我国中小企业信用再担保体系研究
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摘要
世界经济发展的经验表明,中小企业在各国国民经济中占据重要地位,是国民经济发展的重要推动力量,中小企业创造了大量的就业机会,是技术进步的重要力量。但由于中小企业自身资金实力弱、经营风险大、抵押品不足、又缺乏良好的信用记录和信息透明度,中小企业融资难已经成为一个世界性的难题,其表现之一就是中小企业很难从信贷市场获得足够的间接融资。为了解决这一问题,许多国家引入信用担保制度,以便为中小企业提供足够的贷款信用支持,这是市场机制与宏观调控有机结合的典范,也是化解金融风险、改善融资环境的重要手段。实践证明,我国信贷市场上,信用担保机构的加入,也确实能在一定程度上缓解中小企业融资难问题。但是信用担保业在中国毕竟属于朝阳行业,在运行中还存在很多问题,其中最突出问题之一就是信用再担保体系长期缺位,造成信用担保机构的信用能力不够,银行不能充分信任,信用担保杠杆效应未能充分发挥,远远不能满足中小企业的融资需求。本论文即针对以上问题,对中小企业信用再担保问题展开研究,试图构建出符合中国国情的科学的再担保体系,以促进信用担保行业的整体发展,更好地推动我国金融市场的有序发展。
本文首先基于信用担保一般原理、公共产品理论和信贷配给理论,对信用担保的涵义和本质属性进行了阐述,推导出信用担保的作用机理,并得出信用担保作为一种具有正外部效应的准公共产品,单一靠市场提供存在供应不足的问题,政府必须进行资源配置,发挥经济职能的结论。信贷市场上的信贷配给现象作为一种均衡长期存在,信用担保有利于缓解信贷配给现象,但在信用再担保市场中依然存在逆向选择现象。接着,本文详细介绍了日本、韩国、美国、德国中小企业信用再担保体系建设的情况,总结出他们的先进经验,对我国当前建立再担保体系提供了借鉴。然后,本文从政策法律环境、经济金融环境和社会信用环境入手,结合我国实际,分析了目前我国信用担保行业的发展现状、特点和问题,并进行了前瞻性展望,指出信用担保行业重要的发展趋势之一即建立我国各省再担保体系。
在以上内容的基础上,本文构建了适合我国国情,以省为单位的中小企业信用再担保体系,主要内容包括再担保体系建立的宗旨、功能和经营原则;再担保机构的组建原则和组织模式;再担保机构资金来源、规模和应用;再担保机构的管理制度,包括准入门槛、收费标准、风险控制等;再担保机构的财务预测,主要从收支预测和效用预测两个方面来进行;再担保机构的配套环境建设,主要提出加强政策法律环境、社会化服务体系和社会信用环境建设等。
中小企业信用再担保体系的顺利运行,完善的机制是保障,为此本论文又提出了再担保体系的运行机制问题,主要包括科学的定价机制、有效的激励机制、持续不断的国家财政补偿机制、良好的银保合作机制以及高效的信用评级机制。只有这些机制真正地建立起来并发挥作用,我国中小企业信用再担保体系才能实现它的政策目标,推动我国的信用担保事业。
定价机制主要运用期权定价理论对再担保业务定价提供理论指导;激励机制分析了再担保市场上的道德风险问题,指出再担保机构必须对担保机构进行正负两方面激励;国家财政补偿机制主要指出财政应该采用贴息的方式对再担保机构进行补偿,并且应该建立补偿的审核机制和增资机制,保证再担保机构的可持续性发展;银保合作机制研究了目前银保合作中的两大关键问题,风险分担比例和最大担保贷款额度问题,指出了他们各自的影响因素和完善银保合作的对策;评级机制则提出了适用于再担保机构对担保机构进行信用评级的指标体系,并将灰色关联度法和层次分析法进行结合,选取样本对指标体系进行实际检验。
最后,笔者总结了论文的结论和创新点,并指出了今后进一步研究的方向。
The experience of world economy development indicates that small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in national economy in every country. They are important driving force in the national economy development and technology advancement. They also have created the massive employment opportunity. However, because of weak financial strength, big business risks, insufficient pledges, lacking credit records and information transparency, SMEs' financial difficultly already become a worldwide difficult problem, one of its performance is SMEs having difficulty to obtain sufficient credit from the indirect financing. In order to solve this problem, many countries have introduced credit guarantee system to offer enough credit support for SMEs. This is an apotheosis of combination of market mechanism and macro adjustments and controls. It is also the important means to dissolve financial risks and improve the financing environment. Practice has proved that, on Chinese lending market, the joining of credit guarantee organizations (CGOs) can alleviate the financing difficulty of SMEs to a certain extent. However, the credit guarantee industry in China belongs to Chaoyang industry, there are still many problems in operation. One of the most prominent issue is credit reguarantee system for long-term absence , resulting in the credit guarantee organizations'(CGOs) credit ability insufficiency, the bank cannot trust fully, the credit guarantee leverage effect has not been able to display fully, far from being able to meet the financing needs of SMEs.
The article aims at the above question, launches the research on the SMEs' credit reguarantee system,attempts to construct credit reguarantee system which conforms to the Chinese national condition, promotes the credit guarantee profession integral development, and better promotes orderly development in Chinese financial markets. Credit Guarantee has a positive external effects as the quasi-public goods, relying on a single market has the problem of insufficient supply, the Government must carry out the distribution of resources, and play a macro-control function.Credit rationing phenomenon as a balanced long-term presence in the credit market. Credit guarantee can resolve some of the information asymmetry, but adverse selection still exists in the credit guarantee market. Then, the paper described in detail the SMEs' credit reguarantee system construction in Japan, South Korea, the United States and Germany, summarizes their advanced experience, and provides a reference of Chinese current establishment of credit reguarantee system. Then, from the legal environment policy, economic and financial environment and social credit environment, with reality of China, the paper analyses the current credit guarantee's present situation, characteristics and problems, and take a forward-looking about prospect of the credit guarantee system—one trend that is the establishment of credit reguarantee system in each province of China. On the basis of the above content ,this paper construct the SMEs credit reguarantee system taking the province as a unit with Chinese national conditions, including the purpose of the establishment ,functions and operating principles of credit reguarantee system; the establishment principles and organization model; sources , scale and operation of funds to credit reguarantee agencies; management rules, including access , fees, risk control etc. The financial forecast, mainly from the revenue and expenditure and effectiveness in two aspects. Necessary environment construction, mainly to strengthen the legal environment, social service system and building a social credit environment.
For the smooth operation of SMEs' credit reguarantee system, the consummation mechanism is the safeguard. So this paper also proposes a system to guarantee the operation mechanism, including scientific pricing mechanism, an effective incentive mechanism, the continued state financial compensation mechanism, a good-efficient security cooperation mechanism and the credit rating mechanism. Only these mechanisms truly established , Chinese SMEs' credit guarantee system can achieve its policy objective and promote the development of China.
Pricing mechanism mainly use option pricing theory to provide theoretical guidance in business operation. Incentive mechanism mainly analyses the problem of moral hazard on the credit reguarantee market, and indicates that credit guarantee organizations (CGOs) must be carried out both positive and negative incentives; The national finance compensation mechanism mainly uses the deducted interest to compensate the credit reguarantee organization. The compensation should establish audit mechanism and the replenishment mechanism,to ensure the credit reguarantee organization the sustainable development; Bank—guarantee cooperation mechanism mainly researches ontwo key issues about the current cooperation , including risk-sharing ratio and the largest secured credit amount. The artical points out the factors affecting them and proposes the measures improving the effectiveness of the bank-guarantee cooperation; The rating mechanism proposed is suitable in credit rating on credit guarantee organizations. Then on the way we associates GRAP with AHP, and select samples to examine the target system.
Finally, the author of the paper sums up the conclusions and innovations, and points out the future direction of further study.
本文首先基于信用担保一般原理、公共产品理论和信贷配给理论,对信用担保的涵义和本质属性进行了阐述,推导出信用担保的作用机理,并得出信用担保作为一种具有正外部效应的准公共产品,单一靠市场提供存在供应不足的问题,政府必须进行资源配置,发挥经济职能的结论。信贷市场上的信贷配给现象作为一种均衡长期存在,信用担保有利于缓解信贷配给现象,但在信用再担保市场中依然存在逆向选择现象。接着,本文详细介绍了日本、韩国、美国、德国中小企业信用再担保体系建设的情况,总结出他们的先进经验,对我国当前建立再担保体系提供了借鉴。然后,本文从政策法律环境、经济金融环境和社会信用环境入手,结合我国实际,分析了目前我国信用担保行业的发展现状、特点和问题,并进行了前瞻性展望,指出信用担保行业重要的发展趋势之一即建立我国各省再担保体系。
在以上内容的基础上,本文构建了适合我国国情,以省为单位的中小企业信用再担保体系,主要内容包括再担保体系建立的宗旨、功能和经营原则;再担保机构的组建原则和组织模式;再担保机构资金来源、规模和应用;再担保机构的管理制度,包括准入门槛、收费标准、风险控制等;再担保机构的财务预测,主要从收支预测和效用预测两个方面来进行;再担保机构的配套环境建设,主要提出加强政策法律环境、社会化服务体系和社会信用环境建设等。
中小企业信用再担保体系的顺利运行,完善的机制是保障,为此本论文又提出了再担保体系的运行机制问题,主要包括科学的定价机制、有效的激励机制、持续不断的国家财政补偿机制、良好的银保合作机制以及高效的信用评级机制。只有这些机制真正地建立起来并发挥作用,我国中小企业信用再担保体系才能实现它的政策目标,推动我国的信用担保事业。
定价机制主要运用期权定价理论对再担保业务定价提供理论指导;激励机制分析了再担保市场上的道德风险问题,指出再担保机构必须对担保机构进行正负两方面激励;国家财政补偿机制主要指出财政应该采用贴息的方式对再担保机构进行补偿,并且应该建立补偿的审核机制和增资机制,保证再担保机构的可持续性发展;银保合作机制研究了目前银保合作中的两大关键问题,风险分担比例和最大担保贷款额度问题,指出了他们各自的影响因素和完善银保合作的对策;评级机制则提出了适用于再担保机构对担保机构进行信用评级的指标体系,并将灰色关联度法和层次分析法进行结合,选取样本对指标体系进行实际检验。
最后,笔者总结了论文的结论和创新点,并指出了今后进一步研究的方向。
The experience of world economy development indicates that small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in national economy in every country. They are important driving force in the national economy development and technology advancement. They also have created the massive employment opportunity. However, because of weak financial strength, big business risks, insufficient pledges, lacking credit records and information transparency, SMEs' financial difficultly already become a worldwide difficult problem, one of its performance is SMEs having difficulty to obtain sufficient credit from the indirect financing. In order to solve this problem, many countries have introduced credit guarantee system to offer enough credit support for SMEs. This is an apotheosis of combination of market mechanism and macro adjustments and controls. It is also the important means to dissolve financial risks and improve the financing environment. Practice has proved that, on Chinese lending market, the joining of credit guarantee organizations (CGOs) can alleviate the financing difficulty of SMEs to a certain extent. However, the credit guarantee industry in China belongs to Chaoyang industry, there are still many problems in operation. One of the most prominent issue is credit reguarantee system for long-term absence , resulting in the credit guarantee organizations'(CGOs) credit ability insufficiency, the bank cannot trust fully, the credit guarantee leverage effect has not been able to display fully, far from being able to meet the financing needs of SMEs.
The article aims at the above question, launches the research on the SMEs' credit reguarantee system,attempts to construct credit reguarantee system which conforms to the Chinese national condition, promotes the credit guarantee profession integral development, and better promotes orderly development in Chinese financial markets. Credit Guarantee has a positive external effects as the quasi-public goods, relying on a single market has the problem of insufficient supply, the Government must carry out the distribution of resources, and play a macro-control function.Credit rationing phenomenon as a balanced long-term presence in the credit market. Credit guarantee can resolve some of the information asymmetry, but adverse selection still exists in the credit guarantee market. Then, the paper described in detail the SMEs' credit reguarantee system construction in Japan, South Korea, the United States and Germany, summarizes their advanced experience, and provides a reference of Chinese current establishment of credit reguarantee system. Then, from the legal environment policy, economic and financial environment and social credit environment, with reality of China, the paper analyses the current credit guarantee's present situation, characteristics and problems, and take a forward-looking about prospect of the credit guarantee system—one trend that is the establishment of credit reguarantee system in each province of China. On the basis of the above content ,this paper construct the SMEs credit reguarantee system taking the province as a unit with Chinese national conditions, including the purpose of the establishment ,functions and operating principles of credit reguarantee system; the establishment principles and organization model; sources , scale and operation of funds to credit reguarantee agencies; management rules, including access , fees, risk control etc. The financial forecast, mainly from the revenue and expenditure and effectiveness in two aspects. Necessary environment construction, mainly to strengthen the legal environment, social service system and building a social credit environment.
For the smooth operation of SMEs' credit reguarantee system, the consummation mechanism is the safeguard. So this paper also proposes a system to guarantee the operation mechanism, including scientific pricing mechanism, an effective incentive mechanism, the continued state financial compensation mechanism, a good-efficient security cooperation mechanism and the credit rating mechanism. Only these mechanisms truly established , Chinese SMEs' credit guarantee system can achieve its policy objective and promote the development of China.
Pricing mechanism mainly use option pricing theory to provide theoretical guidance in business operation. Incentive mechanism mainly analyses the problem of moral hazard on the credit reguarantee market, and indicates that credit guarantee organizations (CGOs) must be carried out both positive and negative incentives; The national finance compensation mechanism mainly uses the deducted interest to compensate the credit reguarantee organization. The compensation should establish audit mechanism and the replenishment mechanism,to ensure the credit reguarantee organization the sustainable development; Bank—guarantee cooperation mechanism mainly researches ontwo key issues about the current cooperation , including risk-sharing ratio and the largest secured credit amount. The artical points out the factors affecting them and proposes the measures improving the effectiveness of the bank-guarantee cooperation; The rating mechanism proposed is suitable in credit rating on credit guarantee organizations. Then on the way we associates GRAP with AHP, and select samples to examine the target system.
Finally, the author of the paper sums up the conclusions and innovations, and points out the future direction of further study.
引文
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