上市公司股权激励条件下的信息操纵机理研究
|
摘要
股权激励作为解决代理问题、降低代理成本的一种有效激励方式,其对于提高西方国家上市公司的核心竞争力起到了举足轻重的作用,促进了西方国家经济的发展。然而,以安然、世界通信为代表的一系列公司财务丑闻的曝光,使得人们不得不重新审视股权激励的效果。西方国家实施股权激励的实践证明:股权激励是一把“双刃剑”,运用得当则会起到长期激励的积极作用,如果运用不当也会带来新的道德风险,如高管人员粉饰财务报表、虚构利润及虚假陈述等信息操纵行为,产生一些负面效应。
在中国,近年来运用股权激励来激励企业经理人员,已成为人们的共识和政策取向。随着股权分置改革的落幕,经营者股权激励的相关措施陆续成形,股权激励越来越受到重视。因此,在我国上市公司大规模实施股权激励计划之际,有必要客观地认识股权激励的效果。当前,探讨股权激励实施过程中高管人员的信息操纵问题并对症下药,是我国理论界与实务界都面临的一个紧迫课题。作者希望本文的研究结论能为已实施或拟实施股权激励的上市公司实施恰当的股权激励计划和监管部门制定合理的政策提供有益的思路。
当前国内外学者从理论上推导分析股权激励条件下高管人员信息操纵问题的文献研究并不充分,研究如何阻止股权激励所引致的经营者信息操纵的文献更是凤毛麟角,而且仅有的理论研究文献也多从静态的角度、并且在博弈的参与人为完全理性的前提下进行研究推导。与既有的研究不同,作者以股权激励实施条件下经营者信息操纵的形成机理为研究主线,在学习、总结和吸收国外相关研究成果的基础上,结合我国上市公司的实际情况,研究探讨我国上市公司的股权激励效果。全文共由七个部分组成:
第一部分提出了选题的背景及意义、研究方法、研究内容、研究体系结构;并对相关概念进行了界定。为后面的研究提供必要的理论铺垫和分析前提。
第二部分为相关理论及文献回顾。本部分首先对股权激励的主要理论基础—代理理论、剩余索取权理论与人力资本理论的相关文献进行了简要的回顾,以加强对实施股权激励计划的必要性的理解;然后分别简要介绍了股权激励与上市公司信息操纵的相关文献研究成果,为本文后续的研究提供研究基础和背景资料;最后分析评述了股权激励与信息披露相关文献研究成果。
第三部分为我国上市公司股权激励与信息操纵现状分析。本部分分别对我国上市公司股权激励状况及存在的问题、我国上市公司信息操纵状况及存在的问题进行了探讨,为后面的理论与实证研究作了现实背景铺垫。
第四部分为股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵的静态博弈分析。本部分首先扩展了传统的委托代理模型,将监控变量内生化,建立一个包括信息操纵的股权激励模型。由此来分析股权激励实施条件下,各因素对股权激励及信息操纵的影响。
第五部分为股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵的动态演化博弈分析。本部分在股东与经理仅为有限理性的前提下,运用演化博弈的方法来分析股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵的动态形成机理,为更好地规避股权激励所引致的经营者信息操纵问题提供理论参考。
第六部分为我国上市公司股权激励与经营者信息操纵关系的实证研究。本部分采用我国上市公司的数据,首先运用面板数据模型检验我国上市公司股权激励与盈余管理的关系,然后采用Logistic回归方法检验我国上市公司股权激励与舞弊的关系来实证我国上市公司的股权激励实施效果。
最后部分为结论。本部分对全文的研究结论进行总结,并根据研究结论提出政策建议,最后对论文的研究局限性及进一步的研究方向提出自己的看法。本文的创新点主要体现在以下几个方面:
①扩展了传统的委托代理模型,将监控变量内生化,建立了一个包括信息操纵与监控的股权激励模型来分析股权激励、监控与信息操纵之间的关系。本模型的研究结果可为在我国资本市场有效性不强,且监控机制尚待完善的情况下,实施股权激励计划的上市公司提供理论参考。
②运用演化博弈方法,从动态的角度考察股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵的形成机理。已有的研究都是在股东与经理为完全理性的前提下进行的推导分析。事实上,股东与经理通常仅具有有限理性,因此,通过研究有限理性条件下,股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵策略的动态形成机理,研究前提更接近实际情况,结论也更有用。
③以我国上市公司的数据为样本,对我国上市公司股权激励与信息操纵的关系进行实证检验。检验结果回答了我国上市公司实施股权激励计划是降低了经营者信息披露的代理成本,还是导致经营者操纵信息,增加了信息披露的代理成本的问题。
As an effective way to solve agent question and decrease the cost of agent, equity incentive has significantly improved the companies’core competition and boosted the development of economy in western countries. However, a series of financial scandals, namely Enron and Worldcom, make people have to reconsider the effects of equity incentive. The practice of equity incentive in western countries demonstrates that equity incentive is a“two-edged sword”: it gets active effects of long-term incentive in suitable condition, otherwise, it brings with some new moral hazard and produces some negative effects such as information manipulation, namely Windowing Dressing, fabricating profits and false statements.
In our country, it has become the consensus and policy orientation that using equity incentive to inspirit top managers in recent years. With the fall of non-tradable shares reform and related measures gradually forming, equity incentive has been received more and more focused. So, it is necessary to recognize the effects of equity incentive objectively in the time when the equity incentive plan will be implemented in a large scale. Currently, it is an urgent task to discuss top executives’information manipulation and right both in theory and practice field. The author hopes that these research results would supply useful thinking for Chinese listed companies which have implemented or will implement equity incentive plan to make appropriate plan and authorities to make reasonable policy.
But so far there is not sufficient research on top managers’information manipulation in the process of equity incentive theoretically. Moreover, the literatures of how to prevent information manipulation triggered by equity incentive are extremely rare. And the little existing research was only in static perspective and assumed that the game partners were rational. Different from the existing research, on the basis of learning, summarizing and absorbing the foreign relevant achievement in the research field, combining with the reality of the listed company of our country, this paper focuses on the information manipulation mechanism during equity incentive enforcement, so as to show the effects of equity incentive. It is divided into seven parts altogether.
The first part introduces the background and significant,method, contents, and architecture of the research; And defines the basic concept .Thus offers the theory foreshadowing and the analytical prerequisite for the following research.
The second part is the review of related theory and literatures. In this part, principal-agent theory, residual claim theory and human capital theory are firstly introduced to strengthen understanding the necessity of equity incentive. Then the literatures about equity incentive and information manipulation are given a brief introduction, this provides research basis and background information to the following parts. At last, the author reviews the literatures which research the relationship between equity incentive and information disclosure.
The third part is the status of equity incentive and information manipulation. In this part, the author discusses the status and issues of equity incentive and information manipulation in our country. Thus offers the practical background foreshadowing for the following parts.
The fourth part is the static game analysis of information manipulation in the process of equity incentive. The author begins with extending the traditional principal-agent model, treating regulation as endogenous, constructs an equity incentive model including information manipulation and regulation to analyze that the factors how to influence equity incentive and information manipulation.
The fifth part is the dynamic evolutionary game analysis of information manipulation in the process of equity incentive. The author analyzes the dynamic formation mechanism of information manipulation under the assumption that shareholder and manager are limited rational by using evolutionary game method. The research results provide a theoretical reference to avoid information manipulation triggered by equity incentive.
The sixth part is the empirical research on equity incentive and information manipulation in our country. In this part, the author tests the relationship between equity incentive and information manipulation by using panel data model firstly, then tests the relationship between equity incentive and fraud by using the data of Chinese listed company.
The last part is conclusion. In this part, the author summarize the conclusion of the above every part, put forward some policy suggestions and myself view on the limitation of the thesis and direction studied further in the future.
The following contents are the main innovation points in this paper:
①An equity incentive model including information manipulation and endogenous monitor was constructed by extending traditional principal-agent model to analyze the relationship among equity incentive、information manipulation、monitor. The conclusions of this model would provide a theoretical reference for the listed companies which implement equity incentive when the capital market is not efficiency enough and the regulation mechanism needs to be improved.
②Research on the mechanism of executive’s information manipulation in dynamic perspective by using evolutionary game method. The existing research all assumed that shareholders and managers were full rational. But in fact, shareholders and managers are always limited rational. So to study the information manipulation mechanism with the assumption of limited rational is more connected with the actual and the conclusions are more useful.
③Based on the data of Chinese listed company, this paper empirically tests the relationship between equity incentive and information manipulation. The results answer the questions that the implement of equity incentive plan reduced the agent cost or increase the agent cost for the first time.
在中国,近年来运用股权激励来激励企业经理人员,已成为人们的共识和政策取向。随着股权分置改革的落幕,经营者股权激励的相关措施陆续成形,股权激励越来越受到重视。因此,在我国上市公司大规模实施股权激励计划之际,有必要客观地认识股权激励的效果。当前,探讨股权激励实施过程中高管人员的信息操纵问题并对症下药,是我国理论界与实务界都面临的一个紧迫课题。作者希望本文的研究结论能为已实施或拟实施股权激励的上市公司实施恰当的股权激励计划和监管部门制定合理的政策提供有益的思路。
当前国内外学者从理论上推导分析股权激励条件下高管人员信息操纵问题的文献研究并不充分,研究如何阻止股权激励所引致的经营者信息操纵的文献更是凤毛麟角,而且仅有的理论研究文献也多从静态的角度、并且在博弈的参与人为完全理性的前提下进行研究推导。与既有的研究不同,作者以股权激励实施条件下经营者信息操纵的形成机理为研究主线,在学习、总结和吸收国外相关研究成果的基础上,结合我国上市公司的实际情况,研究探讨我国上市公司的股权激励效果。全文共由七个部分组成:
第一部分提出了选题的背景及意义、研究方法、研究内容、研究体系结构;并对相关概念进行了界定。为后面的研究提供必要的理论铺垫和分析前提。
第二部分为相关理论及文献回顾。本部分首先对股权激励的主要理论基础—代理理论、剩余索取权理论与人力资本理论的相关文献进行了简要的回顾,以加强对实施股权激励计划的必要性的理解;然后分别简要介绍了股权激励与上市公司信息操纵的相关文献研究成果,为本文后续的研究提供研究基础和背景资料;最后分析评述了股权激励与信息披露相关文献研究成果。
第三部分为我国上市公司股权激励与信息操纵现状分析。本部分分别对我国上市公司股权激励状况及存在的问题、我国上市公司信息操纵状况及存在的问题进行了探讨,为后面的理论与实证研究作了现实背景铺垫。
第四部分为股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵的静态博弈分析。本部分首先扩展了传统的委托代理模型,将监控变量内生化,建立一个包括信息操纵的股权激励模型。由此来分析股权激励实施条件下,各因素对股权激励及信息操纵的影响。
第五部分为股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵的动态演化博弈分析。本部分在股东与经理仅为有限理性的前提下,运用演化博弈的方法来分析股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵的动态形成机理,为更好地规避股权激励所引致的经营者信息操纵问题提供理论参考。
第六部分为我国上市公司股权激励与经营者信息操纵关系的实证研究。本部分采用我国上市公司的数据,首先运用面板数据模型检验我国上市公司股权激励与盈余管理的关系,然后采用Logistic回归方法检验我国上市公司股权激励与舞弊的关系来实证我国上市公司的股权激励实施效果。
最后部分为结论。本部分对全文的研究结论进行总结,并根据研究结论提出政策建议,最后对论文的研究局限性及进一步的研究方向提出自己的看法。本文的创新点主要体现在以下几个方面:
①扩展了传统的委托代理模型,将监控变量内生化,建立了一个包括信息操纵与监控的股权激励模型来分析股权激励、监控与信息操纵之间的关系。本模型的研究结果可为在我国资本市场有效性不强,且监控机制尚待完善的情况下,实施股权激励计划的上市公司提供理论参考。
②运用演化博弈方法,从动态的角度考察股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵的形成机理。已有的研究都是在股东与经理为完全理性的前提下进行的推导分析。事实上,股东与经理通常仅具有有限理性,因此,通过研究有限理性条件下,股权激励实施中经营者信息操纵策略的动态形成机理,研究前提更接近实际情况,结论也更有用。
③以我国上市公司的数据为样本,对我国上市公司股权激励与信息操纵的关系进行实证检验。检验结果回答了我国上市公司实施股权激励计划是降低了经营者信息披露的代理成本,还是导致经营者操纵信息,增加了信息披露的代理成本的问题。
As an effective way to solve agent question and decrease the cost of agent, equity incentive has significantly improved the companies’core competition and boosted the development of economy in western countries. However, a series of financial scandals, namely Enron and Worldcom, make people have to reconsider the effects of equity incentive. The practice of equity incentive in western countries demonstrates that equity incentive is a“two-edged sword”: it gets active effects of long-term incentive in suitable condition, otherwise, it brings with some new moral hazard and produces some negative effects such as information manipulation, namely Windowing Dressing, fabricating profits and false statements.
In our country, it has become the consensus and policy orientation that using equity incentive to inspirit top managers in recent years. With the fall of non-tradable shares reform and related measures gradually forming, equity incentive has been received more and more focused. So, it is necessary to recognize the effects of equity incentive objectively in the time when the equity incentive plan will be implemented in a large scale. Currently, it is an urgent task to discuss top executives’information manipulation and right both in theory and practice field. The author hopes that these research results would supply useful thinking for Chinese listed companies which have implemented or will implement equity incentive plan to make appropriate plan and authorities to make reasonable policy.
But so far there is not sufficient research on top managers’information manipulation in the process of equity incentive theoretically. Moreover, the literatures of how to prevent information manipulation triggered by equity incentive are extremely rare. And the little existing research was only in static perspective and assumed that the game partners were rational. Different from the existing research, on the basis of learning, summarizing and absorbing the foreign relevant achievement in the research field, combining with the reality of the listed company of our country, this paper focuses on the information manipulation mechanism during equity incentive enforcement, so as to show the effects of equity incentive. It is divided into seven parts altogether.
The first part introduces the background and significant,method, contents, and architecture of the research; And defines the basic concept .Thus offers the theory foreshadowing and the analytical prerequisite for the following research.
The second part is the review of related theory and literatures. In this part, principal-agent theory, residual claim theory and human capital theory are firstly introduced to strengthen understanding the necessity of equity incentive. Then the literatures about equity incentive and information manipulation are given a brief introduction, this provides research basis and background information to the following parts. At last, the author reviews the literatures which research the relationship between equity incentive and information disclosure.
The third part is the status of equity incentive and information manipulation. In this part, the author discusses the status and issues of equity incentive and information manipulation in our country. Thus offers the practical background foreshadowing for the following parts.
The fourth part is the static game analysis of information manipulation in the process of equity incentive. The author begins with extending the traditional principal-agent model, treating regulation as endogenous, constructs an equity incentive model including information manipulation and regulation to analyze that the factors how to influence equity incentive and information manipulation.
The fifth part is the dynamic evolutionary game analysis of information manipulation in the process of equity incentive. The author analyzes the dynamic formation mechanism of information manipulation under the assumption that shareholder and manager are limited rational by using evolutionary game method. The research results provide a theoretical reference to avoid information manipulation triggered by equity incentive.
The sixth part is the empirical research on equity incentive and information manipulation in our country. In this part, the author tests the relationship between equity incentive and information manipulation by using panel data model firstly, then tests the relationship between equity incentive and fraud by using the data of Chinese listed company.
The last part is conclusion. In this part, the author summarize the conclusion of the above every part, put forward some policy suggestions and myself view on the limitation of the thesis and direction studied further in the future.
The following contents are the main innovation points in this paper:
①An equity incentive model including information manipulation and endogenous monitor was constructed by extending traditional principal-agent model to analyze the relationship among equity incentive、information manipulation、monitor. The conclusions of this model would provide a theoretical reference for the listed companies which implement equity incentive when the capital market is not efficiency enough and the regulation mechanism needs to be improved.
②Research on the mechanism of executive’s information manipulation in dynamic perspective by using evolutionary game method. The existing research all assumed that shareholders and managers were full rational. But in fact, shareholders and managers are always limited rational. So to study the information manipulation mechanism with the assumption of limited rational is more connected with the actual and the conclusions are more useful.
③Based on the data of Chinese listed company, this paper empirically tests the relationship between equity incentive and information manipulation. The results answer the questions that the implement of equity incentive plan reduced the agent cost or increase the agent cost for the first time.
引文
程芙蓉. 2004.浅析上市公司会计信息操纵行为及治理对策[J].湖北财经高等专科学校学报, 3:42-45.
陈工孟,高宁. 2005.中国证券监管有效性的实证研究[J].管理世界, (7):40-48.
陈海棠. 2003.管理层股票期权的负激励效应[J].商业研究, (22):87-90.
陈千里. 2008.股权激励、盈余操纵与国有股减持[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版), 48(1):149-157.
陈晓,秦跃红. 2003.“庄家”与信息披露的质量[J].管理世界, (3):28-36.
陈晓敏,任凤慧. 2001.论证券市场中会计信息的公开披露[J].审计与经济研究, 7:36-39.
陈小悦,徐晓东. 2001.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究, 11.
程书强. 2006.机构投资者持股与上市公司会计盈余信息关系实证研究[J].管理世界, 9:129-137.
党兴华,权小锋,杨敏利. 2007.风险投资委托代理关系中的监控与激励博弈分析[J].科研管理, 28(1): 155–161.
董明. 2005.中国上市公司信息披露监管研究[D].武汉理工大学硕士论文.
戴园晨. 2001.股市泡沫生成机理以及由大辩论引发的深层思考-兼论股市运行扭曲与庄股情结[J].经济研究, 4:41-51.
卜冬花. 2006.谈上市公司操纵利润的行为[J].山西财税, (8):33-35.
冯仲,陈海棠. 2003.管理层股票期权的负效应[J].商业研究, 22:87-90.
顾斌,周立烨. 2007.中国上市公司股权激励实施效果的研究[J].会计研究, (2):79-86.
郭福春. 2003.信息操纵:中国证券市场上的一种寻租行为分析[J].企业经济, 12:221-223.
高洁,盛昭瀚. 2004.发电侧电力市场竞价策略的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报, 18(3):91-96.
高锦萍,钟伟强. 2005.上市公司财务欺诈与股价操纵—基于中国证监会处罚公告的研究[J].经济问题探索, (1):82-88.
葛家澍,黄世忠. 2002.安然事件的反思[J].会计研究, 2:3-11.
高雷,宋顺林. 2007.高管人员持股与企业绩效——基于上市公司2000～2004年面板数据的经验证据[J].财经研究, 3.
韩丹,闵亮,陈婷. 2007.管理层股权激励与上市公司会计造假相关性的实证检验[J].统计与决策, (9)(理论版):69-73.
何佳,何基报. 2001.中国股市重大事件信息披露与股价异动[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告.
衡涛,陈志国,胡碧玉. 2005.媒体、虚假广告主和国家三方行为的博弈分析[J].统计与决策, 8(下):51-54.
何卫东. 2003.上市公司自愿性信息披露的动机、策略和监管[J].深交所, (1):31-33.
黄小花,李林初. 2004.管理层收购与上市公司治理绩效研究[J].财经理论与实践, 25 (1): 52-57.
胡阳,刘志远,任美琴. 2006.设计有效的经营者持股激励机制-基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论, 9(5):52-58.
胡宇辰,戴淑燕. 2001.股权激励实施的风险规避[J].中国工业经济, (9):77-81.
黄宗福. 2007.内幕信息、市场操纵与证券市场监管[[D].厦门大学博士学位论文.
姜芳. 2007.股权激励的发展历程探讨[J].管理科学, (5):87-89.
金立. 2003.中国企业经理人股票期权激励研究[D].厦门大学.
姜兰. 2008.中国证券市场信息操纵行为、环境与防控体系研究[D].吉林大学.
姜锡明,刘西友. 2008.自愿性信息披露动因及载体探讨[J].中国管理信息化, 11(1):46-48.
雷光勇,刘慧龙. 2006.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界, (1):129-138.
刘剑,谈传生. 2005.管理层持股与公司绩效:来自深圳股票市场的经验证据[J].中国软科学, (10).
刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文. 2003. CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,3.
刘国亮,王家胜. 2000.上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究[J].经济理论与经济管理, (5) :40-45.
刘小玄. 1996.现代企业的激励制度:剩余支配权[J].经济研究, 5:3-11.
李琳. 2006.会计造假行为的社会心理学透视[J].财会月刊(综合), (7):45-47.
李曜,管恩华. 2005.上市公司股票增值权激励效果的实证研究,商业经济与管理, 10:44-51.
卢侠巍. 2000.关于中国上市公司高层经理人员操纵会计盈余行为与长期激励机制问题研究[J]. (6):26-30.
刘毅斌.中国股票期权激励的现状分析[J].湖南财经专科学校学报, 20(5):56-59.
刘铮,鲍童. 2004.股票期权制度:美国经验和中国现状[J].现代管理, 2005, (3):42-45.
林钟高,刘永样,徐正刚. 2003.中国会计信息披露现状及其对策分析[J].山西财经大学学报, 2:84-89.
李增泉. 2000.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究, (1): 24-30.
马利利. 2008.浅析上市公司舞弊手段及防范措施[J].财经论坛, (3):74-77.
彭向宇. 2008.上市公司监管之症结—违规信息披露[J].管理科学, (2):49-50.
钱红光. 2007.当前中国上市公司自愿性信息披露状况的研究[J].湖北工业大学学报, 22(6):37-41.
饶超. 2007.盈余管理与会计造假的区别[J].冶金财会,3:37-39.
史彩霞. 2006.管理者股票期权制度的负效应[J].商业会计, (11):50-52.
石岿然,肖条军. 2005.零售市场价格策略的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报, 4:144-148.
2002.上海荣正投资咨询公司[R].中国企业家价值报告.
2003.上海荣正投资咨询公司[R].中国企业家价值报告.
2002.深交所研究报告[R].信息披露违规处罚实际效果研究.
司茹. 2005.上市公司财务报告舞弊问题研究—基于公司内部治理的视角[D].辽宁大学博士学位论文.
石婷婷. 2001.论人力资本产权及激励制度创新[J].福建论坛(社会科学版), 222:21-22.
孙铮,王志伟,吴茜. 2002.市场监管公司治理会计改革一从美国《2002年SOX法案》看中国的会计改革[J].会计研究, 12:12-15.
孙自愿,朱学义. 2003.中国企业经营者股权激励的运作研究[J].预测, (6):50-55.
陶世隆. 2001.公平披露规则与证券市场透明度[J].管理世界, (1):137-139.
王冬梅,陈忠琏. 2000.上市公司会计信息操纵的经济学分析[J].数理统计与管理, 2:18-22.
魏刚. 2000.高级管理层激励与上市公司绩效[J].经济研究, (3).
王华,黄之骏. 2006.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界, 9.
魏杰,赵俊超. 2004.中国建立现代产权制度应满足五个要求[J].经济研究参考, 55:16-17.
沃健. 2002.会计造假行为的法律治理与制度规范[J].财经论丛, (5):66-69.
王克敏,王志超. 2007.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理—基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界, (7):111-120.
王乔,章卫东. 2002.上市公司会计信息操纵行为探讨[J].会计研究, 12:42-45.
王庆仁,高春涛. 1999.上市公司“壳”资源的经济学分析[J].证券市场导报, 8:54-59.
吴青云. 2008.中国证券市场信息披露存在的问题和对策[J].实事求是, 3:36-39.
吴淑琨. 2002.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究[J].中国工业经济, (1).
吴娓,涂燕,付强. 2006.财务造假、盈余管理与管理层期权激励[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版), 27(3):72-76.
王永平,孟卫东. 2004.供应链企业合作竞争机制的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报, 2:96-99.
王跃堂. 2000.会计政策选择的经济动机—基于沪深股市的实证研究[J].会计研究, 12.
王战强,万鹏. 1998.上市公司高级管理人员持股状况研究政策建议[R].君安证券研究所.
许承明,濮卫东. 2003.内部人持股与上市公司绩效研究.数量经济技术经济研究, 11.
徐二明,王智慧. 2000.中国上市公司治理结构与战略绩效的相关性研究[J].南开管理评论, (4): 4-14.
熊璟. 2006.上市公司操纵会计信息方法披露[J].财会研究, (10):45-47.
熊季霞,高波. 2007.风险投资运作中的三方博弈分析[J].济南金融, (3):9-14.
夏娜丽. 2007.公司股权激励及高管薪酬披露分析[J].证券市场导报, (7):60-65.
徐大伟,蔡锐,徐鸣雷. 2005.管理层持股比例与公司绩效关系的实证研究——基于中国上市公司的MBO[J].管理科学, 18(4):40-47.
于东智. 2003.董事会、公司治理与绩效:对我国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学, (3):29-44.
叶德珠. 2008.高管人员信息披露造假的行为经济学分析[J].财经科学, 238(1):28-35.
杨萍. 2005.上市公司会计信息操纵行为探析[J].新疆农垦经济, 9:104-107.
杨胜刚,何靖,曾翼. 2007.反洗钱中监管机构和商业银行的博弈与委托代理问题研究[J]. (1):71–84.
于卫兵. 2004.从美国财务舞弊谈股票期权会计理论的完善[J].沿海企业与科技(增刊):26-27.
余颖. 2000.股票期权激励效果的博弈分析[J].经济与管理研究, (2).
易余胤,肖条军,盛昭瀚. 2005.合作研发中机会主义行为的演化博弈分析[J].管理科学学报, 4:80-88.
尹智雄. 1997.企业员工持股运作实务[M].北京:经济科学出版社.
张程春,蹇静. 2008.中国上市公司违规信息披露的影响因素研究[J].审计研究, (1):75-83.
张帆. 2003.股权激励的激励机制及其绩效解说[D].复旦大学.
张欢. 2007.弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联书店, 1996:398-403.
张维迎. 1998.控制权丧失的不可弥补性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍[J].经济研究, (7):3-14.
张维迎. 2003.作为激励机制的法律-评侵权损害赔偿的经济分析[J].中国人民大学学报, 2:155-156.
张维迎. 2006.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联出版社.
张详建,徐晋,郭岚. 2004.企业盈余管理存在原因的理论分析[J].软科学,5.
张宗新,张晓荣,廖士光. 2005.上市公司自愿性信息披露行为有效吗?基于1998-2003年中国证券市场的检验[J].经济学(季刊), 4(2):369-387.
张宗新,季雷. 2005.内幕信息操纵的股价冲击效应—理论与中国股市证据[J].金融研究, 4:144-154.
张宗益,宋增基. 2002.上市公司经理持股与公司绩效实证研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版), 8(6).
张惠忠. 2000.论上市公司会计信息披露问题[J].中国软科学, 3:89-93.
赵娜,孟祥革. 2007.股票期权激励陷阱研究[J].华东经济管理, 21(12):126-129.
赵晓红. 2006.盈余管理与会计造假[J].呼伦贝尔学院学报, 8:34-37.
祝红梅. 2002.内幕信息、内幕交易及其管制[J].南开经济研究, 2:16-21.
邹宏秋. 2003.中国上市公司股权激励现状考察[J].北方经贸, (1):55-57.
周建波,孙菊生. 2003.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究-来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].经济研究, (6):74-83.
周其仁. 1996.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究, 4.
周世东. 2002.上市公司股权激励的缺陷探析[J].经济体制改革, (5):34-38.
朱亮. 2007.中国证券市场信息披露问题浅析[J].今日财富, (12):65-67.
Allen Franklin, Gale Douglas. 1992. Stock Price Manipulation[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,(5):503-529.
Bar-Gill O, L Bebchuk. 2003. Misreporting Corporate Performance[Z]. Working Paper, Harvard Law School.
Barnhart.Sc W., Rosenstein St. 1998. Board Composition, Managerial Ownership, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Financial Review, 4:1-16.
Becker G.. 1968. Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 76:169-217.
Benabou R.., 1992. Laroque G. Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107:921-958.
Benjamin E., Hermalin, Michael S. 1991. Weisbach. The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance [J]. Financial Management, 4:101-112.
Bernstein A. 2002. Options: Middle Managers will Take the Hit, Commentary [J]. Business Week, 9:9.
Bin Ke. 2004. Do Equity-based Incentives Induce CEOs to Manage Earnings to Report Strings of Consecutive Earning Increases? [Z]. Working Paper, Pennsylvania State University.
Bowman, P&Haire D. 1975. Stock Performance and Voluntary Disclosure[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.
Brown K. 2002. Many Firms may Play with Numbers to Paint Prettier Pictures of Themselves[J]. The Wall Street Journal, 2:6.
Bruno Biais. 1993. Price Formation and Equilibrium Liquidity in Fragmented and Centralized Markets[J]. The Journal of Finance, 25(1):157-187.
Cheng Q., Warfield T. 2005. Equity Incentives and Earnings Management[J]. Accounting Review, 80:441–476.
Choi. 2000. Regulating Investors not Issuers: A Market-based Proposal[J]. California Law Review. Coase, Ronald. 1937. The Nature of the Firm[M]. Economic, 4:386-405.
Coles Jeffrey L.,Michael L.Lemmon,J.felix Meschke. 2004. Structural Models and Endogeneityu in Corporate Finance: the Link between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance [Z]. Working Paper, Arizonastate University.
Core J., W. Guay. 1999. The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 28:151-184.
Cui H., Y.T. Mak. 2002. The Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance in High R&D Firms [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 313-316.
Daniel Bergstresser, Thomas Philippon. 2006. CEO Incentives and Earnings Management[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 80:511-529.
David Aboody D., Kasznik R.. 2000. CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of CorporateVoluntary Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29: 73–100.
David J, Denis, Paul Hanouna. 2006. Atulya Sarin. Is there a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation?[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12:467-488.
DeAngelo L.E. 1986. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders [J]. The Accounting Review, 41:400-420.
Eitan Goldman, Steve L, Slezak. 2006. An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation [J]. Journal of Financial and Economics, 80: 603- 626.
Fama Eugene F. 1983. Jensen Michael C. Agency Problems and Residual Claims [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 26.
Feltham G, M. Wu. 2001. Incentive Efficiency of Stock versus Options[J]. Review of Accounting Studies, (6):7-28.
Gaver J, J. Gaver K. M, Austin J. R. 1995. Additional Evidence on Bonus Plans and Income Management[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 1:3-28.
Ghosh Chinmoy, C.F. 2003. Sirmans. Board Independence, Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts [J]. Journal of Real Estate Finance Economics, 26, 287-318.
Gigler F., T.Hemmer. 2002. Conservatism, Optimal Disclosure Policy, and the Timeliness of Financial Reports[J].Journal of Accounting Research, 18.
Gigler F., T. Hemmer. 1998. On the Frequency, Quality, and Informational Role of Mandatory Financial Reports[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 36.
Gordon Gemmill. 1996. Transparency and Liquidity: A Study of Block Trades on the London Stock Exchange under Different Publication Rules[J]. Journal of Finance, (5):1765-1792.
Griffith. 1999. CEO Ownership and Firm Value [J]. Managerial and Decision Economics, 20: 1-8.
Guojin Gong. 2007. Outside Directors’Equity-based Compensation and Earning Management [Z]. Working paper, Penn State University.
Hagerman, Robert L., Zmijewski, Mark E. 1979. Some Economic Determinants of Accounting Policy Choice[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2, 141-161.
Hall B. J., Murphy K.J. 2000. Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options[J]. American Economic Review, (90):209-214.
Harris, M.and A.Raviv. 1991. The Theory of Capital Structure[J]. Journal of Finance, 46.
Healy Paul, Palepu Krishra. 2001. The Fall of Economy[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17:1-45.
Healy, Paul M.. 1985. The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 1:85-107.
Strong, John S., Meyer John R.. 1987. Asset Write Downs: Managerial Incentives and Security Returns[J].Journal of Finance, 3:643.
Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S. 1998. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and their Monitoring of the CEO[J]. American Economic Review, 88:96-118.
Hirst D, S H Teoh. 2002. Limited Attention, Information Disclosure and Financial Reporting[M]. Working Paper, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University.
Holthausen R. W.. 1981. Evidence on the Effect of Bond Covenants and Management Compensation Contracts on the Choice of Accounting Techniques: The Case of the Depreciation Switch-back[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3:73-109.
Ilan Guttman, Ohad Kadan. 2003. Adding the Noise: a Theory of Compensation-driven Earnings Management [Z]. Working paper, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Jap Efendi, Anup Srivasetava, Edward P Swanson. 2007. Why do Corporate Manager Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 85: 667-708.
Jensen M C. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]. The Journal of Finance, 48:831-880.
Jensen Michael C., William H. 1976. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior、Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 3.
Jorge Gabriel Aseff. 2001. Essays on Managerial Compensation[D]. Arizona State University.
Joseph Kissan, Thevaranjian Ales. 1998. Monitoring and Incentives in Sales Organizations: An Agency-theoretic Perspective[J].Marketing Science, 17(2):107–123.
Levitt A. 1998. THe Numbers Game [A]. Speech Delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business. New York. NY, 28.
Lin Peng, Ailsa Roell. 2006. Executive Pay and Shareholder Litigation[Z]. Working paper, Columbia University.
McConnell John, Henri Servaes. 1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 27.
Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon, Edward L Maydew. 2006. Is there a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(1):113-142.
Morck Randall, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W.Vishny. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 20.
Natasha Burns, Simi Kedia. 2006. The Impact of Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 79:35-67.
Oswald S.L., J.S. Jahera Jr. 1991. The Influence of Ownership on Performance: An Empirical Study [J]. Strategy Management Journal, 12, 322.
Pagano, Roell. 1996. Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading[J]. The Journal of Finance, (2):579-613.
Patrick Bolton,Jose Scheinkaman,WeiXiong.2003. Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets[Z]. NBER working paper, 3.
Paul M .Healy,James M. Wahlen. 1999. A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implications for Standard Setting[J]. Accounting Horizons:365-383.
Ravi Singh. 2003. Incentive Compensation and the Quality of Disclosure[Z]. Working paper, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University.
Richard Dietrich, Steven J Kachelmeier. 2001. Market Efficiency, Bounded Rationality, and Supplemental Business Reporting Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, (2).
Roberta Romano. 1998. Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation [J]. Yale Law Review, 5.
R Ramy Elitzur, Varda Yaari. 1995. Executive Incentive Compensation and Earning Manipulation in a Multi-period Setting [J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 26: 201- 219.
Schipper K. Commentary on Earnings Management[J].Accounting Horizons,1989, 12:91-102.
Schultz Theodore W. 1961. Investment in Human Capital[J]. The American Economic Review, 51(1):1-17.
Shivdasani A. 1993. Board Composition, Ownership Structure and Hostile Takeovers [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16:167-198.
Stulz Rene M. 1988. Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 20.
Taylor and Jonker. 1978. Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and Game Dynamics[M].
Watts R., J.Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory[M]. Prentice Hall.
Uzun H, Szewczyk, Varma R. 2004. Board Composition and Corporate Fraud[J]. Financial Analysts Journal, 6:33-43.
Vafeas N. 1999. Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 53:113–142.
Venky Nagar, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter Wysocki. 2003. Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-based Incentives [J]. Journal of Accounting Economics, 34: 283- 309.
Yisong S Tian. 2003. Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud [Z]. Working Paper, York University.
陈工孟,高宁. 2005.中国证券监管有效性的实证研究[J].管理世界, (7):40-48.
陈海棠. 2003.管理层股票期权的负激励效应[J].商业研究, (22):87-90.
陈千里. 2008.股权激励、盈余操纵与国有股减持[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版), 48(1):149-157.
陈晓,秦跃红. 2003.“庄家”与信息披露的质量[J].管理世界, (3):28-36.
陈晓敏,任凤慧. 2001.论证券市场中会计信息的公开披露[J].审计与经济研究, 7:36-39.
陈小悦,徐晓东. 2001.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究, 11.
程书强. 2006.机构投资者持股与上市公司会计盈余信息关系实证研究[J].管理世界, 9:129-137.
党兴华,权小锋,杨敏利. 2007.风险投资委托代理关系中的监控与激励博弈分析[J].科研管理, 28(1): 155–161.
董明. 2005.中国上市公司信息披露监管研究[D].武汉理工大学硕士论文.
戴园晨. 2001.股市泡沫生成机理以及由大辩论引发的深层思考-兼论股市运行扭曲与庄股情结[J].经济研究, 4:41-51.
卜冬花. 2006.谈上市公司操纵利润的行为[J].山西财税, (8):33-35.
冯仲,陈海棠. 2003.管理层股票期权的负效应[J].商业研究, 22:87-90.
顾斌,周立烨. 2007.中国上市公司股权激励实施效果的研究[J].会计研究, (2):79-86.
郭福春. 2003.信息操纵:中国证券市场上的一种寻租行为分析[J].企业经济, 12:221-223.
高洁,盛昭瀚. 2004.发电侧电力市场竞价策略的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报, 18(3):91-96.
高锦萍,钟伟强. 2005.上市公司财务欺诈与股价操纵—基于中国证监会处罚公告的研究[J].经济问题探索, (1):82-88.
葛家澍,黄世忠. 2002.安然事件的反思[J].会计研究, 2:3-11.
高雷,宋顺林. 2007.高管人员持股与企业绩效——基于上市公司2000～2004年面板数据的经验证据[J].财经研究, 3.
韩丹,闵亮,陈婷. 2007.管理层股权激励与上市公司会计造假相关性的实证检验[J].统计与决策, (9)(理论版):69-73.
何佳,何基报. 2001.中国股市重大事件信息披露与股价异动[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究所研究报告.
衡涛,陈志国,胡碧玉. 2005.媒体、虚假广告主和国家三方行为的博弈分析[J].统计与决策, 8(下):51-54.
何卫东. 2003.上市公司自愿性信息披露的动机、策略和监管[J].深交所, (1):31-33.
黄小花,李林初. 2004.管理层收购与上市公司治理绩效研究[J].财经理论与实践, 25 (1): 52-57.
胡阳,刘志远,任美琴. 2006.设计有效的经营者持股激励机制-基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].南开管理评论, 9(5):52-58.
胡宇辰,戴淑燕. 2001.股权激励实施的风险规避[J].中国工业经济, (9):77-81.
黄宗福. 2007.内幕信息、市场操纵与证券市场监管[[D].厦门大学博士学位论文.
姜芳. 2007.股权激励的发展历程探讨[J].管理科学, (5):87-89.
金立. 2003.中国企业经理人股票期权激励研究[D].厦门大学.
姜兰. 2008.中国证券市场信息操纵行为、环境与防控体系研究[D].吉林大学.
姜锡明,刘西友. 2008.自愿性信息披露动因及载体探讨[J].中国管理信息化, 11(1):46-48.
雷光勇,刘慧龙. 2006.大股东控制、融资规模与盈余操纵程度[J].管理世界, (1):129-138.
刘剑,谈传生. 2005.管理层持股与公司绩效:来自深圳股票市场的经验证据[J].中国软科学, (10).
刘斌,刘星,李世新,何顺文. 2003. CEO薪酬与企业业绩互动效应的实证检验[J].会计研究,3.
刘国亮,王家胜. 2000.上市公司股权结构、激励制度及绩效的实证研究[J].经济理论与经济管理, (5) :40-45.
刘小玄. 1996.现代企业的激励制度:剩余支配权[J].经济研究, 5:3-11.
李琳. 2006.会计造假行为的社会心理学透视[J].财会月刊(综合), (7):45-47.
李曜,管恩华. 2005.上市公司股票增值权激励效果的实证研究,商业经济与管理, 10:44-51.
卢侠巍. 2000.关于中国上市公司高层经理人员操纵会计盈余行为与长期激励机制问题研究[J]. (6):26-30.
刘毅斌.中国股票期权激励的现状分析[J].湖南财经专科学校学报, 20(5):56-59.
刘铮,鲍童. 2004.股票期权制度:美国经验和中国现状[J].现代管理, 2005, (3):42-45.
林钟高,刘永样,徐正刚. 2003.中国会计信息披露现状及其对策分析[J].山西财经大学学报, 2:84-89.
李增泉. 2000.激励机制与企业绩效:一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究, (1): 24-30.
马利利. 2008.浅析上市公司舞弊手段及防范措施[J].财经论坛, (3):74-77.
彭向宇. 2008.上市公司监管之症结—违规信息披露[J].管理科学, (2):49-50.
钱红光. 2007.当前中国上市公司自愿性信息披露状况的研究[J].湖北工业大学学报, 22(6):37-41.
饶超. 2007.盈余管理与会计造假的区别[J].冶金财会,3:37-39.
史彩霞. 2006.管理者股票期权制度的负效应[J].商业会计, (11):50-52.
石岿然,肖条军. 2005.零售市场价格策略的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报, 4:144-148.
2002.上海荣正投资咨询公司[R].中国企业家价值报告.
2003.上海荣正投资咨询公司[R].中国企业家价值报告.
2002.深交所研究报告[R].信息披露违规处罚实际效果研究.
司茹. 2005.上市公司财务报告舞弊问题研究—基于公司内部治理的视角[D].辽宁大学博士学位论文.
石婷婷. 2001.论人力资本产权及激励制度创新[J].福建论坛(社会科学版), 222:21-22.
孙铮,王志伟,吴茜. 2002.市场监管公司治理会计改革一从美国《2002年SOX法案》看中国的会计改革[J].会计研究, 12:12-15.
孙自愿,朱学义. 2003.中国企业经营者股权激励的运作研究[J].预测, (6):50-55.
陶世隆. 2001.公平披露规则与证券市场透明度[J].管理世界, (1):137-139.
王冬梅,陈忠琏. 2000.上市公司会计信息操纵的经济学分析[J].数理统计与管理, 2:18-22.
魏刚. 2000.高级管理层激励与上市公司绩效[J].经济研究, (3).
王华,黄之骏. 2006.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界, 9.
魏杰,赵俊超. 2004.中国建立现代产权制度应满足五个要求[J].经济研究参考, 55:16-17.
沃健. 2002.会计造假行为的法律治理与制度规范[J].财经论丛, (5):66-69.
王克敏,王志超. 2007.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理—基于我国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界, (7):111-120.
王乔,章卫东. 2002.上市公司会计信息操纵行为探讨[J].会计研究, 12:42-45.
王庆仁,高春涛. 1999.上市公司“壳”资源的经济学分析[J].证券市场导报, 8:54-59.
吴青云. 2008.中国证券市场信息披露存在的问题和对策[J].实事求是, 3:36-39.
吴淑琨. 2002.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究[J].中国工业经济, (1).
吴娓,涂燕,付强. 2006.财务造假、盈余管理与管理层期权激励[J].内蒙古社会科学(汉文版), 27(3):72-76.
王永平,孟卫东. 2004.供应链企业合作竞争机制的演化博弈分析[J].管理工程学报, 2:96-99.
王跃堂. 2000.会计政策选择的经济动机—基于沪深股市的实证研究[J].会计研究, 12.
王战强,万鹏. 1998.上市公司高级管理人员持股状况研究政策建议[R].君安证券研究所.
许承明,濮卫东. 2003.内部人持股与上市公司绩效研究.数量经济技术经济研究, 11.
徐二明,王智慧. 2000.中国上市公司治理结构与战略绩效的相关性研究[J].南开管理评论, (4): 4-14.
熊璟. 2006.上市公司操纵会计信息方法披露[J].财会研究, (10):45-47.
熊季霞,高波. 2007.风险投资运作中的三方博弈分析[J].济南金融, (3):9-14.
夏娜丽. 2007.公司股权激励及高管薪酬披露分析[J].证券市场导报, (7):60-65.
徐大伟,蔡锐,徐鸣雷. 2005.管理层持股比例与公司绩效关系的实证研究——基于中国上市公司的MBO[J].管理科学, 18(4):40-47.
于东智. 2003.董事会、公司治理与绩效:对我国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学, (3):29-44.
叶德珠. 2008.高管人员信息披露造假的行为经济学分析[J].财经科学, 238(1):28-35.
杨萍. 2005.上市公司会计信息操纵行为探析[J].新疆农垦经济, 9:104-107.
杨胜刚,何靖,曾翼. 2007.反洗钱中监管机构和商业银行的博弈与委托代理问题研究[J]. (1):71–84.
于卫兵. 2004.从美国财务舞弊谈股票期权会计理论的完善[J].沿海企业与科技(增刊):26-27.
余颖. 2000.股票期权激励效果的博弈分析[J].经济与管理研究, (2).
易余胤,肖条军,盛昭瀚. 2005.合作研发中机会主义行为的演化博弈分析[J].管理科学学报, 4:80-88.
尹智雄. 1997.企业员工持股运作实务[M].北京:经济科学出版社.
张程春,蹇静. 2008.中国上市公司违规信息披露的影响因素研究[J].审计研究, (1):75-83.
张帆. 2003.股权激励的激励机制及其绩效解说[D].复旦大学.
张欢. 2007.弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联书店, 1996:398-403.
张维迎. 1998.控制权丧失的不可弥补性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍[J].经济研究, (7):3-14.
张维迎. 2003.作为激励机制的法律-评侵权损害赔偿的经济分析[J].中国人民大学学报, 2:155-156.
张维迎. 2006.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联出版社.
张详建,徐晋,郭岚. 2004.企业盈余管理存在原因的理论分析[J].软科学,5.
张宗新,张晓荣,廖士光. 2005.上市公司自愿性信息披露行为有效吗?基于1998-2003年中国证券市场的检验[J].经济学(季刊), 4(2):369-387.
张宗新,季雷. 2005.内幕信息操纵的股价冲击效应—理论与中国股市证据[J].金融研究, 4:144-154.
张宗益,宋增基. 2002.上市公司经理持股与公司绩效实证研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版), 8(6).
张惠忠. 2000.论上市公司会计信息披露问题[J].中国软科学, 3:89-93.
赵娜,孟祥革. 2007.股票期权激励陷阱研究[J].华东经济管理, 21(12):126-129.
赵晓红. 2006.盈余管理与会计造假[J].呼伦贝尔学院学报, 8:34-37.
祝红梅. 2002.内幕信息、内幕交易及其管制[J].南开经济研究, 2:16-21.
邹宏秋. 2003.中国上市公司股权激励现状考察[J].北方经贸, (1):55-57.
周建波,孙菊生. 2003.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究-来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].经济研究, (6):74-83.
周其仁. 1996.市场里的企业:一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约[J].经济研究, 4.
周世东. 2002.上市公司股权激励的缺陷探析[J].经济体制改革, (5):34-38.
朱亮. 2007.中国证券市场信息披露问题浅析[J].今日财富, (12):65-67.
Allen Franklin, Gale Douglas. 1992. Stock Price Manipulation[J]. The Review of Financial Studies,(5):503-529.
Bar-Gill O, L Bebchuk. 2003. Misreporting Corporate Performance[Z]. Working Paper, Harvard Law School.
Barnhart.Sc W., Rosenstein St. 1998. Board Composition, Managerial Ownership, and Firm Performance: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Financial Review, 4:1-16.
Becker G.. 1968. Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 76:169-217.
Benabou R.., 1992. Laroque G. Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107:921-958.
Benjamin E., Hermalin, Michael S. 1991. Weisbach. The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance [J]. Financial Management, 4:101-112.
Bernstein A. 2002. Options: Middle Managers will Take the Hit, Commentary [J]. Business Week, 9:9.
Bin Ke. 2004. Do Equity-based Incentives Induce CEOs to Manage Earnings to Report Strings of Consecutive Earning Increases? [Z]. Working Paper, Pennsylvania State University.
Bowman, P&Haire D. 1975. Stock Performance and Voluntary Disclosure[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.
Brown K. 2002. Many Firms may Play with Numbers to Paint Prettier Pictures of Themselves[J]. The Wall Street Journal, 2:6.
Bruno Biais. 1993. Price Formation and Equilibrium Liquidity in Fragmented and Centralized Markets[J]. The Journal of Finance, 25(1):157-187.
Cheng Q., Warfield T. 2005. Equity Incentives and Earnings Management[J]. Accounting Review, 80:441–476.
Choi. 2000. Regulating Investors not Issuers: A Market-based Proposal[J]. California Law Review. Coase, Ronald. 1937. The Nature of the Firm[M]. Economic, 4:386-405.
Coles Jeffrey L.,Michael L.Lemmon,J.felix Meschke. 2004. Structural Models and Endogeneityu in Corporate Finance: the Link between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance [Z]. Working Paper, Arizonastate University.
Core J., W. Guay. 1999. The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 28:151-184.
Cui H., Y.T. Mak. 2002. The Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance in High R&D Firms [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 8, 313-316.
Daniel Bergstresser, Thomas Philippon. 2006. CEO Incentives and Earnings Management[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 80:511-529.
David Aboody D., Kasznik R.. 2000. CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of CorporateVoluntary Disclosures [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29: 73–100.
David J, Denis, Paul Hanouna. 2006. Atulya Sarin. Is there a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation?[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12:467-488.
DeAngelo L.E. 1986. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders [J]. The Accounting Review, 41:400-420.
Eitan Goldman, Steve L, Slezak. 2006. An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation [J]. Journal of Financial and Economics, 80: 603- 626.
Fama Eugene F. 1983. Jensen Michael C. Agency Problems and Residual Claims [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 26.
Feltham G, M. Wu. 2001. Incentive Efficiency of Stock versus Options[J]. Review of Accounting Studies, (6):7-28.
Gaver J, J. Gaver K. M, Austin J. R. 1995. Additional Evidence on Bonus Plans and Income Management[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 1:3-28.
Ghosh Chinmoy, C.F. 2003. Sirmans. Board Independence, Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts [J]. Journal of Real Estate Finance Economics, 26, 287-318.
Gigler F., T.Hemmer. 2002. Conservatism, Optimal Disclosure Policy, and the Timeliness of Financial Reports[J].Journal of Accounting Research, 18.
Gigler F., T. Hemmer. 1998. On the Frequency, Quality, and Informational Role of Mandatory Financial Reports[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 36.
Gordon Gemmill. 1996. Transparency and Liquidity: A Study of Block Trades on the London Stock Exchange under Different Publication Rules[J]. Journal of Finance, (5):1765-1792.
Griffith. 1999. CEO Ownership and Firm Value [J]. Managerial and Decision Economics, 20: 1-8.
Guojin Gong. 2007. Outside Directors’Equity-based Compensation and Earning Management [Z]. Working paper, Penn State University.
Hagerman, Robert L., Zmijewski, Mark E. 1979. Some Economic Determinants of Accounting Policy Choice[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 2, 141-161.
Hall B. J., Murphy K.J. 2000. Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options[J]. American Economic Review, (90):209-214.
Harris, M.and A.Raviv. 1991. The Theory of Capital Structure[J]. Journal of Finance, 46.
Healy Paul, Palepu Krishra. 2001. The Fall of Economy[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17:1-45.
Healy, Paul M.. 1985. The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 1:85-107.
Strong, John S., Meyer John R.. 1987. Asset Write Downs: Managerial Incentives and Security Returns[J].Journal of Finance, 3:643.
Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S. 1998. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and their Monitoring of the CEO[J]. American Economic Review, 88:96-118.
Hirst D, S H Teoh. 2002. Limited Attention, Information Disclosure and Financial Reporting[M]. Working Paper, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University.
Holthausen R. W.. 1981. Evidence on the Effect of Bond Covenants and Management Compensation Contracts on the Choice of Accounting Techniques: The Case of the Depreciation Switch-back[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3:73-109.
Ilan Guttman, Ohad Kadan. 2003. Adding the Noise: a Theory of Compensation-driven Earnings Management [Z]. Working paper, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Jap Efendi, Anup Srivasetava, Edward P Swanson. 2007. Why do Corporate Manager Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 85: 667-708.
Jensen M C. 1993. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems[J]. The Journal of Finance, 48:831-880.
Jensen Michael C., William H. 1976. Meckling. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior、Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 3.
Jorge Gabriel Aseff. 2001. Essays on Managerial Compensation[D]. Arizona State University.
Joseph Kissan, Thevaranjian Ales. 1998. Monitoring and Incentives in Sales Organizations: An Agency-theoretic Perspective[J].Marketing Science, 17(2):107–123.
Levitt A. 1998. THe Numbers Game [A]. Speech Delivered at the NYU Center for Law and Business. New York. NY, 28.
Lin Peng, Ailsa Roell. 2006. Executive Pay and Shareholder Litigation[Z]. Working paper, Columbia University.
McConnell John, Henri Servaes. 1990. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 27.
Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon, Edward L Maydew. 2006. Is there a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(1):113-142.
Morck Randall, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W.Vishny. 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 20.
Natasha Burns, Simi Kedia. 2006. The Impact of Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 79:35-67.
Oswald S.L., J.S. Jahera Jr. 1991. The Influence of Ownership on Performance: An Empirical Study [J]. Strategy Management Journal, 12, 322.
Pagano, Roell. 1996. Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading[J]. The Journal of Finance, (2):579-613.
Patrick Bolton,Jose Scheinkaman,WeiXiong.2003. Executive Compensation and Short-termist Behavior in Speculative Markets[Z]. NBER working paper, 3.
Paul M .Healy,James M. Wahlen. 1999. A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implications for Standard Setting[J]. Accounting Horizons:365-383.
Ravi Singh. 2003. Incentive Compensation and the Quality of Disclosure[Z]. Working paper, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University.
Richard Dietrich, Steven J Kachelmeier. 2001. Market Efficiency, Bounded Rationality, and Supplemental Business Reporting Disclosure [J]. Journal of Accounting Research, (2).
Roberta Romano. 1998. Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation [J]. Yale Law Review, 5.
R Ramy Elitzur, Varda Yaari. 1995. Executive Incentive Compensation and Earning Manipulation in a Multi-period Setting [J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 26: 201- 219.
Schipper K. Commentary on Earnings Management[J].Accounting Horizons,1989, 12:91-102.
Schultz Theodore W. 1961. Investment in Human Capital[J]. The American Economic Review, 51(1):1-17.
Shivdasani A. 1993. Board Composition, Ownership Structure and Hostile Takeovers [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16:167-198.
Stulz Rene M. 1988. Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 20.
Taylor and Jonker. 1978. Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and Game Dynamics[M].
Watts R., J.Zimmerman. 1986. Positive Accounting Theory[M]. Prentice Hall.
Uzun H, Szewczyk, Varma R. 2004. Board Composition and Corporate Fraud[J]. Financial Analysts Journal, 6:33-43.
Vafeas N. 1999. Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 53:113–142.
Venky Nagar, Dhananjay Nanda, Peter Wysocki. 2003. Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-based Incentives [J]. Journal of Accounting Economics, 34: 283- 309.
Yisong S Tian. 2003. Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud [Z]. Working Paper, York University.