基于TPL的VMI供应链决策博弈与收益共享机制研究
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摘要
随着生产外包过程中多级供应链库存成本的上升，越来越多的企业开始实施供应商管理库存（VMI）；同时，第三方物流（TPL）的兴起使得许多供应商将VMI业务外包给第三方物流服务商（TPLP）。在分散决策VMI供应链中，参与者之间存在与利益相关的决策博弈；特别是当参与者人数增多时，博弈将会变得更为复杂。基于此，本论文系统研究TPLP独立或非独立决策时VMI供应链的决策博弈与收益共享机制设计问题，主要创新性研究工作总结如下：
构建单供应商VMI供应链序贯决策博弈与纳什讨价还价博弈模型，指出每种博弈都具有唯一的均衡。通过分析纳什讨价还价博弈框架发现，供应商的收益却可能随着其讨价还价能力的增强而减少；存在使供应商利润最大化的供应商最优讨价还价能力。同时，供应商最优讨价还价能力受供应商物流引入非独立决策TPLP的影响。
将TPLP作为独立决策主体，研究包括TPLP、单供应商和制造商在内的三级VMI&TPL供应链决策博弈，提出基于分散决策和基于参与者供应链贡献度两种收益共享合作机制。前者分为两方收益共享机制和三方收益共享机制；研究发现供应链效率在三方收益共享较两方收益共享时更高，TPLP和制造商则更偏好其他参与者之间合作而非自己参与两方合作。此外，前一种机制可能出现分配不公平，而后一种机制则可有效避免这一不足。
以装配生产为背景，构建两供应商装配式VMI供应链决策博弈模型。研究表明分散决策下装配式VMI供应链效率较单供应商VMI供应链中更低。然后，引入基于分散决策和基于参与者供应链贡献度的收益共享机制。研究发现：若参与者利润不变，在一定条件下，他们的讨价还价能力空间在不同机制中具有相似特征；在前一种机制中，应限制供应商的增量利润分配比例，尤其是当他对备选供应源的成本优势变小时。
基于TPLP、N个供应商和单制造商构成的装配式VMI&TPL供应链，构建决策博弈模型与收益共享机制。在分散决策下，TPLP对每类零部件库存服务分别定价或对所有零部件提供总服务价格。通过比较发现，两种定价模式下参与者利润无差异，且供应链的效率损失率均与供应商数量正相关。在基于参与者供应链贡献度的收益共享机制中，参与者愿意参与该机制的最低讨价还价能力值与供应商数量正相关。在基于分散决策的收益共享机制中，TPLP的服务价格低于其成本，供应商的总价格等于其总成本。此外，两种机制在一定讨价还价能力条件下可以相互转化。
With the increased holding cost of multi-echelon supply chains in process ofproduction outsourcing, more and more companies start to implement vendor-managedinventory (VMI); meanwhile, the growth of third-party logistics (TPL) induces manysuppliers to outsource the operation of VMI to third-party logistics provider (TPLP). In adecentralized VMI supply chain, the decision game on benefit exists among the playersand, with the increased number of the players, becomes more complicated. Departing fromthis, this dissertation concentrates on the decision game and revenue-sharing mechanismdesign in VMI supply chains with the TPLP who makes decision independently or not.More specifically, the innovative research works are summarized as follows:
The sequential decision game and Nash bargaining game in a VMI supply chain withsingle supplier are modeled, and the unique equilibrium of each game is concluded. Byanalyzing the Nash bargaining game framework, the dissertation uncovers that thesupplier’s revenue may decrease with her bargaining power; there exists optimalbargaining power for the supplier to maximize her profit. Meanwhile, the optimalbargaining power for the supplier is impacted by her decision on whether to incorporatethe TPLP who does not make decision independently.
By incorporating the TPLP who makes decision independently, the dissertationstudies the decision game and revenue-sharing mechanisms among the TPLP, singlesupplier and manufacturer in a3-echelon VMI&TPL supply chain, and proposes tworevenue-sharing mechanisms respectively based on decentralized decision-making and theplayers’ contributions on supply chain. The first mechanism is divided into twomechanisms with two players and with three players separately; the research discoversthat the supply chain efficiency is higher in the mechanism with three players than in theone with two players, and either the TPLP or the manufacturer prefers the cooperationbetween the others than that between herself and another player. Moreover, the unequaldistribution of revenue may arise in the first mechanism, but can be avoided in the second.
The model of a decision game in an assembly VMI supply chain is proposed in thecontext of assembling production. The research results show that the supply chain efficiency is higher in the assembly supply chain than in the supply chain with singlesupplier if the players’ decisions are decentralized. Then, the revenue-sharing mechanismsrespectively based on decentralized decision-making and the players’ contributions onsupply chain are proposed. It is shown that given the equal profits under differentmechanisms for all players, the bargaining power space for them exhibits similarcharacteristics; the supplier’s shared proportion of the added profit needs to be bounded inthe former mechanism, especially when her cost advantage on the alternative supplysource is reduced.
The dissertation studies the decision game and revenue-sharing mechanisms in anassembly VMI&TPL supply chain with TPLP, N suppliers and single manufacturer. Inthe decentralized supply chain, the TPLP either chooses the service price for each kind ofthe components or a total price for all kinds of components. It is uncovered by comparisonthat the players’ profits make no difference for these two pricing modes, and the loss rateof supply chain efficiency increases with the number of the suppliers. Under therevenue-sharing mechanism based on the players’ contributions on supply chain, theminimal bargaining power value for a player to participate in such mechanism decreaseswith the number of the suppliers. In the revenue-sharing mechanism based ondecentralized decision-making, the TPLP chooses service price that is lower than her cost,and the sum of suppliers’ prices equals the sum of their costs. Moreover, the twomechanisms can be mutually converted under certain conditions on the players’ bargainingpowers.
构建单供应商VMI供应链序贯决策博弈与纳什讨价还价博弈模型，指出每种博弈都具有唯一的均衡。通过分析纳什讨价还价博弈框架发现，供应商的收益却可能随着其讨价还价能力的增强而减少；存在使供应商利润最大化的供应商最优讨价还价能力。同时，供应商最优讨价还价能力受供应商物流引入非独立决策TPLP的影响。
将TPLP作为独立决策主体，研究包括TPLP、单供应商和制造商在内的三级VMI&TPL供应链决策博弈，提出基于分散决策和基于参与者供应链贡献度两种收益共享合作机制。前者分为两方收益共享机制和三方收益共享机制；研究发现供应链效率在三方收益共享较两方收益共享时更高，TPLP和制造商则更偏好其他参与者之间合作而非自己参与两方合作。此外，前一种机制可能出现分配不公平，而后一种机制则可有效避免这一不足。
以装配生产为背景，构建两供应商装配式VMI供应链决策博弈模型。研究表明分散决策下装配式VMI供应链效率较单供应商VMI供应链中更低。然后，引入基于分散决策和基于参与者供应链贡献度的收益共享机制。研究发现：若参与者利润不变，在一定条件下，他们的讨价还价能力空间在不同机制中具有相似特征；在前一种机制中，应限制供应商的增量利润分配比例，尤其是当他对备选供应源的成本优势变小时。
基于TPLP、N个供应商和单制造商构成的装配式VMI&TPL供应链，构建决策博弈模型与收益共享机制。在分散决策下，TPLP对每类零部件库存服务分别定价或对所有零部件提供总服务价格。通过比较发现，两种定价模式下参与者利润无差异，且供应链的效率损失率均与供应商数量正相关。在基于参与者供应链贡献度的收益共享机制中，参与者愿意参与该机制的最低讨价还价能力值与供应商数量正相关。在基于分散决策的收益共享机制中，TPLP的服务价格低于其成本，供应商的总价格等于其总成本。此外，两种机制在一定讨价还价能力条件下可以相互转化。
With the increased holding cost of multi-echelon supply chains in process ofproduction outsourcing, more and more companies start to implement vendor-managedinventory (VMI); meanwhile, the growth of third-party logistics (TPL) induces manysuppliers to outsource the operation of VMI to third-party logistics provider (TPLP). In adecentralized VMI supply chain, the decision game on benefit exists among the playersand, with the increased number of the players, becomes more complicated. Departing fromthis, this dissertation concentrates on the decision game and revenue-sharing mechanismdesign in VMI supply chains with the TPLP who makes decision independently or not.More specifically, the innovative research works are summarized as follows:
The sequential decision game and Nash bargaining game in a VMI supply chain withsingle supplier are modeled, and the unique equilibrium of each game is concluded. Byanalyzing the Nash bargaining game framework, the dissertation uncovers that thesupplier’s revenue may decrease with her bargaining power; there exists optimalbargaining power for the supplier to maximize her profit. Meanwhile, the optimalbargaining power for the supplier is impacted by her decision on whether to incorporatethe TPLP who does not make decision independently.
By incorporating the TPLP who makes decision independently, the dissertationstudies the decision game and revenue-sharing mechanisms among the TPLP, singlesupplier and manufacturer in a3-echelon VMI&TPL supply chain, and proposes tworevenue-sharing mechanisms respectively based on decentralized decision-making and theplayers’ contributions on supply chain. The first mechanism is divided into twomechanisms with two players and with three players separately; the research discoversthat the supply chain efficiency is higher in the mechanism with three players than in theone with two players, and either the TPLP or the manufacturer prefers the cooperationbetween the others than that between herself and another player. Moreover, the unequaldistribution of revenue may arise in the first mechanism, but can be avoided in the second.
The model of a decision game in an assembly VMI supply chain is proposed in thecontext of assembling production. The research results show that the supply chain efficiency is higher in the assembly supply chain than in the supply chain with singlesupplier if the players’ decisions are decentralized. Then, the revenue-sharing mechanismsrespectively based on decentralized decision-making and the players’ contributions onsupply chain are proposed. It is shown that given the equal profits under differentmechanisms for all players, the bargaining power space for them exhibits similarcharacteristics; the supplier’s shared proportion of the added profit needs to be bounded inthe former mechanism, especially when her cost advantage on the alternative supplysource is reduced.
The dissertation studies the decision game and revenue-sharing mechanisms in anassembly VMI&TPL supply chain with TPLP, N suppliers and single manufacturer. Inthe decentralized supply chain, the TPLP either chooses the service price for each kind ofthe components or a total price for all kinds of components. It is uncovered by comparisonthat the players’ profits make no difference for these two pricing modes, and the loss rateof supply chain efficiency increases with the number of the suppliers. Under therevenue-sharing mechanism based on the players’ contributions on supply chain, theminimal bargaining power value for a player to participate in such mechanism decreaseswith the number of the suppliers. In the revenue-sharing mechanism based ondecentralized decision-making, the TPLP chooses service price that is lower than her cost,and the sum of suppliers’ prices equals the sum of their costs. Moreover, the twomechanisms can be mutually converted under certain conditions on the players’ bargainingpowers.
引文
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