基于演化博弈的淮河流域水环境管理研究
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摘要
水是人类社会赖以生存和发展的最基本条件,水环境污染和水资源短缺已成为当今世界各国面临的主要问题。水环境管理通常包括水质管理和水资源量管理。水环境系统是一个复杂的动态系统,与外界持续地进行物质和能量的交换,它具有复杂性系统的属性。对于复杂性水环境演化系统,在其内部机制和外部环境的影响和作用机理以及内部与外部之间的相互作用和耦合机制尚不清楚的情况下,运用传统的研究方法对水环境管理研究显得十分有限,因此需要用科学的管理理论方法对流域进行研究。本文以淮河流域为研究对象,从演化博弈的角度展开对水环境管理的研究。
演化博弈论是在20世纪90年代迅速发展起来的一种理论,是数理统计学前沿的数理工具,其在水污染控制规划领域的应用研究尚处于探索阶段。本文在对不同水环境管理理论、方法的比较分析基础上,将演化博弈论引入水环境管理中,为水环境管理规划的研究提供科学、系统的理论方法。水环境管理过程是在不确定性有限理性空间内进行的,从演化的角度来考虑水环境污染控制系统中参与群体间相互作用的行为动态调整过程,用演化博弈模型分析参与群体策略自发形成的过程,构成一个水污染控制系统的宏观模型,以期为淮河流域水环境控制规划提供贴切实际的理论依据。
本文较全面地分析评述了淮河流域水环境管理现状,通过对淮河流域中水环境现状的分析,显示了开展本课题研究的紧迫性、重要性,为本文展开研究奠定历史事实基础。对演化思想理论渊源、哲学基础、研究传统与现代发展进行介绍,阐述了演化博弈理论的产生、发展及应用,分析了演化博弈论特征及其应用空间的拓展,构建了本文研究的理论平台。
全文理论研究的主要内容:将演化博弈论引入水环境系统研究中,分析讨论了淮河流域和谐水环境系统演化机理。对复杂性淮河流域的水环境系统建立了水环境控制规划的动态博弈模型,并运用演化博弈论建立了淮河流域经济群体之间的竞争合作的演化博弈模型,分析了竞争合作演化的动态过程。由于淮河经济群体间竞争合作模式的自发演化依赖于合作和不合作的相对收益,这个收益又与政府监管制度有关。接着又运用动态博弈模型研究了监管法规演化与经济群体间尝试合作的企业间的动态博弈过程。分析了制度安排和淮河流域经济群体合作的进化制度的形成。
运用演化博弈理论对淮河水资源管理中群决策问题进行初步研究,对水资源的开发利用模式与多层次决策规划方案提出了群决策演化博弈模型。并提出了建模、求解方法;建立了流域水污染扩散演化问题的控制模型,并设计了基于蛋白质分泌调节机制的生物情智学习行为的演化博弈算法进行求解分析,并建立多目标问题协同进化博弈分析的技术路线和计算步骤,对水资源配置优化问题进行分析,并进行实例计算验证;分析构建了水资源配置中的水权和水市场交易模型,建立了贝叶斯博弈结合线性规划法利益分配模型;并对位于淮河流域蚌埠市水资源优化分配规划模型进行实例研究,提出蚌埠市水资源优化配置多目标规划优化的具体方案。
上述研究成果不仅丰富了水环境管理理论的内容,也拓宽了传统水环境管理模型的应用空间,为决策者进行实际的水环境管理规划决策提供了更充分的科学依据。
Water is indispensable to the existence and development of human beings. However, water pollution and water shortage has become one of the major problems facing the world today. Generally, water environment management includes water quality management and water resources. water environment system is a complex dynamic system exchanging materials and energy with the outside word continuously. It has the attributes of the complexity system. for the complexity of evolution of the water environment. its internal mechanisms and the effects and mechanism of external environment and is not clear to mechanism of interaction and coupling between internal with external. The use of traditional methods is a very limited to study water environment management. This requires to study scientific management for a water environment.. Based on the study of the Huaihe River basin, this dissertation made study on the water environment management.
Evolutionary game theory has gained rapid development in the 1990s. It is the cutting-edge tools in the field of mathematical statistics. Its applied research in the field of water pollution control programs is still at the exploratory stage, this dissertation based on the comparative analysis of different methods and theory of water environment management, introduces the evolutionary game theory to water environment management so as to provide scientific and systematic method for water environment management planning research. The water environment management is carried out within the limited ration space in uncertainty. To consider the process of the dynamic adjustment of interaction behavior between the participate from the perspective of the evolution of the water pollution control system. Using the model of evolutionary game analysis the spontaneous formation process of participate group strategy. To build a macro-model of water pollution control system. With a view to the providing the theoretical basis actually appropriate for the Huaihe River basin water planning and environmental control. this paper a more comprehensive analysis of the comments the status quo of the Huaihe River basin water environment management.
This dissertation analyses the status quo of ecological environment and water pollution control analysis of the Huaihe River basin, shows the urgency and importance to carry out this research. laying historical foundation for the further research. The introduction to the origin theory of ideological of evolution and on the basis of philosophy and study of traditional and modern development and on the production, and the development and application of the evolution game theory, analysis of characteristic of the evolution game theory and its application, the introduction to the evolution game theory in the system of the water environment, analysis of the mechanism of the harmonious evolution of the Huaihe River basin water environment system, construct the theoretical platform for this dissertation.
To establish a dynamic game model of water environment programming for the complexity system of water environment of the Huaihe River basin, this dissertation uses the evolution of the game theory to build a game model concerning the economic groups of the Huaihe River valley analysis of the process of the dynamics evolution of cooperation and competition. As the game model of spontaneous evolution of economic groups of the Huaihe River depends on the relative pay-off of the cooperation, non-cooperation, and the pay-off related government regulatory system. Then the dissertation studied the dynamic game process of evolution of regulatory rules and economic groups to try to cooperate inter-enterprise by using dynamic game model on the analysis of the evolution of the formation of the system of the status quo of institutional arrangements and economic groups cooperation of the Huaihe River basin in the evolution of the formation of the system..
The theoretical studies in the dissertation are as follows. First, using the evolutionary game theory to make a preliminary study in decision-making group of the Huaihe River water resources management, establishing the evolutionary game model of multi-stage group decision-making, putting forward a solution method, building the control model of the evolution spread of water pollution, presenting an algorithm of evolutionary game with biological intelligence-learning behavior based on the mechanism of protein secreted, making analysis of technical line and calculation steps of multi-objective problem of co-evolutionary game, analyzing water resources optimized allocation, building model of water rights and water market of a water resources allocation to establishment of model for the distribution of benefits of a Bayesian game combined with linear programming, studying optimization model for the allocation of water resources planning of Bengbu city of located in the Huaihe River valley. Presentation of specific programs of the Multi-objective optimization plans to optimize the water resources allocation of Bengbu city.
The above-mentioned research not only enriched the theory of water environment control but also broadened the applications of the traditional water environment model, providing more sufficient scientific evidence for decision makers to make water environment planning decision.
演化博弈论是在20世纪90年代迅速发展起来的一种理论,是数理统计学前沿的数理工具,其在水污染控制规划领域的应用研究尚处于探索阶段。本文在对不同水环境管理理论、方法的比较分析基础上,将演化博弈论引入水环境管理中,为水环境管理规划的研究提供科学、系统的理论方法。水环境管理过程是在不确定性有限理性空间内进行的,从演化的角度来考虑水环境污染控制系统中参与群体间相互作用的行为动态调整过程,用演化博弈模型分析参与群体策略自发形成的过程,构成一个水污染控制系统的宏观模型,以期为淮河流域水环境控制规划提供贴切实际的理论依据。
本文较全面地分析评述了淮河流域水环境管理现状,通过对淮河流域中水环境现状的分析,显示了开展本课题研究的紧迫性、重要性,为本文展开研究奠定历史事实基础。对演化思想理论渊源、哲学基础、研究传统与现代发展进行介绍,阐述了演化博弈理论的产生、发展及应用,分析了演化博弈论特征及其应用空间的拓展,构建了本文研究的理论平台。
全文理论研究的主要内容:将演化博弈论引入水环境系统研究中,分析讨论了淮河流域和谐水环境系统演化机理。对复杂性淮河流域的水环境系统建立了水环境控制规划的动态博弈模型,并运用演化博弈论建立了淮河流域经济群体之间的竞争合作的演化博弈模型,分析了竞争合作演化的动态过程。由于淮河经济群体间竞争合作模式的自发演化依赖于合作和不合作的相对收益,这个收益又与政府监管制度有关。接着又运用动态博弈模型研究了监管法规演化与经济群体间尝试合作的企业间的动态博弈过程。分析了制度安排和淮河流域经济群体合作的进化制度的形成。
运用演化博弈理论对淮河水资源管理中群决策问题进行初步研究,对水资源的开发利用模式与多层次决策规划方案提出了群决策演化博弈模型。并提出了建模、求解方法;建立了流域水污染扩散演化问题的控制模型,并设计了基于蛋白质分泌调节机制的生物情智学习行为的演化博弈算法进行求解分析,并建立多目标问题协同进化博弈分析的技术路线和计算步骤,对水资源配置优化问题进行分析,并进行实例计算验证;分析构建了水资源配置中的水权和水市场交易模型,建立了贝叶斯博弈结合线性规划法利益分配模型;并对位于淮河流域蚌埠市水资源优化分配规划模型进行实例研究,提出蚌埠市水资源优化配置多目标规划优化的具体方案。
上述研究成果不仅丰富了水环境管理理论的内容,也拓宽了传统水环境管理模型的应用空间,为决策者进行实际的水环境管理规划决策提供了更充分的科学依据。
Water is indispensable to the existence and development of human beings. However, water pollution and water shortage has become one of the major problems facing the world today. Generally, water environment management includes water quality management and water resources. water environment system is a complex dynamic system exchanging materials and energy with the outside word continuously. It has the attributes of the complexity system. for the complexity of evolution of the water environment. its internal mechanisms and the effects and mechanism of external environment and is not clear to mechanism of interaction and coupling between internal with external. The use of traditional methods is a very limited to study water environment management. This requires to study scientific management for a water environment.. Based on the study of the Huaihe River basin, this dissertation made study on the water environment management.
Evolutionary game theory has gained rapid development in the 1990s. It is the cutting-edge tools in the field of mathematical statistics. Its applied research in the field of water pollution control programs is still at the exploratory stage, this dissertation based on the comparative analysis of different methods and theory of water environment management, introduces the evolutionary game theory to water environment management so as to provide scientific and systematic method for water environment management planning research. The water environment management is carried out within the limited ration space in uncertainty. To consider the process of the dynamic adjustment of interaction behavior between the participate from the perspective of the evolution of the water pollution control system. Using the model of evolutionary game analysis the spontaneous formation process of participate group strategy. To build a macro-model of water pollution control system. With a view to the providing the theoretical basis actually appropriate for the Huaihe River basin water planning and environmental control. this paper a more comprehensive analysis of the comments the status quo of the Huaihe River basin water environment management.
This dissertation analyses the status quo of ecological environment and water pollution control analysis of the Huaihe River basin, shows the urgency and importance to carry out this research. laying historical foundation for the further research. The introduction to the origin theory of ideological of evolution and on the basis of philosophy and study of traditional and modern development and on the production, and the development and application of the evolution game theory, analysis of characteristic of the evolution game theory and its application, the introduction to the evolution game theory in the system of the water environment, analysis of the mechanism of the harmonious evolution of the Huaihe River basin water environment system, construct the theoretical platform for this dissertation.
To establish a dynamic game model of water environment programming for the complexity system of water environment of the Huaihe River basin, this dissertation uses the evolution of the game theory to build a game model concerning the economic groups of the Huaihe River valley analysis of the process of the dynamics evolution of cooperation and competition. As the game model of spontaneous evolution of economic groups of the Huaihe River depends on the relative pay-off of the cooperation, non-cooperation, and the pay-off related government regulatory system. Then the dissertation studied the dynamic game process of evolution of regulatory rules and economic groups to try to cooperate inter-enterprise by using dynamic game model on the analysis of the evolution of the formation of the system of the status quo of institutional arrangements and economic groups cooperation of the Huaihe River basin in the evolution of the formation of the system..
The theoretical studies in the dissertation are as follows. First, using the evolutionary game theory to make a preliminary study in decision-making group of the Huaihe River water resources management, establishing the evolutionary game model of multi-stage group decision-making, putting forward a solution method, building the control model of the evolution spread of water pollution, presenting an algorithm of evolutionary game with biological intelligence-learning behavior based on the mechanism of protein secreted, making analysis of technical line and calculation steps of multi-objective problem of co-evolutionary game, analyzing water resources optimized allocation, building model of water rights and water market of a water resources allocation to establishment of model for the distribution of benefits of a Bayesian game combined with linear programming, studying optimization model for the allocation of water resources planning of Bengbu city of located in the Huaihe River valley. Presentation of specific programs of the Multi-objective optimization plans to optimize the water resources allocation of Bengbu city.
The above-mentioned research not only enriched the theory of water environment control but also broadened the applications of the traditional water environment model, providing more sufficient scientific evidence for decision makers to make water environment planning decision.
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