国内产品市场整合的演进与影响机制研究
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摘要
本文意在研究国内产品市场的整合进程及其影响机制。国内市场整合是市场经济发展的内在要求。在整合的市场中,地区间按照比较优势进行分工,从事专业化生产,进而促使市场范围扩大,产业空间集聚,并在收益递增的作用下自我加强(Krugman,1991),但这些一般机制在我国现实经济中运行的并不顺利。20世纪70年代末,中国以分权为特征的经济体制改革调动了地方政府发展当地经济的积极性和热情,同时也使地方政府获得了分割区域市场,保护本地经济的激励,这种分割市场的行为成为一种逆市场力量,对国民经济运行产生持续的危害。作为我国经济改革中的顽症之一,国内市场分割问题一直倍受各界关注。本文的研究即是在国内市场分割的背景下展开的。
事实上,市场机制的自我完善以及市场力量的成长能够产生一种促进国内市场整合的作用力,但是在市场分割力量的制约下,这种驱动力的整合作用将被严重破坏。分割力量的存在,将会增加区际贸易的交易成本,阻碍地区间的分工协作、贸易发展和国内统一大市场的形成,是影响国内市场整合进程的关键因素之一。本文通过分析分割力量的大小及变化,研究我国产品市场整合进程中的内在影响机制。本文认为,国内市场分割力量的大小和变化取决于地方政府在区际贸易中的行为选择,而地方政府的行为选择受多方因素影响和约束,包括中央政府的监督协调、本地居民的福利以及企业的盈利能力等方面。在全球经济一体化的背景下,对外贸易的发生,将会对国内居民的消费意识、企业行为产生影响,也将间接影响地方政府在区际贸易中的政策选择,进而影响国内产品市场的整合进程。当然,本文所研究的影响机制仅是众多重要机制的一部分,并没有囊括全部的机制。
与以往的研究相比,本文的创新之处在于:借鉴战略性贸易政策及区域贸易自由化的相关理论和模型,从辖区利益驱动的角度,分析了封闭经济条件下,地方政府在国内贸易中的行为选择机制以及该机制对国内不同产品市场整合进程的影响。并通过比较不同情形下的福利水平,验证地方政府的行为动机。在引入对外贸易的视角后,将分析纳入到开放经济的框架下,研究相关因素对国内不同产品市场整合进程的影响。通过比较静态分析,对比两种条件下各因素影响力的变化。与此同时,本文测算了中国国内产品市场在1985-2006年间的整合程度,分析其发展趋势,借助实证分析验证了进出口等因素对市场整合程度的影响。
从整体结构来看,本文采用了现状描述—模型推导—实证分析的研究思路。主要内容如下:
首先,对我国国内产品市场的整合进程进行了描述,发现该进程具有阶段性、波动性的特点。总体而言,随着国内市场整合力量和分割力量的此消彼长,市场整合进程呈现螺旋式前进的趋势。改革开放以来,作为阻碍国内市场整合的最主要的原因,地方政府的行政垄断行为已导致国内产品市场呈现分割趋势,这种分割力量是动态变化的,其内容和表现形式均随时间发生变化。在中央政府的政策导向和监督规范下,地方政府分割国内市场的行为已有所收敛,但依然存在,且日趋隐蔽,难以观察。本文将地方政府的各类分割行为归纳整理,主要有两大类:设置流出壁垒和流入壁垒。总体来看,各种分割行为均会限制产品在区域间的自由流动,增加产品进出本地市场的成本,人为扭曲产品的价格。此外,政府的行政垄断行为导致地区间产业结构趋同现象更加明显,加深了区域间的经济冲突,阻碍了区域经济一体化进程。
其次,本文在封闭经济的框架下,借鉴战略性贸易政策和区域贸易自由化的相关理论,构建数理模型研究国内两地区市场整合进程中的内在机制。本文认为,地方政府在区际贸易中的行为选择机制是其中最为重要的机制之一。事实上,影响政府行为选择的因素众多,本文将其抽象为“辖区利益”,地方政府总是有动力追求辖区利益的最大化。通过对不同类型的产品市场进行分析,本文发现,只要地方政府通过行政垄断行为在区域市场问设置壁垒的成本不高,地方政府总是倾向于借助垄断行为追求辖区利益的最大化,尤其是那些生产力相对落后的地区,地方政府实施行政垄断的动力较为充足,这种行政干预使企业间的竞争转化成地方政府之间的竞争。该行政垄断行为所面临的实施成本取决于中央政府促进区域市场一体化的政策力度、对地方政府行为有效甄别的能力以及相应的惩罚措施,同时也取决于市场机制的完善程度。此外,本文通过比较地方政府不同行为选择下,居民和企业的福利水平的变化,验证了地方政府阻碍地区间市场整合的动机。
再次,将对外贸易引入国内产品市场整合进程的分析中,试图在开放经济的框架下研究相关因素对国内产品市场整合进程的影响机制,并将封闭和开放两种条件下的研究进行对比,分析相关因素对市场整合影响力的变化。当国内两地区的代表性企业存在出口竞争时,国内产品市场的整合阻力与出口优惠额、壁垒设置成本成反比,与进口国关税、区际贸易运输成本成正比。与封闭经济条件下的研究相比,贸易壁垒设置成本的提高对市场整合进程的促进作用减弱,产品出口优惠幅度的减少,将在一定程度阻碍国内市场的整合。当在两地代表性企业中引入进口竞争时,国内产品市场的分割力量与各地市场对产品的潜在需求、进口关税、进口贸易中的运输成本、区际贸易中的运费呈正向变动关系,与地方政府设置壁垒所需承担的成本呈反向变动关系。与封闭经济条件下的研究相比,产品潜在市场需求、区际贸易中的单位运输成本及贸易壁垒的设置成本对国内市场整合的阻碍作用降低;进口关税、进口贸易的单位运输成本、两地企业边际成本的变动对国内市场整合程度的影响力有所提高。
最后,本文采用统计及计量分析方法,对国内贸易的发展现状、国内产品市场的整合程度及相关因素的影响进行了分析。本文借助2002年各地区的投入产出表分析了开放经济条件下我国国内贸易的发展现状和地区市场的对外开放程度,得出的结论是:我国国内贸易规模较大,但是与我国巨大的国内市场相比,其规模还尚有扩大空间。此外,本文借助相对价格法测算了1985-2006年国内产品市场的整合程度及其变化趋势,发现中国国内产品市场的整合趋势日渐明显,市场一体化程度不断提高。本文考察了进出口等因素对国内市场整合程度的影响,结论是:进口在当地经济发展中将阻碍本地区与其它地区的市场整合;出口规模较大的地区有动力促进市场一体化;人均GDP与市场整合程度呈正相关关系,国有企业职工比重、省际市场距离与市场整合程度负相关等等。
This paper is intended to study the integration process of domestic market in transition economy. Regional market integration is the inherent requirement of economic development. In the integrated market, several firms among different regions pursue division of labor in accordance with comparative advantages, engage in regional specialized production, and extend the scope of regional market. Finally, many industries have increasing returns due to external economies, then getting concentrated. This process will feed on itself (Krugman, 1991). But the general mechanism is not running smoothly in China. At the end of the 20th century, economic reform characterized by decentralization mobilized local governments to develop local economy. At the same time, it also had prompted the local government to protect local economy through market segmentation, which is not conducive to economic development. As one of the deadly diseases in economic reform of our country, the issue of regional market segmentation has always drawn people's attention.
In fact, the self-improvement of market mechanism and the growth of market force are able to drive domestic market to integrate inherently. However, the mechanism is distorted by market segmentation forces, so the role of the market force which can lead to market integration will be severely damaged. Market segmentation forces impedes the development of inter-regional trades, raises the transaction costs, hampers the inter-regional cooperation and division of labor, and hinders the formation of a unified domestic market. So Market segmentation force is the key factors of regional market integration process. This paper holds that the force leading to regional market segmentation and its changes depend on the local governments' strategy in inter-regional trade. Many factors can influence local governments' decision, such as the supervision of central government, the welfare of local residents and the profit of local firms. In the background of economic globalization, economic opening can change the decisive environment of local government, enterprises' behaviors and peoples' views, then impact market the integration process.
Comparing with the existing literatures, the main innovation points of this paper are as follows:
Referring to the theories of strategic trade policy and regional integration, it studies the mechanism of local government's decision and the effect of the decision on different domestic commodity markets integration in the view of jurisdiction interest motivation under closed economic conditions. Also it explains local governments how to select its strategy in the inter-regional trade in by welfare analysis in different conditions. Based on the perspective of international trades, it analyzes the influence of different factors on domestic market integration process under the opening economy by considering import and export.
The research structure is the description of current situation firstly, model analysis secondly, and empirical study finally. The main contents are as follows:
First of all, this paper describes the process of domestic market integration, and shows the complicated stage characteristics of the process. Overall, China's domestic market integration has been improving, and the process of market integration is fluctuant as the result of interaction between the market force and distorting force. Since reform and opening up, as the most important reason of impeding market integration, the regional administrative monopoly has led to the market segmentation. This force of segmentation is dynamic, and its content and forms changes over time. Central government takes the policy to promote the market integration, under the guidance and supervision of central government, local protectionism weakens. But it is proved that the market segmentation which is more difficult to observe than before still exists. All forms of market segmentation are divided into two categories, those are outflow barriers and inflow barriers. Because of those barriers, the costs of sales increase, and the prices of commodities are distorted. Apart from that, the regional administrative monopoly could promote the convergence of industrial structure and deepen regional economic conflicts.
Second, in the closed economy, this paper refers to the theories of strategic trade policy and regional integration, and studies the mechanism of local government's decision in the inter-provincial trade, which plays an important role in the integration of domestic markets. The paper holds that local government has the motivation to improving the benefits of the region. Through the analysis of different markets, we find that local government would like to implement their market segmentation policy if the cost of implementing market segmentation policy is low. Especially, the local governments of those regions where industries and enterprises without comparative advantages are lack of competitivity have sufficient motivation to acquire short-term benefits through market segmentation and local protectionism. Besides, the paper verifies the motivation of government to implement market segmentation policy by comparing the welfare of residents and enterprises under different government decision.
Third, this paper tries to study the inherent mechanism how relative factors affect market integration process under opening economy by introducing import and export. When two enterprises in different regions compete for exporting, the resistance of market integration is inversely proportional to margin preference of export, the cost of implementing market segmentation, and proportional to tariff of import country, transportation cost in inter-provincial trade. Compared with the study of the closed economy, the force promote domestic market to integrate is weakened when the cost of setting barriers in inter-regional trade is increasing. The reduction of margin preference impedes the integration of domestic market. When a foreign enterprise is in the competition with two domestic enterprises, the force of market segmentation is proportional to the potential demand for products, tariff, transportation cost of international trade and inter-provincial trade. And it is inversely proportional to the cost of setting inter-regional trade barriers. Comparing to the study in closed economy, the negative influence of potential demand for product, transportation cost in inter-provincial trade and the cost of setting barriers on domestic market integration weakens, and the effect of tariff, transportation cost in international trade and marginal cost of each enterprises on market integration strengthens.
At last, this paper investigates the current situation of domestic trade, the degrees of domestic market integration, and influence factors which affect domestic commodity market integration by using statistic and econometric approaches. Using regional input-output table in 2002, it investigates the current situation of domestic trade and openness degree of regional market under open economy, finding that interregional trade scale is large in total, but its scale is relative small compared to China's huge domestic market, so there is still room for expansion. It measures the integration degree of domestic commodity market by using relative price index and describes its trends, finding that domestic commodity market integration degree improves over the past twenty years. It studies the effects of import, export and other factors on regional market integration degree. The result is that: (1) Import may hinder regional market integration; (2) The region which owns large export scale trends to promote market integration; (3) There is significant positive relationship statistically between GDP per-capital and degree of market integration; (4) The proportion of state-owned enterprises, distance of province-to-province has negative effects on the degree of market integration, and so on.
事实上,市场机制的自我完善以及市场力量的成长能够产生一种促进国内市场整合的作用力,但是在市场分割力量的制约下,这种驱动力的整合作用将被严重破坏。分割力量的存在,将会增加区际贸易的交易成本,阻碍地区间的分工协作、贸易发展和国内统一大市场的形成,是影响国内市场整合进程的关键因素之一。本文通过分析分割力量的大小及变化,研究我国产品市场整合进程中的内在影响机制。本文认为,国内市场分割力量的大小和变化取决于地方政府在区际贸易中的行为选择,而地方政府的行为选择受多方因素影响和约束,包括中央政府的监督协调、本地居民的福利以及企业的盈利能力等方面。在全球经济一体化的背景下,对外贸易的发生,将会对国内居民的消费意识、企业行为产生影响,也将间接影响地方政府在区际贸易中的政策选择,进而影响国内产品市场的整合进程。当然,本文所研究的影响机制仅是众多重要机制的一部分,并没有囊括全部的机制。
与以往的研究相比,本文的创新之处在于:借鉴战略性贸易政策及区域贸易自由化的相关理论和模型,从辖区利益驱动的角度,分析了封闭经济条件下,地方政府在国内贸易中的行为选择机制以及该机制对国内不同产品市场整合进程的影响。并通过比较不同情形下的福利水平,验证地方政府的行为动机。在引入对外贸易的视角后,将分析纳入到开放经济的框架下,研究相关因素对国内不同产品市场整合进程的影响。通过比较静态分析,对比两种条件下各因素影响力的变化。与此同时,本文测算了中国国内产品市场在1985-2006年间的整合程度,分析其发展趋势,借助实证分析验证了进出口等因素对市场整合程度的影响。
从整体结构来看,本文采用了现状描述—模型推导—实证分析的研究思路。主要内容如下:
首先,对我国国内产品市场的整合进程进行了描述,发现该进程具有阶段性、波动性的特点。总体而言,随着国内市场整合力量和分割力量的此消彼长,市场整合进程呈现螺旋式前进的趋势。改革开放以来,作为阻碍国内市场整合的最主要的原因,地方政府的行政垄断行为已导致国内产品市场呈现分割趋势,这种分割力量是动态变化的,其内容和表现形式均随时间发生变化。在中央政府的政策导向和监督规范下,地方政府分割国内市场的行为已有所收敛,但依然存在,且日趋隐蔽,难以观察。本文将地方政府的各类分割行为归纳整理,主要有两大类:设置流出壁垒和流入壁垒。总体来看,各种分割行为均会限制产品在区域间的自由流动,增加产品进出本地市场的成本,人为扭曲产品的价格。此外,政府的行政垄断行为导致地区间产业结构趋同现象更加明显,加深了区域间的经济冲突,阻碍了区域经济一体化进程。
其次,本文在封闭经济的框架下,借鉴战略性贸易政策和区域贸易自由化的相关理论,构建数理模型研究国内两地区市场整合进程中的内在机制。本文认为,地方政府在区际贸易中的行为选择机制是其中最为重要的机制之一。事实上,影响政府行为选择的因素众多,本文将其抽象为“辖区利益”,地方政府总是有动力追求辖区利益的最大化。通过对不同类型的产品市场进行分析,本文发现,只要地方政府通过行政垄断行为在区域市场问设置壁垒的成本不高,地方政府总是倾向于借助垄断行为追求辖区利益的最大化,尤其是那些生产力相对落后的地区,地方政府实施行政垄断的动力较为充足,这种行政干预使企业间的竞争转化成地方政府之间的竞争。该行政垄断行为所面临的实施成本取决于中央政府促进区域市场一体化的政策力度、对地方政府行为有效甄别的能力以及相应的惩罚措施,同时也取决于市场机制的完善程度。此外,本文通过比较地方政府不同行为选择下,居民和企业的福利水平的变化,验证了地方政府阻碍地区间市场整合的动机。
再次,将对外贸易引入国内产品市场整合进程的分析中,试图在开放经济的框架下研究相关因素对国内产品市场整合进程的影响机制,并将封闭和开放两种条件下的研究进行对比,分析相关因素对市场整合影响力的变化。当国内两地区的代表性企业存在出口竞争时,国内产品市场的整合阻力与出口优惠额、壁垒设置成本成反比,与进口国关税、区际贸易运输成本成正比。与封闭经济条件下的研究相比,贸易壁垒设置成本的提高对市场整合进程的促进作用减弱,产品出口优惠幅度的减少,将在一定程度阻碍国内市场的整合。当在两地代表性企业中引入进口竞争时,国内产品市场的分割力量与各地市场对产品的潜在需求、进口关税、进口贸易中的运输成本、区际贸易中的运费呈正向变动关系,与地方政府设置壁垒所需承担的成本呈反向变动关系。与封闭经济条件下的研究相比,产品潜在市场需求、区际贸易中的单位运输成本及贸易壁垒的设置成本对国内市场整合的阻碍作用降低;进口关税、进口贸易的单位运输成本、两地企业边际成本的变动对国内市场整合程度的影响力有所提高。
最后,本文采用统计及计量分析方法,对国内贸易的发展现状、国内产品市场的整合程度及相关因素的影响进行了分析。本文借助2002年各地区的投入产出表分析了开放经济条件下我国国内贸易的发展现状和地区市场的对外开放程度,得出的结论是:我国国内贸易规模较大,但是与我国巨大的国内市场相比,其规模还尚有扩大空间。此外,本文借助相对价格法测算了1985-2006年国内产品市场的整合程度及其变化趋势,发现中国国内产品市场的整合趋势日渐明显,市场一体化程度不断提高。本文考察了进出口等因素对国内市场整合程度的影响,结论是:进口在当地经济发展中将阻碍本地区与其它地区的市场整合;出口规模较大的地区有动力促进市场一体化;人均GDP与市场整合程度呈正相关关系,国有企业职工比重、省际市场距离与市场整合程度负相关等等。
This paper is intended to study the integration process of domestic market in transition economy. Regional market integration is the inherent requirement of economic development. In the integrated market, several firms among different regions pursue division of labor in accordance with comparative advantages, engage in regional specialized production, and extend the scope of regional market. Finally, many industries have increasing returns due to external economies, then getting concentrated. This process will feed on itself (Krugman, 1991). But the general mechanism is not running smoothly in China. At the end of the 20th century, economic reform characterized by decentralization mobilized local governments to develop local economy. At the same time, it also had prompted the local government to protect local economy through market segmentation, which is not conducive to economic development. As one of the deadly diseases in economic reform of our country, the issue of regional market segmentation has always drawn people's attention.
In fact, the self-improvement of market mechanism and the growth of market force are able to drive domestic market to integrate inherently. However, the mechanism is distorted by market segmentation forces, so the role of the market force which can lead to market integration will be severely damaged. Market segmentation forces impedes the development of inter-regional trades, raises the transaction costs, hampers the inter-regional cooperation and division of labor, and hinders the formation of a unified domestic market. So Market segmentation force is the key factors of regional market integration process. This paper holds that the force leading to regional market segmentation and its changes depend on the local governments' strategy in inter-regional trade. Many factors can influence local governments' decision, such as the supervision of central government, the welfare of local residents and the profit of local firms. In the background of economic globalization, economic opening can change the decisive environment of local government, enterprises' behaviors and peoples' views, then impact market the integration process.
Comparing with the existing literatures, the main innovation points of this paper are as follows:
Referring to the theories of strategic trade policy and regional integration, it studies the mechanism of local government's decision and the effect of the decision on different domestic commodity markets integration in the view of jurisdiction interest motivation under closed economic conditions. Also it explains local governments how to select its strategy in the inter-regional trade in by welfare analysis in different conditions. Based on the perspective of international trades, it analyzes the influence of different factors on domestic market integration process under the opening economy by considering import and export.
The research structure is the description of current situation firstly, model analysis secondly, and empirical study finally. The main contents are as follows:
First of all, this paper describes the process of domestic market integration, and shows the complicated stage characteristics of the process. Overall, China's domestic market integration has been improving, and the process of market integration is fluctuant as the result of interaction between the market force and distorting force. Since reform and opening up, as the most important reason of impeding market integration, the regional administrative monopoly has led to the market segmentation. This force of segmentation is dynamic, and its content and forms changes over time. Central government takes the policy to promote the market integration, under the guidance and supervision of central government, local protectionism weakens. But it is proved that the market segmentation which is more difficult to observe than before still exists. All forms of market segmentation are divided into two categories, those are outflow barriers and inflow barriers. Because of those barriers, the costs of sales increase, and the prices of commodities are distorted. Apart from that, the regional administrative monopoly could promote the convergence of industrial structure and deepen regional economic conflicts.
Second, in the closed economy, this paper refers to the theories of strategic trade policy and regional integration, and studies the mechanism of local government's decision in the inter-provincial trade, which plays an important role in the integration of domestic markets. The paper holds that local government has the motivation to improving the benefits of the region. Through the analysis of different markets, we find that local government would like to implement their market segmentation policy if the cost of implementing market segmentation policy is low. Especially, the local governments of those regions where industries and enterprises without comparative advantages are lack of competitivity have sufficient motivation to acquire short-term benefits through market segmentation and local protectionism. Besides, the paper verifies the motivation of government to implement market segmentation policy by comparing the welfare of residents and enterprises under different government decision.
Third, this paper tries to study the inherent mechanism how relative factors affect market integration process under opening economy by introducing import and export. When two enterprises in different regions compete for exporting, the resistance of market integration is inversely proportional to margin preference of export, the cost of implementing market segmentation, and proportional to tariff of import country, transportation cost in inter-provincial trade. Compared with the study of the closed economy, the force promote domestic market to integrate is weakened when the cost of setting barriers in inter-regional trade is increasing. The reduction of margin preference impedes the integration of domestic market. When a foreign enterprise is in the competition with two domestic enterprises, the force of market segmentation is proportional to the potential demand for products, tariff, transportation cost of international trade and inter-provincial trade. And it is inversely proportional to the cost of setting inter-regional trade barriers. Comparing to the study in closed economy, the negative influence of potential demand for product, transportation cost in inter-provincial trade and the cost of setting barriers on domestic market integration weakens, and the effect of tariff, transportation cost in international trade and marginal cost of each enterprises on market integration strengthens.
At last, this paper investigates the current situation of domestic trade, the degrees of domestic market integration, and influence factors which affect domestic commodity market integration by using statistic and econometric approaches. Using regional input-output table in 2002, it investigates the current situation of domestic trade and openness degree of regional market under open economy, finding that interregional trade scale is large in total, but its scale is relative small compared to China's huge domestic market, so there is still room for expansion. It measures the integration degree of domestic commodity market by using relative price index and describes its trends, finding that domestic commodity market integration degree improves over the past twenty years. It studies the effects of import, export and other factors on regional market integration degree. The result is that: (1) Import may hinder regional market integration; (2) The region which owns large export scale trends to promote market integration; (3) There is significant positive relationship statistically between GDP per-capital and degree of market integration; (4) The proportion of state-owned enterprises, distance of province-to-province has negative effects on the degree of market integration, and so on.
引文
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