企业网络中关系性交易治理机制及其影响研究
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摘要
近年来，世界各国经济中网络组织形式的普遍兴起引起了理论界的广泛重视，推动着企业网络理论的快速发展。企业网络理论认为，网络组织是介于企业和市场之间的一种制度安排，对于交易效率的分析应该在企业—网络—市场的三层次分析框架下进行。这一理论的崛起正在改变着传统企业理论和产业组织理论的基本视野。值得注意的是，虽然企业网络组织作为一种交易治理的制度创新形式已经得到了学术界的认可，并且在经济发展实践中已经形成越来越大的影响，但是研究人员对于企业网络中交易治理的微观过程及其效率问题的分析还没有形成统一的共识。
传统理论中对于一般交易过程中合约效率的分析，形成了一个基于两分法的分析框架：市场和层级制企业。这导致了长期以来把交易治理安排分为市场价格治理和层级制权威治理的基本分野。本文采用整体主义视角，在企业—网络—市场的三层次分析框架下，着重探讨企业网络作为一种制度安排对关系性交易进行治理的有效性及其影响。作为本文逻辑分析框架的基础，我们把企业间关系作为分析的基本单位，并且把时间因素引入交易费用分析。在此基础上，为了分析企业网络中各种关系要素之间的复杂交互作用，本文还借鉴了经济社会学中的一个基本概念：嵌入性。嵌入性作为企业网络安排的一个重要特征，贯穿了本文研究的始终。
本文首先回顾了企业网络相关理论的发展动态，在大量文献阅读和归纳的基础上，发现从经济学和管理学两个不同的角度切入，是形成企业网络理论两个基本分支的重要原因。在交易费用理论视野中，企业网络和市场、层级制企业一样，也是一种交易治理的制度安排。在战略管理理论范围内，企业网络代表着一种类型的策略行为，它包含着在竞争与合作这一对辩证矛盾之间不断进行均衡的战略思想。这两个领域的发展中已经出现了不断交叉融合的趋势，都不约而同地把分析的重点逐渐集中在网络运行和治理问题上。这个方面已有的研究成果，为本文对企业网络安排进行过程性分析提供了最直接的理论和方法基础。在此基础上，本文的研究工作集中在以下三个方面：
(1)通过对网络嵌入性结构中互动过程的分析，揭示了企业网络安排对于关系性交易的治理是有效的，这种有效性具有明显的过程性特征。
在交易费用经济学中，交易特征是决定治理安排的基本因素。本文认为，网络中关系性交易是在供给稳定条件下受需求不稳定性约束的定制化复杂交易，它在时间上是连续的，具有重复博弈的特征。在各种关系纽带的交互作用下，关系
浙江大学博士学位论文
性交易导致了企业网络中的嵌入性结构，这是构建网络交易秩序的基础。在嵌入
性结构中包含实体性要素和社会经济性要素。随着企业参与网络嵌入性结构的互
动过程，这些要素相互嵌入形成了企业之间的行为连接、资源融合和行为者纽带，
这使交易双方相互拥有对方资产的局部支配权。由于支配权是资产产权的组成部
分，所以关系成员由此获得了对对方资产的部分剩余控制权，从而改变了交易剩
余控制权分布状况。随着关系性合约的运行，网络安排通过嵌入性结构中的互动
过程可以实现关系影响力分布与交易剩余控制权分布之间的匹配，完成对关系性
交易合约不完全性的有效补充，进而保证合约运行的效率性。我们还注意到，在
网络安排对关系性交易合约治理的连续过程中，企业网络成员之间构成了一个网
络团队，网络治理安排的有效性也可以视为网络成员在互动过程中团队合作与团
队学习的结果。
(2)通过对网络交易剩余的产生机理及其结构的分析，揭示了网络交易剩
余是网络嵌入性结构中关系互动的结果，它具有经济和社会双重属性。
网络交易剩余是嵌入性结构中关系经济性的基本体现。在嵌入性结构中，关
系的基本作用是建立了网络成员之间的行为连接、资源融合和行为者纽带。由于
网络嵌入性结构中包含各种实体性要素和社会经济性要素，网络交易剩余是这些
要素综合作用的结果。理论和实证分析结果表明，在嵌入性结构中，各种要素之
间的互动产生了一系列基本效应。这些效应体现在网络成员的整体行为结构中，
包括共同愿景、信息共享、一致行动、知识转移、资源共享等5个方面，这5
个方面是产生网络交易剩余的基本途径。
网络交易剩余是关系性交易在网络治理安排下所产生的“整体性价值”增值。
它不仅是嵌入性结构中互动过程的结果，也是网络治理安排有效性的体现。网络
交易剩余在时间上的分布特征和空间上的结构特征决定了其复杂性。分析表明，
网络交易剩余具有明显的结构性特征，包括经济性剩余和社会性剩余。本文结合
实证数据分析，界定了网络交易经济性剩余的内容，它包括利润功能、业务量增
加功能、自我保护功能、知识与创新功能、市场功能、接近功能等6个部分。社
会性剩余是网络成员追求社会性目标的体现。网络交易剩余的结构性特征说明了
它具有经济和社会的双重属性。
(3)根据对网络成员行为逻辑的分析，揭示了网络安排对企业成员行为结
构的规定性，这种规定性体现为合作、排他和选择三种基本战略行为导向。
行为是任何
In recent years, the thriving of network organizations in world economy has wined much attention in academic field. Consequently, the development of network theories has also been accelerated. According to the network theory, networks are institutional arrangement between markets and hierarchies, and the proper way to study the efficiency of transactions must be taken under the framework of firms-networks-hierarchies. The growing up of network theory is changing the landscape of traditional firm theories and industrial organization theories. Even now network as an institutional innovation has been widely accepted, and it is engendering gigantic shock in the practice, but unanimous agreement on its essential conceptions about what is happening in it and how it can be efficient are still not reached among the economists.
Based on the analysis of the contract efficiency of a common transaction process, an academic dichotomy - markets and hierarchies - on transaction governance has formed in tradition. Correspondingly, it is assumed that there exist two types of transaction governance arrangements: the price mechanism and the authority mechanism. From the viewpoint of holism, we have explored the validity and relative consequences of the networks under the trichotomous framework of firms-networks-hierarchies. To achieve such goals, we took the inter-firm network relationship as the basic assumptive unit in our analyzing process, and integrated the time as a factor into the transaction cost approach. Furthermore, to anatomize the interaction of different elements of the relationships, we also import a concept from the sociology: embedded structure. As the kernel of networks, the embedded structure plays an important role in our research.
The first section of this dissertation is literature review. We found out that there exist two branches in the network theories. Some literatures are in the scope of economics, and others in management science. In the view of transaction cost theories, networks were treated as one kind of governance arrangement, like markets and hierarchies. Correspondingly, within the scope of strategic management, networks can be seen as some tactics, it implies there is some balance between cooperation and competition in the networks. Except for its diversification, there has been a clear
synthetic trend in the development of network theories. Obviously, the focus of the academic works has gradually switched to the operation and governance mechanism of the networks. Enlightened by the previous works, this dissertation has concentrated on the analysis of the network arrangement process. The following three parts are the main work of this dissertation.
(1) By analyzing the interaction process in the embedded structure, we suggested that the network arrangement is valid to govern the relational transactions.
According to transaction cost approaches, the governance arrangements are depended upon the characters of transactions. In this dissertation, the relational transaction is described as customized transactions with stable supplies and uncertain demands. It is a continuous transaction with the characters of repeated games. With the interactions of different factors, relational transactions bring up the embedded structure, which forms the foundation of the orders in the networks. The embedded structure is comprised of two types of components: the real factors and the social-economic factors. In case a firm took part in the interaction in the networks, the above factors could build activity links, resources integrations, and actor bonds. Therefore, each partner may obtain partial control on the assets of others, and then some rights of residual control on these assets. This means some changes have taken place in the allocations of the rights of residual control in the relational transactions. Along with the operation of the relational contract, the network will match the power of relationship with the rights of residual control fairly well through the interactions in the embedded structure. Th
传统理论中对于一般交易过程中合约效率的分析，形成了一个基于两分法的分析框架：市场和层级制企业。这导致了长期以来把交易治理安排分为市场价格治理和层级制权威治理的基本分野。本文采用整体主义视角，在企业—网络—市场的三层次分析框架下，着重探讨企业网络作为一种制度安排对关系性交易进行治理的有效性及其影响。作为本文逻辑分析框架的基础，我们把企业间关系作为分析的基本单位，并且把时间因素引入交易费用分析。在此基础上，为了分析企业网络中各种关系要素之间的复杂交互作用，本文还借鉴了经济社会学中的一个基本概念：嵌入性。嵌入性作为企业网络安排的一个重要特征，贯穿了本文研究的始终。
本文首先回顾了企业网络相关理论的发展动态，在大量文献阅读和归纳的基础上，发现从经济学和管理学两个不同的角度切入，是形成企业网络理论两个基本分支的重要原因。在交易费用理论视野中，企业网络和市场、层级制企业一样，也是一种交易治理的制度安排。在战略管理理论范围内，企业网络代表着一种类型的策略行为，它包含着在竞争与合作这一对辩证矛盾之间不断进行均衡的战略思想。这两个领域的发展中已经出现了不断交叉融合的趋势，都不约而同地把分析的重点逐渐集中在网络运行和治理问题上。这个方面已有的研究成果，为本文对企业网络安排进行过程性分析提供了最直接的理论和方法基础。在此基础上，本文的研究工作集中在以下三个方面：
(1)通过对网络嵌入性结构中互动过程的分析，揭示了企业网络安排对于关系性交易的治理是有效的，这种有效性具有明显的过程性特征。
在交易费用经济学中，交易特征是决定治理安排的基本因素。本文认为，网络中关系性交易是在供给稳定条件下受需求不稳定性约束的定制化复杂交易，它在时间上是连续的，具有重复博弈的特征。在各种关系纽带的交互作用下，关系
浙江大学博士学位论文
性交易导致了企业网络中的嵌入性结构，这是构建网络交易秩序的基础。在嵌入
性结构中包含实体性要素和社会经济性要素。随着企业参与网络嵌入性结构的互
动过程，这些要素相互嵌入形成了企业之间的行为连接、资源融合和行为者纽带，
这使交易双方相互拥有对方资产的局部支配权。由于支配权是资产产权的组成部
分，所以关系成员由此获得了对对方资产的部分剩余控制权，从而改变了交易剩
余控制权分布状况。随着关系性合约的运行，网络安排通过嵌入性结构中的互动
过程可以实现关系影响力分布与交易剩余控制权分布之间的匹配，完成对关系性
交易合约不完全性的有效补充，进而保证合约运行的效率性。我们还注意到，在
网络安排对关系性交易合约治理的连续过程中，企业网络成员之间构成了一个网
络团队，网络治理安排的有效性也可以视为网络成员在互动过程中团队合作与团
队学习的结果。
(2)通过对网络交易剩余的产生机理及其结构的分析，揭示了网络交易剩
余是网络嵌入性结构中关系互动的结果，它具有经济和社会双重属性。
网络交易剩余是嵌入性结构中关系经济性的基本体现。在嵌入性结构中，关
系的基本作用是建立了网络成员之间的行为连接、资源融合和行为者纽带。由于
网络嵌入性结构中包含各种实体性要素和社会经济性要素，网络交易剩余是这些
要素综合作用的结果。理论和实证分析结果表明，在嵌入性结构中，各种要素之
间的互动产生了一系列基本效应。这些效应体现在网络成员的整体行为结构中，
包括共同愿景、信息共享、一致行动、知识转移、资源共享等5个方面，这5
个方面是产生网络交易剩余的基本途径。
网络交易剩余是关系性交易在网络治理安排下所产生的“整体性价值”增值。
它不仅是嵌入性结构中互动过程的结果，也是网络治理安排有效性的体现。网络
交易剩余在时间上的分布特征和空间上的结构特征决定了其复杂性。分析表明，
网络交易剩余具有明显的结构性特征，包括经济性剩余和社会性剩余。本文结合
实证数据分析，界定了网络交易经济性剩余的内容，它包括利润功能、业务量增
加功能、自我保护功能、知识与创新功能、市场功能、接近功能等6个部分。社
会性剩余是网络成员追求社会性目标的体现。网络交易剩余的结构性特征说明了
它具有经济和社会的双重属性。
(3)根据对网络成员行为逻辑的分析，揭示了网络安排对企业成员行为结
构的规定性，这种规定性体现为合作、排他和选择三种基本战略行为导向。
行为是任何
In recent years, the thriving of network organizations in world economy has wined much attention in academic field. Consequently, the development of network theories has also been accelerated. According to the network theory, networks are institutional arrangement between markets and hierarchies, and the proper way to study the efficiency of transactions must be taken under the framework of firms-networks-hierarchies. The growing up of network theory is changing the landscape of traditional firm theories and industrial organization theories. Even now network as an institutional innovation has been widely accepted, and it is engendering gigantic shock in the practice, but unanimous agreement on its essential conceptions about what is happening in it and how it can be efficient are still not reached among the economists.
Based on the analysis of the contract efficiency of a common transaction process, an academic dichotomy - markets and hierarchies - on transaction governance has formed in tradition. Correspondingly, it is assumed that there exist two types of transaction governance arrangements: the price mechanism and the authority mechanism. From the viewpoint of holism, we have explored the validity and relative consequences of the networks under the trichotomous framework of firms-networks-hierarchies. To achieve such goals, we took the inter-firm network relationship as the basic assumptive unit in our analyzing process, and integrated the time as a factor into the transaction cost approach. Furthermore, to anatomize the interaction of different elements of the relationships, we also import a concept from the sociology: embedded structure. As the kernel of networks, the embedded structure plays an important role in our research.
The first section of this dissertation is literature review. We found out that there exist two branches in the network theories. Some literatures are in the scope of economics, and others in management science. In the view of transaction cost theories, networks were treated as one kind of governance arrangement, like markets and hierarchies. Correspondingly, within the scope of strategic management, networks can be seen as some tactics, it implies there is some balance between cooperation and competition in the networks. Except for its diversification, there has been a clear
synthetic trend in the development of network theories. Obviously, the focus of the academic works has gradually switched to the operation and governance mechanism of the networks. Enlightened by the previous works, this dissertation has concentrated on the analysis of the network arrangement process. The following three parts are the main work of this dissertation.
(1) By analyzing the interaction process in the embedded structure, we suggested that the network arrangement is valid to govern the relational transactions.
According to transaction cost approaches, the governance arrangements are depended upon the characters of transactions. In this dissertation, the relational transaction is described as customized transactions with stable supplies and uncertain demands. It is a continuous transaction with the characters of repeated games. With the interactions of different factors, relational transactions bring up the embedded structure, which forms the foundation of the orders in the networks. The embedded structure is comprised of two types of components: the real factors and the social-economic factors. In case a firm took part in the interaction in the networks, the above factors could build activity links, resources integrations, and actor bonds. Therefore, each partner may obtain partial control on the assets of others, and then some rights of residual control on these assets. This means some changes have taken place in the allocations of the rights of residual control in the relational transactions. Along with the operation of the relational contract, the network will match the power of relationship with the rights of residual control fairly well through the interactions in the embedded structure. Th
引文
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