新型社区公共产品有效供给机制研究
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摘要
随着城市化进程的加快,创建新型社会建设模式,打造新型社区,对于我国经济发展和社会稳定起到了关键性作用。政府通过有效提供新型社区公共产品,结合新型社区基层建设,为缓解我国贫困、城乡收入差距、农民工和失地农民的基本社会保障不足等矛盾作出了巨大贡献,是消除我国经济发展瓶颈性障碍的重要手段。自十六届三中全会以来,我国政府一直致力于新型社区建设,社区公共产品的有效供给始终是重要议题之一,“十二五”规划又将建立健全基本公共产品及服务体系作为其重要内容,强调“逐步实现不同区域的基本公共产品及服务均等化”。表明国家对新型社区公共产品的有效供给给予了高度重视。但在新型社区建设过程中,公共产品有效供给不足问题始终存在,主要表现在居民需求表达路径不畅、供给总量不足以及供需错位等方面。目前,居民对公共健康、公共教育、公共卫生、公共环境以及社会保障等基本公共产品日益增长的需求与其有效供给不足之间的矛盾,已成为我国社会建设的主要矛盾。现有的公共产品理论,即需求表达理论和供给理论不能有效的解释这些现实问题,更不能解决这一主要矛盾。因此,研究新型社区公共产品的有效供给机制,极具理论和现实意义。
论文主体分七大部分对新型社区公共产品有效供给机制展开论述：
第一部分：引言。引言部分主要介绍选题的背景、研究目的和意义、文献综述、论文的基本框架、研究方法和技术路线以及本论文的创新和不足等内容。
第二部分：新型社区与新型社区公共产品的基本界定。“新型社区”和“新型公共产品”是本论文中两个最基本的概念界定,也是本论文的研究基础。
1.对“新型社区”的重新诠释。在我国城镇化进程中,传统的社区划分方式已不能完全函括现代社区建设发展的新局面和新特点,同时国家也未出台统筹规划安排,各地区依据实际发展需要自行创建,模式不一。本文根据经济发展程度、居民结构、社区功能和文化底蕴,把新型社区划分为四种形式：城市社区、新型农村社区、农民工社区和企业社区,文中在分别对四类新型社区的概念和特征进行分类描述的基础上,提出了我国新型社区的新内涵。
2.对“新型社区公共产品”的概念界定。本文在论述我国新型社区发展模式的基础上,依照布坎南的可分性—不可分性方法,对新型社区公共产品的内涵进行了合理界定,并在探讨产品特征的基础上,对新型社区公共产品进行了分类比较研究。
第三部分：新型社区公共产品有效供给理论研究。本文在新型社区公共产品有效供给理论研究方面的论证重点存在于两方面：一是把公共产品的提供平台设置在新型社区范围内,通过缩小规模来提高需求表达效率；二是根据新型社区公共产品是否存在外溢性,将新型社区公共产品区分为新型社区非外溢性公共产品和新型社区外溢性公共产品,本文在研究新型社区公共产品基本供给理论的基础上,又着重探讨了新型社区间外溢性公共产品提供模式的理论基础,力求更加全面、深入的解决公共产品供给低效问题,并为之提供新的思维方式和目标途径。
1.新型社区公共产品需求表达有效性的理论基础。本文通过公共选择成本理论和个体理性经济人假设理论论证了由社区这一载体提供公共产品可以保证居民对公共产品需求表达的有效性,新型社区应作为公共产品的基本供给单位和基础平台。
2.新型社区公共产品供给有效性的理论基础。本文分别通过规范分析、图理分析、构建静态博弈均衡模型等方法,从多中心理论、公共权力学说理论和制度变迁和制度创新理论三个角度来研究新型社区公共产品多元提供模式的理论基础。
3.新型社区公共产品外溢性公共产品合作供给的理论基础。新型社区公共产品具有动态外溢性特征,导致“免费搭便车”问题和公共资源有欠优化等问题,新型社区之间需要研究一种新的提供模式来解决这类公共产品。本文将从免费搭便车理论和公共资源优化配置理论两大角度来研究新型社区外溢性公共产品的理论基础。
第四部分：新型社区公共产品有效供给机制的基本内容。根据新型社区的新特征,以及居民对公共产品的新需求,本文分别对新型社区公共产品需求表达机制、供给机制和基本原则进行了重新认定。
1.新型社区公共产品需求表达机制分析。新型社区公共产品需求表达机制主要包括需求表达方法和需求表达路径两方面。根据新型社区公共产品的范围、性质和需求特征,本文通过对典型的需求表达方法和表达路径进行了比较分析,结果表明：目前在我国,需求表达方法的现实选择是用手投票方法和或有估价方法；新型社区居委会、议事会和社会组织三大需求表达路径各具特色,其社会性功能均具有极大的可挖掘力。
2.新型社区公共产品的供给机制研究。新型社区公共产品供给机制主要包括供给要素和提供模式两方面。本文通过图理描述、数理推导等方式对供给要素和提供模式进行分类研究。结果表明：多元提供模式是能够保证我国新型社区公共产品有效供给的最佳模式,是选择新型社区公共产品提供模式,的必然趋势。
3.新型社区公共产品的基本原则。为保证新型社区公共产品的有效供给,效率与公平是两大基本原则,二者相互兼顾,相得益彰,不存在替代关系。其中,效率原则包括帕累托最优、帕累托改进和潜在帕累托改进原则,公平原则包括机会均等和社会分配公平。
第五部分：新型社区公共产品供给效率的实证研究。本文通过分别对新型社区公共产品需求表达及其多维提供模式的现状和效率性进行实证分析,发现我国新型社区公共产品需求表达效率和供给效率双重低下,问题突出。
1.新型社区公共产品需求表达效率的实证研究。本文基于2009年西南财经大学财税学院“农村公共产品研究课题组”的调研资料、中国人民大学社会学系与香港科技大学社会科学部的“中国综合社会调查”数据、国家统计局第五次人口普查基础数据,使用描述性统计方法对我国新型社区公共产品需求表达效率进行了相关实证研究。结果表明：居民公共产品需求表达渠道不通畅,是我国当前地方公共产品供给有效性严重不足的主要原因。“用手投票”是公共产品需求表达的基本途径,流动人口部分反映了居民对公共产品的需求,但囿于户籍制度,用脚投票机制在我国尚不可行。另外,有待提高的农村居民素质、孱弱的组织行动能力以及落后的管理手段,是影响“一事一议”直接需求表达效率的重要因素。选民较低的参与度和我国传统的“自上而下”供给体制,导致居民通过基层选举来表达对公共产品需求的渠道不通畅。因此,居民在“用手投票”表达公共产品需求效率低下的情况下,解放户籍制度,直接通过“用脚投票”成为唯一选择。
2.新型社区公共产品供给效率的实证研究。本论文通过对2007-2012年城市社区公共产品支出水平与新型农村社区公共产品支出水平进行比较,发现我国新型社区在提供公共产品时出现了明显的非均等化特征；又通过对2007-2012年我国31个省、自治区和直辖市的地方一般公共支出与多维供给模式中政府、社会组织和私人企业三大要素的组织规模和出资规模进行数量比较和面板数据计量分析,结果表明：在新型社区公共产品的提供上,政府无论在组织规模上还是出资规模上,都较社会组织和私人企业有明显优势,我国新型社区公共产品的供给主体仍是政府,多维供给机制呈现出“一大二小”的偏倚性特征,即多维供给机制并未实质性建立起来,还需要进一步完善。
第六部分：提高新型社区公共产品有效供给的政策理论模型。本文将构建两大政策模型为有效供给新型社区公共产品的政策改革及实施提供理论指导,一是构建“互联、互补、互动”三大联动机制的政策理论模型；二是通过构建外溢性公共产品供给模式的非合作博弈均衡模型,提出新型社区之间的直接供给承诺和匹配率间接供给机制。
1.“互联、互补、互动”三大联动机制的政策理论模型构建。本文就政府调控机制与社会协作机制之间的互联机制、政府行政功能和社会自治功能之间的互补机制、政府管理力量与社会调节力量之间的互动机制进行研究。
2.新型社区外溢性公共产品供给模式的非合作博弈均衡模型。本文通过构建两个社区之间的非合作博弈均衡模型,从理论上探讨了同时提供和序贯提供两种社区间外溢性公共产品的二阶段或三阶段博弈均衡变化过程,并在此基础上分析了直接供给承诺与以匹配率为主要方式的间接供给承诺的相互关系。研究表明：两个社区完全承诺直接供给和匹配率间接供给下的同时提供模型结果是帕累托最优的：只有一个社区进行匹配率间接承诺的模型结果具有不确定性,但是做出匹配率承诺的社区的福利对比没有承诺的社区来说有所增进;序贯提供两种外溢性公共产品时,总供给量要低于同时提供模型的总供给量,两种外溢性公共产品的供给量具有关联性,匹配率的作用不显著。
第七部分：完善新型社区公共产品供给机制的政策建议。本文通过田野调查、案例研究等方法,在获取了当前我国典型案例信息的基础上,建议从如何构建互联、互动、互补机制角度出发,完善新型社区需求表达机制,强化新型社区治理的共治性,积极构建多维供给模式；并根据非合作博弈均衡模型的推导结果,提出新型社区间就外溢性公共产品应如何实施直接供给与匹配率间接供给的合作机制；另外,本文又从资金筹集、法律规范、政策引导和加强监管等方面设置配套机制以提高新型社区公共产品的供给效应。
With the accelerated process of urbanization, creating a new type of social construction model and building new types of communities have played a key role in the economic development and social stability. Combined with the new community construction at the grassroots level, the government made huge contributions to alleviate poverty, the income gap between urban and rural areas, and lack of basic social security and so on by providing the new community public goods effectively. It is an important means to eliminate the bottleneck of economic development in our country that providing the new community public goods effectively. Our government has been committed to the new community construction, and it is a important issue that providing the new community public goods effectively since the third plenary session of16th. The "twelfth five-year" plan emphasizes on providing basic public goods equally at different regions, and one of its contents is to establish and perfect the system of basic public goods and services. All suggest that our government attaches great importance to providing the new community public goods effectively. But now, it has always existed that the problem of the shortage supplying in the new community public goods with the process of the new community construction. The main contents are the poor expressing paths, supplying insufficiently, as well as the dislocation between supplying and demanding. The existing public goods theories, which have supplying theory and expressing demands theory, couldn't explain the realistic problems effectively, more couldn't make a theoretical guidance to the government in providing the new community public goods effectively. And these problems couldn't solve timely and effectively, that would lead to economic development lacking of power, social instability and other major issues. Now, the contradiction between the growing demands for public goods from the new community residents and the lack of effective providing has been a main contradiction at the process of the new community construction. Recently, residents discontented with the public health, the public education, the public environment, social security and so on form weakly to strongly, which shows that contradictions of the social construction increasingly prominent and have intensified trend. Therefore, the study of mechanisms in providing public goods for the new community effectively has extreme theoretical and practical values.
The paper is divided into seven parts to study mechanisms in providing public goods for the new community effectively.
The first part:Introduction. The introduction section mainly introduces the topic background, research purpose and significance, the present research situation in domestic and foreign, the basic framework, research methods, technical route, the innovation and the insufficiency of the paper, etc.
The second part:The study that how to definite the new community and its public goods."The new community" and "the new community public goods" are two most basic definitions in the research, also is the basis of this research.
1. The reinterpretation of "the new community".In the process of urbanization, traditional methods couldn't contain new situations and new characteristics in the construction and development of the new community. The government didn't make a unified planning. Regions create different patterns in the new community by the actual development needs. According to the degree of economic development, the residents'structure, community functions and the cultural background, there are four forms about the new community:urban community, the new rural community, rural migrant workers community and enterprise community. The paper described concepts and features.
2. The concept of "the new community public goods". At the basis of delimiting the new community, according to the Buchanan method, the paper proposed the accurate definition about the new community public goods and basic characteristics. At last, the paper had a comparison and classification research on it.
The third part:The theory research of providing the new community public goods effectively. There are two main contents. One is the platform of providing public goods has been set up the new community, which improved the efficiency of expressing demands; Second is the new community public goods is divided into the spillover public goods and the not spillover according to the new community whether surplus. The paper discusses the theoretical foundation of providing two types of public goods. The two aspects made the supply of public goods meet the residents'needs, improve the supplying efficiency, and achieve the optimal allocation of resources. This part provides a new thinking way to solve the problem of the inefficient supplying on the new community public goods.
1. The theoretical basis on how to make sure the effectiveness of expressing demands on the new community public goods. The cost of public choice theory and the hypothesis of individual rational economic man theory would show that the new community is the best platform to provide public goods at the reason of it guaranteeing the effectiveness of expressing demands on public goods.
2. The theory basis on how to make sure the effectiveness of providing the new community public goods. The grassroots democracy constructed in the new community in our country, which gave the diversified interests structure characteristic to the new community. At the same time, Multidimensional offer pattern is referred to providing public goods for meeting the heterogeneity and diversity of demands. Based on the multi-center theory, public power theory and the institutional change and institutional innovation theory, this part would study the theoretical foundation of the efficient supply in the new community public goods.
3. The theory basis on how to make sure the effectiveness of cooperated providing the spillover public goods. According to the spillover feature of the new community public goods, new communities should take mutual cooperation pattern to provide to avoid the free-ride problem and achieve the social Pareto optimal allocation of public resources. This part would explore the theory foundation for the spillover public goods from the free-ride theory and the theory of optimal allocation in public resources.
The fourth part:The study of the elements which the new community public goods have and basis principles in providing public goods effectively. According to new features of the new community and residents'demands for public goods, the paper reidentifints elements of expressing demands and supplying.
1. The study on the expression mechanism of community public goods demands. The expression mechanism of community public goods demands mainly includes the expression method and the expression way. In the analysis of methods of expressing demands and paths, the realistic choices are to improve the use of valuation of voting by hand or feet, and to use three paths which have a new community neighborhood committee, Council and social organization.
2. The study on the supply mechanism model of the new community public goods. The supplying system mainly includes two aspects, which are supplying factors and providing modes. In the analysis of the supply factors and the supply modes, the paper shows that, multiple offer patterns is he best model that is able to guarantee the effective supply of the new community public goods, and which is inevitable trend of choosing the supplying ways.
3. The basic principles of the new community public goods. In order to ensure the effective supply of new community public goods, efficiency and fairness are two basic and indispensable principles, the efficiency includes Pareto optimality, Pareto improvement and potential Pareto improvement principle, fair principle includes the equal opportunity and social justice; in addition, in the field of the new community public goods, efficiency and fairness principle work together harmony and there is not a trade-off relationship between the two.
The fifth part:An Empirical Study on the supplying efficiency of the new community public goods. Through the analysis of the status and efficiency in expressing demands, multidimensional offer pattern's situation and efficiency, as well as summarizing problems, we can find out that tihere has no efficiency in expressing demands and supplying.
1. An empirical study on the efficiency of expressing the new community public goods demands. Based on the survey data of the finance and Taxation College of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics " the countryside public goods research group " in2009, and the " China General Social Survey " data of the Sociology Department of Renmin University in China and the Hong Kong University Science&Technology, Department of Social Sciences, the national Bureau of statistics of the fifth census data, using descriptive statistical method and SAS clustering analysis with the expressing efficiency of the new community public goods. The results show that:The inefficiency of local public goods supply is becoming a serious problem, the main cause is that expression channels of residents demand for public goods are not patency. The main public goods expressions are "voting by hand" and "voting by feet". Based on the empirical analysis of "voting by hand" and "voting by their feet", we get these conclusions:the poor rural residents'Quality, the inability of executive power and backward management means, are the factors which leads to the no-efficiency of "one project one discussion" direct-expression. The low voters'extent of participation and the disjunction between election practice and theory, are the reasons of public goods expression no-patency by grass-roots election way. The residents have to "vote by feet" when they can't express public goods demand smoothly by the "voting by hand" way.
2. An empirical study on the efficiency of supplying the new community public goods. Based on the data from2007to2012, and making comparison with three aspects, which are the expenditure level of public goods in city and in the rural, the organization scale of government and non-governmental (including social organizations and private enterprises), the investment scale of the government and the social capital. The article makes some questions, which the local government is still main body to provide new type of community public service, new types of community public service are in lack and providing unfairly, are also serious, through the methods of panel data measurement analysis to the local general public expenditure in31provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. Aiming at these issues, this paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the efficiency in providing new types of new community public services, such as transforming the government leading provide mechanism, building multidimensional offer pattern.
The sixth part:The study of the policy's theory model to achieve the effective supplying the new community public goods. The part will construct two policy's theory models providing guidance for policy reform on the effective supplying of the new community public goods, The one is a linkage mechanism of " Internet, complementary, interactive "; the second is the study of two or three phases dynamic game change process of providing two spillover public goods at the same time and sequentially by constructing a non cooperative game equilibrium model between two communities.
1. Construction the linkage mechanism of "Internet, complementary, interactive ".The Internet mechanism refers to the relationship of the government regulation mechanism and social collaboration mechanism; the complementary mechanism is the relationship of administrative functions of government and social autonomy function; the interaction mechanism is the relationship of government management and social adjustment.
2. The study of two or three phase's dynamic game change process of providing two spillover public goods at the same time and sequentially by constructing a non cooperative game equilibrium model between two communities. The paper studies two or three phases dynamic game change process of providing two spillover public goods at the same time and sequentially by constructing a non cooperative game equilibrium model between two communities. This paper also studies the relation of direct contributions and matching rate on the basis of this model. Research finds that the result of committing direct contributions and matching rate by two communities at the same time is the Pareto optimality. The model result of one community committing matching rate is uncertain, and the welfare of committing area would improve in contrast with committing direct contributions and matching rate by two communities. Total quantity of two spillover public goods by providing sequentially is lower than total quantity of providing at the same time. Two spillover public goods have relation in supplying character, and the matching rate has no significant role of supplying character. Hereby, some recommendations are proposed for how to provide spillover public goods between some communities.
The seventh part:The policy research to improve the supplying efficiency of the new community public goods. Based on case studies and fieldwork studies, this part discusses the roles of the government, the social organism, and the enterprise in the provision of basic public goods in the transformation stage to provide the corresponding policy suggestions for the effective supplying, from perfecting the expression mechanism, strengthening co-governance between community and government, and improving the supporting mechanism.
论文主体分七大部分对新型社区公共产品有效供给机制展开论述：
第一部分：引言。引言部分主要介绍选题的背景、研究目的和意义、文献综述、论文的基本框架、研究方法和技术路线以及本论文的创新和不足等内容。
第二部分：新型社区与新型社区公共产品的基本界定。“新型社区”和“新型公共产品”是本论文中两个最基本的概念界定,也是本论文的研究基础。
1.对“新型社区”的重新诠释。在我国城镇化进程中,传统的社区划分方式已不能完全函括现代社区建设发展的新局面和新特点,同时国家也未出台统筹规划安排,各地区依据实际发展需要自行创建,模式不一。本文根据经济发展程度、居民结构、社区功能和文化底蕴,把新型社区划分为四种形式：城市社区、新型农村社区、农民工社区和企业社区,文中在分别对四类新型社区的概念和特征进行分类描述的基础上,提出了我国新型社区的新内涵。
2.对“新型社区公共产品”的概念界定。本文在论述我国新型社区发展模式的基础上,依照布坎南的可分性—不可分性方法,对新型社区公共产品的内涵进行了合理界定,并在探讨产品特征的基础上,对新型社区公共产品进行了分类比较研究。
第三部分：新型社区公共产品有效供给理论研究。本文在新型社区公共产品有效供给理论研究方面的论证重点存在于两方面：一是把公共产品的提供平台设置在新型社区范围内,通过缩小规模来提高需求表达效率；二是根据新型社区公共产品是否存在外溢性,将新型社区公共产品区分为新型社区非外溢性公共产品和新型社区外溢性公共产品,本文在研究新型社区公共产品基本供给理论的基础上,又着重探讨了新型社区间外溢性公共产品提供模式的理论基础,力求更加全面、深入的解决公共产品供给低效问题,并为之提供新的思维方式和目标途径。
1.新型社区公共产品需求表达有效性的理论基础。本文通过公共选择成本理论和个体理性经济人假设理论论证了由社区这一载体提供公共产品可以保证居民对公共产品需求表达的有效性,新型社区应作为公共产品的基本供给单位和基础平台。
2.新型社区公共产品供给有效性的理论基础。本文分别通过规范分析、图理分析、构建静态博弈均衡模型等方法,从多中心理论、公共权力学说理论和制度变迁和制度创新理论三个角度来研究新型社区公共产品多元提供模式的理论基础。
3.新型社区公共产品外溢性公共产品合作供给的理论基础。新型社区公共产品具有动态外溢性特征,导致“免费搭便车”问题和公共资源有欠优化等问题,新型社区之间需要研究一种新的提供模式来解决这类公共产品。本文将从免费搭便车理论和公共资源优化配置理论两大角度来研究新型社区外溢性公共产品的理论基础。
第四部分：新型社区公共产品有效供给机制的基本内容。根据新型社区的新特征,以及居民对公共产品的新需求,本文分别对新型社区公共产品需求表达机制、供给机制和基本原则进行了重新认定。
1.新型社区公共产品需求表达机制分析。新型社区公共产品需求表达机制主要包括需求表达方法和需求表达路径两方面。根据新型社区公共产品的范围、性质和需求特征,本文通过对典型的需求表达方法和表达路径进行了比较分析,结果表明：目前在我国,需求表达方法的现实选择是用手投票方法和或有估价方法；新型社区居委会、议事会和社会组织三大需求表达路径各具特色,其社会性功能均具有极大的可挖掘力。
2.新型社区公共产品的供给机制研究。新型社区公共产品供给机制主要包括供给要素和提供模式两方面。本文通过图理描述、数理推导等方式对供给要素和提供模式进行分类研究。结果表明：多元提供模式是能够保证我国新型社区公共产品有效供给的最佳模式,是选择新型社区公共产品提供模式,的必然趋势。
3.新型社区公共产品的基本原则。为保证新型社区公共产品的有效供给,效率与公平是两大基本原则,二者相互兼顾,相得益彰,不存在替代关系。其中,效率原则包括帕累托最优、帕累托改进和潜在帕累托改进原则,公平原则包括机会均等和社会分配公平。
第五部分：新型社区公共产品供给效率的实证研究。本文通过分别对新型社区公共产品需求表达及其多维提供模式的现状和效率性进行实证分析,发现我国新型社区公共产品需求表达效率和供给效率双重低下,问题突出。
1.新型社区公共产品需求表达效率的实证研究。本文基于2009年西南财经大学财税学院“农村公共产品研究课题组”的调研资料、中国人民大学社会学系与香港科技大学社会科学部的“中国综合社会调查”数据、国家统计局第五次人口普查基础数据,使用描述性统计方法对我国新型社区公共产品需求表达效率进行了相关实证研究。结果表明：居民公共产品需求表达渠道不通畅,是我国当前地方公共产品供给有效性严重不足的主要原因。“用手投票”是公共产品需求表达的基本途径,流动人口部分反映了居民对公共产品的需求,但囿于户籍制度,用脚投票机制在我国尚不可行。另外,有待提高的农村居民素质、孱弱的组织行动能力以及落后的管理手段,是影响“一事一议”直接需求表达效率的重要因素。选民较低的参与度和我国传统的“自上而下”供给体制,导致居民通过基层选举来表达对公共产品需求的渠道不通畅。因此,居民在“用手投票”表达公共产品需求效率低下的情况下,解放户籍制度,直接通过“用脚投票”成为唯一选择。
2.新型社区公共产品供给效率的实证研究。本论文通过对2007-2012年城市社区公共产品支出水平与新型农村社区公共产品支出水平进行比较,发现我国新型社区在提供公共产品时出现了明显的非均等化特征；又通过对2007-2012年我国31个省、自治区和直辖市的地方一般公共支出与多维供给模式中政府、社会组织和私人企业三大要素的组织规模和出资规模进行数量比较和面板数据计量分析,结果表明：在新型社区公共产品的提供上,政府无论在组织规模上还是出资规模上,都较社会组织和私人企业有明显优势,我国新型社区公共产品的供给主体仍是政府,多维供给机制呈现出“一大二小”的偏倚性特征,即多维供给机制并未实质性建立起来,还需要进一步完善。
第六部分：提高新型社区公共产品有效供给的政策理论模型。本文将构建两大政策模型为有效供给新型社区公共产品的政策改革及实施提供理论指导,一是构建“互联、互补、互动”三大联动机制的政策理论模型；二是通过构建外溢性公共产品供给模式的非合作博弈均衡模型,提出新型社区之间的直接供给承诺和匹配率间接供给机制。
1.“互联、互补、互动”三大联动机制的政策理论模型构建。本文就政府调控机制与社会协作机制之间的互联机制、政府行政功能和社会自治功能之间的互补机制、政府管理力量与社会调节力量之间的互动机制进行研究。
2.新型社区外溢性公共产品供给模式的非合作博弈均衡模型。本文通过构建两个社区之间的非合作博弈均衡模型,从理论上探讨了同时提供和序贯提供两种社区间外溢性公共产品的二阶段或三阶段博弈均衡变化过程,并在此基础上分析了直接供给承诺与以匹配率为主要方式的间接供给承诺的相互关系。研究表明：两个社区完全承诺直接供给和匹配率间接供给下的同时提供模型结果是帕累托最优的：只有一个社区进行匹配率间接承诺的模型结果具有不确定性,但是做出匹配率承诺的社区的福利对比没有承诺的社区来说有所增进;序贯提供两种外溢性公共产品时,总供给量要低于同时提供模型的总供给量,两种外溢性公共产品的供给量具有关联性,匹配率的作用不显著。
第七部分：完善新型社区公共产品供给机制的政策建议。本文通过田野调查、案例研究等方法,在获取了当前我国典型案例信息的基础上,建议从如何构建互联、互动、互补机制角度出发,完善新型社区需求表达机制,强化新型社区治理的共治性,积极构建多维供给模式；并根据非合作博弈均衡模型的推导结果,提出新型社区间就外溢性公共产品应如何实施直接供给与匹配率间接供给的合作机制；另外,本文又从资金筹集、法律规范、政策引导和加强监管等方面设置配套机制以提高新型社区公共产品的供给效应。
With the accelerated process of urbanization, creating a new type of social construction model and building new types of communities have played a key role in the economic development and social stability. Combined with the new community construction at the grassroots level, the government made huge contributions to alleviate poverty, the income gap between urban and rural areas, and lack of basic social security and so on by providing the new community public goods effectively. It is an important means to eliminate the bottleneck of economic development in our country that providing the new community public goods effectively. Our government has been committed to the new community construction, and it is a important issue that providing the new community public goods effectively since the third plenary session of16th. The "twelfth five-year" plan emphasizes on providing basic public goods equally at different regions, and one of its contents is to establish and perfect the system of basic public goods and services. All suggest that our government attaches great importance to providing the new community public goods effectively. But now, it has always existed that the problem of the shortage supplying in the new community public goods with the process of the new community construction. The main contents are the poor expressing paths, supplying insufficiently, as well as the dislocation between supplying and demanding. The existing public goods theories, which have supplying theory and expressing demands theory, couldn't explain the realistic problems effectively, more couldn't make a theoretical guidance to the government in providing the new community public goods effectively. And these problems couldn't solve timely and effectively, that would lead to economic development lacking of power, social instability and other major issues. Now, the contradiction between the growing demands for public goods from the new community residents and the lack of effective providing has been a main contradiction at the process of the new community construction. Recently, residents discontented with the public health, the public education, the public environment, social security and so on form weakly to strongly, which shows that contradictions of the social construction increasingly prominent and have intensified trend. Therefore, the study of mechanisms in providing public goods for the new community effectively has extreme theoretical and practical values.
The paper is divided into seven parts to study mechanisms in providing public goods for the new community effectively.
The first part:Introduction. The introduction section mainly introduces the topic background, research purpose and significance, the present research situation in domestic and foreign, the basic framework, research methods, technical route, the innovation and the insufficiency of the paper, etc.
The second part:The study that how to definite the new community and its public goods."The new community" and "the new community public goods" are two most basic definitions in the research, also is the basis of this research.
1. The reinterpretation of "the new community".In the process of urbanization, traditional methods couldn't contain new situations and new characteristics in the construction and development of the new community. The government didn't make a unified planning. Regions create different patterns in the new community by the actual development needs. According to the degree of economic development, the residents'structure, community functions and the cultural background, there are four forms about the new community:urban community, the new rural community, rural migrant workers community and enterprise community. The paper described concepts and features.
2. The concept of "the new community public goods". At the basis of delimiting the new community, according to the Buchanan method, the paper proposed the accurate definition about the new community public goods and basic characteristics. At last, the paper had a comparison and classification research on it.
The third part:The theory research of providing the new community public goods effectively. There are two main contents. One is the platform of providing public goods has been set up the new community, which improved the efficiency of expressing demands; Second is the new community public goods is divided into the spillover public goods and the not spillover according to the new community whether surplus. The paper discusses the theoretical foundation of providing two types of public goods. The two aspects made the supply of public goods meet the residents'needs, improve the supplying efficiency, and achieve the optimal allocation of resources. This part provides a new thinking way to solve the problem of the inefficient supplying on the new community public goods.
1. The theoretical basis on how to make sure the effectiveness of expressing demands on the new community public goods. The cost of public choice theory and the hypothesis of individual rational economic man theory would show that the new community is the best platform to provide public goods at the reason of it guaranteeing the effectiveness of expressing demands on public goods.
2. The theory basis on how to make sure the effectiveness of providing the new community public goods. The grassroots democracy constructed in the new community in our country, which gave the diversified interests structure characteristic to the new community. At the same time, Multidimensional offer pattern is referred to providing public goods for meeting the heterogeneity and diversity of demands. Based on the multi-center theory, public power theory and the institutional change and institutional innovation theory, this part would study the theoretical foundation of the efficient supply in the new community public goods.
3. The theory basis on how to make sure the effectiveness of cooperated providing the spillover public goods. According to the spillover feature of the new community public goods, new communities should take mutual cooperation pattern to provide to avoid the free-ride problem and achieve the social Pareto optimal allocation of public resources. This part would explore the theory foundation for the spillover public goods from the free-ride theory and the theory of optimal allocation in public resources.
The fourth part:The study of the elements which the new community public goods have and basis principles in providing public goods effectively. According to new features of the new community and residents'demands for public goods, the paper reidentifints elements of expressing demands and supplying.
1. The study on the expression mechanism of community public goods demands. The expression mechanism of community public goods demands mainly includes the expression method and the expression way. In the analysis of methods of expressing demands and paths, the realistic choices are to improve the use of valuation of voting by hand or feet, and to use three paths which have a new community neighborhood committee, Council and social organization.
2. The study on the supply mechanism model of the new community public goods. The supplying system mainly includes two aspects, which are supplying factors and providing modes. In the analysis of the supply factors and the supply modes, the paper shows that, multiple offer patterns is he best model that is able to guarantee the effective supply of the new community public goods, and which is inevitable trend of choosing the supplying ways.
3. The basic principles of the new community public goods. In order to ensure the effective supply of new community public goods, efficiency and fairness are two basic and indispensable principles, the efficiency includes Pareto optimality, Pareto improvement and potential Pareto improvement principle, fair principle includes the equal opportunity and social justice; in addition, in the field of the new community public goods, efficiency and fairness principle work together harmony and there is not a trade-off relationship between the two.
The fifth part:An Empirical Study on the supplying efficiency of the new community public goods. Through the analysis of the status and efficiency in expressing demands, multidimensional offer pattern's situation and efficiency, as well as summarizing problems, we can find out that tihere has no efficiency in expressing demands and supplying.
1. An empirical study on the efficiency of expressing the new community public goods demands. Based on the survey data of the finance and Taxation College of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics " the countryside public goods research group " in2009, and the " China General Social Survey " data of the Sociology Department of Renmin University in China and the Hong Kong University Science&Technology, Department of Social Sciences, the national Bureau of statistics of the fifth census data, using descriptive statistical method and SAS clustering analysis with the expressing efficiency of the new community public goods. The results show that:The inefficiency of local public goods supply is becoming a serious problem, the main cause is that expression channels of residents demand for public goods are not patency. The main public goods expressions are "voting by hand" and "voting by feet". Based on the empirical analysis of "voting by hand" and "voting by their feet", we get these conclusions:the poor rural residents'Quality, the inability of executive power and backward management means, are the factors which leads to the no-efficiency of "one project one discussion" direct-expression. The low voters'extent of participation and the disjunction between election practice and theory, are the reasons of public goods expression no-patency by grass-roots election way. The residents have to "vote by feet" when they can't express public goods demand smoothly by the "voting by hand" way.
2. An empirical study on the efficiency of supplying the new community public goods. Based on the data from2007to2012, and making comparison with three aspects, which are the expenditure level of public goods in city and in the rural, the organization scale of government and non-governmental (including social organizations and private enterprises), the investment scale of the government and the social capital. The article makes some questions, which the local government is still main body to provide new type of community public service, new types of community public service are in lack and providing unfairly, are also serious, through the methods of panel data measurement analysis to the local general public expenditure in31provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. Aiming at these issues, this paper puts forward some suggestions to improve the efficiency in providing new types of new community public services, such as transforming the government leading provide mechanism, building multidimensional offer pattern.
The sixth part:The study of the policy's theory model to achieve the effective supplying the new community public goods. The part will construct two policy's theory models providing guidance for policy reform on the effective supplying of the new community public goods, The one is a linkage mechanism of " Internet, complementary, interactive "; the second is the study of two or three phases dynamic game change process of providing two spillover public goods at the same time and sequentially by constructing a non cooperative game equilibrium model between two communities.
1. Construction the linkage mechanism of "Internet, complementary, interactive ".The Internet mechanism refers to the relationship of the government regulation mechanism and social collaboration mechanism; the complementary mechanism is the relationship of administrative functions of government and social autonomy function; the interaction mechanism is the relationship of government management and social adjustment.
2. The study of two or three phase's dynamic game change process of providing two spillover public goods at the same time and sequentially by constructing a non cooperative game equilibrium model between two communities. The paper studies two or three phases dynamic game change process of providing two spillover public goods at the same time and sequentially by constructing a non cooperative game equilibrium model between two communities. This paper also studies the relation of direct contributions and matching rate on the basis of this model. Research finds that the result of committing direct contributions and matching rate by two communities at the same time is the Pareto optimality. The model result of one community committing matching rate is uncertain, and the welfare of committing area would improve in contrast with committing direct contributions and matching rate by two communities. Total quantity of two spillover public goods by providing sequentially is lower than total quantity of providing at the same time. Two spillover public goods have relation in supplying character, and the matching rate has no significant role of supplying character. Hereby, some recommendations are proposed for how to provide spillover public goods between some communities.
The seventh part:The policy research to improve the supplying efficiency of the new community public goods. Based on case studies and fieldwork studies, this part discusses the roles of the government, the social organism, and the enterprise in the provision of basic public goods in the transformation stage to provide the corresponding policy suggestions for the effective supplying, from perfecting the expression mechanism, strengthening co-governance between community and government, and improving the supporting mechanism.
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