控制性股东专用性资产投资行为研究
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摘要
上市公司的控制性股东无论是为了追求盈利性的目标,如获得物质利益或者使企业利润最大化；还是非盈利性目标,如产品市场份额、外部间接经济效益、公司控制权等,当控制性股东认为预期通过上市公司可实现其追求的目标,那么控制性股东就会对上市公司投入关系专用性资产。潜在地,专用性资产的投入为这种契约关系提供了保证(通过可置信承诺信号的传递),对稳固与上市公司的契约关系产生了重要影响。控制性股东投入的专用性资产是一种特殊资产,提高了上市公司的差异化水平；随着这种专用性资产的投入,将控制性股东与上市公司之间的利益捆绑于这类资产,限制了控制性股东对上市公司的利益侵占行为,关系两者之间契约中断的控股股东的机会主义行为受到了影响,促进控制性股东与上市公司形成利益协同的局面,继而影响了上市公司的价值。但是由于不完全契约和可占用性准租的客观存在,导致了专用性资产捆绑效应“失效”,本文将这个问题置于公司治理的框架下,研究公司治理机制对专用性投资有效性的影响。
本文共分七章。第一章为导论；第二章为文献综述,在对已有的资产专用性方面的研究文献和大股东行为与公司价值的研究成果进行梳理的基础上,对这些研究进行了评论；第三章为理论分析与研究假设。主要根据资产专用性的基本理论以及代理理论、公司治理理论等对控制性股东投入专用性资产的动因、资产专用性对控制性股东机会主义行为的约束效应以及资产专用性、公司治理和公司价值等问题进行分析并提出相关的研究假设；第四章为控制性股东专用性资产投资动因研究。基于资产专用性指标,运用主成分分析法构建资产专用性指标,对影响控制性股东专用性资产投资行为的各因素分别进行计量,构建相应的模型进行实证检验并对结果进行分析；第五章为资产专用性对控制性股东机会主义行为约束效应的实证检验。首先本章在考察了资产专用性对控制性股东机会主义的约束效应的基础上,又考虑了两权分离程度对这种约束效应的影响；第六章为资产专用性、公司治理与公司价值(基于控制性股东视角)的实证研究,检验公司治理对控制性股东专用性投资对公司价值影响的调节作用；第七章为研究结论。本章总结了本文的研究结论,提出了一些实践启示,同时,讨论了本文研究存在的局限性和一些未来的研究方向。
本文得出的主要研究结论包括：
1.考察了控制性股东专用性资产投资动因的问题。首先,控制性股东向上市公司投入专用性资产的行为是在利益协同效应和壕沟防御效应影响下的结果；其次,在利益协同效应的作用下,控制性股东更偏好于对上市公司投入专用性资产,而在壕沟防御效应的作用下,控制性股东对上市公司的专用性资产水平降低；最后,激励效应与防御效应与控制性股东的专用性资产投资行为呈倒U型的非线性曲线回归关系,模型的拐点为32.85%,即控制性股东的持股比例在不超过32.85%的区域内利益协同效应明显,而超过32.85%以后壕沟防御效应开始影响控制性股东的专用性资产的投资行为。
2.从控制性股东视角,提出了资产专用性对控制性股东行为的“约束”效应是一种条件效应的观点。控制性股东的专用性资产投资将其绑定在与上市公司之间的契约上,一定程度上约束了控制性股东的机会主义行为；然而,资产专用性和行为主体之间并非简单的线性关系,结合我国上市公司控制权与现金流权分离的实际,将控制性股东利益侵占动机与资产专用性的约束效应进行了关系研究,发现较高的两权分离程度会造成资产专用性的“约束”效应失灵。
3.实证检验了资产专用性和公司治理机制对上市公司价值的共同影响。控制性股东的专用性投资使上市公司拥有了异质化的资本,获得了独特而又难于模仿的市场优势；再加上资产专用性的“可置信承诺”的信号效应以及对机会主义的约束,控制性股东的专用性投资一定程度上提升了上市公司的价值。但是,控制性股东对上市公司的利益侵占对这一观点形成了悖论,本文将这种代理问题置于公司治理的研究框架下,对控制性股东的行为做出了新的解释。研究发现：控制性股东的专用性投资能够提高所投资上市公司的的市场价值,产生正的价值效应；公司治理对控制性股东专用性投资和公司价值有调节作用,即对公司治理机制较完善的企业而言,控股股东的专用性投资水平越高,公司价值越高。
Whether for profitability objective (maximization of Material Benefits or profit) or non-profitability objective (economic control rights, social benefits and market share), the controlling shareholder can invest specific assets only under the premise of obtaining expected return from the listed company. Through this, the controlling shareholder can build the powerful contractual relationship. Specific assets can give security for this private order, that is the credible commitment. The controlling shareholder of the listed company invests specific assets, in one way, just as differentiated assets. In another way, the controlling shareholder's contribution of such kind of specific assets to the listed company have generated the binding effect between the controlling shareholder and the listed company, which in turn will hinder the opportunism of the majority shareholder (i.e., the misappropriation of the controlling shareholder).Hence a situation of cooperation is created between the controlling shareholder and the listed company, which can impact corporate value. Because of the appropriable quasi-rent and incomplete Contract, asset specificity can not play its role well. This paper studies the effect of asset specificity on the corporate value under corporate governance in China.
As the thoughts above, the dissertation is constituted with seven main chapters. The first chapter is the introduction which focuses on explaining the research problems from the reality, the theoretical and realistic meaning of the research and the main constructions. The second chapter is the literature review about the assets specificity, controlling shareholder's behavior and corporate value, corporate governance and so on to form the theoretical basic for further analyze. The third chapter are theoretical analysis and hypotheses, mainly based on the basic theory of the assets specificity, agency theory, as well as corporate governance theory to analyze and put forward the hypothesis of issues such as the controlling shareholder's motivation to invest in specific assets, the binding effect of asset specificity to control the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders, the relationship of asset specificity, corporate governance and corporate value. The forth chapter is the research of controlling shareholder's motivation to invest in specific assets. Based on asset specificity, using principal component analysis to build assets specificity indicators, to measure factors that affect the controlling shareholder's investment intensity of specific assets and to construct the corresponding model to make empirical test and the results were analyzed; The fifth chapter is the empirical test of the effect of asset specificity on the controlling shareholder's opportunistic behavior. First, this chapter not only examines the effect of asset specificity on the controlling shareholder's opportunistic behavior, but also consider the impact of the separation of ownership and the degree of the effect of this constraint; The sixth chapter is the empirical study of asset specificity, corporate governance and firm value (based on the controlling shareholder's perspective), inspect corporate governance's impact on the relationship between the controlling shareholders' investment about specific assets and firm value of the listed company. The last chapter is the conclusion of the study. This chapter summarizes the conclusions of this study, presented some practical revelation, at the same time to discuss the limitations and future research directions of this study.
The main research findings can be summarized as the following four points:
1. we analyze and test the question of the controlling shareholders'investing motivation of specific assets. Firstly, there are things that have effect on the controlling shareholder's behavior. The things are incentive effect and entrenchment effect. Secondly, the controlling shareholder can prefer to invest the specific assets under the incentive effect, as well as reluctant to do it under the entrenchment effect. The tests prove that the relationship between these two effects and the controlling shareholders'investing motivation of specific assets presents an inverted U-curve relationship. The maximum value will occur at the32.85%(controlling shareholder's share proportion) point. At the region less than32.85%point, the incentive effect is significant.
2. It is condition effect view that asset specific will have "binding" effect on controlling shareholder from the perspective of them. Investment in specific assets of controlling shareholders binding themselves to the contract with listed companies, to some extent, constrains the opportunistic behavior of the controlling shareholders. However it is not simple linear relationship between asset specificity and behavior subject, combined with the separation of the control rights and cash flow rights of listed companies in China, we study the binding effect of controlling shareholders' interests encroachment motivation and asset specificity. As a result, the test found that the higher the degree of ownership would cause the failure of asset specificity's binding effect.
3. Empirical inspect the combined effect of asset specificity and corporate governance on listed companies. Asset specificity of controlling shareholders'force listed companies have heterogeneous capital, access to the unique and difficult to imitate market advantage. And with asset specificity's signal effect of "credible commitment" and constraints of opportunistic behavior, the specific investments of controlling shareholder, to some extent, enhance the value of the listed companies. However, the benefit expropriation of the controlling shareholders of listed companies formed a paradox on this point. The treatise will put this agency problem in the framework of corporate governance, and make a new interpretation of the behavior of the controlling shareholders. The result shows that there is positively significant relation between asset specificity and corporate value. Moreover, the level of corporate governance in the listed company, as a moderator, can impact this relation.
本文共分七章。第一章为导论；第二章为文献综述,在对已有的资产专用性方面的研究文献和大股东行为与公司价值的研究成果进行梳理的基础上,对这些研究进行了评论；第三章为理论分析与研究假设。主要根据资产专用性的基本理论以及代理理论、公司治理理论等对控制性股东投入专用性资产的动因、资产专用性对控制性股东机会主义行为的约束效应以及资产专用性、公司治理和公司价值等问题进行分析并提出相关的研究假设；第四章为控制性股东专用性资产投资动因研究。基于资产专用性指标,运用主成分分析法构建资产专用性指标,对影响控制性股东专用性资产投资行为的各因素分别进行计量,构建相应的模型进行实证检验并对结果进行分析；第五章为资产专用性对控制性股东机会主义行为约束效应的实证检验。首先本章在考察了资产专用性对控制性股东机会主义的约束效应的基础上,又考虑了两权分离程度对这种约束效应的影响；第六章为资产专用性、公司治理与公司价值(基于控制性股东视角)的实证研究,检验公司治理对控制性股东专用性投资对公司价值影响的调节作用；第七章为研究结论。本章总结了本文的研究结论,提出了一些实践启示,同时,讨论了本文研究存在的局限性和一些未来的研究方向。
本文得出的主要研究结论包括：
1.考察了控制性股东专用性资产投资动因的问题。首先,控制性股东向上市公司投入专用性资产的行为是在利益协同效应和壕沟防御效应影响下的结果；其次,在利益协同效应的作用下,控制性股东更偏好于对上市公司投入专用性资产,而在壕沟防御效应的作用下,控制性股东对上市公司的专用性资产水平降低；最后,激励效应与防御效应与控制性股东的专用性资产投资行为呈倒U型的非线性曲线回归关系,模型的拐点为32.85%,即控制性股东的持股比例在不超过32.85%的区域内利益协同效应明显,而超过32.85%以后壕沟防御效应开始影响控制性股东的专用性资产的投资行为。
2.从控制性股东视角,提出了资产专用性对控制性股东行为的“约束”效应是一种条件效应的观点。控制性股东的专用性资产投资将其绑定在与上市公司之间的契约上,一定程度上约束了控制性股东的机会主义行为；然而,资产专用性和行为主体之间并非简单的线性关系,结合我国上市公司控制权与现金流权分离的实际,将控制性股东利益侵占动机与资产专用性的约束效应进行了关系研究,发现较高的两权分离程度会造成资产专用性的“约束”效应失灵。
3.实证检验了资产专用性和公司治理机制对上市公司价值的共同影响。控制性股东的专用性投资使上市公司拥有了异质化的资本,获得了独特而又难于模仿的市场优势；再加上资产专用性的“可置信承诺”的信号效应以及对机会主义的约束,控制性股东的专用性投资一定程度上提升了上市公司的价值。但是,控制性股东对上市公司的利益侵占对这一观点形成了悖论,本文将这种代理问题置于公司治理的研究框架下,对控制性股东的行为做出了新的解释。研究发现：控制性股东的专用性投资能够提高所投资上市公司的的市场价值,产生正的价值效应；公司治理对控制性股东专用性投资和公司价值有调节作用,即对公司治理机制较完善的企业而言,控股股东的专用性投资水平越高,公司价值越高。
Whether for profitability objective (maximization of Material Benefits or profit) or non-profitability objective (economic control rights, social benefits and market share), the controlling shareholder can invest specific assets only under the premise of obtaining expected return from the listed company. Through this, the controlling shareholder can build the powerful contractual relationship. Specific assets can give security for this private order, that is the credible commitment. The controlling shareholder of the listed company invests specific assets, in one way, just as differentiated assets. In another way, the controlling shareholder's contribution of such kind of specific assets to the listed company have generated the binding effect between the controlling shareholder and the listed company, which in turn will hinder the opportunism of the majority shareholder (i.e., the misappropriation of the controlling shareholder).Hence a situation of cooperation is created between the controlling shareholder and the listed company, which can impact corporate value. Because of the appropriable quasi-rent and incomplete Contract, asset specificity can not play its role well. This paper studies the effect of asset specificity on the corporate value under corporate governance in China.
As the thoughts above, the dissertation is constituted with seven main chapters. The first chapter is the introduction which focuses on explaining the research problems from the reality, the theoretical and realistic meaning of the research and the main constructions. The second chapter is the literature review about the assets specificity, controlling shareholder's behavior and corporate value, corporate governance and so on to form the theoretical basic for further analyze. The third chapter are theoretical analysis and hypotheses, mainly based on the basic theory of the assets specificity, agency theory, as well as corporate governance theory to analyze and put forward the hypothesis of issues such as the controlling shareholder's motivation to invest in specific assets, the binding effect of asset specificity to control the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders, the relationship of asset specificity, corporate governance and corporate value. The forth chapter is the research of controlling shareholder's motivation to invest in specific assets. Based on asset specificity, using principal component analysis to build assets specificity indicators, to measure factors that affect the controlling shareholder's investment intensity of specific assets and to construct the corresponding model to make empirical test and the results were analyzed; The fifth chapter is the empirical test of the effect of asset specificity on the controlling shareholder's opportunistic behavior. First, this chapter not only examines the effect of asset specificity on the controlling shareholder's opportunistic behavior, but also consider the impact of the separation of ownership and the degree of the effect of this constraint; The sixth chapter is the empirical study of asset specificity, corporate governance and firm value (based on the controlling shareholder's perspective), inspect corporate governance's impact on the relationship between the controlling shareholders' investment about specific assets and firm value of the listed company. The last chapter is the conclusion of the study. This chapter summarizes the conclusions of this study, presented some practical revelation, at the same time to discuss the limitations and future research directions of this study.
The main research findings can be summarized as the following four points:
1. we analyze and test the question of the controlling shareholders'investing motivation of specific assets. Firstly, there are things that have effect on the controlling shareholder's behavior. The things are incentive effect and entrenchment effect. Secondly, the controlling shareholder can prefer to invest the specific assets under the incentive effect, as well as reluctant to do it under the entrenchment effect. The tests prove that the relationship between these two effects and the controlling shareholders'investing motivation of specific assets presents an inverted U-curve relationship. The maximum value will occur at the32.85%(controlling shareholder's share proportion) point. At the region less than32.85%point, the incentive effect is significant.
2. It is condition effect view that asset specific will have "binding" effect on controlling shareholder from the perspective of them. Investment in specific assets of controlling shareholders binding themselves to the contract with listed companies, to some extent, constrains the opportunistic behavior of the controlling shareholders. However it is not simple linear relationship between asset specificity and behavior subject, combined with the separation of the control rights and cash flow rights of listed companies in China, we study the binding effect of controlling shareholders' interests encroachment motivation and asset specificity. As a result, the test found that the higher the degree of ownership would cause the failure of asset specificity's binding effect.
3. Empirical inspect the combined effect of asset specificity and corporate governance on listed companies. Asset specificity of controlling shareholders'force listed companies have heterogeneous capital, access to the unique and difficult to imitate market advantage. And with asset specificity's signal effect of "credible commitment" and constraints of opportunistic behavior, the specific investments of controlling shareholder, to some extent, enhance the value of the listed companies. However, the benefit expropriation of the controlling shareholders of listed companies formed a paradox on this point. The treatise will put this agency problem in the framework of corporate governance, and make a new interpretation of the behavior of the controlling shareholders. The result shows that there is positively significant relation between asset specificity and corporate value. Moreover, the level of corporate governance in the listed company, as a moderator, can impact this relation.
引文
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