地方政府竞争下中国之“谜”的若干问题研究
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摘要
改革开放之后的三十多年,中国特有的渐进式改革并没有像某些西方经济学家所预期的那样遭受失败,而是在经济、社会等领域的转型中取得了非凡的成功,经济实力和综合国力大大增强,全球影响力极大提升。在经济成就方面,中国的GDP总量从1978年的3645亿元增长到2009年的335353亿元,年均增长9.80%以上。同时,中国在消除贫困、教育、医疗、科研、社会保障等方面也取得了举世瞩目的成就。中国的经济和社会成就既被世人誉为“增长奇迹”,也被许多人所不理解,成了许多人眼里的“谜”。①因为,中国经济增长表现出了四个前所未有的独特之处：一是,中国的GDP增长速度高、持续时间长。从增长速度来讲,历史以来,目前还没有任何一个大国能保持每年将近10%的增长速度长达30多年。而且,在可预计的未来,中国的高速增长还可能持续较长一段时期。这不能不是一个“奇迹”。二是,从经济理论的角度看,这个奇迹的神秘之处在于其“非常规”的性质：经济增长理论所强调的若干增长条件,如自然资源禀赋、‘物质和人力资本积累以及技术创新能力,中国与其它国家相比并无独特之处,甚至处于低水平阶段,如人均资源禀赋、技术创新水平。也就是说,按照这些理论的预言,中国不应该有经济奇迹发生。三是,中国的经济增长是在制度不完善的转型过程中取得的。就是说,中国改革没有按照西方主流经济学的理论逻辑展开,没有按照“华盛顿共识”所描绘的蓝图进行,而是在产权不完全清晰、价格不完全自由、不完全民主、社会不完全平等、对外不完全开放、政治改革滞后等一系列不太理想甚至扭曲的制度条件下,取得了比按照西方主流经济学逻辑和“华盛顿共识”要求进行改革的前苏联和东欧各国更大的成就。四是,中国在取得伟大的经济成就的同时,也伴随着诸多经济方面的困局,如：地方保护主义的盛行、国有企业效率的低下、对民营经济的歧视、收入分配的严重不公、对外依赖程度的畸高、金融体系的不完善、腐败的盛行……这就愈加彰显出中国的经济增长作为一种奇迹的意义。因而,自1990年代中后期以来,国际上许多经济学家和研究中国问题的学者都把中国的非凡经济表现视为一个“谜”——即中国之“谜”(如：张维迎,1998；彼得·诺兰(Nolan),1993；J.Buchanan和汪丁丁,1998)。
如何解释中国经济增长之“谜”呢?能不能找到一个内在逻辑一致的视角,既能用以解释中国的经济成就,又能理解中国经济和社会发展中的诸多令人困惑之处?对中国这样的转型中大国所出现的“谜”的阐释不仅可以增加我们对转型和经济增长的知识,也有助于中国坚持业已生成的好的制度、改革阻碍经济和社会发展的坏的制度,还能促进中国经验和中国模式在世界的推广,为世界上其他发展中国家和转型国家探寻经济起飞之路提供有益的借鉴。为此,本文将对中国经济和社会发展中所表现出的几个突出之“谜”进行解释。具体而言,本文的主要研究工作和创新如下：
一、提出了一个基于地方政府竞争的用以解释中国之“谜”的逻辑框架
就已有文献来说,许多经济学家强调了地方政府竞争对于中国经济增长的重要性,如：张军(2005、2007)、周业安(2003、2005)、张五常(2005、2008、2009),陆铭和陈钊等人(2005、2006)、周黎安(2005、2007、2008)、徐现祥(2006)等等；也有许多学者探讨了地方政府竞争所带来的诸多影响,如：地方政府竞争对民营化的影响(张维迎等,1998)、地方政府竞争对FDI流入的影响(庞明礼,2007)、地方政府竞争对基础设施建设的影响(张军等,2007)、地方政府竞争对地方保护主义和市场化进程的影响(周黎安,2007；陆铭和陈钊,2006)等等；还有一些人探讨了地方政府竞争的激励来源,如：周黎安认为中国政治领域中的晋升锦标赛机制是促成地方政府竞争的根本、张五常认为中国的土地分成制度是生成地方政府竞争的主要制度安排......然而,现有文献还未能提出一个内在逻辑一致的逻辑框架,既能分析中国推行改革和开放时所面临的约束、又能指出地方政府竞争之所以形成的激励和约束条件、还能分析地方政府竞争下所导致的中国经济增长的巨大成就和其中出现的诸多困局。为此,本文的第2章构建了一个基于地方政府竞争的逻辑框架,在这个框架中,我回答了上述问题,并认为地方政府竞争是缔造中国之“谜”的最重要的推动力；同时,在这个框架中,我解释了中国地方政府竞争形成的原因,地方政府竞争带来的诸多效应以及知识在中国地方政府竞争和经济增长中所起的作用。
二、分析了形成地方政府竞争所需的必要条件：激励和约束地方政府官员的制度安排
激励很重要,把激励搞对,一国的经济才能起飞和发展。就一国来说,不仅要搞好企业治理,对企业管理者和员工实施有效的激励；同时,鉴于政府在经济发展中的重要性,也要搞好政府治理。而政府不是抽象的政府,是由各级官员组成的政府。地方政府的决策是地方官员做出的,地方政府的整体行为也是官员个体行为“加总”的结果,因此,我们必须深入理解地方官员背后的激励和约束机制是什么,才能深刻地把握中国地方政府竞争的决定因素。
我认为,对中国地方政府官员的激励和约束是多方面的,不是某种单一的因素在起作用,而是多种因素共同作用,促使着这些官员一方面为辖区的经济增长而出力献策、四处奔波,一方面也为了其私利而进行腐败、忽视民生或采取其他可能导致诸如市场分割、倾向城市的公共品提供、低就业的增长等效应出现的行为。
因此,本文的第3章研究了改革开放后激励和约束中国地方政府官员的制度安排,认为主要有以下六种：一是财政分权制度；二是政治上的晋升锦标赛机制；三是事权上的属地化行政逐级发包制；四是中国的党政关系安排；五是中国的混合型地区组织结构；六是中国的关于如何做官的传统文化及对关系网络的重视等非正式制度。同时,本文对这些制度在激励和约束地方政府官员时所起的作用做了较深入的研究。
三、分析了地方政府竞争对地方政府官员的腐败的影响
一般来说,腐败会抑制经济的增长和社会公平主义。然而,为什么中国在腐败程度如此高的情况下,却能保持经济的快速发展呢?如果我们认为地方政府竞争是促成中国之“谜”的最重要的推动力,那么地方政府竞争会对地方政府官员的腐败产生什么样的影响呢?
本文的第4章为此构建了一个模型,试图探讨在中国政治领域中实行的晋升锦标赛对地方政府官员的腐败行为的影响。分析结果表明,晋升锦标赛和地方政府竞争对地方政府官员的腐败行为具有正负两个方面的影响,即,一方面晋升锦标赛和地方政府竞争能促使地方政府官员廉洁从政、努力工作,以便促进辖区的经济增长,从而获得更高的晋升机会；另一方面,晋升锦标赛和地方政府竞争又会促使地方政府官员涉足腐败。分析结果还表明：在地方政府竞争下,职位薪酬只能在满足参与约束条件下起杜绝地方政府官员腐败的作用,而一旦地方政府官员决定进行腐败时,所谓的“高薪养廉”对降低地方政府官员的腐败程度作用甚微,真正起作用的是高低职位间的薪酬差。同时,地区间的增长条件差异、政治环境差异、反腐败的投入差异、司法的公正与透明度差异等因素会通过诸如“破罐子破摔效应”、“示范效应”、“大染缸效应”等机制对地方政府官员是致力于腐败还是致力于清廉产生重要影响。
四、关于地方政府竞争对产业选择、就业和收入分配的影响的结论
中国经济发展中的四个重要现象是：第一、各地方政府为“招商引资”而展开激烈竞争；第二、重化工业等资本密集型产业的比重过高,而服务业等劳动密集型产业的发展远远滞后于经济的发展；第三、经济的高速增长与就业的低速增长并存；第四、收入分配严重不公,资本收入占比不断提高,而工资性收入占比不断下降。为什么会存在看似如此矛盾的现象?有没有一个内在逻辑一致的理论可以同时解释这四种现象呢?
本文的第5章构建了两个基于地方政府竞争的模型。第一个模型说明了地方政府竞争下,地方政府之间会展开“招商引资”大战,而且地方政府官员之间的晋升竞争越激烈,为此而展开的“招商引资”大战也会越激烈。
第二个模型则分析了地方政府竞争下,地方政府的产业选择对就业、收入分配所产生的影响。分析结果表明,在地方政府及其官员“为增长而展开竞争”之下,将产生以下三种效应：
一是资本和技术密集型产业过度发展,劳动力密集型产业被忽视。资本和技术密集型产业相对于劳动力密集型产业来说,具有更强的增长效应,因而,地方政府及官员更愿意引进、扶持那些规模大、资本密集或技术密集型的企业,而忽视劳动力密集型的中小企业的发展,这也就导致了中国许多地区的中小企业在金融上、政策上、市场准入上长期得不到公平待遇。同时,也派生出一个重要现象,就是各地区产业同构和重复建设严重,而且那些增长拉动效果大的产业的同构程度将会很高。
二是导致“低就业或无就业的增长”。在各地区偏好资本和技术密集型产业发展战略时,由于中国是一个资本相对稀缺、而劳动力相对丰裕的国家,这种偏离要素禀赋的发展,就会发生资本和机器替代劳动力,对劳动力的需求不断下降的现象,即出现“无就业或低就业的增长”。
三是导致劳动者工资性收入占比在国民收入的初次分配中不断下降,而资本性收入所占份额会不断提高。由于偏好于资本和技术密集型产业,而忽视劳动力密集型产业,会导致对资本和技术的需求增加,资本和技术的价格上升；对劳动力的需求下降,劳动力价格增长缓慢。这就会带来劳动分配份额在GDP的比重持续下降。
五、关于地方政府竞争对宏观经济波动的影响
在地方政府竞争下,为追求更快的经济增长,各地方政府及其官员就会萌生出投资的冲动,从而导致中国的经济过热；一旦过热,中央政府将采取紧缩措施和政治惩罚,这又会引起经济的紧缩。这样,就会导致中国的宏观经济的周期性波动。
本文的第6章构建了一个计量模型,用HP方法分离出GDP构成中的各波动项,然后寻找各波动项对GDP增长率的波动项的影响大小。我们利用1990年至2004年每年的GDP总量、居民消费、政府消费、资本形成总额、货物和服务净出口、各项信贷总额、以及价格指数等数据,基于面板数据的计量分析表明,在地方政府支出和受地方政府影响的投资波动是引起中国宏观经济波动的主要原因。
In the period of the 30 years of Reform and Opening, China's unique progressive reform has not been met the failure as some western economists expected, on the contrary, it achieved remarkable success in the area of economic, social transoformation. China's economic and comprehensive power has much increased and its global influence increased considerably as well. In the economic achivements, the total GDP increased from 364.5 billion yuan in 1978 to 33.5353 trillion yuan in 2009, with the average annual growth of over 9.80%. Meanwhile, China has also made remarkable achievements in many other fields, such as poverty elimination, education, health care, average life expectancy, research and social security. China's economic and social achievements, which is known as " a growth miracle", are not understood by many people and regarded as a "mystery". The reason is that China's economic growth shows four unprecedented uniques:first of all, China's GDP growth maitained a high rate and sustained in a long period of time. From the growth rate, there has never been one big country which can maitain an annual growth rate of 10% in 30 years on the history. Moreover, it might continue for a longer period in the foreseeable future. It cann't be not a "miracle". Secondly, the mystery of this miracle shows "unconventional" characteristics from point of view of the economic theory:comparing to other countries, China has no advantages in many conditions stressed by the growth theory such as natural resource endowment, physical and human capital accumulation, and technological innovation capability and so on. In spite of that, China is at a comparatively low level in per capita resource endowment and technological innovation. In other words, China's economic miracle should not have happened according to these theoretical predictions. Thirdly, China's economic growth is obtained in the course of its transformation with imperfect system. That is, instead of on the basis of the logic of western mainstream economic theory or following the blueprint described by "Washington Consensus", China's reform is carried under a series of unsatisfying and even distorted system conditions such as not entirely clear poverty rights, not entirely free price, inadequate democratic, incomplete social equality, incomplete opening to the outside and lagged political reform, and has achieved greater accomplishment than the countries of former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which carried out their reform in accordance with the mainstream of Western economic logic and the "Washington Consensus". Fourthly, accompany with the great economic ahcievements, China is in many difficulties:the prevalence of local protectionism, the low efficiency of state-owned enterprises, discrimination to the private economy, grave injustice of income distribution, the extremely high external dependence, the imperfection of financial system and the prevalence of corruption.... This even more highlights the meaning of China's economic growth as a miracle. Thus, since the late 1990s, many economists and scholars in the world who studies China regarded China's extraordinary economic performance as a "myth" --- that is, China's "Mystery" (such as:Zhang Weiying,1998; Peter Nolan (Nolan),1993; J. Buchanan, and Wang Dingding,1998).
How to explain the "mystery" of China's economic growth? Is it possible to find a perspective with internal logic consistency which can be used to explain both China's economic success and the confusion during the economic and social development? The explaination of the "mystery" emerged in the big countries in transition like China contributes to increasing our knowledge of transition and economic growth. It is also helpful for China to adhere to the good system that has generated already, to improve the drawbacks of the existing system, to reform the bad systems impedeing economic and social development. Besides, it can promote China's experience and the Chinese model in the world, which is helpful for other developing countries to explore the road of economic take-off. Therefore, this paper will focus on explaining a few prominent "mysteries" shown in China's economic and social development. Specifically, this paper's main research work and innovations are as follows:
First, a logical framework based on the competition among local government to explaining the China "mystery".
In the existing literature, many economists emphasized the importance of the competition among local governments for China's economic growth, for example:Zhang Jun(2005,2007), Zhou Ye'an (2003,2005), Steven Cheung (2005,2008,2009), Lu Ming and Chen Zhao et al(2005,2006), Zhou Li'an(2005,2007,2008), Xu Xianxiang (2006), etc.; there are also many scholars explored the effects of local governments competition, such as:the effects on privatization (Zhanget al,1998), on FDI inflow (Pang Mingli,2007), on infrastructure construction (Zhang Jun, et al,2007), and on the local protectionism and market-oriented process (Zhou Nathan,2007; Lu Ming and Chen Zhao,2006), and so on; furthermore, there are some scholar discussed the incentive sources of the competition among local governments, for example:Zhou Li'an believes that the promotion tournament mechanism in political area is the root of local government competition, Steven Chueng thinks that China's share system of land is the main institutional arrangement that generates the local government competition...However, there isn't any framework with internal logic consistency in the existing literature, which can be used to analyze the constrains of China's Reform and opening up, point out the incentives and constrains that cause the local government competition, and analyze China's great achievements and difficulties of economic growth under the competition among local governments as well. So in Chapter 2, a logical framwork is constructed based on local government competition. In this framwork, the above questions are answered and the competition among local government is consisdered to be the most important driving force to create China's "mystery". Meanwhile, the reasons and effects of China's local government competition are also explained in this framework, as well as the role of knowledge played in the local government competition and economic growth in China.
Secondly, the necessary conditions for the local government competition:the institutional arrangements that encourage and bind local government officials.
Incentive is very important. It is only to incent properly that would the economy of one country take off and develop. For one country, governance is necessary not only for enterprises which means effective incentive to the managers and employees, but also for government given the importance of government in the economic development. By means of government, I mean the one composed by officials from all levels, not the abstract one. The decisions of local government are made by officials. The overall behavior of local government is "an aggregation" of the officials'individual behavior. So we must have a deep understanding of the incentive and restraint mechanisms on local officials in order to find out the determinant of local government competiton.
This paper proposed that the incentive and restraint to the local officials are affected not by a single factor, but by various of factors working together, which will encourage these officials to contribute to the economic growth and working hard back and forth for their jurisdiction, and on the other hand, it will also promote corruption, neglection of citizens'livelihood and other behaviors for private interests which might lead to the consequences of market segmentation, bias public goods providing and low growth of employment, etc.
It is studied in Chapter 3 that the institutional arrangements which encourage and bind China's local officials. There are six kinds of institutional arrangements as the following: the first one is fiscal decentralization system; the second one is the promotion tournament mechanism in political area; the third one is the level-by-level localization administrative contracting system of of routine powers; the fourth one is relationships of China's Party and Government; the fifth one is the hybrid regional organization structure of China; the sixth one is the informal systems of how to be an official in China's traditional culture and of the importance attached to the network of relationships. At the same time, this paper makes comparatively deep research on the role of these systems in incentiving and constrainting the local government officials.
Thirdly, the impact on the corruptions of local government officials by the local government competition
Generally speaking, corruption will inhibit economic growth and social equity doctrine. However, why could China be able to maintain rapid economic development with corruption of such a high level? If we think that competition among local governments be the most important driving force to promote China's "mystery", what impacts would the local competition impose on the corruptions of local government officials then?
Chapter 4 builds a model for the attempt to explore the impact of the promotion tournament in China's political area on the corruption of local government officials. The results show that there are both positive and negative effects of promotion tournaments and local government competition on the corruptions of local government officials, that is, on one hand, local government officials will be encouraged to be uncorrupted in his post and to work hard in promoting the economic growth of his jurisdiction in order to obtain a promotion opportunities; on the other hand, the local government officials will be driven to be involved in corruption. The results also show that:In the local government competition, jobs pay play the role of eliminating corruption of local government officials only when it meet the conditions of the participation constraint. Once the local government officials decide to corrupt, the so-called "high-paying Honesty" play a weak role in reducing the corruption of local government officials while it is the the pay difference between high and low positions that plays the real role.
Meanwhile, many other factors will have significant impacts on local government officials' corruption of uncorruption, such as differences in inter-regional growth conditions, differences in the political environment, differences of investment in anti-corruption, differences of fairness and transparency in the administration of justice through such mechanisms as "the effect of throwing the handle after the blade", "demonstration effect", "big dye vat effect", and so on.
Fourthly, the conclusions of the effects of local government competition on the industry selection, employment and income distribution
There are three important phenomena in China's economic development:the first one is over high proportion of capital-intensive industries such as the heavy and chemical industries with the lagging-behind of labor-intensive industries such as services in the economy; the second one is the coexistence of the high growth of economy and low growth of employment; and third one is that the grave injustice in income distribution, the rising proportion of capital income and the declining propption of wage. Why there are so many paradox coexist together? Is there any theory with inner logic cosistence which can be used to explain these three phenomena.
Chapter V of this article constructed two models based on competition among local governments. The first model describes that under the local competition, local governments will embark in the " War of Introducing Businesses & Investments" and the more fiercer of promotion competition among local government officials, the more intense will be the " War of Introducing Businesses & Investments" do.
The second model analyzes under the competition of local government, local government's industry choice would do what impacts on employment and income distribution.The analysis shows that the following three effects will be brought out by the "competition for growth" among local government:
The first one is the over development of capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries with the ignorance of labor-intensive industries. Compared to labor-intensive industries, capital- intensive and technology-intensive industries has stronger effects in growth. Therefore, local governments and government officials are more willing to introduce and support those large scale, capital-intensive or technology-intensive enterprises, while ignoring development of labor-intensive SMEs', which lead to the injustice in finance, policy, market access for a long time in many districts of China. Another important phenomenon emerges at the same time, that is the serious duplication and same structure of industries in different districts. And in addition, those industries which have obvious effect in boosting economic growth are highly same-structured.
The second one is "the growth with low employment or no employment". Since China is of relative scarcity of capital and is abundant of labor, when every district prefers the strategy of developing capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries, the development diviated from the endowment of factors of production will lead to a phenomenon that capital and equipment replace labor and the demand for labor decline, namely, to "growth with non-employment or low employment."
The third one is the declining of allocation according to work and the increasing of distribution according to capital in the initial distribution of national income. It is the preference to the capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries and neglecting of labor-intensive industries that will lead to the increasing demand for capital and technology which brings about the rise of capital and technology price, as well as the declining demand for labor which brings about slowing down the labor price. This will bring about a sustained decline in allocation share of labor.
Fifthly, the impact of local government competition on macroeconomic fluctuations
In the local government competition, local governments and their officials will have an impulse to invest in the pursuit of faster economic growth, which will lead to economic overheating in China. Once it happens, the the central government will take austerity measures and political punishment, which will cause economic contraction. In this way, China's macro-economy fluctuates periodically.
Chapter 6 constructed a econometric model to isolate the various volatile items in GDP composition of items with the HP way, and then attempts to find their impact on the volatile items of GDP growth. We use the data from 1990 to 2004 including the total GDP each year, household consumption, government consumption, gross capital formation, net exports of goods and services, the total amount of credits, as well as data such as price index. The econometric analysis based on pana data shows that the investment fluctuations under the support of local government is the main reason that cause China's macro-economy influctuations.
如何解释中国经济增长之“谜”呢?能不能找到一个内在逻辑一致的视角,既能用以解释中国的经济成就,又能理解中国经济和社会发展中的诸多令人困惑之处?对中国这样的转型中大国所出现的“谜”的阐释不仅可以增加我们对转型和经济增长的知识,也有助于中国坚持业已生成的好的制度、改革阻碍经济和社会发展的坏的制度,还能促进中国经验和中国模式在世界的推广,为世界上其他发展中国家和转型国家探寻经济起飞之路提供有益的借鉴。为此,本文将对中国经济和社会发展中所表现出的几个突出之“谜”进行解释。具体而言,本文的主要研究工作和创新如下：
一、提出了一个基于地方政府竞争的用以解释中国之“谜”的逻辑框架
就已有文献来说,许多经济学家强调了地方政府竞争对于中国经济增长的重要性,如：张军(2005、2007)、周业安(2003、2005)、张五常(2005、2008、2009),陆铭和陈钊等人(2005、2006)、周黎安(2005、2007、2008)、徐现祥(2006)等等；也有许多学者探讨了地方政府竞争所带来的诸多影响,如：地方政府竞争对民营化的影响(张维迎等,1998)、地方政府竞争对FDI流入的影响(庞明礼,2007)、地方政府竞争对基础设施建设的影响(张军等,2007)、地方政府竞争对地方保护主义和市场化进程的影响(周黎安,2007；陆铭和陈钊,2006)等等；还有一些人探讨了地方政府竞争的激励来源,如：周黎安认为中国政治领域中的晋升锦标赛机制是促成地方政府竞争的根本、张五常认为中国的土地分成制度是生成地方政府竞争的主要制度安排......然而,现有文献还未能提出一个内在逻辑一致的逻辑框架,既能分析中国推行改革和开放时所面临的约束、又能指出地方政府竞争之所以形成的激励和约束条件、还能分析地方政府竞争下所导致的中国经济增长的巨大成就和其中出现的诸多困局。为此,本文的第2章构建了一个基于地方政府竞争的逻辑框架,在这个框架中,我回答了上述问题,并认为地方政府竞争是缔造中国之“谜”的最重要的推动力；同时,在这个框架中,我解释了中国地方政府竞争形成的原因,地方政府竞争带来的诸多效应以及知识在中国地方政府竞争和经济增长中所起的作用。
二、分析了形成地方政府竞争所需的必要条件：激励和约束地方政府官员的制度安排
激励很重要,把激励搞对,一国的经济才能起飞和发展。就一国来说,不仅要搞好企业治理,对企业管理者和员工实施有效的激励；同时,鉴于政府在经济发展中的重要性,也要搞好政府治理。而政府不是抽象的政府,是由各级官员组成的政府。地方政府的决策是地方官员做出的,地方政府的整体行为也是官员个体行为“加总”的结果,因此,我们必须深入理解地方官员背后的激励和约束机制是什么,才能深刻地把握中国地方政府竞争的决定因素。
我认为,对中国地方政府官员的激励和约束是多方面的,不是某种单一的因素在起作用,而是多种因素共同作用,促使着这些官员一方面为辖区的经济增长而出力献策、四处奔波,一方面也为了其私利而进行腐败、忽视民生或采取其他可能导致诸如市场分割、倾向城市的公共品提供、低就业的增长等效应出现的行为。
因此,本文的第3章研究了改革开放后激励和约束中国地方政府官员的制度安排,认为主要有以下六种：一是财政分权制度；二是政治上的晋升锦标赛机制；三是事权上的属地化行政逐级发包制；四是中国的党政关系安排；五是中国的混合型地区组织结构；六是中国的关于如何做官的传统文化及对关系网络的重视等非正式制度。同时,本文对这些制度在激励和约束地方政府官员时所起的作用做了较深入的研究。
三、分析了地方政府竞争对地方政府官员的腐败的影响
一般来说,腐败会抑制经济的增长和社会公平主义。然而,为什么中国在腐败程度如此高的情况下,却能保持经济的快速发展呢?如果我们认为地方政府竞争是促成中国之“谜”的最重要的推动力,那么地方政府竞争会对地方政府官员的腐败产生什么样的影响呢?
本文的第4章为此构建了一个模型,试图探讨在中国政治领域中实行的晋升锦标赛对地方政府官员的腐败行为的影响。分析结果表明,晋升锦标赛和地方政府竞争对地方政府官员的腐败行为具有正负两个方面的影响,即,一方面晋升锦标赛和地方政府竞争能促使地方政府官员廉洁从政、努力工作,以便促进辖区的经济增长,从而获得更高的晋升机会；另一方面,晋升锦标赛和地方政府竞争又会促使地方政府官员涉足腐败。分析结果还表明：在地方政府竞争下,职位薪酬只能在满足参与约束条件下起杜绝地方政府官员腐败的作用,而一旦地方政府官员决定进行腐败时,所谓的“高薪养廉”对降低地方政府官员的腐败程度作用甚微,真正起作用的是高低职位间的薪酬差。同时,地区间的增长条件差异、政治环境差异、反腐败的投入差异、司法的公正与透明度差异等因素会通过诸如“破罐子破摔效应”、“示范效应”、“大染缸效应”等机制对地方政府官员是致力于腐败还是致力于清廉产生重要影响。
四、关于地方政府竞争对产业选择、就业和收入分配的影响的结论
中国经济发展中的四个重要现象是：第一、各地方政府为“招商引资”而展开激烈竞争；第二、重化工业等资本密集型产业的比重过高,而服务业等劳动密集型产业的发展远远滞后于经济的发展；第三、经济的高速增长与就业的低速增长并存；第四、收入分配严重不公,资本收入占比不断提高,而工资性收入占比不断下降。为什么会存在看似如此矛盾的现象?有没有一个内在逻辑一致的理论可以同时解释这四种现象呢?
本文的第5章构建了两个基于地方政府竞争的模型。第一个模型说明了地方政府竞争下,地方政府之间会展开“招商引资”大战,而且地方政府官员之间的晋升竞争越激烈,为此而展开的“招商引资”大战也会越激烈。
第二个模型则分析了地方政府竞争下,地方政府的产业选择对就业、收入分配所产生的影响。分析结果表明,在地方政府及其官员“为增长而展开竞争”之下,将产生以下三种效应：
一是资本和技术密集型产业过度发展,劳动力密集型产业被忽视。资本和技术密集型产业相对于劳动力密集型产业来说,具有更强的增长效应,因而,地方政府及官员更愿意引进、扶持那些规模大、资本密集或技术密集型的企业,而忽视劳动力密集型的中小企业的发展,这也就导致了中国许多地区的中小企业在金融上、政策上、市场准入上长期得不到公平待遇。同时,也派生出一个重要现象,就是各地区产业同构和重复建设严重,而且那些增长拉动效果大的产业的同构程度将会很高。
二是导致“低就业或无就业的增长”。在各地区偏好资本和技术密集型产业发展战略时,由于中国是一个资本相对稀缺、而劳动力相对丰裕的国家,这种偏离要素禀赋的发展,就会发生资本和机器替代劳动力,对劳动力的需求不断下降的现象,即出现“无就业或低就业的增长”。
三是导致劳动者工资性收入占比在国民收入的初次分配中不断下降,而资本性收入所占份额会不断提高。由于偏好于资本和技术密集型产业,而忽视劳动力密集型产业,会导致对资本和技术的需求增加,资本和技术的价格上升；对劳动力的需求下降,劳动力价格增长缓慢。这就会带来劳动分配份额在GDP的比重持续下降。
五、关于地方政府竞争对宏观经济波动的影响
在地方政府竞争下,为追求更快的经济增长,各地方政府及其官员就会萌生出投资的冲动,从而导致中国的经济过热；一旦过热,中央政府将采取紧缩措施和政治惩罚,这又会引起经济的紧缩。这样,就会导致中国的宏观经济的周期性波动。
本文的第6章构建了一个计量模型,用HP方法分离出GDP构成中的各波动项,然后寻找各波动项对GDP增长率的波动项的影响大小。我们利用1990年至2004年每年的GDP总量、居民消费、政府消费、资本形成总额、货物和服务净出口、各项信贷总额、以及价格指数等数据,基于面板数据的计量分析表明,在地方政府支出和受地方政府影响的投资波动是引起中国宏观经济波动的主要原因。
In the period of the 30 years of Reform and Opening, China's unique progressive reform has not been met the failure as some western economists expected, on the contrary, it achieved remarkable success in the area of economic, social transoformation. China's economic and comprehensive power has much increased and its global influence increased considerably as well. In the economic achivements, the total GDP increased from 364.5 billion yuan in 1978 to 33.5353 trillion yuan in 2009, with the average annual growth of over 9.80%. Meanwhile, China has also made remarkable achievements in many other fields, such as poverty elimination, education, health care, average life expectancy, research and social security. China's economic and social achievements, which is known as " a growth miracle", are not understood by many people and regarded as a "mystery". The reason is that China's economic growth shows four unprecedented uniques:first of all, China's GDP growth maitained a high rate and sustained in a long period of time. From the growth rate, there has never been one big country which can maitain an annual growth rate of 10% in 30 years on the history. Moreover, it might continue for a longer period in the foreseeable future. It cann't be not a "miracle". Secondly, the mystery of this miracle shows "unconventional" characteristics from point of view of the economic theory:comparing to other countries, China has no advantages in many conditions stressed by the growth theory such as natural resource endowment, physical and human capital accumulation, and technological innovation capability and so on. In spite of that, China is at a comparatively low level in per capita resource endowment and technological innovation. In other words, China's economic miracle should not have happened according to these theoretical predictions. Thirdly, China's economic growth is obtained in the course of its transformation with imperfect system. That is, instead of on the basis of the logic of western mainstream economic theory or following the blueprint described by "Washington Consensus", China's reform is carried under a series of unsatisfying and even distorted system conditions such as not entirely clear poverty rights, not entirely free price, inadequate democratic, incomplete social equality, incomplete opening to the outside and lagged political reform, and has achieved greater accomplishment than the countries of former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which carried out their reform in accordance with the mainstream of Western economic logic and the "Washington Consensus". Fourthly, accompany with the great economic ahcievements, China is in many difficulties:the prevalence of local protectionism, the low efficiency of state-owned enterprises, discrimination to the private economy, grave injustice of income distribution, the extremely high external dependence, the imperfection of financial system and the prevalence of corruption.... This even more highlights the meaning of China's economic growth as a miracle. Thus, since the late 1990s, many economists and scholars in the world who studies China regarded China's extraordinary economic performance as a "myth" --- that is, China's "Mystery" (such as:Zhang Weiying,1998; Peter Nolan (Nolan),1993; J. Buchanan, and Wang Dingding,1998).
How to explain the "mystery" of China's economic growth? Is it possible to find a perspective with internal logic consistency which can be used to explain both China's economic success and the confusion during the economic and social development? The explaination of the "mystery" emerged in the big countries in transition like China contributes to increasing our knowledge of transition and economic growth. It is also helpful for China to adhere to the good system that has generated already, to improve the drawbacks of the existing system, to reform the bad systems impedeing economic and social development. Besides, it can promote China's experience and the Chinese model in the world, which is helpful for other developing countries to explore the road of economic take-off. Therefore, this paper will focus on explaining a few prominent "mysteries" shown in China's economic and social development. Specifically, this paper's main research work and innovations are as follows:
First, a logical framework based on the competition among local government to explaining the China "mystery".
In the existing literature, many economists emphasized the importance of the competition among local governments for China's economic growth, for example:Zhang Jun(2005,2007), Zhou Ye'an (2003,2005), Steven Cheung (2005,2008,2009), Lu Ming and Chen Zhao et al(2005,2006), Zhou Li'an(2005,2007,2008), Xu Xianxiang (2006), etc.; there are also many scholars explored the effects of local governments competition, such as:the effects on privatization (Zhanget al,1998), on FDI inflow (Pang Mingli,2007), on infrastructure construction (Zhang Jun, et al,2007), and on the local protectionism and market-oriented process (Zhou Nathan,2007; Lu Ming and Chen Zhao,2006), and so on; furthermore, there are some scholar discussed the incentive sources of the competition among local governments, for example:Zhou Li'an believes that the promotion tournament mechanism in political area is the root of local government competition, Steven Chueng thinks that China's share system of land is the main institutional arrangement that generates the local government competition...However, there isn't any framework with internal logic consistency in the existing literature, which can be used to analyze the constrains of China's Reform and opening up, point out the incentives and constrains that cause the local government competition, and analyze China's great achievements and difficulties of economic growth under the competition among local governments as well. So in Chapter 2, a logical framwork is constructed based on local government competition. In this framwork, the above questions are answered and the competition among local government is consisdered to be the most important driving force to create China's "mystery". Meanwhile, the reasons and effects of China's local government competition are also explained in this framework, as well as the role of knowledge played in the local government competition and economic growth in China.
Secondly, the necessary conditions for the local government competition:the institutional arrangements that encourage and bind local government officials.
Incentive is very important. It is only to incent properly that would the economy of one country take off and develop. For one country, governance is necessary not only for enterprises which means effective incentive to the managers and employees, but also for government given the importance of government in the economic development. By means of government, I mean the one composed by officials from all levels, not the abstract one. The decisions of local government are made by officials. The overall behavior of local government is "an aggregation" of the officials'individual behavior. So we must have a deep understanding of the incentive and restraint mechanisms on local officials in order to find out the determinant of local government competiton.
This paper proposed that the incentive and restraint to the local officials are affected not by a single factor, but by various of factors working together, which will encourage these officials to contribute to the economic growth and working hard back and forth for their jurisdiction, and on the other hand, it will also promote corruption, neglection of citizens'livelihood and other behaviors for private interests which might lead to the consequences of market segmentation, bias public goods providing and low growth of employment, etc.
It is studied in Chapter 3 that the institutional arrangements which encourage and bind China's local officials. There are six kinds of institutional arrangements as the following: the first one is fiscal decentralization system; the second one is the promotion tournament mechanism in political area; the third one is the level-by-level localization administrative contracting system of of routine powers; the fourth one is relationships of China's Party and Government; the fifth one is the hybrid regional organization structure of China; the sixth one is the informal systems of how to be an official in China's traditional culture and of the importance attached to the network of relationships. At the same time, this paper makes comparatively deep research on the role of these systems in incentiving and constrainting the local government officials.
Thirdly, the impact on the corruptions of local government officials by the local government competition
Generally speaking, corruption will inhibit economic growth and social equity doctrine. However, why could China be able to maintain rapid economic development with corruption of such a high level? If we think that competition among local governments be the most important driving force to promote China's "mystery", what impacts would the local competition impose on the corruptions of local government officials then?
Chapter 4 builds a model for the attempt to explore the impact of the promotion tournament in China's political area on the corruption of local government officials. The results show that there are both positive and negative effects of promotion tournaments and local government competition on the corruptions of local government officials, that is, on one hand, local government officials will be encouraged to be uncorrupted in his post and to work hard in promoting the economic growth of his jurisdiction in order to obtain a promotion opportunities; on the other hand, the local government officials will be driven to be involved in corruption. The results also show that:In the local government competition, jobs pay play the role of eliminating corruption of local government officials only when it meet the conditions of the participation constraint. Once the local government officials decide to corrupt, the so-called "high-paying Honesty" play a weak role in reducing the corruption of local government officials while it is the the pay difference between high and low positions that plays the real role.
Meanwhile, many other factors will have significant impacts on local government officials' corruption of uncorruption, such as differences in inter-regional growth conditions, differences in the political environment, differences of investment in anti-corruption, differences of fairness and transparency in the administration of justice through such mechanisms as "the effect of throwing the handle after the blade", "demonstration effect", "big dye vat effect", and so on.
Fourthly, the conclusions of the effects of local government competition on the industry selection, employment and income distribution
There are three important phenomena in China's economic development:the first one is over high proportion of capital-intensive industries such as the heavy and chemical industries with the lagging-behind of labor-intensive industries such as services in the economy; the second one is the coexistence of the high growth of economy and low growth of employment; and third one is that the grave injustice in income distribution, the rising proportion of capital income and the declining propption of wage. Why there are so many paradox coexist together? Is there any theory with inner logic cosistence which can be used to explain these three phenomena.
Chapter V of this article constructed two models based on competition among local governments. The first model describes that under the local competition, local governments will embark in the " War of Introducing Businesses & Investments" and the more fiercer of promotion competition among local government officials, the more intense will be the " War of Introducing Businesses & Investments" do.
The second model analyzes under the competition of local government, local government's industry choice would do what impacts on employment and income distribution.The analysis shows that the following three effects will be brought out by the "competition for growth" among local government:
The first one is the over development of capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries with the ignorance of labor-intensive industries. Compared to labor-intensive industries, capital- intensive and technology-intensive industries has stronger effects in growth. Therefore, local governments and government officials are more willing to introduce and support those large scale, capital-intensive or technology-intensive enterprises, while ignoring development of labor-intensive SMEs', which lead to the injustice in finance, policy, market access for a long time in many districts of China. Another important phenomenon emerges at the same time, that is the serious duplication and same structure of industries in different districts. And in addition, those industries which have obvious effect in boosting economic growth are highly same-structured.
The second one is "the growth with low employment or no employment". Since China is of relative scarcity of capital and is abundant of labor, when every district prefers the strategy of developing capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries, the development diviated from the endowment of factors of production will lead to a phenomenon that capital and equipment replace labor and the demand for labor decline, namely, to "growth with non-employment or low employment."
The third one is the declining of allocation according to work and the increasing of distribution according to capital in the initial distribution of national income. It is the preference to the capital-intensive and technology-intensive industries and neglecting of labor-intensive industries that will lead to the increasing demand for capital and technology which brings about the rise of capital and technology price, as well as the declining demand for labor which brings about slowing down the labor price. This will bring about a sustained decline in allocation share of labor.
Fifthly, the impact of local government competition on macroeconomic fluctuations
In the local government competition, local governments and their officials will have an impulse to invest in the pursuit of faster economic growth, which will lead to economic overheating in China. Once it happens, the the central government will take austerity measures and political punishment, which will cause economic contraction. In this way, China's macro-economy fluctuates periodically.
Chapter 6 constructed a econometric model to isolate the various volatile items in GDP composition of items with the HP way, and then attempts to find their impact on the volatile items of GDP growth. We use the data from 1990 to 2004 including the total GDP each year, household consumption, government consumption, gross capital formation, net exports of goods and services, the total amount of credits, as well as data such as price index. The econometric analysis based on pana data shows that the investment fluctuations under the support of local government is the main reason that cause China's macro-economy influctuations.
引文
①周黎安,转型中的地方政府官员激励与治理,格致出版社,2008,p236
①奥尔森对追求狭隘利益和共容利益对社会福利和国家兴衰的影响有着精彩的论述,见奥尔森的《国家的兴衰探源》(1982)、《权力与繁荣》(2000)等书。
②地方政府为追求GDP增长,采取了许多损害民众利益的做法并未对此进行充分补偿,如城市改造和房地产开发中,对原居民房的强行拆迁和不充分补偿,对农地的占用和不充分补偿……这些行为都导致了民众对政府行为的不满,出现了许多上访、冲突事件。
③唐志军(2009)研究了地方政府竞争对中国的产业选择、就业和收入分配的影响。
*本章以“试论激励和约束地方政府官员的制度安排”为题已发表于《首都师范大学学报》(cssci,2010.2)
①王永钦、张宴和陆铭等人所著的《中国的大国发展之道---来自经济学的声音》(2006)一书中对激励在一国尤其是中国这样的大国中所起的作用有着很好的论述。
①关于晋升如何形成资源配置和激励,姜树林、颜燕、阮杨(2002)作了一个比较详尽的文献综述。
①徐现祥等(2007)也以类似的函数来表达某地GDP的增长函数。
①Cai Hongbin和Daniel Treisman(2005)年的一篇文章同样得出了类似的结论。
①在张维迎(1998)等人看来,地方政府竞争会导致民营化,因为民营化能促进经济的更快增长。
①周黎安和陶婧(2009)指出,地方政府规模的大小与地方政府官员的腐败是成正比的,地方政府规模越大,地方政府官员腐败的可能性就越高。
① Okun, Arthur M.1962. Potential GNP:Its Measurement and Significance. In Proceedings of the Business and Economics Statistics Section, 人 merican Statistical Association,98-103
① K. J. Arrow等人,H. B. Chenery, B. S. Minhas, and R. M. Solow(1961),张军(2002),徐现祥(2009)等人的研究表明,资本密集型产业具有更高的增长效应。
①刘金全,投资波动性与经济周期之间的关联性分析,中国软科学,2003年第4期
②郭庆旺,中国经济波动的解释：投资冲击与全要素生产率冲击,管理世界,2004/07
①刘士宁,改革以来中国经济周期波动的影响因素研究,华中科技大学博士论文,2007,第69-83页
②刘士宁,改革以来中国经济周期波动的影响因素研究,华中科技大学博士论文,2007,第69-83页
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①奥尔森对追求狭隘利益和共容利益对社会福利和国家兴衰的影响有着精彩的论述,见奥尔森的《国家的兴衰探源》(1982)、《权力与繁荣》(2000)等书。
②地方政府为追求GDP增长,采取了许多损害民众利益的做法并未对此进行充分补偿,如城市改造和房地产开发中,对原居民房的强行拆迁和不充分补偿,对农地的占用和不充分补偿……这些行为都导致了民众对政府行为的不满,出现了许多上访、冲突事件。
③唐志军(2009)研究了地方政府竞争对中国的产业选择、就业和收入分配的影响。
*本章以“试论激励和约束地方政府官员的制度安排”为题已发表于《首都师范大学学报》(cssci,2010.2)
①王永钦、张宴和陆铭等人所著的《中国的大国发展之道---来自经济学的声音》(2006)一书中对激励在一国尤其是中国这样的大国中所起的作用有着很好的论述。
①关于晋升如何形成资源配置和激励,姜树林、颜燕、阮杨(2002)作了一个比较详尽的文献综述。
①徐现祥等(2007)也以类似的函数来表达某地GDP的增长函数。
①Cai Hongbin和Daniel Treisman(2005)年的一篇文章同样得出了类似的结论。
①在张维迎(1998)等人看来,地方政府竞争会导致民营化,因为民营化能促进经济的更快增长。
①周黎安和陶婧(2009)指出,地方政府规模的大小与地方政府官员的腐败是成正比的,地方政府规模越大,地方政府官员腐败的可能性就越高。
① Okun, Arthur M.1962. Potential GNP:Its Measurement and Significance. In Proceedings of the Business and Economics Statistics Section, 人 merican Statistical Association,98-103
① K. J. Arrow等人,H. B. Chenery, B. S. Minhas, and R. M. Solow(1961),张军(2002),徐现祥(2009)等人的研究表明,资本密集型产业具有更高的增长效应。
①刘金全,投资波动性与经济周期之间的关联性分析,中国软科学,2003年第4期
②郭庆旺,中国经济波动的解释：投资冲击与全要素生产率冲击,管理世界,2004/07
①刘士宁,改革以来中国经济周期波动的影响因素研究,华中科技大学博士论文,2007,第69-83页
②刘士宁,改革以来中国经济周期波动的影响因素研究,华中科技大学博士论文,2007,第69-83页
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