垄断影响力及其对公司市场估值的影响
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摘要
在政策利好之下,近年来我国核电产业发展迅猛。资本市场特别是股市,对核电产业的投资热情也随之高涨。笔者发现,在同一核电产业,不同上市公司的市场估值水平高低差异明显,反映在市盈率估值水平上即市盈率水平高低差异明显,仅用传统的市盈率影响因素不足以解释清楚市盈率高低差异存在的合理性。现实表明,我国核电产业具有一定的垄断性,可能会导致不同上市公司在市场地位和预期盈利表现上的差异,并可能进一步导致市场估值水平的差异。
在对已有研究成果进行总结和评价的基础上,本文以核电上市公司为例,分析垄断影响力及其对公司市场估值的影响。为更好地展开研究,本文提出垄断影响力的概念及其测量指标,对核电产业上市公司垄断影响力进行定性分析和定量分析,主要选取38家核电上市公司的7期季度数据,最终255个有效样本,将垄断影响力作为主要的自变量,同时将每股收益和总股本也作为自变量纳入到回归模型中,分别以未修正的市盈率和奇异修正的市盈率作为因变量,分两次对垄断影响力与市盈率之间的关系进行回归分析。
通过定性分析和定量分析,发现垄断影响力对市盈率水平的影响确实存在,与此同时,也发现垄断影响力与每股收益和总股本之间存在相关关系。从回归过程的角度看,它们之间的共线性不明显,对回归结果的影响甚微,因此共线性对结果的影响可予以忽略。经整理,本文的主要结论可以归结为以下三点：
第一,垄断影响力与市盈率水平正相关,会显著影响市盈率,即市场会给予那些具有较高垄断影响力的上市公司较高的市盈率估值水平；拥有较高垄断影响力的上市公司的估值水平通常比其他公司高。对比两次回归分析,发现尽管两次分析的结果都对本文的假设进行了验证,但用修正后数据得到的回归模型对结果有所改善,更能体现自变量和因变量之间的关系。
第二,垄断影响力与每股收益存在显著负相关性。由于投资者预期到垄断影响力对公司未来盈利能力将产生影响,进而推高股价、市盈率高企,但垄断影响力对公司当期实际每股收益水平的影响有限,或者说每股收益对垄断影响力的反映有滞后性,因此两者呈现负相关性。
第三,垄断影响力与总股本存在显著负相关性。因为从相对角度来讲,企业股本越大,从某种角度上意味着企业收入相对来说越大,这时垄断影响力所产生的收益性效果就会因为比较基数的扩大显得不明显,所以垄断影响力与总股本呈现负相关性。从绝对角度来讲,如果垄断影响力给所有的公司带来的收益都是同一个水平,那么对于总股本大的公司来说,收益就被摊薄了,因此垄断影响力与总股本也呈现负相关性。
With the support of policy, China's nuclear power industry developed rapidly in recent years. Capital markets, especially stock market also shows high enthusiasm for investment in nuclear power industry. It is easy to notice that there is significant difference in price-earnings ratio among different corporation in the same nuclear power industry. With the explanation of traditional factors of price-earnings ratio (PE) alone, it is not persuative to explain the difference is rationality. It has been found that China's nuclear power industry is monopolistic, which may result in different market position and expected profitability among different listed companies, and may lead to different levels of market valuation..
Based on the summary and evaluation of the existing research, this paper takes listed companies from nuclear power industry for example, and analyses the impact of monopolistic influence on the company's market valuation. This paper proposes the concept of monopolistic influence and its measurement, then makes qualitative and quantitative analysis on those nuclear power companies' monopolistic influence. In this paper,38 major listed nuclear power companies are selected as samples, dating from the first quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2010. Thus, there are totally 255 valid samples. Monopolistic influence is chose as the main independent variable, besides, earnings per share and the total share are also chosen as the other two independent variables into the regression model. During the regression analysis, original PE and singular-amended PE are separately selected as dependent variable, and two regression analysis processes are carried out to prove the relationship between monopolistic influence and PE.
Through qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper find that monopolistic influence do have an impact on companies'market valuation, and there is correlation between monopolistic influence and earnings per share and total share. Since the collinearity between them is not obvious enough to have effect on the regression results, it can be ignored here. The main conclusions of this paper can be drawn as follows:
Firstly, monopolistic influence is positively correlated with PE and has a significant impact on PE, which means market tends to give companies with high monopolistic influence high market valuation, and for most time, companies that have higher monopolistic influence will have higher market valuation than other companies. By comparing the two regression analysis, it is found that although the two regression analysis can both verify the assumption proposed in the beginning of this paper, the model which adopts singular-amended PE can show the relationship between the independent and dependent variables better.
Secondly, monopolistic influence is significantly negative correlated with earnings per share. It maybe because investors expect companies with high monopolistic influence will have impact on companies' future profitability, thereby pushing up stock prices, causing high PE. But monopolistic influence has a limited impact on the company's current level of earnings per share, or there might be a time lag of the impact on earnings per share, thus monopolistic influence is significantly negative correlated with earnings per share.
Thirdly, monopolistic influence is significantly negative correlated with total share. This conclusion can be explained from both relative and absolute point of view. From a relative point of view, if one company has greater equity, its income is relatively greater. Since the amount of company's income is so much, then by comparison of the greater income, the revenue generated by monopolistic influence will relatively less obviously reflected. From the absolute point of view, if the revenue generated by monopolistic influence is at the same level among different companies, since revenue will be diluted by total share, the more total share a company own, the more diluted revenue it will have.
在对已有研究成果进行总结和评价的基础上,本文以核电上市公司为例,分析垄断影响力及其对公司市场估值的影响。为更好地展开研究,本文提出垄断影响力的概念及其测量指标,对核电产业上市公司垄断影响力进行定性分析和定量分析,主要选取38家核电上市公司的7期季度数据,最终255个有效样本,将垄断影响力作为主要的自变量,同时将每股收益和总股本也作为自变量纳入到回归模型中,分别以未修正的市盈率和奇异修正的市盈率作为因变量,分两次对垄断影响力与市盈率之间的关系进行回归分析。
通过定性分析和定量分析,发现垄断影响力对市盈率水平的影响确实存在,与此同时,也发现垄断影响力与每股收益和总股本之间存在相关关系。从回归过程的角度看,它们之间的共线性不明显,对回归结果的影响甚微,因此共线性对结果的影响可予以忽略。经整理,本文的主要结论可以归结为以下三点：
第一,垄断影响力与市盈率水平正相关,会显著影响市盈率,即市场会给予那些具有较高垄断影响力的上市公司较高的市盈率估值水平；拥有较高垄断影响力的上市公司的估值水平通常比其他公司高。对比两次回归分析,发现尽管两次分析的结果都对本文的假设进行了验证,但用修正后数据得到的回归模型对结果有所改善,更能体现自变量和因变量之间的关系。
第二,垄断影响力与每股收益存在显著负相关性。由于投资者预期到垄断影响力对公司未来盈利能力将产生影响,进而推高股价、市盈率高企,但垄断影响力对公司当期实际每股收益水平的影响有限,或者说每股收益对垄断影响力的反映有滞后性,因此两者呈现负相关性。
第三,垄断影响力与总股本存在显著负相关性。因为从相对角度来讲,企业股本越大,从某种角度上意味着企业收入相对来说越大,这时垄断影响力所产生的收益性效果就会因为比较基数的扩大显得不明显,所以垄断影响力与总股本呈现负相关性。从绝对角度来讲,如果垄断影响力给所有的公司带来的收益都是同一个水平,那么对于总股本大的公司来说,收益就被摊薄了,因此垄断影响力与总股本也呈现负相关性。
With the support of policy, China's nuclear power industry developed rapidly in recent years. Capital markets, especially stock market also shows high enthusiasm for investment in nuclear power industry. It is easy to notice that there is significant difference in price-earnings ratio among different corporation in the same nuclear power industry. With the explanation of traditional factors of price-earnings ratio (PE) alone, it is not persuative to explain the difference is rationality. It has been found that China's nuclear power industry is monopolistic, which may result in different market position and expected profitability among different listed companies, and may lead to different levels of market valuation..
Based on the summary and evaluation of the existing research, this paper takes listed companies from nuclear power industry for example, and analyses the impact of monopolistic influence on the company's market valuation. This paper proposes the concept of monopolistic influence and its measurement, then makes qualitative and quantitative analysis on those nuclear power companies' monopolistic influence. In this paper,38 major listed nuclear power companies are selected as samples, dating from the first quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2010. Thus, there are totally 255 valid samples. Monopolistic influence is chose as the main independent variable, besides, earnings per share and the total share are also chosen as the other two independent variables into the regression model. During the regression analysis, original PE and singular-amended PE are separately selected as dependent variable, and two regression analysis processes are carried out to prove the relationship between monopolistic influence and PE.
Through qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper find that monopolistic influence do have an impact on companies'market valuation, and there is correlation between monopolistic influence and earnings per share and total share. Since the collinearity between them is not obvious enough to have effect on the regression results, it can be ignored here. The main conclusions of this paper can be drawn as follows:
Firstly, monopolistic influence is positively correlated with PE and has a significant impact on PE, which means market tends to give companies with high monopolistic influence high market valuation, and for most time, companies that have higher monopolistic influence will have higher market valuation than other companies. By comparing the two regression analysis, it is found that although the two regression analysis can both verify the assumption proposed in the beginning of this paper, the model which adopts singular-amended PE can show the relationship between the independent and dependent variables better.
Secondly, monopolistic influence is significantly negative correlated with earnings per share. It maybe because investors expect companies with high monopolistic influence will have impact on companies' future profitability, thereby pushing up stock prices, causing high PE. But monopolistic influence has a limited impact on the company's current level of earnings per share, or there might be a time lag of the impact on earnings per share, thus monopolistic influence is significantly negative correlated with earnings per share.
Thirdly, monopolistic influence is significantly negative correlated with total share. This conclusion can be explained from both relative and absolute point of view. From a relative point of view, if one company has greater equity, its income is relatively greater. Since the amount of company's income is so much, then by comparison of the greater income, the revenue generated by monopolistic influence will relatively less obviously reflected. From the absolute point of view, if the revenue generated by monopolistic influence is at the same level among different companies, since revenue will be diluted by total share, the more total share a company own, the more diluted revenue it will have.
引文
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