监管态度应当是选择性规制而非禁止性规制。(3)通过对股权分置改革前后上市公司对外关联担保的实证研究发现：股权分置改革在一定程度上达到了提升上市公司价值的目的,但在许多方面效果并不显著,对关联交易的治理监管仍然需要不断创新。
Now, a large number of non-fair related party transactions were serious harm to the interests of small shareholders and endanger the construction of integrity of the entire capital market. It has led to fade of Willingness to invest of investors and affect the efficient of distribution of resources and is not conducive to the healthy development of capital markets as well as the national economy. Therefore, the related party transactions have become the focus of corporate governance. In order to protect the interests of small investors, regulate the operation of listed companies and promote the healthy development of capital markets, it is necessary for related party transactions of listed companies to conduct a comprehensive supervision. All this is based on the depth analysis of related party transactions of listed companies.
Related-party transactions in particular non-fair related-party transactions caused widespread academic attention. The research has been studied on the issues relating to related party transactions from various angles. However, the current research is study only from the related-party transactions'single level and less from overall, comprehensive point of view. While the current research is study related-party transactions more from the company's internal governance mechanisms and give less concerns from of external governance and regulatory. A thorough study is not enough about the relationship between related party transactions and the stakeholders. With the development of split share structure reforms of listed companies in 2005-2007, ownership structure, trading behavior and type of major controller of listed companies have taken place greatly. This change leads to new changes in behavior of related party transactions and inevitably leads to a new perspective on the study of related party transactions. Based on this, this paper will be in-depth discussions of causes, status, impact and control theory of the related party transaction of listed companies in China and proposed the policy recommendations combined with the share structure reform. The research wants to help related party transactions'governance and norms of listed companies and the healthy development of China's capital market in China.
The research includes the following main sections:
First section:Research of the formation mechanism of the related party transactions from the perspective of institution. Institutional change is an important reason for the formation of related-party transactions with the business scale and business model's changes. The firm can not minimize all internal transaction costs with the expanded the size of firm. Meantime because of the formation of the structure of the pyramid model, this resulted in separation control power from power of cash flow and a large number of related party transactions occurred. This is an inevitable trend. At the present stage, because of government regulation strength, it is become more and more difficult for the controlling shareholder to obtain benefits of the related-party transactions through product purchase and sales. The research builds a model to illustrate that the intangible related party transaction especially the related party share transaction is a hidden way to obtain benefit of control. This should cause the attention of the relevant regulatory authorities.
Second section:The hidden related party transactions of listed companies: based on the analysis of hidden costs. The existence of incomplete contracts is an important factor associated with the formation of the related party transaction. In fact, the existence of incomplete contracts is based on the incomplete information of economic world. Information asymmetry is the core concept of the contract theory but also is the most basic reason for the contract transactions'design. The presence of incomplete information led to the existence of, and the hidden related-party transaction has its own particularity on the background of Chinese listed companies. The related party transaction within the group of decrease implicit transaction costs but increased the cost of small shareholders. So, it is difficult to distinguish related-party transactions from the point of normative research. Hidden costs have stronger influence on hidden related party transactions. Hidden costs increase agency costs but the relationship between the hidden costs and the size of related party transactions is uncertain. If considered the opportunity cost of related-party transactions, the transaction costs tend to increase actually.
Third section:The empirical study of the effects of related party transaction of the listed company and the correlation of governance mechanisms. The shares reform has a significant impact on the related party transaction of listed companies. Through the collection of data on listed companies, it establishes a set of Econometric model about factors associated transactions of listed companies before and after the share structure reform. The study found that share-trading reform of listed companies has brought new changes in the related loan guarantee offered. At the same time, corporate governance mechanism associated with the related loan guarantee offered significantly. The related loan guarantee offered and corporate governance mechanisms associated affect the value of listed company.
Forth section:The Study of Selective Regulatory System and its Efficiency of Related Party Transactions of the Listed Company. It is an important issue what was the attitude of the related party transactions based on the analysis of the institutions. By drawing on previous research's results and combining with the practice, it proved to be that a selective regulation of supervision rather than prohibit sexual regulation is a good way for related party transactions through the model. In addition, it builds models that the tunnel of major shareholders is limited to conducting non-fair related party transactions and joined the internal supervision, the remaining equity structure and other factors. It is founded that with the regulatory efforts increased, the value of marginal effect is decline because of the proportion of the controlling shareholder changing related party transactions. Combination centralized holding structure and the internal control can reduce the company's marginal value effect of non-fair related-party transactions. The improvement of the legal protection system and increasing the proportion of shareholding controlled can reduce the company's marginal value effect of non-fair related-party transactions.
Fifth section:The further study of corporate governance of related party transaction of the listed company:based on the analysis of the game. In the governance of supervision of related party transactions, behavior of Controlling shareholder, other big shareholders, regulatory authorities and small and medium shareholders are different. There is a certain link and interaction between them and the interaction affects the practical effect of regulation in turn. So, it is necessary to analysis of the behavior and its association. It is help to evaluate the practical effect of the regulatory regime of governance. The study found that the governance regulation of related party transactions is a result of game of the various related party, and it can not simply to highlight the role of a party.
Sixth section:The construction of regulatory and governance system for listed companies related party transaction from a comparative point of view. Compared and referenced the experience of governance related party regulation between developed countries in Europe and the United States, Hong Kong, Taiwan, it Proposed to build system of Governance and regulatory for the related party transaction of Chinese listed companies. The system conducts a comprehensive study from both internal and external corporate governance mechanism and emphasize further optimized of internal governance mechanisms. Meanwhile referencing the related theory of regulation, it stresses that the external regulation is effective means of monitoring related party transaction of listed companies. A single model of governance is difficult to achieve the best result. Comprehensive governance can minimize the danger of related party transactions and increase its favorable aspect.
There are three innovation points in the paper. First, it researches the issues of related party transaction from an integrated perspective institutional change and transaction costs. In the course of studying the related party transaction, the paper tries to the reasons for the formation of related-party transactions from a system point of institutional change. The paper also analysis the costs of the related party transaction which including explicit costs and implicit costs. At present, the domestic research involved less on the subject. Second, using the game methods studies the governance and regulation of related party transactions of the listed companies from multi-dimensional perspective. The paper uses game methods to study the relation of controlling shareholders, other big shareholders, regulators and small shareholders, and tries to find the relation of related party transaction and stakeholders. Third, the paper studies the relation of the related party transaction and governance mechanism. At present, the domestic research on the related-party transactions are mostly used data from before 2005. But the share structure reform has finished by the 2007. On the background of reform, the conduct of listed companies must be changed associated with the introduction of new policies. This paper studies the changes of related party transaction and makes empirical research on both the influencing factors and governance mechanisms of related party transaction before and after share structure reform.
关联交易尤其是非公允关联交易引起了学术界的普遍重视,相关研究从多个角度对关联交易的有关问题进行了研究。但目前的研究,更多的是从关联交易的单个层面进行研究,较少从全局性、综合性的角度来研究关联交易问题。同时现阶段的研究更多的是从公司内部治理机制研究关联交易,对关联交易外部治理与监管的关注较少,对关联交易与利益相关者的关系研究还不够透彻。同时,随着2005-2007年我国上市公司股权分置改革的进行,上市公司无论是从股权结构、交易行为、还是控股人类型都发生了较大的变化,这种变化也导致了关联交易行为新的变化,这必然也导致对关联交易研究视角的新变化。基于此,本研究将对中国上市公司关联交易的产生原因、现状、影响及其治理进行深入探讨,并结合股权分置改革的进行提出相应的政策建议,以期对中国上市公司关联交易的治理与规范以及中国资本市场的健康发展有所裨益。
本研究内容分主要包括以下几部分：
第一部分,制度变迁视角下的关联交易形成机制研究。制度变迁是关联交易形成的重要原因。制度变迁是随着企业规模扩大与经营模式的变化而发生的,规模的扩大意味着企业不可能将所有的内部交易成本最小化。同时由于控制权结构金字塔模式的形成,这造成了控制权收益与现金流收益的分离,两权的分离与层级制形成的结果必然就是内部关联交易的大量出现,这是一种不可避免的趋势。现阶段,由于政府监管的增强,控股股东通过产品购销等有形的关联交易获得收益越来越难,无形的关联交易越来越普遍。本文通过构建一个模型说明,无形的关联交易尤其是股权交易对上市公司获得控制权收益来讲是一种隐蔽的获益方式,这应当引起有关监管部门的注意。
第二部分,上市公司关联交易的隐性化：基于隐性化成本的分析。不完全契约的存在是关联交易发生的重要因素,但这种关于关联交易的不完全契约存在实际上是建立在经济世界中的不完全信息的命题之上。信息不对称是契约理论中的核心概念,也是交易契约设计的最基本原因。这种不全完信息的存在导致了关联交易隐性化的存在,而关联交易隐性化在中国上市公司的特殊制度背景下具有自己的特殊性：集团内部的关联交易降低了隐性交易成本,却增加了中小股东的成本,因此很难将关联交易从规范研究的角度进行区分。隐性成本对关联交易的隐性化具有更强的影响力,隐性成本增加了代理成本,但这种隐性成本和关联交易规模的关系是不确定的。若同时考虑关联交易的机会成本,在进行分析的时候,实际上关联交易的成本往往会增加。
第三部分,股权分置改革下上市公司关联交易实证研究：以对外关联担保为例。股权分置改革对上市公司的关联交易产生了重要影响,该背景也变得重要起来。通过对上市公司数据的收集,建立一组股权分置前后上市公司对外关联担保影响因素的计量模型以及上市公司关联交易与公司价值、治理监管之间关系的计量模型。研究发现,股权分置改革带来上市公司对外关联担保新的变化,同时,公司治理机制对对外关联担保影响显著,对外关联担保和公司治理机制共同影响了公司的价值。
第四部分,上市公司关联交易的选择性规制及其规制效率分析。在制度分析的基础上,对关联交易持何种态度,这是一个具有现实意义的重要问题。通过借鉴前人研究成果,结合现阶段的实践,本文通过模型推导证明对关联交易的监管只能采取选择性监管而不能采取禁止性监管。另外通过构建模型,将大股东的利益侵占行为仅仅局限于通过非公允关联交易进行,在它们的基础上,加入了内部监督权与剩余股权结构等因素进行分析。研究发现,监管部门的努力程度的提高、控制性股东持股比例的提升通过对关联交易对公司价值边际影响下降；集中的控股结构与内部监管的结合会降低非公允关联交易对公司价值的边际影响；法律保护制度的提高,控制性股东持股比例的提高通过非公允关联交易对公司价值的边际负效应降低。
第五部分,上市公司关联交易治理监管的博弈分析。在对关联交易的治理监管中,控股股东、其他大股东、监管当局和中小股东的行为方式是不同的,他们之间存在一定的联系和相互作用,这种相互作用反过来又会影响到监管的实际效果。因此,考察分析这些行为方式及其联系是必要的,它有利于正确评价一项治理监管制度的实际效果。研究发现,对关联交易的治理监管是一个多个关联方博弈的结果,不能单纯地突出某一方的作用。
第六部分,比较视角下的中国上市公司监管体系构建。通过对欧美发达国家、香港地区、台湾地区对上市公司公司关联交易治理监管的比较与借鉴,得出了相关的启示。并在对国外经验的比较与借鉴的基础上,提出了构建中国上市公司关联交易监管的体系。这种体系从内外部公司治理机制进行全面构建,既强调内部治理机制的进一步优化,同时借鉴规制理论的有关研究成果,强调外部的规制监管是上市公司关联交易有效监管的一个重要手段。单独的一种治理模式都很难取得最佳效果,唯有综合治理才能最大程度地降低关联交易的危害性,加大其有利的一面。
本研究的主要创新点为：(1)提出了在上市公司关联交易治理监管中必须考虑隐性交易成本。当考虑隐性交易成本的时候,许多类型的关联交易存在就变得合理。(2)通过对上市公司关联交易的多方利益相关者的博弈发现：单一的关联交易是无效的,对关联交易的监管态度应当是选择性规制而非禁止性规制。(3)通过对股权分置改革前后上市公司对外关联担保的实证研究发现：股权分置改革在一定程度上达到了提升上市公司价值的目的,但在许多方面效果并不显著,对关联交易的治理监管仍然需要不断创新。
Now, a large number of non-fair related party transactions were serious harm to the interests of small shareholders and endanger the construction of integrity of the entire capital market. It has led to fade of Willingness to invest of investors and affect the efficient of distribution of resources and is not conducive to the healthy development of capital markets as well as the national economy. Therefore, the related party transactions have become the focus of corporate governance. In order to protect the interests of small investors, regulate the operation of listed companies and promote the healthy development of capital markets, it is necessary for related party transactions of listed companies to conduct a comprehensive supervision. All this is based on the depth analysis of related party transactions of listed companies.
Related-party transactions in particular non-fair related-party transactions caused widespread academic attention. The research has been studied on the issues relating to related party transactions from various angles. However, the current research is study only from the related-party transactions'single level and less from overall, comprehensive point of view. While the current research is study related-party transactions more from the company's internal governance mechanisms and give less concerns from of external governance and regulatory. A thorough study is not enough about the relationship between related party transactions and the stakeholders. With the development of split share structure reforms of listed companies in 2005-2007, ownership structure, trading behavior and type of major controller of listed companies have taken place greatly. This change leads to new changes in behavior of related party transactions and inevitably leads to a new perspective on the study of related party transactions. Based on this, this paper will be in-depth discussions of causes, status, impact and control theory of the related party transaction of listed companies in China and proposed the policy recommendations combined with the share structure reform. The research wants to help related party transactions'governance and norms of listed companies and the healthy development of China's capital market in China.
The research includes the following main sections:
First section:Research of the formation mechanism of the related party transactions from the perspective of institution. Institutional change is an important reason for the formation of related-party transactions with the business scale and business model's changes. The firm can not minimize all internal transaction costs with the expanded the size of firm. Meantime because of the formation of the structure of the pyramid model, this resulted in separation control power from power of cash flow and a large number of related party transactions occurred. This is an inevitable trend. At the present stage, because of government regulation strength, it is become more and more difficult for the controlling shareholder to obtain benefits of the related-party transactions through product purchase and sales. The research builds a model to illustrate that the intangible related party transaction especially the related party share transaction is a hidden way to obtain benefit of control. This should cause the attention of the relevant regulatory authorities.
Second section:The hidden related party transactions of listed companies: based on the analysis of hidden costs. The existence of incomplete contracts is an important factor associated with the formation of the related party transaction. In fact, the existence of incomplete contracts is based on the incomplete information of economic world. Information asymmetry is the core concept of the contract theory but also is the most basic reason for the contract transactions'design. The presence of incomplete information led to the existence of, and the hidden related-party transaction has its own particularity on the background of Chinese listed companies. The related party transaction within the group of decrease implicit transaction costs but increased the cost of small shareholders. So, it is difficult to distinguish related-party transactions from the point of normative research. Hidden costs have stronger influence on hidden related party transactions. Hidden costs increase agency costs but the relationship between the hidden costs and the size of related party transactions is uncertain. If considered the opportunity cost of related-party transactions, the transaction costs tend to increase actually.
Third section:The empirical study of the effects of related party transaction of the listed company and the correlation of governance mechanisms. The shares reform has a significant impact on the related party transaction of listed companies. Through the collection of data on listed companies, it establishes a set of Econometric model about factors associated transactions of listed companies before and after the share structure reform. The study found that share-trading reform of listed companies has brought new changes in the related loan guarantee offered. At the same time, corporate governance mechanism associated with the related loan guarantee offered significantly. The related loan guarantee offered and corporate governance mechanisms associated affect the value of listed company.
Forth section:The Study of Selective Regulatory System and its Efficiency of Related Party Transactions of the Listed Company. It is an important issue what was the attitude of the related party transactions based on the analysis of the institutions. By drawing on previous research's results and combining with the practice, it proved to be that a selective regulation of supervision rather than prohibit sexual regulation is a good way for related party transactions through the model. In addition, it builds models that the tunnel of major shareholders is limited to conducting non-fair related party transactions and joined the internal supervision, the remaining equity structure and other factors. It is founded that with the regulatory efforts increased, the value of marginal effect is decline because of the proportion of the controlling shareholder changing related party transactions. Combination centralized holding structure and the internal control can reduce the company's marginal value effect of non-fair related-party transactions. The improvement of the legal protection system and increasing the proportion of shareholding controlled can reduce the company's marginal value effect of non-fair related-party transactions.
Fifth section:The further study of corporate governance of related party transaction of the listed company:based on the analysis of the game. In the governance of supervision of related party transactions, behavior of Controlling shareholder, other big shareholders, regulatory authorities and small and medium shareholders are different. There is a certain link and interaction between them and the interaction affects the practical effect of regulation in turn. So, it is necessary to analysis of the behavior and its association. It is help to evaluate the practical effect of the regulatory regime of governance. The study found that the governance regulation of related party transactions is a result of game of the various related party, and it can not simply to highlight the role of a party.
Sixth section:The construction of regulatory and governance system for listed companies related party transaction from a comparative point of view. Compared and referenced the experience of governance related party regulation between developed countries in Europe and the United States, Hong Kong, Taiwan, it Proposed to build system of Governance and regulatory for the related party transaction of Chinese listed companies. The system conducts a comprehensive study from both internal and external corporate governance mechanism and emphasize further optimized of internal governance mechanisms. Meanwhile referencing the related theory of regulation, it stresses that the external regulation is effective means of monitoring related party transaction of listed companies. A single model of governance is difficult to achieve the best result. Comprehensive governance can minimize the danger of related party transactions and increase its favorable aspect.
There are three innovation points in the paper. First, it researches the issues of related party transaction from an integrated perspective institutional change and transaction costs. In the course of studying the related party transaction, the paper tries to the reasons for the formation of related-party transactions from a system point of institutional change. The paper also analysis the costs of the related party transaction which including explicit costs and implicit costs. At present, the domestic research involved less on the subject. Second, using the game methods studies the governance and regulation of related party transactions of the listed companies from multi-dimensional perspective. The paper uses game methods to study the relation of controlling shareholders, other big shareholders, regulators and small shareholders, and tries to find the relation of related party transaction and stakeholders. Third, the paper studies the relation of the related party transaction and governance mechanism. At present, the domestic research on the related-party transactions are mostly used data from before 2005. But the share structure reform has finished by the 2007. On the background of reform, the conduct of listed companies must be changed associated with the introduction of new policies. This paper studies the changes of related party transaction and makes empirical research on both the influencing factors and governance mechanisms of related party transaction before and after share structure reform.
引文
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