农业保险持续稳健发展的主体行为研究
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摘要
农业保险一直是世界各国保险学和农业经济学界所关注的话题,2004年至2009年我国连续6个中央一号文件都将农业保险列为金融支持农业发展的重要内容。但我国农业保险发展时断时续、停停走走、业务起伏起伏,无法给农民和保险公司以正常的生产、投资与经营预期,也无法稳定政府的财政负担。所以,从客观上讲,无论是农民、保险公司还是政府都希望农业保险能够持续稳健有效运行。要促进农业保险持续稳健发展,就必须根据农业保险持续稳健发展的要求分析农业保险各个主体的行为,通过协调解决各主体间的风险与利益冲突,改善和优化适合农业持续稳健发展的内外部环境,实现主体共赢。因此,本文以农业保险的主要主体(农户、保险公司和政府)及其行为为研究对象,从协调农业保险主体间风险与利益关系的视角研究农业保险问题,积极探索和选择适合农业保险持续稳健发展的最优路径,为农业增效、农民增收、农村发展提供持续有效保障。基于此,本文通过应用农户理论、行为经济学的判断与决策理论,结合制度变迁理论和市场失灵理论,从农业保险各个主体之间的风险与利益关系入手,对农业保险持续稳健发展的内涵、实现原则与条件、影响因素,以及农业保险各个主体及其行为进行了深入研究,就如何实现农业保险持续稳健发展提出相应的对策建议。
全文分为三个部分。第一部分即第一章和第二章,主要阐述农业保险持续稳健发展的内涵、实现原则与条件、影响因素,认为农业保险持续稳健发展要注重其发展潜力的持续培植,不断创造各主体之间风险与利益协调的可靠保证。
第二部分由第三章到第五章构成,以福建农业保险为例,对农业保险的三个主要主体及其行为进行研究,结果发现,无论是农户的农业保险购买行为,还是农业保险供给行为以及政府的农业保险支持行为的持续稳健性都较弱,共同导致农业保险发展持续稳健性较差。其中,增收难、收入低、接受偏好与过分自信、可得性偏差、宣传效果不够理想、前期决策结果影响显著等是导致福建农户农业保险购买行为持续稳健性较弱的主要根源。在农业保险供给方面,政府制度供给不足、财政支持力度小、农业再保险发展缓慢、投保率低、经营工作难度大等是其持续稳健性较弱的重要原因。而导致政府对福建农业保险支持行为的持续稳健性较弱的根本原因在于农业保险利益补偿机制存在严重缺陷,此外,制度供给不足、政府干预失灵、政府支持方式不够稳定也是其重要原因。
第三部分即第六章。通过对改革开放以来福建农业保险三个主体行为的研究,本文得出结论:第一,只有农业保险持续稳健发展才能持续有效发挥农业保险的功能与作用。第二,农业保险三个主要主体行为的弱持续稳健性共同导致农业保险发展持续稳健性较差,而其最根本原因就在于农业保险主体间的风险与利益未能得到有效的协调。第三,在农业灾害损失逐年上升的情况下,农业保险实现持续稳健发展的关键是在政府政策的配合与支持下,建立有效的一系列制度,协调农业保险主体间的风险与利益冲突,实现主体共赢。为此,本文提出实现农业保险持续稳健发展的具体对策:增加法律制度供给、选准经营机制、完善农业保险的利益补偿机制、健全农业风险分散体制、建立农业保险协调与监管机制、规范农业保险的经营,激发农民的农业保险需求。
本文在学术上对以往的研究进行了三个方面的改进:一是创新性地提出农业保险持续稳健发展的内涵;二是深化了行为经济学理论在农业保险领域的研究;三是综合行为经济的判断与决策理论、农户理论、制度变迁理论和市场失灵理论,同时对农业保险的三个主体及其行为进行分析,并以福建为例展开讨论。提出应在政府政策配合和支持下,建立有效的一系列制度,协调农业保险主体间的风险与利益关系,实现农业保险的持续稳健发展。
Agricultural insurance has been always the topics for the world’s insurance, the consecutive Central No.1 Documents from 2004 to 2009 regard agricultural insurance as an important aspect of financial support for agricultural development. However, the development of China’s agricultural insurance experienced intermittent, stop-go, the ups and downs of business, which is unable to give farmers and insurance companies accurate expectations in the normal production, investment and business, and can not stabilize the government’s financial burden. Therefore, objectively speaking, Therefore, objectively speaking, whether it is farmers, insurance companies or the government, they all wish agricultural insurance can continue to run effectively and steadily. To promote the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance, it must analyze the behavior of the various subjects based on the requirements of continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance. Through the coordination of conflicts in the risks and interest among the various bodies, it can improve the internal and external environment which is suitable for the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance and achieve the win-win situation.Therefore, this paper takes the main bodies of agricultural insurance (farmers, insurance companies and government) and their behavior as the research object, and studies from the perspective of the coordination of the relationship between risks and benefits in agricultural insurance, finally actively explore and select the optimal path for the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance.At this base,with the farmers theory ,judgments and decision-making of behavioral economics, institutional change theory and market failure theory, based on the relationship of risks and benefits between the main bodies of agricultural insurance,the paper studies the content, principles , conditions and influencing factors of the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance.Finally, it gives some corresponding suggestions.
This paper has three parts. The first part, including Chapter One and Chapter Two, describes the contents, principles, conditions and impact factors for the steady growth of agricultural insurance. We argues that, in order to keep the growth of agricultural insurance, it is important to develop its potential ability for stable growing, and it is necessary to keep the balance between benefits and risks in different bodies.
The second part of the paper composited of the third to the fifth chapter, which takes Fujian agricultural insurance for example and do study on the three main bodies and their behaviors of agricultural insurance. The result shows that neither farmers’purchase behavior nor insurance agents’supplying behavior or the government support for agricultural insurance, their continuous ability to development is weak, and all contributed to the poor stability on the development of sustainable agricultural insurance. Among them, the difficulty to increase revenue, low income, receive preference, and over-confident, availability bias, inadequate propaganda effect, the significant affection of previous decisions is main source of the continued weak stability of Fujian farmers’agricultural insurance purchase. In the term of agricultural insurance supply, the weak of the continuous stability lies in insufficient supply of government institution, little financial support, slow development of agriculture re-insurance, the low rate of insurance purchase, difficult operation and so on. The reasons led to the weak of continuing stability of Government’s support are that the serious shortcomings in the mechanism of interests compensation, inadequate institution supply, the failure of government intervention, instable government support, and so on.
Chapter Six is the third part. Through the study on the behavior of three main bodies in Fujian Agricultural Insurance since the reform and opening up, this paper get to three results. First, only the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance can lead to effective function of agricultural insurance. Second, continuous weak stability of the three main bodies’behavior lead to the poor continuing stability of agricultural insurance development, thereby the main reason lies in the poor coordination of the main risks and benefits among the bodies of agricultural insurance. Third, in the case of increasing losses in agricultural disaster year after year, the key to steady development of agricultural insurance is to establish an effective system to coordinate risk and interest conflict of the bodies in agricultural insurance under the cooperation and support of government policies, in order to achieve the win-win situation. In this paper, the specific responses to a continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance consisted of increasing the supply of the legal system, selecting the right operating mechanism, improving the interests compensation mechanism of the agricultural insurance, complementing risk diversification system, establishing a whole coordination and monitoring mechanism of agriculture insurance, regulating the operation of agricultural insurance, and stimulating farmers’demand for agricultural insurance.
Compared to the past academic research, there are three improvements. First, it innovativly put forward the connotation of the continuing healthy development in agricultural insurance. Second, it deepened the research of behavioral economics in the field of agricultural insurance. Third, combined with economic behavior theoryand decision-making theory, farmers’theory, institutional change theory and market failure theory, it simultaneously analyzed the three bodies and their behavior the agricultural insurance, and took Fujian as an example to discuss. It suggested that under the cooperation and support of government policies, the establishment of effective series of systems, the coordination of the relationship between risks and benefits among the main bodies in agricultural insurance can achieve the sustained stable development of agricultural insurance.
全文分为三个部分。第一部分即第一章和第二章,主要阐述农业保险持续稳健发展的内涵、实现原则与条件、影响因素,认为农业保险持续稳健发展要注重其发展潜力的持续培植,不断创造各主体之间风险与利益协调的可靠保证。
第二部分由第三章到第五章构成,以福建农业保险为例,对农业保险的三个主要主体及其行为进行研究,结果发现,无论是农户的农业保险购买行为,还是农业保险供给行为以及政府的农业保险支持行为的持续稳健性都较弱,共同导致农业保险发展持续稳健性较差。其中,增收难、收入低、接受偏好与过分自信、可得性偏差、宣传效果不够理想、前期决策结果影响显著等是导致福建农户农业保险购买行为持续稳健性较弱的主要根源。在农业保险供给方面,政府制度供给不足、财政支持力度小、农业再保险发展缓慢、投保率低、经营工作难度大等是其持续稳健性较弱的重要原因。而导致政府对福建农业保险支持行为的持续稳健性较弱的根本原因在于农业保险利益补偿机制存在严重缺陷,此外,制度供给不足、政府干预失灵、政府支持方式不够稳定也是其重要原因。
第三部分即第六章。通过对改革开放以来福建农业保险三个主体行为的研究,本文得出结论:第一,只有农业保险持续稳健发展才能持续有效发挥农业保险的功能与作用。第二,农业保险三个主要主体行为的弱持续稳健性共同导致农业保险发展持续稳健性较差,而其最根本原因就在于农业保险主体间的风险与利益未能得到有效的协调。第三,在农业灾害损失逐年上升的情况下,农业保险实现持续稳健发展的关键是在政府政策的配合与支持下,建立有效的一系列制度,协调农业保险主体间的风险与利益冲突,实现主体共赢。为此,本文提出实现农业保险持续稳健发展的具体对策:增加法律制度供给、选准经营机制、完善农业保险的利益补偿机制、健全农业风险分散体制、建立农业保险协调与监管机制、规范农业保险的经营,激发农民的农业保险需求。
本文在学术上对以往的研究进行了三个方面的改进:一是创新性地提出农业保险持续稳健发展的内涵;二是深化了行为经济学理论在农业保险领域的研究;三是综合行为经济的判断与决策理论、农户理论、制度变迁理论和市场失灵理论,同时对农业保险的三个主体及其行为进行分析,并以福建为例展开讨论。提出应在政府政策配合和支持下,建立有效的一系列制度,协调农业保险主体间的风险与利益关系,实现农业保险的持续稳健发展。
Agricultural insurance has been always the topics for the world’s insurance, the consecutive Central No.1 Documents from 2004 to 2009 regard agricultural insurance as an important aspect of financial support for agricultural development. However, the development of China’s agricultural insurance experienced intermittent, stop-go, the ups and downs of business, which is unable to give farmers and insurance companies accurate expectations in the normal production, investment and business, and can not stabilize the government’s financial burden. Therefore, objectively speaking, Therefore, objectively speaking, whether it is farmers, insurance companies or the government, they all wish agricultural insurance can continue to run effectively and steadily. To promote the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance, it must analyze the behavior of the various subjects based on the requirements of continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance. Through the coordination of conflicts in the risks and interest among the various bodies, it can improve the internal and external environment which is suitable for the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance and achieve the win-win situation.Therefore, this paper takes the main bodies of agricultural insurance (farmers, insurance companies and government) and their behavior as the research object, and studies from the perspective of the coordination of the relationship between risks and benefits in agricultural insurance, finally actively explore and select the optimal path for the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance.At this base,with the farmers theory ,judgments and decision-making of behavioral economics, institutional change theory and market failure theory, based on the relationship of risks and benefits between the main bodies of agricultural insurance,the paper studies the content, principles , conditions and influencing factors of the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance.Finally, it gives some corresponding suggestions.
This paper has three parts. The first part, including Chapter One and Chapter Two, describes the contents, principles, conditions and impact factors for the steady growth of agricultural insurance. We argues that, in order to keep the growth of agricultural insurance, it is important to develop its potential ability for stable growing, and it is necessary to keep the balance between benefits and risks in different bodies.
The second part of the paper composited of the third to the fifth chapter, which takes Fujian agricultural insurance for example and do study on the three main bodies and their behaviors of agricultural insurance. The result shows that neither farmers’purchase behavior nor insurance agents’supplying behavior or the government support for agricultural insurance, their continuous ability to development is weak, and all contributed to the poor stability on the development of sustainable agricultural insurance. Among them, the difficulty to increase revenue, low income, receive preference, and over-confident, availability bias, inadequate propaganda effect, the significant affection of previous decisions is main source of the continued weak stability of Fujian farmers’agricultural insurance purchase. In the term of agricultural insurance supply, the weak of the continuous stability lies in insufficient supply of government institution, little financial support, slow development of agriculture re-insurance, the low rate of insurance purchase, difficult operation and so on. The reasons led to the weak of continuing stability of Government’s support are that the serious shortcomings in the mechanism of interests compensation, inadequate institution supply, the failure of government intervention, instable government support, and so on.
Chapter Six is the third part. Through the study on the behavior of three main bodies in Fujian Agricultural Insurance since the reform and opening up, this paper get to three results. First, only the continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance can lead to effective function of agricultural insurance. Second, continuous weak stability of the three main bodies’behavior lead to the poor continuing stability of agricultural insurance development, thereby the main reason lies in the poor coordination of the main risks and benefits among the bodies of agricultural insurance. Third, in the case of increasing losses in agricultural disaster year after year, the key to steady development of agricultural insurance is to establish an effective system to coordinate risk and interest conflict of the bodies in agricultural insurance under the cooperation and support of government policies, in order to achieve the win-win situation. In this paper, the specific responses to a continuing healthy development of agricultural insurance consisted of increasing the supply of the legal system, selecting the right operating mechanism, improving the interests compensation mechanism of the agricultural insurance, complementing risk diversification system, establishing a whole coordination and monitoring mechanism of agriculture insurance, regulating the operation of agricultural insurance, and stimulating farmers’demand for agricultural insurance.
Compared to the past academic research, there are three improvements. First, it innovativly put forward the connotation of the continuing healthy development in agricultural insurance. Second, it deepened the research of behavioral economics in the field of agricultural insurance. Third, combined with economic behavior theoryand decision-making theory, farmers’theory, institutional change theory and market failure theory, it simultaneously analyzed the three bodies and their behavior the agricultural insurance, and took Fujian as an example to discuss. It suggested that under the cooperation and support of government policies, the establishment of effective series of systems, the coordination of the relationship between risks and benefits among the main bodies in agricultural insurance can achieve the sustained stable development of agricultural insurance.
引文
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