胡塞尔的现象学心理学研究
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摘要
近年来,国内哲学界对胡塞尔现象学作为哲学的研究已初具规模。但作为胡塞尔现象学思想重要组成部分的现象学心理学的研究则相对滞后,几乎还没有学者对胡塞尔的现象学心理学进行系统研究。在心理学界有部分学者对现象学心理学做了研究,但主要是在心理学意义上进行研究,很少在哲学意义上,更严格地说在胡塞尔现象学思想范围内对现象学心理学进行系统研究。
现象学心理学在胡塞尔思想中扮演着重要角色。一方面,作为经验心理学的基础科学,为经验心理学的科学性奠定基础;另一方面,作为通向先验现象学的途径,为达到先验现象学铺平道路。可以说,现象学心理学是沟通心理学和先验现象学的中间桥梁。这种中介位置决定了现象学心理学在胡塞尔现象学思想中的重要位置。因此,系统地研究胡塞尔的现象学心理学思想,对心理学和现象学都有重要的理论意义。
本论文的研究目标是:从哲学意义上对胡塞尔的现象学心理学进行全面而系统的研究,分析胡塞尔现象学心理学产生的思想背景,梳理胡塞尔各个时期的现象学心理学思想,分析现象学心理学的内容、方法和特征,摆明现象学心理学在胡塞尔思想中的重要位置。
Husserl's early attempt was to clarify the basic concepts of mathematics to stabilize the foundation of mathematics. This clarification was done through descriptive psychology which deals with mental behaviour, that is to say it is based on psychology. However, Husserl does not satisfy with using psychology to found the logic. In fact he failed to answer the question how psychological connections of thinking transit to the logical unity of thought content. Reasons for the failure are that he used the methods of psychology. To truly grasp the nature of logic and the relevant philosophical fundamental issue, namely the relationship between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the content known, we must first of all criticize psychologism, then deep into the various subject areas of the pure logic to clarify the relevant issues. He believed that the fundamental problem of psychologism is that it confuses the object of psychology and that of logic, that is confusing judgement behavior and judgement content. Thus, for psychologism, the objectivity of the contents melt into the subjectivity of the behavior. The biggest stereotype of psychologism is that the logic is ultimately related with psychological phenomenon, namely, the concept, judging, reasoning, and so on in logic are the psychological phenomenon. It is impossible and is fundamentally wrong to try to separate logic or part of the logic from psychology. In Husserl's view, logic, mathematics is the science of concept, psychology is the science of existence; while the science of concept is a priori science, the science of existence is empirical science. The science of concept studies the universality of the law of the concept, with obvious certainty; but the science of existence studies the universality of the law of existence, with the obvious probability related to the facts. Therefore, psychology impossibly makes a fundamental interpretation for mathematical and logical basis. This is clearly the task of philosophy, while philosophy and psychology are two completely different disciplines.
However, it can not be denied that any concept objects of logic and mathematics are in some way impartibly linked with psychological experience. As a result, Husserl tried to present an inner intuition which is able to reveal the thinking experience always hidden for thinking person, and propose an essential description which proceeded in purely inner intuition and was related with givenness of pure experience. This is without doubt the task of the psychology of human knowledge. However, the psychology of the day can not complete the task. Thus, Husserl himself began to seek a descriptive science of mental activity, these mental activities constitute the purely logical entity.
Husserl used the term phenomenology to refer to such descriptive psychology. While distinguishing the relationship between psychology and logic, Husserl was gradually clarifying the nature of the method and content of psychology itself. It is epistemologically of importance to keep separate the purely descriptive research from the real psychological research. The purely descriptive research explores the cognitive experience which did not contact sense of theoretical psychology, while the real psychological research sought to explain the pure experience. Phenomenology shudies consciousness from a purely theoretical perspective, while descriptive psychology explores the conscious life from a normative or practical point of view. Pure phenomenology shows a field of neutral researches in which several sciences have their foundation.
In 1925, Husserl set forth more completely on his own idea of early phenomenological psychology in a series of lectures. He extended the concept of a purely descriptive psychology, named the new psychology or phenomenological psychology. This new psychology has the following characteristics: it is an a prior psychology, an eidetic psychology, intuitive or purely descriptive psychology, as well as an intentional psychology in the field of completely natural attitude.
Husserl proposed phenomenological psychology to provide a basis for empirical psychology. His goal or mission is that through the eidetic reduction, to achieve a pure psychology or phenomenological psychology, so as to pave the way for achieving transcendental phenomenology. Therefore, the primary objective of phenomenological psychology is to present the nature of mental phenomena, that is, there is a corresponding relationship between conscious activity and the object of consciousness, its structure is intentionality. The task of phenomenological psychology is to systematically explain the different types and forms of intentional experience. It reduces these intentional experiences to their original intent, and then clarifies the nature of psychology. It focuses on those intentional experiences which must be described as phenomenon. In addition, we can not only through self-experience but also through the experience of others to understand the mental life. Then we can phenomenologically explain common life according to all the relevant intentionality. Its own experience and strange experience constitute the research field of phenomenological psychology.
Husserl believes that only through a radical epoché, we can get consciousness as a pure phenomenon. The universal epochéof the world as it becomes known in consciousness shuts out from the phenomenological field the world as it exists for the subject in simple absoluteness; its place, however, is replaced by the world itself, or the respective meaning of consciousness in its various modes. In this way, through the phenomenological reduction, that is proceeding strict and radical epochéobjective settings in the field of psychology, we get the only genuine inner experience in the sense meant by any well-grounded science of psychology.
Consciousness is a legitimate psychological research theme. Empirical psychology studies consciousness with the empiric method, but the eidetic psychology uses eidetic methods to study consciousness. Husserl interpretates the concept of the eidetic psychology as an introspective psychology, which studies the basic structures and intentional structures of a purely mental life with phenomenological analytical approach. Real psychic phenomenon are brought to direct giveness in introspective psychology, which can be studied according to their nature. Thus, the eidetic psychology functions for empirical psychology as a systematic science of consciousness. Eidetic psychology is the basic science for all of the empirical psychology, which can clarify some basic principles and structures for empirical psychology. The difference between eidetic psychology and empirical psychology is eidetic psychology used eidetic reduction; the difference between eidetic psychology and transcendental phenomenology is transcendental phenomenology used phenomenological reduction. Obviously, eidetic psychology is an eidetic science of the nature of consciousness. It was built on an original intuition and worked completely in the natural attitude. For the phenomenological psychology, it is necessary to carry out only in a purely intuitive intentional analysis, an eidetic science of purely psychic data, and thus a general science of psychic data can be developed.
Psychology is an empirical science. A purely transcendental phenomenology is an eidetic science. Phenomenological psychology is a psychology parallels with the transcendental phenomenology on the approach and content. As an a priori purely intentional psychology guaranteed on the methods through a phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction, it asked to be basis of principle approach. Only based on this basis can we establish a scientifically rigorous empirical psychology. Since psychic data still remains the existence sense of the world in phenomenological psychology, so it is always a science in point of natural view. Also, it only means a pre-stage of originary or a priori phenomenology. It is true that the pre-stage has a role of guidance for entry into phenomenology. In order to change phenomenological psychology into transcendental phenomenology, we need to proceed transcendental reduction on the basis of phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction. This transcendental reduction asked the introspective person to suspend up the self-apperception, which is related to self-experience of pure psychology in the naive self-evidence.
Husserl put forward phenomenological psychology is inseparably related with that he criticized the prevailing naturalistic psychology. Most of naturalistic psychology focus on psychophysical and physiological research. This psychological study mainly served for experimental findings and quantity connections between so-called object stimulus and response. The fundamental principle of natural psychology is that they focus on those indirect and the relevant psychic factors, regardless of all the direct analysis and description of intuition consciousness. Dilthey strongly criticized this naturalistic psychological point of view. In his view, naturalistic psychology explains complex psychic phenomena according to a limited number of assumptions, as well as the causal relationship between these elements. Dilthey proposed a descriptive analytic psychology, its methodology is based upon a descriptive analysis of the internal perception. He replaced the illustrative psychology which gives a causal explanation of our mental life with this psychology. Brentano divided psychology into descriptive psychology and genetic psychology, he also believed that descriptive psychology is logically in the higher priority than genetic psychology. He analyzed conscious structure from the point of empiricism, tried to establish an objective distinction criteria between conscious phenomena and physical phenomena and to explain the various philosophical and scientific concepts and categories according to the psychological laws. He distinguished the difference between mental phenomena and physical phenomena, and believed that all mental phenomena are intentional, and psychological phenomena must point to an object different from the psychological experience, that is physical phenomena.
We believe that the naturalistic psychology failed to achieve either a genuine scientific methodology or psychic acts and their objects in essential purity. Naturalistic psychology fails to recognize a serious flaw itself, namely, if there is no systematic science of consciousness to explore the essential characteristics of conscious life, then it is impossible to understand the true meaning of the psychological facts and laws. Therefore through a systematic phenomenology, we can demonstrate the basis of scientific psychology. Only if the psychology has been constructed on the basis of a systematic phenomenology, the real empirical science of psychology related to the nature can be achieved. Empirical psychology is absolutely based on phenomenological pure psychology.
现象学心理学在胡塞尔思想中扮演着重要角色。一方面,作为经验心理学的基础科学,为经验心理学的科学性奠定基础;另一方面,作为通向先验现象学的途径,为达到先验现象学铺平道路。可以说,现象学心理学是沟通心理学和先验现象学的中间桥梁。这种中介位置决定了现象学心理学在胡塞尔现象学思想中的重要位置。因此,系统地研究胡塞尔的现象学心理学思想,对心理学和现象学都有重要的理论意义。
本论文的研究目标是:从哲学意义上对胡塞尔的现象学心理学进行全面而系统的研究,分析胡塞尔现象学心理学产生的思想背景,梳理胡塞尔各个时期的现象学心理学思想,分析现象学心理学的内容、方法和特征,摆明现象学心理学在胡塞尔思想中的重要位置。
Husserl's early attempt was to clarify the basic concepts of mathematics to stabilize the foundation of mathematics. This clarification was done through descriptive psychology which deals with mental behaviour, that is to say it is based on psychology. However, Husserl does not satisfy with using psychology to found the logic. In fact he failed to answer the question how psychological connections of thinking transit to the logical unity of thought content. Reasons for the failure are that he used the methods of psychology. To truly grasp the nature of logic and the relevant philosophical fundamental issue, namely the relationship between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the content known, we must first of all criticize psychologism, then deep into the various subject areas of the pure logic to clarify the relevant issues. He believed that the fundamental problem of psychologism is that it confuses the object of psychology and that of logic, that is confusing judgement behavior and judgement content. Thus, for psychologism, the objectivity of the contents melt into the subjectivity of the behavior. The biggest stereotype of psychologism is that the logic is ultimately related with psychological phenomenon, namely, the concept, judging, reasoning, and so on in logic are the psychological phenomenon. It is impossible and is fundamentally wrong to try to separate logic or part of the logic from psychology. In Husserl's view, logic, mathematics is the science of concept, psychology is the science of existence; while the science of concept is a priori science, the science of existence is empirical science. The science of concept studies the universality of the law of the concept, with obvious certainty; but the science of existence studies the universality of the law of existence, with the obvious probability related to the facts. Therefore, psychology impossibly makes a fundamental interpretation for mathematical and logical basis. This is clearly the task of philosophy, while philosophy and psychology are two completely different disciplines.
However, it can not be denied that any concept objects of logic and mathematics are in some way impartibly linked with psychological experience. As a result, Husserl tried to present an inner intuition which is able to reveal the thinking experience always hidden for thinking person, and propose an essential description which proceeded in purely inner intuition and was related with givenness of pure experience. This is without doubt the task of the psychology of human knowledge. However, the psychology of the day can not complete the task. Thus, Husserl himself began to seek a descriptive science of mental activity, these mental activities constitute the purely logical entity.
Husserl used the term phenomenology to refer to such descriptive psychology. While distinguishing the relationship between psychology and logic, Husserl was gradually clarifying the nature of the method and content of psychology itself. It is epistemologically of importance to keep separate the purely descriptive research from the real psychological research. The purely descriptive research explores the cognitive experience which did not contact sense of theoretical psychology, while the real psychological research sought to explain the pure experience. Phenomenology shudies consciousness from a purely theoretical perspective, while descriptive psychology explores the conscious life from a normative or practical point of view. Pure phenomenology shows a field of neutral researches in which several sciences have their foundation.
In 1925, Husserl set forth more completely on his own idea of early phenomenological psychology in a series of lectures. He extended the concept of a purely descriptive psychology, named the new psychology or phenomenological psychology. This new psychology has the following characteristics: it is an a prior psychology, an eidetic psychology, intuitive or purely descriptive psychology, as well as an intentional psychology in the field of completely natural attitude.
Husserl proposed phenomenological psychology to provide a basis for empirical psychology. His goal or mission is that through the eidetic reduction, to achieve a pure psychology or phenomenological psychology, so as to pave the way for achieving transcendental phenomenology. Therefore, the primary objective of phenomenological psychology is to present the nature of mental phenomena, that is, there is a corresponding relationship between conscious activity and the object of consciousness, its structure is intentionality. The task of phenomenological psychology is to systematically explain the different types and forms of intentional experience. It reduces these intentional experiences to their original intent, and then clarifies the nature of psychology. It focuses on those intentional experiences which must be described as phenomenon. In addition, we can not only through self-experience but also through the experience of others to understand the mental life. Then we can phenomenologically explain common life according to all the relevant intentionality. Its own experience and strange experience constitute the research field of phenomenological psychology.
Husserl believes that only through a radical epoché, we can get consciousness as a pure phenomenon. The universal epochéof the world as it becomes known in consciousness shuts out from the phenomenological field the world as it exists for the subject in simple absoluteness; its place, however, is replaced by the world itself, or the respective meaning of consciousness in its various modes. In this way, through the phenomenological reduction, that is proceeding strict and radical epochéobjective settings in the field of psychology, we get the only genuine inner experience in the sense meant by any well-grounded science of psychology.
Consciousness is a legitimate psychological research theme. Empirical psychology studies consciousness with the empiric method, but the eidetic psychology uses eidetic methods to study consciousness. Husserl interpretates the concept of the eidetic psychology as an introspective psychology, which studies the basic structures and intentional structures of a purely mental life with phenomenological analytical approach. Real psychic phenomenon are brought to direct giveness in introspective psychology, which can be studied according to their nature. Thus, the eidetic psychology functions for empirical psychology as a systematic science of consciousness. Eidetic psychology is the basic science for all of the empirical psychology, which can clarify some basic principles and structures for empirical psychology. The difference between eidetic psychology and empirical psychology is eidetic psychology used eidetic reduction; the difference between eidetic psychology and transcendental phenomenology is transcendental phenomenology used phenomenological reduction. Obviously, eidetic psychology is an eidetic science of the nature of consciousness. It was built on an original intuition and worked completely in the natural attitude. For the phenomenological psychology, it is necessary to carry out only in a purely intuitive intentional analysis, an eidetic science of purely psychic data, and thus a general science of psychic data can be developed.
Psychology is an empirical science. A purely transcendental phenomenology is an eidetic science. Phenomenological psychology is a psychology parallels with the transcendental phenomenology on the approach and content. As an a priori purely intentional psychology guaranteed on the methods through a phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction, it asked to be basis of principle approach. Only based on this basis can we establish a scientifically rigorous empirical psychology. Since psychic data still remains the existence sense of the world in phenomenological psychology, so it is always a science in point of natural view. Also, it only means a pre-stage of originary or a priori phenomenology. It is true that the pre-stage has a role of guidance for entry into phenomenology. In order to change phenomenological psychology into transcendental phenomenology, we need to proceed transcendental reduction on the basis of phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction. This transcendental reduction asked the introspective person to suspend up the self-apperception, which is related to self-experience of pure psychology in the naive self-evidence.
Husserl put forward phenomenological psychology is inseparably related with that he criticized the prevailing naturalistic psychology. Most of naturalistic psychology focus on psychophysical and physiological research. This psychological study mainly served for experimental findings and quantity connections between so-called object stimulus and response. The fundamental principle of natural psychology is that they focus on those indirect and the relevant psychic factors, regardless of all the direct analysis and description of intuition consciousness. Dilthey strongly criticized this naturalistic psychological point of view. In his view, naturalistic psychology explains complex psychic phenomena according to a limited number of assumptions, as well as the causal relationship between these elements. Dilthey proposed a descriptive analytic psychology, its methodology is based upon a descriptive analysis of the internal perception. He replaced the illustrative psychology which gives a causal explanation of our mental life with this psychology. Brentano divided psychology into descriptive psychology and genetic psychology, he also believed that descriptive psychology is logically in the higher priority than genetic psychology. He analyzed conscious structure from the point of empiricism, tried to establish an objective distinction criteria between conscious phenomena and physical phenomena and to explain the various philosophical and scientific concepts and categories according to the psychological laws. He distinguished the difference between mental phenomena and physical phenomena, and believed that all mental phenomena are intentional, and psychological phenomena must point to an object different from the psychological experience, that is physical phenomena.
We believe that the naturalistic psychology failed to achieve either a genuine scientific methodology or psychic acts and their objects in essential purity. Naturalistic psychology fails to recognize a serious flaw itself, namely, if there is no systematic science of consciousness to explore the essential characteristics of conscious life, then it is impossible to understand the true meaning of the psychological facts and laws. Therefore through a systematic phenomenology, we can demonstrate the basis of scientific psychology. Only if the psychology has been constructed on the basis of a systematic phenomenology, the real empirical science of psychology related to the nature can be achieved. Empirical psychology is absolutely based on phenomenological pure psychology.
引文
①倪梁康.《胡塞尔文集》总序.//胡塞尔.现象学的观念[M].倪梁康译.北京:人民出版社,2007.p.4
①胡塞尔.哲学作为严格的科学[M].倪梁康译.北京:商务印书馆,2002.p. 21
①刘建岭.现象学心理学与经验心理学的关系.武汉科技大学学报(社会科学版) [J].2009,2:11-14.
②刘建岭.现象学心理学与经验心理学的关系.武汉科技大学学报(社会科学版) [J].2009,2:11-14.
①刘建岭.现象学心理学与经验心理学的关系.武汉科技大学学报(社会科学版) [J].2009,2:11-14.
②刘建岭.现象学心理学与经验心理学的关系.武汉科技大学学报(社会科学版) [J].2009,2:11-14.
①Husserl E. Phenomenological psychology. Translated by John Scanlon.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, pp.8-14
①胡塞尔.文章与讲演(1911-1921年)[M].奈农,塞普编;倪梁康译.北京:人民出版社,2009,5.pp.338-339
①Husserl E. Phenomenological psychology. Translated by John Scanlon.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. pp.20-21
②Husserl E. Phenomenological psychology. Translated by John Scanlon.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. pp.21-22
①Husserl E. Phenomenological psychology. Translated by John Scanlon.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. pp.22-23
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②Uhler, K L. A clarification of Edmund Husserl's distinction between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1976.p.21
①Uhler, K L. A clarification of Edmund Husserl's distinction between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1976.pp.39-42
①Kochelmans J J. Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology: A historico-critical study. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967. p.88
①胡塞尔.逻辑研究[M](第一卷).倪梁康译.上海:上海译文出版社,2006.pp.2-3
①Husserl E. Phenomenological psychology. Translated by John Scanlon.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.p.14
①Husserl E. Phenomenological psychology. Translated by John Scanlon.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. pp.14-17
②Husserl E. Phenomenological psychology. Translated by John Scanlon.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. pp.17-19
①Husserl E. Phenomenological psychology. Translated by John Scanlon.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977. pp.19-20
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①施皮尔格伯格.现象学运动[M],王炳文,张金言译.商务印书馆,1995. pp. 149-152
②Husserl E. Phenomenological psychology. Translated by John Scanlon.The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.p.18
③Kochelmans J J. Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology: A historico-critical study. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967.p.91
①胡塞尔.逻辑研究[M](第二卷/第一部分).倪梁康译.上海:上海译文出版社, 2006. pp.13-15
②胡塞尔.逻辑研究[M](第二卷/第一部分).倪梁康译.上海:上海译文出版社, 2006. pp.35-36
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②施皮尔格伯格.现象学运动[M],王炳文,张金言译.北京:商务印书馆,1995. pp.155-159
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②胡塞尔.现象学的观念[M].倪梁康译.北京:人民出版社,2007, pp.19,65-67
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①胡塞尔.现象学的观念[M].倪梁康译.北京:人民出版社,2007, p.23
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①Kochelmans J J. Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology: A historico-critical study. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967.pp. 124-125.
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①胡塞尔.纯粹现象学通论[M].李幼蒸译.北京:商务印书馆,1996.pp.53-54
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