内部资本市场配置效率和公司治理相关性实证研究
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摘要
这些年,国内外学者从多种视角对内部资本市场配置效率进行了大量研究,但一直是众说纷纭,分歧很大。本文另辟蹊径,从我国上市公司的公司治理情况这个角度对企业集团内部资本市场配置效率进行实证研究,认为公司治理是影响企业集团内部资本市场配置效率的重要因素。
由于我国上市公司没有提供详细的分部财务数据,国内学者以前的研究多是选择间接研究法,通过公司间的比较建立模型进行分析。本文与前人研究不同,采用我国在香港上市的但主营业务发生在内地的企业集团作为样本,选择直接研究法,一是可以采用西方经典的测量模型,二是选取的企业集团能够代表我国的上市公司的特征,然后通过模型分析企业公司治理的结构对内部资本市场配置效率的影响。实证分析发现:在参与检验的样本中,第一大股东的持股比例与企业集团的内部资本市场配置效率呈显著负相关关系,即第一大股东持股比例越高,股权越集中,内部资本市场配置的效率就越低;独立董事在董事会所占比例与内部资本市场配置效率呈显著正相关关系,即独立董事人员越多,越能够起到监督激励的效果,内部资本市场配置效率越高;管理层持股比例和内部资本市场配置效率没有通过显著性检验。
由此得出结论,我国上市的企业集团必须加强自身的公司治理机制,解决第一大股东与中小股东的代理问题,加强管理层的管理力度和独立董事的监督强度,改善我国上市公司的治理机制,提高治理效率,使内部资本市场充分发挥其应有的功能优势,对企业内部资源进行合理配置,为企业创造更多财富。
Many scholars all over the world did a large number of studies on the efficiency of internal capital market on a variety of perspectives in recent years, but they had different opinions. This paper attempts to do some study about the efficiency of internal capital market on corporate governance, and corporate governance is an important factor of the efficiency of internal capital market.
Because listed companies in China didn’t provide financial data of the division in details, the previous scholars mostly select indirect research method to study, established comparison’s models to analyze the efficiency of internal capital market. This paper is different from previous studies because it select the direct research method, using Hong Kong-listed of China’s company that its main business in mainland as a sample. There are two reasons: firstly, the sample can use classical measurement model of western, secondly, the sample can represent the characteristics of listed companies of our country. In end, this paper use the models to analyze how the structure of corporate governance affect the efficiency of internal capital markets. Empirical analysis found that: participating in the samples examined, the number of shares of the first major shareholder and the efficiency of internal capital market in enterprise groups has negative correlation, that is, the higher the proportion of the largest shareholding, the first shareholder have the more share concentrated, the lower the efficiency of internal capital market is, and the proportion of independent directors on the board and the efficiency of the internal capital markets have a positive correlation, that is, the more independent directors officers, the higher the efficiency of internal capital market is, because the more independent directors officers can play the role of supervision and encouragement. The proportion of management ownership of shares and the efficiency of internal capital market allocation does not pass the significance test.
So the conclusion is that, listed companies in China must strengthen their corporate governance mechanisms, resolve the agency problems between the first major shareholders and small shareholders, and enhanced management and supervision, to improve the governance mechanism and management efficiency of listed companies in China. Only in this way can be done in listed companies, the internal capital market can play its proper advantage to rationally allocate internal resources to create more wealth for enterprises.
由于我国上市公司没有提供详细的分部财务数据,国内学者以前的研究多是选择间接研究法,通过公司间的比较建立模型进行分析。本文与前人研究不同,采用我国在香港上市的但主营业务发生在内地的企业集团作为样本,选择直接研究法,一是可以采用西方经典的测量模型,二是选取的企业集团能够代表我国的上市公司的特征,然后通过模型分析企业公司治理的结构对内部资本市场配置效率的影响。实证分析发现:在参与检验的样本中,第一大股东的持股比例与企业集团的内部资本市场配置效率呈显著负相关关系,即第一大股东持股比例越高,股权越集中,内部资本市场配置的效率就越低;独立董事在董事会所占比例与内部资本市场配置效率呈显著正相关关系,即独立董事人员越多,越能够起到监督激励的效果,内部资本市场配置效率越高;管理层持股比例和内部资本市场配置效率没有通过显著性检验。
由此得出结论,我国上市的企业集团必须加强自身的公司治理机制,解决第一大股东与中小股东的代理问题,加强管理层的管理力度和独立董事的监督强度,改善我国上市公司的治理机制,提高治理效率,使内部资本市场充分发挥其应有的功能优势,对企业内部资源进行合理配置,为企业创造更多财富。
Many scholars all over the world did a large number of studies on the efficiency of internal capital market on a variety of perspectives in recent years, but they had different opinions. This paper attempts to do some study about the efficiency of internal capital market on corporate governance, and corporate governance is an important factor of the efficiency of internal capital market.
Because listed companies in China didn’t provide financial data of the division in details, the previous scholars mostly select indirect research method to study, established comparison’s models to analyze the efficiency of internal capital market. This paper is different from previous studies because it select the direct research method, using Hong Kong-listed of China’s company that its main business in mainland as a sample. There are two reasons: firstly, the sample can use classical measurement model of western, secondly, the sample can represent the characteristics of listed companies of our country. In end, this paper use the models to analyze how the structure of corporate governance affect the efficiency of internal capital markets. Empirical analysis found that: participating in the samples examined, the number of shares of the first major shareholder and the efficiency of internal capital market in enterprise groups has negative correlation, that is, the higher the proportion of the largest shareholding, the first shareholder have the more share concentrated, the lower the efficiency of internal capital market is, and the proportion of independent directors on the board and the efficiency of the internal capital markets have a positive correlation, that is, the more independent directors officers, the higher the efficiency of internal capital market is, because the more independent directors officers can play the role of supervision and encouragement. The proportion of management ownership of shares and the efficiency of internal capital market allocation does not pass the significance test.
So the conclusion is that, listed companies in China must strengthen their corporate governance mechanisms, resolve the agency problems between the first major shareholders and small shareholders, and enhanced management and supervision, to improve the governance mechanism and management efficiency of listed companies in China. Only in this way can be done in listed companies, the internal capital market can play its proper advantage to rationally allocate internal resources to create more wealth for enterprises.
引文
5肖婧,王新红(2010)研究发现,我国沪深两市的2007年的管理层持股比例达到0.4485%。
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[1] Alchian A.,Corporate Management and Property Rights[N],In Henry Manneed.,Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities,Washington, D.C.,American Enterprise Institute,1969,337-360.
[2] Williamson Oliver E..Markets and Hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implication[M].NewYork:Free Press.1975
[3] Myers,S.C. and N.C. Majluf,Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have[J],Journal of Financial Economics,1984,13:187-222
[4] Lewellen W.G.,A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger[J],Journal of Finance,1971,26: 521-37
[5] Gertner,R.,Scharfstein,D., and Stein,J.,Internal Versus External Capital Markets[J],The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,109(4):1211-1230
[6] Lamont.O.,Cash Flow and Investment:Evidence from Internal Capital Markets[J],Journal of Finance,1997,(52):83-109
[7] Stein,Jeremy C.Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources[J],Journal of Finance 1997,52(1):l11-133
[8] Stein,Jeremy,Agency,Information and Corporate Investment, NBER Working Paper[J],2001,83:421-881
[9] Khanna,T, Palepu,K. The future of business groups in emerging markets:Long runevidence from Chile[J].Academy of Management Journal, 2000,Vol.43, No.3:268-285
[10] Lins,K. and H.Servaes. Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in Emerging Market?[J].Financial Management,2002,31:5-31
[11] Berger,Phillip G. and Eli Ofek, Diversification’s effect on firm value[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995,37(1):39-65
[12] Shin,H. and R.Stulz,Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998,5:531-553
[13] Scharfstein,David S,Jeremy.C. Stein, The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets:Divisional Rent Seeking and Inefficient Investment[J]. Journal of Finance,2000,Vol.55:2537-2564
[14]周业安,韩梅.上市公司内部资本市场研究[J].管理世界,2003,(11):118-125
[15]苏冬蔚.多元化经营与企业价值:我国上市公司多元化溢价的实证分析[J].经济学.2005,10,Vol.4: 135-158
[16]邵军,刘志远.多元化战略对管理层激励的影响—来自中国资本市场的经验证据[J].当代经济科学.2006(2)
[17]蹇张璋.内部资本市场配置效率的实证分析.对外经济贸易大学金融学院[D].硕士毕业论文.2006
[18]卢建新.资本配置、管理激励与内部资本市场效率.中南财经政法大学学报[J].2007,4:92-98
[19]许奇挺.内部资本市场有效性研究—基于中国民营上市公司的实证分析[M],经济科学出版社,2008
[20]谢华,朱丽萍.基于企业集团多元化战略下的内部资本市场研究—以云天化集团(600096)为例[J].会计师,2008,(06):18-21
[21]卢建新.股权结构、公司治理与内部资本市场效率.中国财经政法大学学报[J].2009,4:120-125
[22]蔡琳.中国上市公司系族的股权结构和内部资本市场[D].北京交通大学硕士论文,2003
[23]魏明海,万良勇.我国企业内部资本市场的边界确定[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版),2006,(1):92-97
[24]杨棉之.内部资本市场、公司绩效与控制权私有收益—以华通天香集团为例分析[J].会计研究,2006(12):61-67
[25]涂罡.山东上市公司内部资本市场对大股东占款影响的实证分析[J].山东财政学院学报.2007(1)
[26]饶静,万良勇.我国企业集团内部资本市场的形成机制分析[J].金融与经济,2007(10)
[27]李宁波,邵军.大股东内部资本市场对附属上市公司价值的影响—基于华立系的案例分析[J].辽宁工学院学报(社会科学版).2007(4)
[28]赵红梅.企业集团的内部资本市场对成员企业投融资效率的影响分析[J].财会研究.2007(5)
[29]魏馨,徐荣.内部资本市场与融资约束—基于中国制度背景下H型组织结构上市公司的研究[J].中国金融家,2008,(Z1)
[30] Shleifer,A. and R. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J]. Journal of Political Economy.1986,94(3).461-488
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