基于定序合作博弈模型的人力资本定价级差问题研究
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摘要
从静态角度看,人力资本定价问题可以分解为两个子问题:(1)不同个体之间所得差距纵向倍数关系,本文简称“人力资本定价结构问题”。(2)个体所得一定,所得内部结构的设计。本文讨论第一个问题。
目前国内外人力资本定价研究存在的方法论误区是:试图直接确定人力资本绝对值,而人力资本绝对值处于不断变化中,计算绝对值往往需要作出一系列不同程度脱离实际的假设,研究结论的实践可行性由此显著削弱。
本文提出新研究思路如下:个体之间必须进行合作,因此人力资本的实现是一个合作博弈过程。现实中普遍存在的情形是:合作者对未来收益与自身对合作贡献难以精确量化,而只能或者只宜进行定序化,此时个体之间如何分配全联盟整体收益?本文将上述定义的博奕模型称为“定序合作博弈模型”。高校薪酬分配是定序合作博弈模型在现实中的一个具体应用。
第1章对人力资本理论发展历史进行扼要回顾,总结当前国内外人力资本领域研究的若干主要议题,指出人力资本定价问题还有进一步深化研究的必要。
第2章对合作博弈的发展历史与现状进行综述。
第3章应用不确定决策问题的字典序规则提出定序合作博弈模型的一个解概念即简单字典序解。
第4章、第5章使用实验方法、计量方法对定序合作博弈模型的的简单字典序解进行检验。
第6章讨论定序合作博弈模型解概念的效率分析问题,给出由三个子指标组成的人力资本定价方案的效率评价指标组合。
第7章指出2006年事业单位、高校、科研院所工资改革存在两大不足即职称职务分级过细、分级客观依据不足、薪酬差距倍数确定的客观依据不足。
第8章运用定序合作博弈模型针对2006年事业单位、高校、科研院所工资改革存在两大不足简要的给出政策建议。
第9章对进一步细化、深化第5、6、8章研究方案展开讨论。
第10章对本文主要创新点及若干附带问题进行了总结说明。
From static viewpoint, The human capital pricing problem could be decomposed two subproblems: (1) the pay grade structure between different level human capital. (2) when a person's pay is definite, how design the inner structure of the pay to motive a person to the most? This paper discusses the first subproblem.
In present domestic research, there exists a methodology pitfalls that always trying to calculating absolute value of a person's human capital.But the fact is the value of a person's human capital is rather in a ever-changing state than in a stable state.So under such conditions, many hypothesis and assumptions have to be advanced to reach the calculation.The fault is that too many hypothesises often undermine practical merit of the calculation.
A new approach is suggested in this paper, i.e.: a person's human capital features obvious grading status in a large group .According to this fact, we could measure a person's human capital in a quantitative way, and further resolve the human capital problems.
Because a person cannot realizes his/her human capital in a isolated environment, there must be cooperation between peoples, so the realization of human capital is a cooperation game process.A cooperation game model could be advanced according to the unsure character of human capital, the model' definition is below: when the whole grand coalition income of all players is set, but the contribution of single player to grand coalition cannot or shouldnot be set individually, so how should the whole income be distributed among single player?
The cooperation model definited as above is called 'N-person ordinal cooperation game model'.It is obvious that income distribution problems in college is an implementation in real life of N-person ordinal cooperation game model.
The main content and struc of this paper is as following:
Chap.1 reviews concisely on the history of humancapital theory, and suggests a new method for resolving human capital problem.
Chap.2 reviews concisely on the history and status quo of cooperation game theory.
Chap.3 suggests a value conception for N-person ordinal cooperation game model i.e. most simplest lexicographic value conception, MSL value conception.
Chap.4、chap.5 test MSL value conception using econometric method and experimental economics method.
Chap.6 discusses the efficiency of MSL value conception, and suggests a efficiency measurement indicator.
Chap.7 looks back on the history of china's salary system reforms since 1949, and there are two shortcomings in recent reform of 2006, i.e.: too many position grades、shortage of objectivity of salary grade.
Chap.8 uses N-person ordinal cooperation game model to discuss the two shortcomings in 2006 salary system reform, and gives some policy suggestions.
Chap.9 discusses the more detailed ways to strength the tests of chap.5、6、8.
Chap.10 sums up same main points of this paper on humancapital pricing problem.
目前国内外人力资本定价研究存在的方法论误区是:试图直接确定人力资本绝对值,而人力资本绝对值处于不断变化中,计算绝对值往往需要作出一系列不同程度脱离实际的假设,研究结论的实践可行性由此显著削弱。
本文提出新研究思路如下:个体之间必须进行合作,因此人力资本的实现是一个合作博弈过程。现实中普遍存在的情形是:合作者对未来收益与自身对合作贡献难以精确量化,而只能或者只宜进行定序化,此时个体之间如何分配全联盟整体收益?本文将上述定义的博奕模型称为“定序合作博弈模型”。高校薪酬分配是定序合作博弈模型在现实中的一个具体应用。
第1章对人力资本理论发展历史进行扼要回顾,总结当前国内外人力资本领域研究的若干主要议题,指出人力资本定价问题还有进一步深化研究的必要。
第2章对合作博弈的发展历史与现状进行综述。
第3章应用不确定决策问题的字典序规则提出定序合作博弈模型的一个解概念即简单字典序解。
第4章、第5章使用实验方法、计量方法对定序合作博弈模型的的简单字典序解进行检验。
第6章讨论定序合作博弈模型解概念的效率分析问题,给出由三个子指标组成的人力资本定价方案的效率评价指标组合。
第7章指出2006年事业单位、高校、科研院所工资改革存在两大不足即职称职务分级过细、分级客观依据不足、薪酬差距倍数确定的客观依据不足。
第8章运用定序合作博弈模型针对2006年事业单位、高校、科研院所工资改革存在两大不足简要的给出政策建议。
第9章对进一步细化、深化第5、6、8章研究方案展开讨论。
第10章对本文主要创新点及若干附带问题进行了总结说明。
From static viewpoint, The human capital pricing problem could be decomposed two subproblems: (1) the pay grade structure between different level human capital. (2) when a person's pay is definite, how design the inner structure of the pay to motive a person to the most? This paper discusses the first subproblem.
In present domestic research, there exists a methodology pitfalls that always trying to calculating absolute value of a person's human capital.But the fact is the value of a person's human capital is rather in a ever-changing state than in a stable state.So under such conditions, many hypothesis and assumptions have to be advanced to reach the calculation.The fault is that too many hypothesises often undermine practical merit of the calculation.
A new approach is suggested in this paper, i.e.: a person's human capital features obvious grading status in a large group .According to this fact, we could measure a person's human capital in a quantitative way, and further resolve the human capital problems.
Because a person cannot realizes his/her human capital in a isolated environment, there must be cooperation between peoples, so the realization of human capital is a cooperation game process.A cooperation game model could be advanced according to the unsure character of human capital, the model' definition is below: when the whole grand coalition income of all players is set, but the contribution of single player to grand coalition cannot or shouldnot be set individually, so how should the whole income be distributed among single player?
The cooperation model definited as above is called 'N-person ordinal cooperation game model'.It is obvious that income distribution problems in college is an implementation in real life of N-person ordinal cooperation game model.
The main content and struc of this paper is as following:
Chap.1 reviews concisely on the history of humancapital theory, and suggests a new method for resolving human capital problem.
Chap.2 reviews concisely on the history and status quo of cooperation game theory.
Chap.3 suggests a value conception for N-person ordinal cooperation game model i.e. most simplest lexicographic value conception, MSL value conception.
Chap.4、chap.5 test MSL value conception using econometric method and experimental economics method.
Chap.6 discusses the efficiency of MSL value conception, and suggests a efficiency measurement indicator.
Chap.7 looks back on the history of china's salary system reforms since 1949, and there are two shortcomings in recent reform of 2006, i.e.: too many position grades、shortage of objectivity of salary grade.
Chap.8 uses N-person ordinal cooperation game model to discuss the two shortcomings in 2006 salary system reform, and gives some policy suggestions.
Chap.9 discusses the more detailed ways to strength the tests of chap.5、6、8.
Chap.10 sums up same main points of this paper on humancapital pricing problem.
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