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移动终端中的通信安全技术研究
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摘要
随着移动终端向智能化、开放化的方向发展,移动终端的安全缺陷也日益显露。用户经常将银行账号与密码、重要通知和个人照片等重要隐私信息通过短信、彩信发送,但目前公众移动通信系统尚未提供用户数据的端到端加密传输服务,不能保证用户数据的传输安全。此外,伴随着移动互联网时代的到来,移动网络银行应用也应运而生,它的安全性要求更高,需要不可否认性和隐私保护。因此,本文将从移动通信端到端加密和移动网络银行安全两个方面,对移动终端中的通信安全技术进行研究。
     首先,本文提出了一种移动通信系统端到端加密方案。该方案利用智能卡进行加解密运算和密钥的安全存储,可以抵御移动终端恶意程序的攻击;采用多级密钥管理机制,定期更新密钥,确保密钥不被破解;实现了终端与密钥管理中心的双向认证以及应用程序对用户的认证。该方案可以保证消息在传输过程中和终端存储时的机密性和完整性
     其次,本文完成了移动通信系统端到端加密的终端程序设计。编码实现了Windows Mobile和Symbian平台上短信和彩信端到端加密程序。主要业务流程采用C++开发,这部分代码可以在各移动平台上实现复用。该加密程序能够确保短信和彩信在传输过程和终端存储时的安全。
     最后,本文提出了一种基于智能银行卡的移动网络银行的安全解决方案。智能银行卡是在银行卡中内置类似USB Key的安全模块,还有显示屏和按钮,与移动终端采用NFC的方式通信。用户在银行卡上输入密码后启动该卡,然后与服务器端进行认证。交易信息将发送到银行卡,卡上的显示屏显示交易信息,用户确认后对交易信息进行加密和签名,最后将加密信息发送到服务器。该方案具有很高的安全性,可以达到机密性、完整性、可用性和不可否认性等要求。
As the mobile terminal is becoming more and more intelligent and open, many of its security flaws have appeared. Many users often send bank account numbers and passwords, important notice, and personal photos, and other personal secret information via SMS and MMS. But the public mobile communication systems do not transmit user data with end-to-end encryption, so they cannot guarantee the security of user data. With the coming of mobile internet, applications of mobile online bank have appeared, and their security requirements are much higher. Therefore, this paper will focus on the secure communication technology on mobile terminals, including the end-to-end encryption for public mobile communication systems and the security of mobile online bank.
     Firstly, this paper proposes an end-to-end encryption scheme for public mobile communication systems. This scheme uses a smart card to complete encryption and decryption operations and to store keys safely, and so it can resist attacks from the mobile terminal; it adopts multi-level key management mechanism, updating keys regularly to ensure that the keys won't be cracked; it achieves mutual-authentication between terminals and KMC, and also the authentication from application to users. The scheme can guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of messages during transmission and storage on the terminal.
     Secondly, this paper completes the terminal program design of the end-to-end encryption for public communication systems. We complete the coding of SMS and MMS end-to-end encryption on Windows Mobile and Symbian. The main process is programmed by C++language, and this part of the codes can be used on other mobile platforms. The encryption program can ensure security of SMS and MMS during the transmission and storage processes.
     Finally, this paper proposes a mobile online bank's security solution based on smart bank card. The smart bank card has a built-in security module which is similar to the USB Key; it also has a display and buttons. It communipates with the mobile terminal by NFC. The user enters a password on the bank card to start it, and then the card will authenticate with the bank server. The transaction information would be sent to the bank card, and then be displayed on the card. After the transaction information is confirmed by the user, it will be signed and encrypted, and then be sent to the bank server. This scheme has a high level of security, it can meet the requirements of confidentiality, integrity, availability and non-repudiation.
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