基于质量安全的生猪产业链纵向关系研究
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摘要
中国是生猪生产和消费大国,随着社会经济发展和居民生活水平的提高,猪肉质量安全逐渐成为影响居民消费的重要因素。然而,猪肉质量安全事件的频繁爆发以及中国猪肉产品难以进入发达国家市场,昭示着我国猪肉存在较为严重的安全隐患,其深层次原因是中国小规模养猪场(户)占主导地位的现实而导致的产业链上各利益主体之间存在信息不对称问题。
加强产业链主体之间的纵向关系,可有效降低信息不对称,并因此成为各国加强食品质量安全的重要手段。借鉴发达国家经验,加强生猪质量安全需要发挥产业链上核心主体的主导作用。在生猪产业链上,屠宰加工企业集中度和规模化程度相对较高,并有进一步提升的趋势,因此,屠宰加工企业必将是中国生猪产业链上的核心企业。鉴于屠宰加工企业在生猪产业链上的核心地位和养猪场(户)对生猪质量安全控制的基础地位,重点研究屠宰加工企业和养猪场(户)之间的纵向关系,具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本研究通过梳理信息不对称理论、质量经济学理论、新制度经济学理论和计划行为理论,构建了基于质量安全的生猪产业链纵向关系研究的逻辑框架,利用北京市调研资料,结合定性和定量方法,重点研究屠宰加工企业和养猪场(户)之间的纵向关系。具体研究内容包含：(1)分析了不同纵向协作形式对生猪质量安全的影响机理；(2)分析了北京市生猪产业发展现状,总结出生猪纵向关系发展现状和养猪场(户)安全生产现状；(3)分析屠宰加工企业纵向协作形式选择行为及其对生猪质量安全的控制状况,分析养猪场(户)纵向协作行为的影响因素以及不同纵向协作形式对养猪场(户)质量控制行为的影响；(4)基于质量监管的视角,从全产业链上探讨如何优化屠宰加工企业与其他环节主体之间的纵向关系；(5)从产业链纵向关系的角度为提高中国生猪质量安全水平提出政策建议。
本研究的主要结论有：中国生猪产业链以通过中间商的市场交易形式为主；纵向关系对产业链主体生猪质量安全控制影响显著；屠宰加工企业在控制生猪质量安全水平上可发挥重要作用；饲养规模扩大有利于提高生猪质量安全水平；规范性合作社可有效供给质量安全生猪。
本研究的特色和创新在于：强调通过经济激励来保障生猪质量安全,克服了以往研究只关注质量安全或经济效益的单目标问题；系统研究屠宰加工企业和养猪场(户)的纵向关系,既立足于小规模养猪场(户)占主导地位的国情,又考虑猪肉质量安全备受关注的现状；从提高政府生猪质量安全监管效率的角度,优化了屠宰加工企业与产业链其他主体之间的纵向关系。
China is a powerful country with pig production and consumption. By the development of social economy and the improvement of living standards, the quality safety of the pork gradually becomes the important factors influencing the residents'consumption. However, Pork quality safety incidents outbreak frequently and China's pork products is hard to enter developed countries'market, which heralds that China pork's security is in serious hidden danger. The underlying reason is that this Industrial chain has the information asymmetry between different interest subjects becauseChinese small-scale pig farms (households) occupy the absolute position.
Strengthen the industrial chain's main bodies'tight vertical relations can effectively reduce the information asymmetry between the main body so that it becomes an important means of countries to strengthen food quality and safety. Using the experience of developed countries, strengthen the quality and safety of live pigs needs industrial chain's core subject as a leading role. In the pig industry chain, The degree of concentration and scale of slaughter processing enterprises is relatively high and has a tendency to further increase, so slaughter processing enterprises will surely is the core of pig industry chain in China. Given the slaughter processing enterprises occupy the core position of the pig industry chain and the basis position of pig farms (households) for live pigs'quality and safety control. The key research for the vertical relations between pig slaughter processing enterprises and pig farms (households) has important theoretical and realistic significance.
Combing the information asymmetry theory, quality economics theory, the theory of new institutional economics and the theory of planned behavior, this study built logic framework of research on vertical relations in pig industry chain on the basis of quality and safety. Then the vertical relations between slaughter processing enterprises and pig farms (households) were mainly studied using the field investigation data in Beijing and combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Specific research contents include:(l) Analysis of mechanisms of different forms of vertical coordination which influencing the quality and safety of live pigs;(2) Analysis of present situation of pig industry development in Beijing, the development status of vertical relations during production and marketing and the current situation of safety production for pig farms (households);(3) Analysis of slaughter processing enterprises'choices among different vertical coordination forms, the condition for enterprises in terms of controlling the quality and safety of pigs, the influence factors of the vertical coordination behavior of pig farms (households), and the influence on quality control behavior of pig farms (households) from different forms of vertical coordination;(4) Analysis of ways to optimize the vertical relations between the slaughter processing enterprises and other main bodies on the industry chain based on the perspective of quality supervision and the whole industry chain;(5) Putting forward policy suggestions for China to improve the quality and safety level of pigs from the perspectives of vertical relations in industrial chain.
The main conclusions of this study are as follows:(1) The pig industry chain in China mainly focuses on through middlemen market transaction form;(2)Vertical relations significantly affect the pig quality safety controlling of the bodies in the industrial chain;(3) Slaughtering processing enterprises play an important role in the aspect of controlling of the quality and safety level of live pigs;(4) the expansion of breeding is conducive to improve the quality and safety level of live pigs but small pig farms (households) proportion on the high side;(5) Normative cooperative can supply effectively quality and safety pigs.
Characteristics and innovation of this study is as follows:Emphasizes through economic incentives to ensure the quality and safety of live pigs, and overcomes the single objective problem with focusing on the quality and safety or economic benefit in previous studies; System relations the longitudinal relationship between Slaughter and processing enterprise and pig farm (household) basing on the national conditions that small pig farms (households) dominated and the status that pork quality and safety is widely noted; From the perspective of improving the efficiency of government's supervision for the pig quality and safety, it optimizes the longitudinal relationship between the slaughtering processing enterprises and other subject in this industrial chain.
加强产业链主体之间的纵向关系,可有效降低信息不对称,并因此成为各国加强食品质量安全的重要手段。借鉴发达国家经验,加强生猪质量安全需要发挥产业链上核心主体的主导作用。在生猪产业链上,屠宰加工企业集中度和规模化程度相对较高,并有进一步提升的趋势,因此,屠宰加工企业必将是中国生猪产业链上的核心企业。鉴于屠宰加工企业在生猪产业链上的核心地位和养猪场(户)对生猪质量安全控制的基础地位,重点研究屠宰加工企业和养猪场(户)之间的纵向关系,具有重要的理论和现实意义。
本研究通过梳理信息不对称理论、质量经济学理论、新制度经济学理论和计划行为理论,构建了基于质量安全的生猪产业链纵向关系研究的逻辑框架,利用北京市调研资料,结合定性和定量方法,重点研究屠宰加工企业和养猪场(户)之间的纵向关系。具体研究内容包含：(1)分析了不同纵向协作形式对生猪质量安全的影响机理；(2)分析了北京市生猪产业发展现状,总结出生猪纵向关系发展现状和养猪场(户)安全生产现状；(3)分析屠宰加工企业纵向协作形式选择行为及其对生猪质量安全的控制状况,分析养猪场(户)纵向协作行为的影响因素以及不同纵向协作形式对养猪场(户)质量控制行为的影响；(4)基于质量监管的视角,从全产业链上探讨如何优化屠宰加工企业与其他环节主体之间的纵向关系；(5)从产业链纵向关系的角度为提高中国生猪质量安全水平提出政策建议。
本研究的主要结论有：中国生猪产业链以通过中间商的市场交易形式为主；纵向关系对产业链主体生猪质量安全控制影响显著；屠宰加工企业在控制生猪质量安全水平上可发挥重要作用；饲养规模扩大有利于提高生猪质量安全水平；规范性合作社可有效供给质量安全生猪。
本研究的特色和创新在于：强调通过经济激励来保障生猪质量安全,克服了以往研究只关注质量安全或经济效益的单目标问题；系统研究屠宰加工企业和养猪场(户)的纵向关系,既立足于小规模养猪场(户)占主导地位的国情,又考虑猪肉质量安全备受关注的现状；从提高政府生猪质量安全监管效率的角度,优化了屠宰加工企业与产业链其他主体之间的纵向关系。
China is a powerful country with pig production and consumption. By the development of social economy and the improvement of living standards, the quality safety of the pork gradually becomes the important factors influencing the residents'consumption. However, Pork quality safety incidents outbreak frequently and China's pork products is hard to enter developed countries'market, which heralds that China pork's security is in serious hidden danger. The underlying reason is that this Industrial chain has the information asymmetry between different interest subjects becauseChinese small-scale pig farms (households) occupy the absolute position.
Strengthen the industrial chain's main bodies'tight vertical relations can effectively reduce the information asymmetry between the main body so that it becomes an important means of countries to strengthen food quality and safety. Using the experience of developed countries, strengthen the quality and safety of live pigs needs industrial chain's core subject as a leading role. In the pig industry chain, The degree of concentration and scale of slaughter processing enterprises is relatively high and has a tendency to further increase, so slaughter processing enterprises will surely is the core of pig industry chain in China. Given the slaughter processing enterprises occupy the core position of the pig industry chain and the basis position of pig farms (households) for live pigs'quality and safety control. The key research for the vertical relations between pig slaughter processing enterprises and pig farms (households) has important theoretical and realistic significance.
Combing the information asymmetry theory, quality economics theory, the theory of new institutional economics and the theory of planned behavior, this study built logic framework of research on vertical relations in pig industry chain on the basis of quality and safety. Then the vertical relations between slaughter processing enterprises and pig farms (households) were mainly studied using the field investigation data in Beijing and combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Specific research contents include:(l) Analysis of mechanisms of different forms of vertical coordination which influencing the quality and safety of live pigs;(2) Analysis of present situation of pig industry development in Beijing, the development status of vertical relations during production and marketing and the current situation of safety production for pig farms (households);(3) Analysis of slaughter processing enterprises'choices among different vertical coordination forms, the condition for enterprises in terms of controlling the quality and safety of pigs, the influence factors of the vertical coordination behavior of pig farms (households), and the influence on quality control behavior of pig farms (households) from different forms of vertical coordination;(4) Analysis of ways to optimize the vertical relations between the slaughter processing enterprises and other main bodies on the industry chain based on the perspective of quality supervision and the whole industry chain;(5) Putting forward policy suggestions for China to improve the quality and safety level of pigs from the perspectives of vertical relations in industrial chain.
The main conclusions of this study are as follows:(1) The pig industry chain in China mainly focuses on through middlemen market transaction form;(2)Vertical relations significantly affect the pig quality safety controlling of the bodies in the industrial chain;(3) Slaughtering processing enterprises play an important role in the aspect of controlling of the quality and safety level of live pigs;(4) the expansion of breeding is conducive to improve the quality and safety level of live pigs but small pig farms (households) proportion on the high side;(5) Normative cooperative can supply effectively quality and safety pigs.
Characteristics and innovation of this study is as follows:Emphasizes through economic incentives to ensure the quality and safety of live pigs, and overcomes the single objective problem with focusing on the quality and safety or economic benefit in previous studies; System relations the longitudinal relationship between Slaughter and processing enterprise and pig farm (household) basing on the national conditions that small pig farms (households) dominated and the status that pork quality and safety is widely noted; From the perspective of improving the efficiency of government's supervision for the pig quality and safety, it optimizes the longitudinal relationship between the slaughtering processing enterprises and other subject in this industrial chain.
引文
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