利益集团与中国药品安全规制制度变迁
|
摘要
近年来,药品安全事故时有发生,药品安全规制成为社会大众和学术界非常关心的问题。已有的媒体报道和学术研究大多只关注药品安全事故本身、药检高官腐败以及监管体制问题,鲜有跳出药品安全监管行为本身,从经济发展背景和具体的制度着手,深入分析制度对药品安全规制的相关利益者行为的影响。本文回顾了中国药品安全规制的历史沿革和机构重组,试图用经济学的基础理论来解释中国药品安全规制制度演变逻辑,目的是为了增进人们对药品安全规制政策结果、政策效果的理解,并为当前中国药品安全规制出现的问题提供理论见解。
本文采用新制度经济学方法来研究中国药品安全规制制度问题。具体而言,本文采用利益集团规制理论最前沿的研究成果,即利益集团政治委托——代理理论来解释药品安全规制改革。在本文的分析框架中,制药企业和消费者集团是两个具有冲突利益的委托人,政治家则是代理人。制药企业和消费者集团都试图通过相应途径给政治家施压,从而影响制度安排结果。
本文的分析框架强调信息在利益集团政治压力函数中所起的重要作用。总体来看,消费者成员数量庞大,不易于组织,并且个人参与政治活动的成本也非常高昂,收益却微乎其微,因此消费者集团的成员通常没有参与政治活动的积极性,而是选择搭便车,最终导致其对政策结果的影响微乎其微。反之,制药企业集团由于其成员数量少,搭便车问题易于解决,集团的凝聚力强,容易形成集体行动,因此它们在集团政治活动方面更具有优势。经济理论通常也认为政府规制往往受到特殊利益集团的控制。然而,这一政治结果趋势却因媒体市场的变化正在悄悄的发生改变。因为,媒体提供的信息交流和舆论监督平台,大大降低了消费者参与政治活动的成本。因此,媒体参与制度变革,改变了利益集团对制度结果的相对影响力,克服了抵制规制结构改变的政治和经济力量。同时,媒体通过改善发布信息、监督、评估政策效果的方法,降低了新制度的制度交易成本,从而支持新制度的采用和实施。
本文分析表明,高昂的信息成本使得消费者对投票采取懈怠行为,从而在影响药品安全规制方面,对规制决策者没有形成足够的压力,致使很长一段时间里,中国药品安全规制制度都倾向于保护制药企业的发展,而没有对消费者权益给与应有的关注。但如果成本能被转移到第三者,消费者就会倾向于获取更多选举信息,积极参与投票,从而给规制决策者施加更多压力,最终使得制度的安排有利于他们。媒体正是通过向广大公众提供信息的作用而降低了消费者的投票成本。并且,媒体还通过监督政府官员的不端行为,减少了消费者的监督成本。因此,媒体参与药品安全规制制度安排,使得消费者在影响药品安全规制制度安排方面具有相对成本优势,从而改变了消费者集团与制药企业集团在影响药品安全规制方面的相对优势,最终促使药品安全规制朝着有利于消费者的方向发展。
In recent years, drug safety incidents have occurred sometimes, and drug safety regulation becomes the issue that the public and the academic community concern about very much. Media coverage and academic studies have mostly focused on drug safety incidents themselves, corruption of officials in the regulatory agency and regulatory system issues, rarely out of drug safety supervision act itself, from an economic development background and specific institution to analyze that institution impact on the stakeholders'behaviors of drug safety regulation. This paper reviews history and restructuring of the drug safety regulation in China, trying to use economic basic theory to explain the evolutional logic of the Chinese drug safety regulation institution, which purpose is to make people understand the policy outcomes, the effectiveness of the drug safety regulation and provide a theoretical insight for problems that arise in current drug safety regulation.
This paper employs new institutional economics approach to study on Chinese drug safety regulation institution. In detail, this paper uses frontline research results of interest group regulation theory, that is, interest group politics principal-agent theory to explain the reform of drug safety regulation. In this analytical framework, the pharmaceutical enterprise and consumer's groups are two principals with conflicting interests, and politicians are agents. Pharmaceutical enterprise and consumer groups are trying to put pressure on politicians through the corresponding channels, thus affecting the result of institutional arrangements.
Analytical framework of this article stresses that the information plays an important role in the interest group political pressure function. Overall, the large number of consumers is not easy to organize and the cost of individual participation in political activities is also very high, but their benefits are negligible, so the members of consumer groups usually do not participate in political activities with enthusiasm, and chose free-rider, eventually leading to its minimal impact on policy outcome. On the contrary, the pharmaceutical enterprise group, because of their small number, free-rider problem is easy to solve, group cohesion is very strong, and easy to form a collective action, so they are more advantageous in political activities. Economic theory generally believes that government regulation is often controlled by special interest groups. However, this political results trend is changing quietly because the media market changes. For the media greatly reduce the cost of consumers participating in political activities by providing a platform for exchange of information and supervision by public opinion. Therefore, the media participates in institutional reform, changing the relative power of influence that interest groups impact on institutional outcome, overcoming political and economic power that resists to reform of regulatory structure. Meanwhile, the media reduce institutional transaction costs of the new institution by improving methods of the information released, monitoring, evaluation the effectiveness of policies, thus supporting the adoption and implementation of the new instituion.
This analysis shows that the high information cost makes consumers take slack behavior in voting, and the do not put enough pressure on regulatory decision-makers in affecting drug safety regulation, a very long time, resulting in Chinese drug safety regulation institution have tended to protect the development of the pharmaceutical enterprises, but do not give attention to the interests of consumers that it should. However, if the cost can be transferred to a third party, consumers will tend to get more election information, actively participate in voting, and put more pressure on the regulatory decision-makers, finally, institution arrangement is in their favor. The media lower the cost of consumers'voting by providing information to the general public. And the media reduce the monitoring costs to consumers by overseeing misconduct of government officials. Therefore, the media involved in institutional arrangement of the drug safety regulation, making consumers has a comparative cost advantage in influencing the institutional arrangements of drug safety regulation, thus changing the comparative advantage between consumer group and pharmaceutical enterprise group in influencing drug safety regulation, leading to drug safety regulation to develop in favor of consumer direction.
本文采用新制度经济学方法来研究中国药品安全规制制度问题。具体而言,本文采用利益集团规制理论最前沿的研究成果,即利益集团政治委托——代理理论来解释药品安全规制改革。在本文的分析框架中,制药企业和消费者集团是两个具有冲突利益的委托人,政治家则是代理人。制药企业和消费者集团都试图通过相应途径给政治家施压,从而影响制度安排结果。
本文的分析框架强调信息在利益集团政治压力函数中所起的重要作用。总体来看,消费者成员数量庞大,不易于组织,并且个人参与政治活动的成本也非常高昂,收益却微乎其微,因此消费者集团的成员通常没有参与政治活动的积极性,而是选择搭便车,最终导致其对政策结果的影响微乎其微。反之,制药企业集团由于其成员数量少,搭便车问题易于解决,集团的凝聚力强,容易形成集体行动,因此它们在集团政治活动方面更具有优势。经济理论通常也认为政府规制往往受到特殊利益集团的控制。然而,这一政治结果趋势却因媒体市场的变化正在悄悄的发生改变。因为,媒体提供的信息交流和舆论监督平台,大大降低了消费者参与政治活动的成本。因此,媒体参与制度变革,改变了利益集团对制度结果的相对影响力,克服了抵制规制结构改变的政治和经济力量。同时,媒体通过改善发布信息、监督、评估政策效果的方法,降低了新制度的制度交易成本,从而支持新制度的采用和实施。
本文分析表明,高昂的信息成本使得消费者对投票采取懈怠行为,从而在影响药品安全规制方面,对规制决策者没有形成足够的压力,致使很长一段时间里,中国药品安全规制制度都倾向于保护制药企业的发展,而没有对消费者权益给与应有的关注。但如果成本能被转移到第三者,消费者就会倾向于获取更多选举信息,积极参与投票,从而给规制决策者施加更多压力,最终使得制度的安排有利于他们。媒体正是通过向广大公众提供信息的作用而降低了消费者的投票成本。并且,媒体还通过监督政府官员的不端行为,减少了消费者的监督成本。因此,媒体参与药品安全规制制度安排,使得消费者在影响药品安全规制制度安排方面具有相对成本优势,从而改变了消费者集团与制药企业集团在影响药品安全规制方面的相对优势,最终促使药品安全规制朝着有利于消费者的方向发展。
In recent years, drug safety incidents have occurred sometimes, and drug safety regulation becomes the issue that the public and the academic community concern about very much. Media coverage and academic studies have mostly focused on drug safety incidents themselves, corruption of officials in the regulatory agency and regulatory system issues, rarely out of drug safety supervision act itself, from an economic development background and specific institution to analyze that institution impact on the stakeholders'behaviors of drug safety regulation. This paper reviews history and restructuring of the drug safety regulation in China, trying to use economic basic theory to explain the evolutional logic of the Chinese drug safety regulation institution, which purpose is to make people understand the policy outcomes, the effectiveness of the drug safety regulation and provide a theoretical insight for problems that arise in current drug safety regulation.
This paper employs new institutional economics approach to study on Chinese drug safety regulation institution. In detail, this paper uses frontline research results of interest group regulation theory, that is, interest group politics principal-agent theory to explain the reform of drug safety regulation. In this analytical framework, the pharmaceutical enterprise and consumer's groups are two principals with conflicting interests, and politicians are agents. Pharmaceutical enterprise and consumer groups are trying to put pressure on politicians through the corresponding channels, thus affecting the result of institutional arrangements.
Analytical framework of this article stresses that the information plays an important role in the interest group political pressure function. Overall, the large number of consumers is not easy to organize and the cost of individual participation in political activities is also very high, but their benefits are negligible, so the members of consumer groups usually do not participate in political activities with enthusiasm, and chose free-rider, eventually leading to its minimal impact on policy outcome. On the contrary, the pharmaceutical enterprise group, because of their small number, free-rider problem is easy to solve, group cohesion is very strong, and easy to form a collective action, so they are more advantageous in political activities. Economic theory generally believes that government regulation is often controlled by special interest groups. However, this political results trend is changing quietly because the media market changes. For the media greatly reduce the cost of consumers participating in political activities by providing a platform for exchange of information and supervision by public opinion. Therefore, the media participates in institutional reform, changing the relative power of influence that interest groups impact on institutional outcome, overcoming political and economic power that resists to reform of regulatory structure. Meanwhile, the media reduce institutional transaction costs of the new institution by improving methods of the information released, monitoring, evaluation the effectiveness of policies, thus supporting the adoption and implementation of the new instituion.
This analysis shows that the high information cost makes consumers take slack behavior in voting, and the do not put enough pressure on regulatory decision-makers in affecting drug safety regulation, a very long time, resulting in Chinese drug safety regulation institution have tended to protect the development of the pharmaceutical enterprises, but do not give attention to the interests of consumers that it should. However, if the cost can be transferred to a third party, consumers will tend to get more election information, actively participate in voting, and put more pressure on the regulatory decision-makers, finally, institution arrangement is in their favor. The media lower the cost of consumers'voting by providing information to the general public. And the media reduce the monitoring costs to consumers by overseeing misconduct of government officials. Therefore, the media involved in institutional arrangement of the drug safety regulation, making consumers has a comparative cost advantage in influencing the institutional arrangements of drug safety regulation, thus changing the comparative advantage between consumer group and pharmaceutical enterprise group in influencing drug safety regulation, leading to drug safety regulation to develop in favor of consumer direction.
引文
① North, D.C.,1990, "Instituions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance," Cambirdge: Cambridge University Press, pp.59.
①宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”,《中国改革》,2008(04)。
①康小平,“我国药品监督管理体制完善研究”,硕士学位论文,2005.
②阮秀芳,“完善我国药品监管的制度建设研究”,硕士学位论文,2008。
③王迎春,“中国现行药品监管体制下的药品安全问题研究”,硕士学位论文,2008。
④余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析(下)”,《管理世界》,1997(06)。
⑤ Frances H. Miller,2007, "Adverse Drug Reactions, Medical Accidents, and Patent Safety", http://ssrn.com.
① Mark McClellan,2007, "Fundamental Improvements in Drug Safety for the 21st Century:Time for Systematic, Electronic Infrastructure", www.aei-brookings.org.
② Ariel Katz,2007, "Pharmaceutical Lemons:Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry", http://ssrn.com.
③ Judyth Pendell,2003, " The Adverse Side Effects of Pharmaceutical Litigation ", www.aei-brookings.org.
④ Ernst R.Berndt, Adrian H.B.Gottschalk, Tomas Philipson and Matthew W.Strobeck,2004, "Assessing the Impacts of the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts (PDUFA) on the FDA Approval Process", www.aei-brooking.org.
⑤ John A. Vernon, Joseph H.Golec, Randall Lutter and Clark Nardinelli,2006, "FDANew Drug Approval Times, Prescription Drug User Fees, and R & D Spending", www.aei-brookings.org.
⑥ Vincenzo Atella、Jay Bhattacharya andLorenzo Carbonari,2008, "Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation:Evidence From US and Italy", http://ssrn.com.
①张雅静,“从‘齐二药’到‘欣弗’社会学视角下的药品安全问题”[J],《齐鲁药事》,2007(02)。
②温超英、祖燕,“从欣弗事件看药品监管违规的原因和对策”[J],《医药管理》,2007(09)。
③沈凯、李从东,“供应链视角下的中国药品安全问题研究”[J],《北京理工大学学报》,2008(06)。
④余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析”[J],《管理世界》,1997(05、06)。
⑤宋华琳,“药品不良反应与政府监管制度改革——从安徽欣弗事件引发的思考”[J],《法学》,2006(09)。
⑥宋华琳,“美国药品监管的肇始”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(01)。
⑦宋华琳,“美国药品加速审评程序研究”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(10)。
⑧宋华琳,“药品信息披露与侵权责任”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(08)。
①宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”[J],《中国改革》,2008(04)。
②曹阳、徐丽华,“中国药品安全监管制度变迁的路径选择[J]”,《南京社会科学》,2009(01)。
①王亚华,《水权解释》,上海人民出版社,2005,15。
② Stigler, G.J.,1971, "The Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics& Management Science,2(1), pp.3-21.
③ Peltzman, S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics,19(2), pp.211-241.
④ Becker, G.S.,1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(3), pp.371-400.
⑤ Becker, G.S.,1985, "Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs", Journal of Public Economics,28(3), pp.329-347.
⑥ Spiller,p.,1990,"Politicians, Interest Group, and Regulators:A Multi-principals Agency Theory of Regulation"(or "Let Them be Bribed"), Journal of Law and Economics 33, pp.65-101.
① Laffont, J. and Tirole, J.,1991, " The Politics of Government Decision-making:A Theoryof Regulatory Capture", Quarterly Journal of Economica,106 (4) pp.1089-1127.
② Laffont, J-J. and Tirole, J.,1993, "ATheory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation", Cambridge:MIT Press.
① George A. Akerlof,1970, "The Market for'Lemons'——Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanism",84 Q.J. Econ, pp.488.
② Ariel Katz,2007, "Pharmaceutical Lemons:Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry",15, http://ssrn.com.
③由于信息缺乏导致消费者无知。
① Vincenzo Atella, Jay Bhattacharya and Lorenzo Carbonari,2008, "Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation Evidence from US and Italy", http://ssrn.com.
② Vincenzo Atella, Jay Bhattacharya and Lorenzo Carbonari,2008, "Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation Evidence from US and Italy", http://ssrn.com.
①新药研制的成本是巨大的,通常政府除了在政策上给与大量支持,还投入了大量资金,因此,新药产品的价格不能根据研发成本来确定,而应该把政府的补偿剔出,否则消费者为一种药品需要付两次款。
② Peltzman, S., 1973, "An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation:The 1962 Drug Amendments", Journal of Political Economy,81(5), pp.1049-1091.
①[美]加里·S.贝克尔,《人类行为的经济学分析》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008,63。
① Kip Viscusi,2006, "Regulation of Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks", http://ssrn.com.
② Manning, R.L.,1994, "Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines", Journal of Law and Economics,37(1), pp.247-275.
③ Viscusi, W.K and M.J. Moore,1993, "Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation", Journal of Political Economy,101, pp.161-184.
④[美]加里·S.贝克尔,《人类行为的经济学分析》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008,88。
①[美]加里·S.贝克尔,《人类行为的经济学分析》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008,63。
①目前中国医生的薪酬制度与其业绩挂钩,因而,药品企业就陷入了这样一种尴尬：价格越高的品种,医院越欢迎；真正疗效好、价格低、消费者能够承受的药品品种,即便中标也难以实现大批量销售。
② Patrick W.Schmitz,2000, "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation", International Review of Law and Economic, Vol.20(3).
① North, D.,1994, "Economic Performance through Time", American Economic Review, vol 84, pp. 360-361.
②阿维纳什·K·迪克希特,《经济政策的制定：交易成本政治学的视角》[M],中译本,北京：中国人们大学出版社,2002,30。
③阿维纳什·K·迪克希特,《经济政策的制定：交易成本政治学的视角》,[M],中译本,北京：中国人们大学出版社,2002,8。
①[法]让-雅克·拉丰、让·梯若尔,《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,406。
① Bartley J. Madden, "More Choice Better Health", http://www.wiapp.org/article/default.asp?id=630.
②满瑟尔·奥尔森《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006,167。
① Milton Mueller,2004, Reinventing Media Activism:Public Interest Advocacy in the Making of U.S. Communication-Information Policy,1960-2002, www.digital-convergence.org.
② Knight, J,1992, Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2.
③T·W·舒尔茨,《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,253。
④V·W·拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,329。
⑤[美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯,《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社2008,3。
①[美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯,《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社2008,4。
②[美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯,《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社2008,12。
①L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺斯,《制度变迁理论：概念与原因》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,266。
②Eisenstadt, ShmuelN.,1965, Essays on Comparative Institutions, New York:John Wiley & Sons.
③T·W·舒尔茨,《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,251。
④L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺斯,《制度变迁理论：概念与原因》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》上海：上海人民出版社,1990,277。
①L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺斯,《制度创新的理论：描述、类推与说明》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》上海：上海人民出版社,1990,296。
②V·W·拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,333。
③林毅夫,《关于制度变迁的经济理论：诱致性变迁与强制性变迁》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》上海：上海人民出版社,1990,384。
①[美]丹尼尔·W.布洛姆利,《经济利益与经济制度——公共政策的理论基础》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006,53。
①余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析(上)”,《管理世界》,1997(05)。
①宋华琳,“政府规制改革的成因与动力——以晚近中国药品安全规制为中心的观察”,《管理世界》,2008(08)。
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊,《联邦党人文集》[M],中译本,北京：商务印书馆,1980。
②David B. Truman,1951, " The Government process ", Alfreda. Knopf, Inc.1 sted.
③[英]戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺,《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》[M],中译本,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2002。
④[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1995,141。
①张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进”,《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
② Arthur Bentley,1908, "The Process of Government", Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
③张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进”,《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
④ David B. Truman,1951, "The Government process",Alfreda. Knopf, Inc.1 sted.
Bernstein, M. H.,1955, "Regulation Business by Independent Commission", Princeton:Princeton University.
①Posner, R. A.,1974, "Theories of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science,5 (2), pp.335-358。
②于立、肖兴志,“规制理论发展综述”,《财经问题研究》,2000(01)。
③ Stigler, G.,1971, "Theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.2, pp.3-21.
④张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进”,《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
⑤ Olson, Mancur.1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
⑥ Stigler, G.,1971, "Theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.2, pp.3.
① Peltzman, S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), pp.211-241.
② Becker, G. S,1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence ", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(August), pp.371-400.
③ Becker, G. S,1985, "Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs ", Journal of Public Economics,28 (3):329-347.
④张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进”,《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
⑤ Becker, G. S,1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(August), pp.396.
① Spiller,p.,1990,"Politicians, Interest Group, and Regulators:A Multi-principals Agency Theory of Regulation"(or "Let Them be Bribed"), Journal of Law and Economics 33,pp.65-101.
② Laffont, J. and Tirole, J.,1991, " The Politics of Government Decision-making:A Theory of Regulatory Capture", Quarterly Journal of Economics,106 (4) pp.1089-1127.
③ Laffont, J-J. and Tirole, J.,1993, "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation", Cambridge:MIT Press.
④ McCubbins, Mathew D,,1985,"The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure", American Journal of Political Science,29(November), pp.726.
① North,D.,1990. "Institution, institutional change and economic performance", Cambridge Uni versity Press.
② North,D., and Thomas,R.P.,1973, "The rise of western world:Anew economic history", Cambridge University Press.
③ Sjostrand, S.-E.,1995, "Toward a Theory of Institutional Change", In J. Groenewegen, C. Pitelis.
④ Holm, P.,1995, "The Dynamics of Institutionalization:Transformation Processes in Norwegian Fisheries", Administrative Science Quarterly,40, pp.398-422.
⑤ Greenwood, R., and Hinings, C. R.,1996, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change:Bringing together the Old and the New Institutionalism ", The Academy of Management Review,21(4), pp.1022-1054.
⑥ Seo, M.-G., and Creed, W. E. D.,2002,"Institutional Contradictions, Praxis and Institutional Change: A Dialectical Perspective ", Academy of Management Review,27(2), pp.222-247.
⑦ Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner,2003, "Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Institutional Change:The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments", William Davidson Institute Working Paper 589.
⑧胡汝银,“中国改革的政治经济学”,《经济发展研究》,1992(04)。
①樊纲,《渐进之路：对经济改革的经济学分析》(M),北京：中国社会科学出版社,1993,94-98。
②盛洪,“关于中国市场化改革的过渡过程的研究”[J],经济研究1996(01)。
③张超、孙健,“利益集团理论与国有企业制度变迁”[J],《财经问题研究》,2005(12)。
①林毅夫,《关于制度变迁的经济学理论：诱致性制度变迁与强制性制度变迁》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,392。
①[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1995,29。
①[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1995,37。
②[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1999,233.
①[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1999,269.
① Moe,Terry M.,1984, "The New Economic of Organization", American Journal of Political Science, 28 (November):756-757.
① Cecilia Testa,2003, "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures:is One Chamber Better than Two?", DEDPS,41 (November).
Alexan der Dyck, David Moss and Luigi Zingales,2008, "Media versus Special Interest" Http://ssrn. com.
① Becker,G. S., 1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(August), pp.371-400.
② Roger G.No11, 1999, "The Economics and Politics of the Slowdown in Regulatory Reform", www.aei.org.
①[美]埃里克·弗鲁博顿、[德]鲁道夫·瑞切特,《新制度经济学：一个交易费用分析范式》,中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006,191。
②Hal Varian,《用代理人监督代理人》,载自艾瑞克·G·菲吕博顿等,《新制度经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海财经大学出版社,371。
①L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺思, 《制度变迁的理论：概念与原因》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,274.
② Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner,2003, "Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Change in Emergent Institutions:The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments", Http://ssrn.com.
① Libecap, G.D.,1989, "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Right", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145, pp.6-34.
② Dale B. Thompson,1998, " The Institutional-Transaction-Cost Framework for Public Policy Analysis", Http://ssrn.com.
① Magali Delmas,2003, "Firms'Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution:A Transaction Cost Approach", Http://ssrn.com.
② Challen, Ray,2000, "Instutions, Transaction Cost and Environmental Policy:Institutional Reform for Water Resource", Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., pp.52-53.
① Kaplow, Louis,1974, "The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are Undesirable", Intl. Rev. of Law and Economics12, pp.3-11.
② Krueger, A.O., "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society". American Economic Review, 64, pp.291-303.
③ Posner, R.A.,1975, "The Social Cost of Monopoly & Regulation", Jouranl. Policy & Econmics 83, pp.807-27.
① Libecap, G.D,1989, "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Right", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145, pp.6-34.
①刘彦昌,“既得利益集团的内涵解析”[J],《岭南学刊》,2004(04)。
②邵道生,“既得利益集团与中国的腐败问题”[J],《廉政大视野》,2003(11)。
③刘彦昌,“既得利益集团的内涵解析”[J],《岭南学刊》,2004(04)。
① Wolfgang Mayer and Alex Mourmouras, 2002, " Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality", Http://ssrn.com.
①[美]安东尼·唐斯,《官僚制内幕》[M],中译本,中国人民大学出版社,2006,209-210。
① Macneil, I.R.,1974, "The Many Futures of Contracts", Southern California Law Review 47, pp.753.
② Hadfield, G.K.,1990, "Problematic Relations:Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts", Stanford Law Review 42, pp.927.
① Schumpeter, Joseph,1934, "The Theory of Economic Development", Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press.
① Eisenstadt,1968, "Social Institution", in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
② Hayami, Yujiro and Masao Kikuchi,1981, "Asian Village Economy at the Crossroad:an Economic Approach to Institutional Change", Tokyo:University of Tokyo Press and Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press.
③ North, D.C.,1990, "Instituions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance", Cambirdge: Cambridge University Press, pp.59.
① Hans Peter Peters,1994, "Mass Media as an Information Channel and Public Arena", Risk5, pp.241-250.
① Stigler, G.,1971, "Theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.2, pp.3-21.
② Peltzman, S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), pp.211-241.
③ Olson, Mancur,1965, "The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups ", Harvard University Press.
④ Kiewiet, D. Roderick, Mathew D. McCubbins,1991, "The Logic of Delegation", Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
①McChesney, F.S., P,1987, "Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation", Journal of Legal Studies,16(1), pp.101-108.
②柯武刚史漫飞,《制度经济学——社会秩序与公共政策》[M],中译本,北京：商务印书馆,2000,65。
③ Stigler, G.,1971, "Theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.2, pp.3-21.
①[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],杨晓维译,上海人民出版社,2003,292。
② Breton, Albert,1974, "The Economic Theory of Representative Government", Chicago:Aldine.
③ Alexander Dyck, David Moss, and Luigi Zingales,2008, "Media versus Special Interests", http://ssrn.com.
④ Ascension Andina-Diaz,2007, "Media Competition and Information Disclosure", http://ssrn.com.
⑤ Oberholzer-Gee, R. and J. Waldfogel,2005, "Group Size and Political Mobilization", Journal of Law and Economics, vol.ⅩLⅧ, pp.73-91.
⑥ Besley, T. and Prat, A.,2006, "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability" , American Economic Review 96, pp.720-736.
① Gentzkow, M. and Shapiro, J.M.,2006, "Media Bias and Reputation", Journal of Political Economy114, pp.280-316.
② Ascension Andina-Diaz, 2007, "Media Competition and Information Disclosure", http://ssrn.com.
③Panova,E.,2006, "A Model of Media Pandering", Mimeo UQAM.
④ Maria Petrova,2008, "Mass Media and Special Interest Groups", Http://ssrn.com.
⑤ Christopher J. Coyne,2005, "The Role of Media as a Supporting Institution:Implications for Development Policy", Http://ssm.com.
① Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman,1996, " Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics ", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.63, No.2 (April), pp.265-286.
②王绍光,“中国公共政策议程设置的模式”,《中国社会科学》,2006(05)。
①宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”[J],《中国改革》,2008(04)。
②宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”[J],《中国改革》,2008(04)。
①[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],杨晓维译,上海人民出版社,2003,358。
②[美]埃里克·弗鲁博顿,《新制度经济学：一个交易费用分析范式》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006,145。
① Alessandro Olper and Johan F.M. Swinnen,2009, "Mass Media and Public Policy:Global Evidence from Agricultural Policies", Http://ssrn.com.
② Gentzkow, M. A., Glaeser, E. L. and Goldin, C.,2006, "The Rise of the Fourth Estate:How Newspapers Became Informative and Why it Mattered", In E. L. Glaeser and C. Goldin (eds.), "Corruption and Reform:Lessons from America's History", National Bureau of Economic Research.
③ Brunetti, A. and Weder, B.,2003, "A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption", Journal of Public Economics87, pp.1801-24. Ahrend, R.,2002, "Press Freedom, Human Capital, and Corruption", DELTA Working Paper, No.2002-11, DELTA.
① Ascension Andina-Diaz,2007, "Media Competition and Information Disclosure", http://ssrn.com.
② Besley, T. and Prat, A.,2006, "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability", American Economic Review96, pp.720-736.
③ Ellman, M. and Germano, F.,2005, "What Do the Papers Sell?", Mimeo UPF.
④ Suphachol Suphachalasai,2005, "Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media", Http://ssrn.com.
①宋华琳,“政府规制改革的成因与动力——以晚近中国药品安全规制为中心的观察”[J],《管理世界》,2008(08)。
① Davis Lance E. and North, Douglass C.,1970, "Institutional Change and American Economic Growth:a First Step towards a theory of Institutional Innovation, Journal of Economic History,30, pp.131-149.
② Daniel W. Bromley,1989, "Economic Interests and Institutions:the Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy, Basil Blackwell Inc., New York.
③王亚华, 《水权解释》,上海人民出版社,2005,155。
① Robert Salisbur,1983, "Toward a New Understanding of Interest Groups", in Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis, eds., The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, Congressional Quarterly Press.
①T·W·舒尔茨,《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,253。
[1]Ahrend, R.,2002, "Press Freedom, Human Capital, and Corruption", DELTA Working Paper, No.2002-11, DELTA.
[2]Alessandro Olper and Johan F.M.Swinnen,2009, "Mass Media and Public Policy: Global Evidence from Agricultural Policies", Http://ssrn.com.
[3]Alexander Dyck, David Moss and Luigi Zingales,2008, "Media versus Special Interest", Http://ssrn.com.
[4]Ascension Andina-Diaz,2007, "Media Competition and Information Disclosure", http://ssm.com.
[5]Ariel Katz,2007, "Pharmaceutical Lemons:Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry", http://ssrn.com.
[6]Arthur Bentley,1908, "The Process of Government", Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
[7]Bartley J. Madden, "More Choice Better Health", http://www.wiapp.org/article/default.asp?id=630.
[8]Becker, G.S.,1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(3), pp.371-400.
[9]Becker, GS.,1985, "Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs", Journal of Public Economics,28(3), pp.329-347.
[10]Bernstein, M.H.,1955, "Regulation Business by Independent Commission", Princeton:Princeton University.
[11]Besley, T. and Prat, A.,2006, "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and
Government Accountability", American Economic Review 96,720-736.
[12]Breton, Albert,1974, "The Economic Theory of Representative Government", Chicago:Aldine.
[13]Brunetti, A. and Weder, B.,2003, "A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption", Journal of Public Economics,87, pp.1801-24.
[14]Cecilia Testa,2003, "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures:is One Chamber Better than Two?", DEDPS,41(November).
[15]Challen, Ray,2000, "Instutions, Transaction Cost and Environmental Policy: Institutional Reform for Water Resource", Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., pp.52-53.
[16]Christopher J. Coyne,2005, "The Role of Media as a Supporting Institution: Implications for Development Policy", Http://ssrn.com.
[17]Dale B. Thompson,1998, "The Institutional-Transaction-Cost Framework for Public Policy Analysis", Http://ssrn.com.
[18]Daniel W.Bromley,1989, "Economic Interests and Institutions:the Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy, Basil Blackwell Inc., New York.
[19]David B. Truman,1951, "The Government process",Alfreda. Knopf, Inc.1 sted.
[20]Davis Lance E. and North, Douglass C.,1970, "Institutional Change and American Economic Growth:a First Step towards a theory of Institutional Innovation, Journal of Economic History,30, pp.131-149.
[21]Dixit, A. K.,1996, "The Making of Economic Policy:A Transaction-cost Politics Perspective", Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, pp.161-163.
[22]Downs, A.,1957, "An Economic Theory of Democracy", New York, Harper and Row.
[23]Eisenstadt, Shmuel N.,1965, Essays on Comparative Institutions, New York:John Wiley & Sons.
[24]Eisenstadt, Shmuel N.,1968, "Social Institution", in David L.Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
[25]Ellman, M. and Germano, F.,2005, "What Do the Papers Sell?", Mimeo UPF.
[26]Ernst R.Berndt, Adrian H.B.Gottschalk, Tomas Philipson and Matthew W.Strobeck,2004, "Assessing the Impacts of the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts (PDUFA) on the FDA Approval Process", www.aei-brooking.org.
[27]Frances H. Miller,2007, "Adverse Drug Reactions, Medical Accidents, and Patent Safety", http://ssrn.com.
[28]Gentzkow, M. and Shapiro, J.M.,2006, "Media Bias and Reputation", Journal of Political Economy,114, pp.280-316.
[29]Gentzkow, M. A., Glaeser, E. L. and Goldin, C.,2006, "The Rise of the Fourth Estate: How Newspapers Became Informative and Why it Mattered", In E. L. Glaeser and C. Goldin (eds.), "Corruption and Reform:Lessons from America's History", National Bureau of Economic Research.
[30]George A. Akerlof,1970, "The Market for'Lemons'——Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanism",84 Q.J. Econ. pp.488.
[31]Greenwood, R., and Hinings, C. R.,1996, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change:Bringing together the Old and the New Institutionalism", The Academy of Management Review,21(4), pp.1022-1054.
[32]Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman,1996, "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.63, No.2 (April), pp.265-286.
[33]Hadfield, G.K.,1990, "Problematic Relations:Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts", Stanford Law Review 42, pp.927.
[34]Hans Peter Peters,1994, "Mass Media as an Information Channel and Public Arena", Risk,5, pp.241-250.
[35]Hayami, Yujiro and Masao Kikuchi,1981, "Asian Village Economy at the Crossroad: an Economic Approach to Institutional Change", Tokyo:University of Tokyo Press and Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press.
[36]Holm, P.,1995, "The Dynamics of Institutionalization:Transformation Processes in Norwegian Fisheries", Administrative Science Quarterly,40, pp.398-422.
[37]John A.Vernon, Joseph H. Golec, Randall Lutter and Clark Nardinelli,2006, "FDA New Drug Approval Times, Prescription Drug User Fees, and R & D Spending", www.aei-brookings.org.
[38]Judyth Pendell,2003, "The Adverse Side Effects of Pharmaceutical Litigation", www.aei-brookings.org
[39]Kaplow, Louis,1974, "The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are Undesirable", Intl. Rev. of Law and Economics12, pp.3-11.
[40]Kiewiet, D. Roderick,Mathew D. McCubbins,1991, "The Logic of Delegation", Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
[41]Kip Viscusi,2006, "Regulation of Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks", http://ssrn.com.
[42]Knight, J,1992, Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp.2.
[43]Krueger, A.O.,1974, "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society", American Economic Review,64, pp.291-303.
[44]Laffont, J-J. and Tirole, J.,1991, " The Politics of Government Decision-making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture", Quarterly Journal of Economica,106 (4) pp. 1089-1127.
[45]Laffont, .J-J. and Tirole, J.,1993, "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation", Cambridge:MIT Press.
[46]Libecap, GD.,1989, "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Right", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics145, pp.6-34.
[47]Macneil, I.R.,1974, "The Many Futures of Contracts", Southern California Law Review 47, pp.753.
[48]Magali Delmas,2003, "Firms'Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach", Http://ssrn.com.
[49]Manning, R.L.,1994, "Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines" [J], Journal of Law and Economics,37(1), pp.247-275.
[50]Maria Petrova,2008, "Mass Media and Special Interest Groups", Http://ssrn.com.
[51]Mark McClellan,2007, "Fundamental Improvements in Drug Safety for the 21st Century:Time for Systematic, Electronic Infrastructure", www.aei-brookings.org.
[52]McChesney, F.S., P,1987, "Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation", Journal of Legal Studies,16(1):101-108.
[53]McCubbins, Mathew D,,1985, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure", American Journal of Political Science,29(November), pp.726.
[54]Milton Mueller,2004, "Reinventing Media Activism:Public Interest Advocacy in the Making of U.S. Communication-Information Policy,1960-2002", www.digital-convergence.org.
[55]Moe,Terry M.,1984, "The New Economic of Organization", American Journal of Political Science,28 (November), pp.756.
[56]North,D.,and Thomas,R.P.,1973,"The rise of western world:A new economic history", Cambridge University Press.
[57]North, D.C.,1990, "Instituions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance," Cambirdge:Cambridge University Press, pp.59.
[58]North, D.,1994, "Economic Performance through Time", American Economic Review, vo184,n°3, pp.360-361.
[59]Oberholzer-Gee, R. and J. Waldfogel,2005, "Group Size and Political Mobilization", Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLVIII, pp.73-91.
[60]Olson, Mancur,1965, "The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups ", Harvard University Press.
[61]Panova,E.,2006, "A Model of Media Pandering", Mimeo UQAM.
[62]Patrick W.Schmitz,2000, "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation", International Review of Law and Economic, Vol.20(3).
[63]Peltzman, S.,1973, "An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation:The 1962 Drug Amendments", Journal of Political Economy,81(5), pp.1049-1091.
[64]Peltzman, S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics,19(2), pp.211-241.
[65]Posner, R.A.,1974, "Theories of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science,5(2), pp.335-358。
[66]Posner, R.A.,1975, "The Social Cost of Monopoly & Regulation", Jouranl. Policy & Econmics 83, pp.807-827.
[67]Robert Salisbur,1983, "Toward a New Understanding of Interest Groups", in Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis, eds., The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, Congressional Quarterly Press.
[68]Roger G. Noll,1999, "The Economics and Politics of the Slowdown in Regulatory Reform", www.aei.org.
[69]Schumpeter, Joseph,1934, "The Theory of Economic Development", Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press.
[70]Seo, M.-G., and Creed, W. E. D.,2002, "Institutional Contradictions, Praxis and Institutional Change:A Dialectical Perspective", Academy of Management Review, 27(2), pp.222-247.
[71]Sjostrand, S.-E.,1995, "Toward a Theory of Institutional Change", In J. Groenewegen, C. Pitelis.
[72]Spiller,p.,1990,"Politicians, Interest Group, and Regulators:A Multi-principals Agency Theory of Regulation"(or "Let Them be Bribed"), Journal of Law and Economics 33, pp.65-101.
[73]Stigler, G.J.,1971, "The Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics& Management Science,2(1), pp.3-21.
[74]Stromberg, D.,2001, "Mass Media and Public Policy", European Economic Review45, pp.652-63.
[75]Stromberg, D.,2004a, "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy", Review of Economic Studies,71, pp.265-284.
[76]Stromberg, D.,2004b, "Radio's Impact on Public Spending", Quarterly Journal of Economics,119, pp.189-221.
[77]Suphachol Suphachalasai,2005, "Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media", Http://ssrn.com.
[78]Vincenzo Atella、Jay Bhattacharya and Lorenzo Carbonari,2008, "Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation:Evidence From US and Italy", http://ssrn.com.
[79]Viscusi, W.K and M.J. Moore,1993, "Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation" [J], Journal of Political Economy,101, pp.161-184.
[80]Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner,2003, "Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Institutional Change:The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments", William Davidson Institute Working Paper 589.
[81]Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner,2003, "Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Change in Emergent Institutions:The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments", Http://ssrn.com.
[82]Wolfgang Mayer and Alex Mourmouras,2002, "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality", Http://ssrn.com.
[83]柯武刚史漫飞,《制度经济学——社会秩序与公共政策》[M],中译本,北京：商务印书馆,2000。
[84]Hal Varian,《用代理人监督代理人》,载自艾瑞克·G·菲吕博顿等,《新制度经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海财经大学出版社,1998。
[85][美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2003。
[86][美]安东尼·唐斯,《官僚制内幕》[M],中译本,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2006。
[87][美]埃里克·弗鲁博顿、[德]鲁道夫·瑞切特,《新制度经济学：一个交易费用分析范式》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006。
[88][美]加里·S.贝克尔,《人类行为的经济学分析》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008。
[89]阿维纳什·K·迪克希特,《经济政策的制定：交易成本政治学的视角》[M],中译本,北京：中国人们大学出版社,2002。
[90][美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯,《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008。
[91][法]让-雅克·拉丰、让·梯若尔,《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2004。
[92]满瑟尔·奥尔森《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006。
[93][美]丹尼尔·W.布洛姆利,《经济利益与经济制度——公共政策的理论基础》[M], 中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006。
[94]王亚华,《水权解释》[M],上海人民出版社,2005。
[95]T·W·舒尔茨,《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[96]V·W·拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[97]L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺斯,《制度变迁理论：概念与原因》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[98]V·W·拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[99]林毅夫,《关于制度变迁的经济学理论：诱致性制度变迁与强制性制度变迁》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[100][美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊,《联邦党人文集》[M],中译本,北京：商务印书馆,1980。
[101][英]戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺,《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》[M],中译本,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2002。
[102]樊纲,《渐进之路：对经济改革的经济学分析》(M),北京：中国社会科学出版社,1993,94-98。
[103]王绍光,“中国公共政策议程设置的模式”[J],《中国社会科学》,2006(05)。
[104]刘彦昌,“既得利益集团的内涵解析”[J],《岭南学刊》,2004(04)。
[105]邵道生,“既得利益集团与中国的腐败问题”[J],《廉政大视野》,2003(11)。
[106]胡汝银,“中国改革的政治经济学”[J],《经济发展研究》,1992(04)。
[107]康小平,“我国药品监督管理体制完善研究”,硕士学位论文,2005.
[108]阮秀芳,“完善我国药品监管的制度建设研究”,硕士学位论文,2008。
[109]王迎春,“中国现行药品监管体制下的药品安全问题研究”,硕士学位论文,2008。
[110]张雅静,“从‘齐二药’到‘欣弗’社会学视角下的药品安全问题”[J],《齐鲁药事》,2007(02)。
[111]温超英、祖燕,“从欣弗事件看药品监管违规的原因和对策”[J],《医药管理》,2007(09)。
[112]沈凯、李从东,“供应链视角下的中国药品安全问题研究”[J],《北京理工大学 学报》,2008(06)。
[113]余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析(上)”[J],《管理世界》,1997(05)。
[114]余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析(下)”[J],《管理世界》,1997(06)。
[115]宋华琳,“药品不良反应与政府监管制度改革——从安徽欣弗事件引发的思考”[J],《法学》,2006(09)。
[116]宋华琳,“美国药品监管的肇始”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(01)。
[117]宋华琳,“美国药品加速审评程序研究”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(10)。
[118]宋华琳,“药品信息披露与侵权责任”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(08)。
[119]宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”[J],《中国改革》,2008(04)。
[120]宋华琳,“政府规制改革的成因与动力——以晚近中国药品安全规制为中心的观察”[J],《管理世界》,2008(08)。
[121]曹阳、徐丽华,“中国药品安全监管制度变迁的路径选择”[J],《南京社会科学》,2009(01)。
[122]张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进” [J],《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
[123]于立、肖兴志,“规制理论发展综述” [J],《财经问题研究》,2000(01)。
[124]盛洪,“关于中国市场化改革的过渡过程的研究”[J],经济研究1996(01)。
[125]张超、孙健,“利益集团理论与国有企业制度变迁”,《财经问题研究》[J],2005(12)。
[126]“从《美国大欺诈》到《政府伦理法案》”[J],《医药世界》,2007(05)。
[137]《食品药品监管局新闻发布会》(2007年8月8日),http://www.xinhuanet.com/zhibo/20070808/wz.htm.
[128]《中国卫生改革开放30年》编委会,中国卫生改革开放30年,人民卫生出版社,2008。
①宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”,《中国改革》,2008(04)。
①康小平,“我国药品监督管理体制完善研究”,硕士学位论文,2005.
②阮秀芳,“完善我国药品监管的制度建设研究”,硕士学位论文,2008。
③王迎春,“中国现行药品监管体制下的药品安全问题研究”,硕士学位论文,2008。
④余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析(下)”,《管理世界》,1997(06)。
⑤ Frances H. Miller,2007, "Adverse Drug Reactions, Medical Accidents, and Patent Safety", http://ssrn.com.
① Mark McClellan,2007, "Fundamental Improvements in Drug Safety for the 21st Century:Time for Systematic, Electronic Infrastructure", www.aei-brookings.org.
② Ariel Katz,2007, "Pharmaceutical Lemons:Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry", http://ssrn.com.
③ Judyth Pendell,2003, " The Adverse Side Effects of Pharmaceutical Litigation ", www.aei-brookings.org.
④ Ernst R.Berndt, Adrian H.B.Gottschalk, Tomas Philipson and Matthew W.Strobeck,2004, "Assessing the Impacts of the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts (PDUFA) on the FDA Approval Process", www.aei-brooking.org.
⑤ John A. Vernon, Joseph H.Golec, Randall Lutter and Clark Nardinelli,2006, "FDANew Drug Approval Times, Prescription Drug User Fees, and R & D Spending", www.aei-brookings.org.
⑥ Vincenzo Atella、Jay Bhattacharya andLorenzo Carbonari,2008, "Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation:Evidence From US and Italy", http://ssrn.com.
①张雅静,“从‘齐二药’到‘欣弗’社会学视角下的药品安全问题”[J],《齐鲁药事》,2007(02)。
②温超英、祖燕,“从欣弗事件看药品监管违规的原因和对策”[J],《医药管理》,2007(09)。
③沈凯、李从东,“供应链视角下的中国药品安全问题研究”[J],《北京理工大学学报》,2008(06)。
④余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析”[J],《管理世界》,1997(05、06)。
⑤宋华琳,“药品不良反应与政府监管制度改革——从安徽欣弗事件引发的思考”[J],《法学》,2006(09)。
⑥宋华琳,“美国药品监管的肇始”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(01)。
⑦宋华琳,“美国药品加速审评程序研究”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(10)。
⑧宋华琳,“药品信息披露与侵权责任”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(08)。
①宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”[J],《中国改革》,2008(04)。
②曹阳、徐丽华,“中国药品安全监管制度变迁的路径选择[J]”,《南京社会科学》,2009(01)。
①王亚华,《水权解释》,上海人民出版社,2005,15。
② Stigler, G.J.,1971, "The Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics& Management Science,2(1), pp.3-21.
③ Peltzman, S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics,19(2), pp.211-241.
④ Becker, G.S.,1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(3), pp.371-400.
⑤ Becker, G.S.,1985, "Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs", Journal of Public Economics,28(3), pp.329-347.
⑥ Spiller,p.,1990,"Politicians, Interest Group, and Regulators:A Multi-principals Agency Theory of Regulation"(or "Let Them be Bribed"), Journal of Law and Economics 33, pp.65-101.
① Laffont, J. and Tirole, J.,1991, " The Politics of Government Decision-making:A Theoryof Regulatory Capture", Quarterly Journal of Economica,106 (4) pp.1089-1127.
② Laffont, J-J. and Tirole, J.,1993, "ATheory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation", Cambridge:MIT Press.
① George A. Akerlof,1970, "The Market for'Lemons'——Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanism",84 Q.J. Econ, pp.488.
② Ariel Katz,2007, "Pharmaceutical Lemons:Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry",15, http://ssrn.com.
③由于信息缺乏导致消费者无知。
① Vincenzo Atella, Jay Bhattacharya and Lorenzo Carbonari,2008, "Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation Evidence from US and Italy", http://ssrn.com.
② Vincenzo Atella, Jay Bhattacharya and Lorenzo Carbonari,2008, "Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation Evidence from US and Italy", http://ssrn.com.
①新药研制的成本是巨大的,通常政府除了在政策上给与大量支持,还投入了大量资金,因此,新药产品的价格不能根据研发成本来确定,而应该把政府的补偿剔出,否则消费者为一种药品需要付两次款。
② Peltzman, S., 1973, "An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation:The 1962 Drug Amendments", Journal of Political Economy,81(5), pp.1049-1091.
①[美]加里·S.贝克尔,《人类行为的经济学分析》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008,63。
① Kip Viscusi,2006, "Regulation of Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks", http://ssrn.com.
② Manning, R.L.,1994, "Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines", Journal of Law and Economics,37(1), pp.247-275.
③ Viscusi, W.K and M.J. Moore,1993, "Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation", Journal of Political Economy,101, pp.161-184.
④[美]加里·S.贝克尔,《人类行为的经济学分析》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008,88。
①[美]加里·S.贝克尔,《人类行为的经济学分析》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008,63。
①目前中国医生的薪酬制度与其业绩挂钩,因而,药品企业就陷入了这样一种尴尬：价格越高的品种,医院越欢迎；真正疗效好、价格低、消费者能够承受的药品品种,即便中标也难以实现大批量销售。
② Patrick W.Schmitz,2000, "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation", International Review of Law and Economic, Vol.20(3).
① North, D.,1994, "Economic Performance through Time", American Economic Review, vol 84, pp. 360-361.
②阿维纳什·K·迪克希特,《经济政策的制定：交易成本政治学的视角》[M],中译本,北京：中国人们大学出版社,2002,30。
③阿维纳什·K·迪克希特,《经济政策的制定：交易成本政治学的视角》,[M],中译本,北京：中国人们大学出版社,2002,8。
①[法]让-雅克·拉丰、让·梯若尔,《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,406。
① Bartley J. Madden, "More Choice Better Health", http://www.wiapp.org/article/default.asp?id=630.
②满瑟尔·奥尔森《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006,167。
① Milton Mueller,2004, Reinventing Media Activism:Public Interest Advocacy in the Making of U.S. Communication-Information Policy,1960-2002, www.digital-convergence.org.
② Knight, J,1992, Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2.
③T·W·舒尔茨,《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,253。
④V·W·拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,329。
⑤[美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯,《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社2008,3。
①[美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯,《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社2008,4。
②[美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯,《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社2008,12。
①L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺斯,《制度变迁理论：概念与原因》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,266。
②Eisenstadt, ShmuelN.,1965, Essays on Comparative Institutions, New York:John Wiley & Sons.
③T·W·舒尔茨,《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,251。
④L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺斯,《制度变迁理论：概念与原因》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》上海：上海人民出版社,1990,277。
①L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺斯,《制度创新的理论：描述、类推与说明》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》上海：上海人民出版社,1990,296。
②V·W·拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,333。
③林毅夫,《关于制度变迁的经济理论：诱致性变迁与强制性变迁》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》上海：上海人民出版社,1990,384。
①[美]丹尼尔·W.布洛姆利,《经济利益与经济制度——公共政策的理论基础》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006,53。
①余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析(上)”,《管理世界》,1997(05)。
①宋华琳,“政府规制改革的成因与动力——以晚近中国药品安全规制为中心的观察”,《管理世界》,2008(08)。
①[美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊,《联邦党人文集》[M],中译本,北京：商务印书馆,1980。
②David B. Truman,1951, " The Government process ", Alfreda. Knopf, Inc.1 sted.
③[英]戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺,《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》[M],中译本,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2002。
④[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1995,141。
①张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进”,《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
② Arthur Bentley,1908, "The Process of Government", Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
③张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进”,《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
④ David B. Truman,1951, "The Government process",Alfreda. Knopf, Inc.1 sted.
Bernstein, M. H.,1955, "Regulation Business by Independent Commission", Princeton:Princeton University.
①Posner, R. A.,1974, "Theories of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science,5 (2), pp.335-358。
②于立、肖兴志,“规制理论发展综述”,《财经问题研究》,2000(01)。
③ Stigler, G.,1971, "Theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.2, pp.3-21.
④张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进”,《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
⑤ Olson, Mancur.1965. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge:Harvard University Press.
⑥ Stigler, G.,1971, "Theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.2, pp.3.
① Peltzman, S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), pp.211-241.
② Becker, G. S,1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence ", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(August), pp.371-400.
③ Becker, G. S,1985, "Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs ", Journal of Public Economics,28 (3):329-347.
④张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进”,《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
⑤ Becker, G. S,1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(August), pp.396.
① Spiller,p.,1990,"Politicians, Interest Group, and Regulators:A Multi-principals Agency Theory of Regulation"(or "Let Them be Bribed"), Journal of Law and Economics 33,pp.65-101.
② Laffont, J. and Tirole, J.,1991, " The Politics of Government Decision-making:A Theory of Regulatory Capture", Quarterly Journal of Economics,106 (4) pp.1089-1127.
③ Laffont, J-J. and Tirole, J.,1993, "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation", Cambridge:MIT Press.
④ McCubbins, Mathew D,,1985,"The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure", American Journal of Political Science,29(November), pp.726.
① North,D.,1990. "Institution, institutional change and economic performance", Cambridge Uni versity Press.
② North,D., and Thomas,R.P.,1973, "The rise of western world:Anew economic history", Cambridge University Press.
③ Sjostrand, S.-E.,1995, "Toward a Theory of Institutional Change", In J. Groenewegen, C. Pitelis.
④ Holm, P.,1995, "The Dynamics of Institutionalization:Transformation Processes in Norwegian Fisheries", Administrative Science Quarterly,40, pp.398-422.
⑤ Greenwood, R., and Hinings, C. R.,1996, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change:Bringing together the Old and the New Institutionalism ", The Academy of Management Review,21(4), pp.1022-1054.
⑥ Seo, M.-G., and Creed, W. E. D.,2002,"Institutional Contradictions, Praxis and Institutional Change: A Dialectical Perspective ", Academy of Management Review,27(2), pp.222-247.
⑦ Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner,2003, "Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Institutional Change:The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments", William Davidson Institute Working Paper 589.
⑧胡汝银,“中国改革的政治经济学”,《经济发展研究》,1992(04)。
①樊纲,《渐进之路：对经济改革的经济学分析》(M),北京：中国社会科学出版社,1993,94-98。
②盛洪,“关于中国市场化改革的过渡过程的研究”[J],经济研究1996(01)。
③张超、孙健,“利益集团理论与国有企业制度变迁”[J],《财经问题研究》,2005(12)。
①林毅夫,《关于制度变迁的经济学理论：诱致性制度变迁与强制性制度变迁》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,392。
①[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1995,29。
①[美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森,《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1995,37。
②[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1999,233.
①[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1999,269.
① Moe,Terry M.,1984, "The New Economic of Organization", American Journal of Political Science, 28 (November):756-757.
① Cecilia Testa,2003, "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures:is One Chamber Better than Two?", DEDPS,41 (November).
Alexan der Dyck, David Moss and Luigi Zingales,2008, "Media versus Special Interest" Http://ssrn. com.
① Becker,G. S., 1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(August), pp.371-400.
② Roger G.No11, 1999, "The Economics and Politics of the Slowdown in Regulatory Reform", www.aei.org.
①[美]埃里克·弗鲁博顿、[德]鲁道夫·瑞切特,《新制度经济学：一个交易费用分析范式》,中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006,191。
②Hal Varian,《用代理人监督代理人》,载自艾瑞克·G·菲吕博顿等,《新制度经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海财经大学出版社,371。
①L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺思, 《制度变迁的理论：概念与原因》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,274.
② Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner,2003, "Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Change in Emergent Institutions:The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments", Http://ssrn.com.
① Libecap, G.D.,1989, "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Right", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145, pp.6-34.
② Dale B. Thompson,1998, " The Institutional-Transaction-Cost Framework for Public Policy Analysis", Http://ssrn.com.
① Magali Delmas,2003, "Firms'Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution:A Transaction Cost Approach", Http://ssrn.com.
② Challen, Ray,2000, "Instutions, Transaction Cost and Environmental Policy:Institutional Reform for Water Resource", Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., pp.52-53.
① Kaplow, Louis,1974, "The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are Undesirable", Intl. Rev. of Law and Economics12, pp.3-11.
② Krueger, A.O., "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society". American Economic Review, 64, pp.291-303.
③ Posner, R.A.,1975, "The Social Cost of Monopoly & Regulation", Jouranl. Policy & Econmics 83, pp.807-27.
① Libecap, G.D,1989, "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Right", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 145, pp.6-34.
①刘彦昌,“既得利益集团的内涵解析”[J],《岭南学刊》,2004(04)。
②邵道生,“既得利益集团与中国的腐败问题”[J],《廉政大视野》,2003(11)。
③刘彦昌,“既得利益集团的内涵解析”[J],《岭南学刊》,2004(04)。
① Wolfgang Mayer and Alex Mourmouras, 2002, " Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality", Http://ssrn.com.
①[美]安东尼·唐斯,《官僚制内幕》[M],中译本,中国人民大学出版社,2006,209-210。
① Macneil, I.R.,1974, "The Many Futures of Contracts", Southern California Law Review 47, pp.753.
② Hadfield, G.K.,1990, "Problematic Relations:Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts", Stanford Law Review 42, pp.927.
① Schumpeter, Joseph,1934, "The Theory of Economic Development", Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press.
① Eisenstadt,1968, "Social Institution", in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
② Hayami, Yujiro and Masao Kikuchi,1981, "Asian Village Economy at the Crossroad:an Economic Approach to Institutional Change", Tokyo:University of Tokyo Press and Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press.
③ North, D.C.,1990, "Instituions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance", Cambirdge: Cambridge University Press, pp.59.
① Hans Peter Peters,1994, "Mass Media as an Information Channel and Public Arena", Risk5, pp.241-250.
① Stigler, G.,1971, "Theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.2, pp.3-21.
② Peltzman, S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), pp.211-241.
③ Olson, Mancur,1965, "The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups ", Harvard University Press.
④ Kiewiet, D. Roderick, Mathew D. McCubbins,1991, "The Logic of Delegation", Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
①McChesney, F.S., P,1987, "Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation", Journal of Legal Studies,16(1), pp.101-108.
②柯武刚史漫飞,《制度经济学——社会秩序与公共政策》[M],中译本,北京：商务印书馆,2000,65。
③ Stigler, G.,1971, "Theory of economic regulation", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol.2, pp.3-21.
①[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],杨晓维译,上海人民出版社,2003,292。
② Breton, Albert,1974, "The Economic Theory of Representative Government", Chicago:Aldine.
③ Alexander Dyck, David Moss, and Luigi Zingales,2008, "Media versus Special Interests", http://ssrn.com.
④ Ascension Andina-Diaz,2007, "Media Competition and Information Disclosure", http://ssrn.com.
⑤ Oberholzer-Gee, R. and J. Waldfogel,2005, "Group Size and Political Mobilization", Journal of Law and Economics, vol.ⅩLⅧ, pp.73-91.
⑥ Besley, T. and Prat, A.,2006, "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability" , American Economic Review 96, pp.720-736.
① Gentzkow, M. and Shapiro, J.M.,2006, "Media Bias and Reputation", Journal of Political Economy114, pp.280-316.
② Ascension Andina-Diaz, 2007, "Media Competition and Information Disclosure", http://ssrn.com.
③Panova,E.,2006, "A Model of Media Pandering", Mimeo UQAM.
④ Maria Petrova,2008, "Mass Media and Special Interest Groups", Http://ssrn.com.
⑤ Christopher J. Coyne,2005, "The Role of Media as a Supporting Institution:Implications for Development Policy", Http://ssm.com.
① Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman,1996, " Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics ", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.63, No.2 (April), pp.265-286.
②王绍光,“中国公共政策议程设置的模式”,《中国社会科学》,2006(05)。
①宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”[J],《中国改革》,2008(04)。
②宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”[J],《中国改革》,2008(04)。
①[美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],杨晓维译,上海人民出版社,2003,358。
②[美]埃里克·弗鲁博顿,《新制度经济学：一个交易费用分析范式》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006,145。
① Alessandro Olper and Johan F.M. Swinnen,2009, "Mass Media and Public Policy:Global Evidence from Agricultural Policies", Http://ssrn.com.
② Gentzkow, M. A., Glaeser, E. L. and Goldin, C.,2006, "The Rise of the Fourth Estate:How Newspapers Became Informative and Why it Mattered", In E. L. Glaeser and C. Goldin (eds.), "Corruption and Reform:Lessons from America's History", National Bureau of Economic Research.
③ Brunetti, A. and Weder, B.,2003, "A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption", Journal of Public Economics87, pp.1801-24. Ahrend, R.,2002, "Press Freedom, Human Capital, and Corruption", DELTA Working Paper, No.2002-11, DELTA.
① Ascension Andina-Diaz,2007, "Media Competition and Information Disclosure", http://ssrn.com.
② Besley, T. and Prat, A.,2006, "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and Government Accountability", American Economic Review96, pp.720-736.
③ Ellman, M. and Germano, F.,2005, "What Do the Papers Sell?", Mimeo UPF.
④ Suphachol Suphachalasai,2005, "Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media", Http://ssrn.com.
①宋华琳,“政府规制改革的成因与动力——以晚近中国药品安全规制为中心的观察”[J],《管理世界》,2008(08)。
① Davis Lance E. and North, Douglass C.,1970, "Institutional Change and American Economic Growth:a First Step towards a theory of Institutional Innovation, Journal of Economic History,30, pp.131-149.
② Daniel W. Bromley,1989, "Economic Interests and Institutions:the Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy, Basil Blackwell Inc., New York.
③王亚华, 《水权解释》,上海人民出版社,2005,155。
① Robert Salisbur,1983, "Toward a New Understanding of Interest Groups", in Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis, eds., The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, Congressional Quarterly Press.
①T·W·舒尔茨,《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》,上海：上海人民出版社,1994,253。
[1]Ahrend, R.,2002, "Press Freedom, Human Capital, and Corruption", DELTA Working Paper, No.2002-11, DELTA.
[2]Alessandro Olper and Johan F.M.Swinnen,2009, "Mass Media and Public Policy: Global Evidence from Agricultural Policies", Http://ssrn.com.
[3]Alexander Dyck, David Moss and Luigi Zingales,2008, "Media versus Special Interest", Http://ssrn.com.
[4]Ascension Andina-Diaz,2007, "Media Competition and Information Disclosure", http://ssm.com.
[5]Ariel Katz,2007, "Pharmaceutical Lemons:Innovation and Regulation in the Drug Industry", http://ssrn.com.
[6]Arthur Bentley,1908, "The Process of Government", Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
[7]Bartley J. Madden, "More Choice Better Health", http://www.wiapp.org/article/default.asp?id=630.
[8]Becker, G.S.,1983, "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics,98(3), pp.371-400.
[9]Becker, GS.,1985, "Public Policies, Pressure Groups and Dead Weight Costs", Journal of Public Economics,28(3), pp.329-347.
[10]Bernstein, M.H.,1955, "Regulation Business by Independent Commission", Princeton:Princeton University.
[11]Besley, T. and Prat, A.,2006, "Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand? Media Capture and
Government Accountability", American Economic Review 96,720-736.
[12]Breton, Albert,1974, "The Economic Theory of Representative Government", Chicago:Aldine.
[13]Brunetti, A. and Weder, B.,2003, "A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption", Journal of Public Economics,87, pp.1801-24.
[14]Cecilia Testa,2003, "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures:is One Chamber Better than Two?", DEDPS,41(November).
[15]Challen, Ray,2000, "Instutions, Transaction Cost and Environmental Policy: Institutional Reform for Water Resource", Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., pp.52-53.
[16]Christopher J. Coyne,2005, "The Role of Media as a Supporting Institution: Implications for Development Policy", Http://ssrn.com.
[17]Dale B. Thompson,1998, "The Institutional-Transaction-Cost Framework for Public Policy Analysis", Http://ssrn.com.
[18]Daniel W.Bromley,1989, "Economic Interests and Institutions:the Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy, Basil Blackwell Inc., New York.
[19]David B. Truman,1951, "The Government process",Alfreda. Knopf, Inc.1 sted.
[20]Davis Lance E. and North, Douglass C.,1970, "Institutional Change and American Economic Growth:a First Step towards a theory of Institutional Innovation, Journal of Economic History,30, pp.131-149.
[21]Dixit, A. K.,1996, "The Making of Economic Policy:A Transaction-cost Politics Perspective", Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, pp.161-163.
[22]Downs, A.,1957, "An Economic Theory of Democracy", New York, Harper and Row.
[23]Eisenstadt, Shmuel N.,1965, Essays on Comparative Institutions, New York:John Wiley & Sons.
[24]Eisenstadt, Shmuel N.,1968, "Social Institution", in David L.Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.
[25]Ellman, M. and Germano, F.,2005, "What Do the Papers Sell?", Mimeo UPF.
[26]Ernst R.Berndt, Adrian H.B.Gottschalk, Tomas Philipson and Matthew W.Strobeck,2004, "Assessing the Impacts of the Prescription Drug User Fee Acts (PDUFA) on the FDA Approval Process", www.aei-brooking.org.
[27]Frances H. Miller,2007, "Adverse Drug Reactions, Medical Accidents, and Patent Safety", http://ssrn.com.
[28]Gentzkow, M. and Shapiro, J.M.,2006, "Media Bias and Reputation", Journal of Political Economy,114, pp.280-316.
[29]Gentzkow, M. A., Glaeser, E. L. and Goldin, C.,2006, "The Rise of the Fourth Estate: How Newspapers Became Informative and Why it Mattered", In E. L. Glaeser and C. Goldin (eds.), "Corruption and Reform:Lessons from America's History", National Bureau of Economic Research.
[30]George A. Akerlof,1970, "The Market for'Lemons'——Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanism",84 Q.J. Econ. pp.488.
[31]Greenwood, R., and Hinings, C. R.,1996, "Understanding Radical Organizational Change:Bringing together the Old and the New Institutionalism", The Academy of Management Review,21(4), pp.1022-1054.
[32]Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman,1996, "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics", Review of Economic Studies, Vol.63, No.2 (April), pp.265-286.
[33]Hadfield, G.K.,1990, "Problematic Relations:Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts", Stanford Law Review 42, pp.927.
[34]Hans Peter Peters,1994, "Mass Media as an Information Channel and Public Arena", Risk,5, pp.241-250.
[35]Hayami, Yujiro and Masao Kikuchi,1981, "Asian Village Economy at the Crossroad: an Economic Approach to Institutional Change", Tokyo:University of Tokyo Press and Baltimore:Johns Hopkins University Press.
[36]Holm, P.,1995, "The Dynamics of Institutionalization:Transformation Processes in Norwegian Fisheries", Administrative Science Quarterly,40, pp.398-422.
[37]John A.Vernon, Joseph H. Golec, Randall Lutter and Clark Nardinelli,2006, "FDA New Drug Approval Times, Prescription Drug User Fees, and R & D Spending", www.aei-brookings.org.
[38]Judyth Pendell,2003, "The Adverse Side Effects of Pharmaceutical Litigation", www.aei-brookings.org
[39]Kaplow, Louis,1974, "The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are Undesirable", Intl. Rev. of Law and Economics12, pp.3-11.
[40]Kiewiet, D. Roderick,Mathew D. McCubbins,1991, "The Logic of Delegation", Chicago:University of Chicago Press.
[41]Kip Viscusi,2006, "Regulation of Health, Safety, and Environmental Risks", http://ssrn.com.
[42]Knight, J,1992, Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, pp.2.
[43]Krueger, A.O.,1974, "The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society", American Economic Review,64, pp.291-303.
[44]Laffont, J-J. and Tirole, J.,1991, " The Politics of Government Decision-making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture", Quarterly Journal of Economica,106 (4) pp. 1089-1127.
[45]Laffont, .J-J. and Tirole, J.,1993, "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation", Cambridge:MIT Press.
[46]Libecap, GD.,1989, "Distributional Issues in Contracting for Property Right", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics145, pp.6-34.
[47]Macneil, I.R.,1974, "The Many Futures of Contracts", Southern California Law Review 47, pp.753.
[48]Magali Delmas,2003, "Firms'Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach", Http://ssrn.com.
[49]Manning, R.L.,1994, "Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vaccines" [J], Journal of Law and Economics,37(1), pp.247-275.
[50]Maria Petrova,2008, "Mass Media and Special Interest Groups", Http://ssrn.com.
[51]Mark McClellan,2007, "Fundamental Improvements in Drug Safety for the 21st Century:Time for Systematic, Electronic Infrastructure", www.aei-brookings.org.
[52]McChesney, F.S., P,1987, "Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation", Journal of Legal Studies,16(1):101-108.
[53]McCubbins, Mathew D,,1985, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure", American Journal of Political Science,29(November), pp.726.
[54]Milton Mueller,2004, "Reinventing Media Activism:Public Interest Advocacy in the Making of U.S. Communication-Information Policy,1960-2002", www.digital-convergence.org.
[55]Moe,Terry M.,1984, "The New Economic of Organization", American Journal of Political Science,28 (November), pp.756.
[56]North,D.,and Thomas,R.P.,1973,"The rise of western world:A new economic history", Cambridge University Press.
[57]North, D.C.,1990, "Instituions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance," Cambirdge:Cambridge University Press, pp.59.
[58]North, D.,1994, "Economic Performance through Time", American Economic Review, vo184,n°3, pp.360-361.
[59]Oberholzer-Gee, R. and J. Waldfogel,2005, "Group Size and Political Mobilization", Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLVIII, pp.73-91.
[60]Olson, Mancur,1965, "The Logic of Collective Action:Public Goods and the Theory of Groups ", Harvard University Press.
[61]Panova,E.,2006, "A Model of Media Pandering", Mimeo UQAM.
[62]Patrick W.Schmitz,2000, "On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation", International Review of Law and Economic, Vol.20(3).
[63]Peltzman, S.,1973, "An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation:The 1962 Drug Amendments", Journal of Political Economy,81(5), pp.1049-1091.
[64]Peltzman, S.,1976, "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation", Journal of Law and Economics,19(2), pp.211-241.
[65]Posner, R.A.,1974, "Theories of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics & Management Science,5(2), pp.335-358。
[66]Posner, R.A.,1975, "The Social Cost of Monopoly & Regulation", Jouranl. Policy & Econmics 83, pp.807-827.
[67]Robert Salisbur,1983, "Toward a New Understanding of Interest Groups", in Allan Cigler and Burdette Loomis, eds., The Changing Nature of Interest Group Politics, Congressional Quarterly Press.
[68]Roger G. Noll,1999, "The Economics and Politics of the Slowdown in Regulatory Reform", www.aei.org.
[69]Schumpeter, Joseph,1934, "The Theory of Economic Development", Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press.
[70]Seo, M.-G., and Creed, W. E. D.,2002, "Institutional Contradictions, Praxis and Institutional Change:A Dialectical Perspective", Academy of Management Review, 27(2), pp.222-247.
[71]Sjostrand, S.-E.,1995, "Toward a Theory of Institutional Change", In J. Groenewegen, C. Pitelis.
[72]Spiller,p.,1990,"Politicians, Interest Group, and Regulators:A Multi-principals Agency Theory of Regulation"(or "Let Them be Bribed"), Journal of Law and Economics 33, pp.65-101.
[73]Stigler, G.J.,1971, "The Theory of Economic Regulation", Bell Journal of Economics& Management Science,2(1), pp.3-21.
[74]Stromberg, D.,2001, "Mass Media and Public Policy", European Economic Review45, pp.652-63.
[75]Stromberg, D.,2004a, "Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy", Review of Economic Studies,71, pp.265-284.
[76]Stromberg, D.,2004b, "Radio's Impact on Public Spending", Quarterly Journal of Economics,119, pp.189-221.
[77]Suphachol Suphachalasai,2005, "Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media", Http://ssrn.com.
[78]Vincenzo Atella、Jay Bhattacharya and Lorenzo Carbonari,2008, "Pharmaceutical Industry, Drug Quality and Regulation:Evidence From US and Italy", http://ssrn.com.
[79]Viscusi, W.K and M.J. Moore,1993, "Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation" [J], Journal of Political Economy,101, pp.161-184.
[80]Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner,2003, "Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Institutional Change:The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments", William Davidson Institute Working Paper 589.
[81]Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner,2003, "Legitimacy, Interest Group Pressures and Change in Emergent Institutions:The Case of Foreign Investors and Host Country Governments", Http://ssrn.com.
[82]Wolfgang Mayer and Alex Mourmouras,2002, "Vested Interests in a Positive Theory of IFI Conditionality", Http://ssrn.com.
[83]柯武刚史漫飞,《制度经济学——社会秩序与公共政策》[M],中译本,北京：商务印书馆,2000。
[84]Hal Varian,《用代理人监督代理人》,载自艾瑞克·G·菲吕博顿等,《新制度经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海财经大学出版社,1998。
[85][美]乔·B.史蒂文斯,《集体选择经济学》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2003。
[86][美]安东尼·唐斯,《官僚制内幕》[M],中译本,北京：中国人民大学出版社,2006。
[87][美]埃里克·弗鲁博顿、[德]鲁道夫·瑞切特,《新制度经济学：一个交易费用分析范式》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006。
[88][美]加里·S.贝克尔,《人类行为的经济学分析》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008。
[89]阿维纳什·K·迪克希特,《经济政策的制定：交易成本政治学的视角》[M],中译本,北京：中国人们大学出版社,2002。
[90][美]道格拉斯·C·诺斯,《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2008。
[91][法]让-雅克·拉丰、让·梯若尔,《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2004。
[92]满瑟尔·奥尔森《集体行动的逻辑》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006。
[93][美]丹尼尔·W.布洛姆利,《经济利益与经济制度——公共政策的理论基础》[M], 中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,2006。
[94]王亚华,《水权解释》[M],上海人民出版社,2005。
[95]T·W·舒尔茨,《制度与人的经济价值的不断提高》,载自[美]R.科斯、A.阿尔钦、D.诺斯等著,《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度经济学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[96]V·W·拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[97]L.E.戴维斯、D.C.诺斯,《制度变迁理论：概念与原因》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[98]V·W·拉坦,《诱致性制度变迁理论》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[99]林毅夫,《关于制度变迁的经济学理论：诱致性制度变迁与强制性制度变迁》,载科斯等《财产权利与制度变迁——产权学派与新制度学派译文集》[M],中译本,上海：上海人民出版社,1994。
[100][美]汉密尔顿、杰伊、麦迪逊,《联邦党人文集》[M],中译本,北京：商务印书馆,1980。
[101][英]戴维·米勒、韦农·波格丹诺,《布莱克维尔政治学百科全书》[M],中译本,北京：中国政法大学出版社,2002。
[102]樊纲,《渐进之路：对经济改革的经济学分析》(M),北京：中国社会科学出版社,1993,94-98。
[103]王绍光,“中国公共政策议程设置的模式”[J],《中国社会科学》,2006(05)。
[104]刘彦昌,“既得利益集团的内涵解析”[J],《岭南学刊》,2004(04)。
[105]邵道生,“既得利益集团与中国的腐败问题”[J],《廉政大视野》,2003(11)。
[106]胡汝银,“中国改革的政治经济学”[J],《经济发展研究》,1992(04)。
[107]康小平,“我国药品监督管理体制完善研究”,硕士学位论文,2005.
[108]阮秀芳,“完善我国药品监管的制度建设研究”,硕士学位论文,2008。
[109]王迎春,“中国现行药品监管体制下的药品安全问题研究”,硕士学位论文,2008。
[110]张雅静,“从‘齐二药’到‘欣弗’社会学视角下的药品安全问题”[J],《齐鲁药事》,2007(02)。
[111]温超英、祖燕,“从欣弗事件看药品监管违规的原因和对策”[J],《医药管理》,2007(09)。
[112]沈凯、李从东,“供应链视角下的中国药品安全问题研究”[J],《北京理工大学 学报》,2008(06)。
[113]余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析(上)”[J],《管理世界》,1997(05)。
[114]余晖,“中国药业政府管制制度形成障碍的分析(下)”[J],《管理世界》,1997(06)。
[115]宋华琳,“药品不良反应与政府监管制度改革——从安徽欣弗事件引发的思考”[J],《法学》,2006(09)。
[116]宋华琳,“美国药品监管的肇始”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(01)。
[117]宋华琳,“美国药品加速审评程序研究”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(10)。
[118]宋华琳,“药品信息披露与侵权责任”[J],《中国处方药》,2007(08)。
[119]宋华琳,“中国药品规制改革依然‘在路上’”[J],《中国改革》,2008(04)。
[120]宋华琳,“政府规制改革的成因与动力——以晚近中国药品安全规制为中心的观察”[J],《管理世界》,2008(08)。
[121]曹阳、徐丽华,“中国药品安全监管制度变迁的路径选择”[J],《南京社会科学》,2009(01)。
[122]张红凤,“利益集团规制理论的演进” [J],《经济社会体制比较》,2006(01)。
[123]于立、肖兴志,“规制理论发展综述” [J],《财经问题研究》,2000(01)。
[124]盛洪,“关于中国市场化改革的过渡过程的研究”[J],经济研究1996(01)。
[125]张超、孙健,“利益集团理论与国有企业制度变迁”,《财经问题研究》[J],2005(12)。
[126]“从《美国大欺诈》到《政府伦理法案》”[J],《医药世界》,2007(05)。
[137]《食品药品监管局新闻发布会》(2007年8月8日),http://www.xinhuanet.com/zhibo/20070808/wz.htm.
[128]《中国卫生改革开放30年》编委会,中国卫生改革开放30年,人民卫生出版社,2008。