征收权模式下的抵制行为研究
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摘要
在现有征收体制下,征地拆迁中的抵制问题己成为城市化过程中面临的突出难题。本文立足被征收者的视角,对征地拆迁过程中的抵制问题展开了科学研究。在详细分析征地拆迁抵制行为产生的社会背景,归纳征地拆迁抵制行为典型策略的基础上,本文通过对杭州被征收者进行一对一的问卷调查,研究抵制行为的具体现状,运用Binary Logistic模型找出影响征地拆迁抵制行为的主要因素,构建结构方程模型,分析征地拆迁抵制行为演化动态特征,并提出相关的政策建议。
在此研究的整体框架体系下,本文得出以下主要研究结论：
1.社会转型和结构变迁、民众权利利益意识觉醒、维稳体制、高房价与高生活成本,以及群众对社会的不满意和对部分政府的不信任情绪等综合构成了征地拆迁抵制事件不断发生、演化的社会情境。
2.征地拆迁中抵制行为的主要表达方式有：弱者化、合法化、媒介化、利益化、极端化等形式。其抵制行为虽带有一定对抗性质,但又常常使用边缘的、踩线不越线的行为。
3.人们对征地拆迁的意愿和预期是倾向于期盼。当前征地拆迁过程中出现的“钉子户”、“上访户”等抵制行为,很大部分并非源自他们认为政府对房子和土地的掠夺,更不具有“抗征政治”中的政治诉求,更多的是想在与政府的博弈过程中获得更多利益空间。
4.基于杭州抽样调查问卷的模型分析显示：基本个体特征、社会资本、社会保障、相关制度及社会背景等因素对征地拆迁抵制行为发生具有显著影响。
5.对于征地拆迁抵制行为的演化而言,制度性因素作为具体可见的诱因,其所具有的功能是,激活人们已积累起来的情绪。社会背景虽然并不必然导致各种征地拆迁抵制事件的爆发,但却作为一种源影响动力作用于社会公众,对其行为和心理产生重要影响,尤其是影响人们对征地拆迁制度政策的认知,进而推动抵制事件的发生及演化。风险感知除了直接影响了人们抵制行为产生,也会进一步影响人们对具体征地拆迁政策制度的判断,进而影响抵制行为发生及演化。
基于前文的详细分析,本文认为征地拆迁抵制行为的预防与治理应从完善征地拆迁制度；提高政府公信力；积极拓展社会资本构建多元化解决机制；塑造良好社会背景舆论等多方面展开。
Under the Eminent Domain, the hold out problem of land acquisition and demolition has become a difficult problem in the process of urbanization. Based on the theories and methods at home and abroad, this article research the hold out problem of land acquisition and demolition scientifically.The main contents of this article include:To Construct the research framework; to analyze the social background of the hold out problem of land acquisition and demolition; Combined with the case study, to conclude several typical strategies of the hold out behavior; to find out the main factors influencing the hold out behavior based on the Binary Logistic model; to analyze dynamic characteristics of behavioral evolution of the hold out behavior using structural equation model; to put forward some policy proposes based on research findings.
Study on the research framework, this paper presents the following conclusions:
1. The social context, which continue to occur the land acquisition and demolition boycott incidents, is constituted by social transformation and structural changes, the public awareness of the benefits awakening rights, the stability maintenance system, the high housing prices and the high cost of living, the dissatisfied with the community of the people, and the distrust amongst of some government.
2. Peoples'main expressions, of the holdout behavior in the land acquisition and demolition, are the weak, the rightful resistance, the exposure, the interest, and some specific strategies. The holdout behavior, which is a kind of act with certain against nature, usually uses some artifice, which is fringe or just step on the line do not cross the line.
3. Facing land acquisition and demolition, peoples'willing and expectations is inclined to look forward to. In the process of land acquisition and demolition, most of the holdout behaviors like "nail household","petition", are not because of the people believe the government is robbing the house and land. There is also not much political appeal of the "land acquisition counteractive politics". More time, they just want to get more interest space in the game with the government.
4. The model analysis which based on the sampling questionnaire in Hangzhou shows that individual basic characteristics, social capital, social security and related systems, social background etc. factors, have specific effects on the hold out behavior of land acquisition and demolition.
5. Institutional factor as a visible cause of the holdout behavior in land acquisition and demolition, which activates the accumulated emotion. The society background not bound to lead to all kinds of the hold out behaviors in the land acquisition and demolition, but as a kind of affective motive power acting on the people, and influence their action and mentality. Especially, it influences peoples' consideration to the land acquisition and demolition institutional policies, and then, promotes the the holdout accidents to happen and evolve. Risk perception not only influence peoples'behavior, but also influence peoples' judgment to the exact land acquisition and demolition institutional policies which may influence the hold out behavior happening and evolving as further. So, a few local governments choose all kinds of violent measures, such as verbal threats, interest threats, blowing petition, violent stop, to solute the holdout problem, which measures may reduce the holdout behavior during the land acquisition and demolition on the surface for their own safety and interests concerns., but can't avoid the effect of land acquisition and demolition in the root. Instead, they trigger widespread scepticism of land acquisition and demolition, and intensify contradictions.
Based on the detailed analysis, we draw the following conclusion that, the prevention and control of the hold out behavior in the land acquisition and demolition should unfold from Improving the land acquisition and demolition system, improving governmental credibility, expanding the social capital to build a diversified resolution mechanism, shaping good social public background opinion, and so on.
在此研究的整体框架体系下,本文得出以下主要研究结论：
1.社会转型和结构变迁、民众权利利益意识觉醒、维稳体制、高房价与高生活成本,以及群众对社会的不满意和对部分政府的不信任情绪等综合构成了征地拆迁抵制事件不断发生、演化的社会情境。
2.征地拆迁中抵制行为的主要表达方式有：弱者化、合法化、媒介化、利益化、极端化等形式。其抵制行为虽带有一定对抗性质,但又常常使用边缘的、踩线不越线的行为。
3.人们对征地拆迁的意愿和预期是倾向于期盼。当前征地拆迁过程中出现的“钉子户”、“上访户”等抵制行为,很大部分并非源自他们认为政府对房子和土地的掠夺,更不具有“抗征政治”中的政治诉求,更多的是想在与政府的博弈过程中获得更多利益空间。
4.基于杭州抽样调查问卷的模型分析显示：基本个体特征、社会资本、社会保障、相关制度及社会背景等因素对征地拆迁抵制行为发生具有显著影响。
5.对于征地拆迁抵制行为的演化而言,制度性因素作为具体可见的诱因,其所具有的功能是,激活人们已积累起来的情绪。社会背景虽然并不必然导致各种征地拆迁抵制事件的爆发,但却作为一种源影响动力作用于社会公众,对其行为和心理产生重要影响,尤其是影响人们对征地拆迁制度政策的认知,进而推动抵制事件的发生及演化。风险感知除了直接影响了人们抵制行为产生,也会进一步影响人们对具体征地拆迁政策制度的判断,进而影响抵制行为发生及演化。
基于前文的详细分析,本文认为征地拆迁抵制行为的预防与治理应从完善征地拆迁制度；提高政府公信力；积极拓展社会资本构建多元化解决机制；塑造良好社会背景舆论等多方面展开。
Under the Eminent Domain, the hold out problem of land acquisition and demolition has become a difficult problem in the process of urbanization. Based on the theories and methods at home and abroad, this article research the hold out problem of land acquisition and demolition scientifically.The main contents of this article include:To Construct the research framework; to analyze the social background of the hold out problem of land acquisition and demolition; Combined with the case study, to conclude several typical strategies of the hold out behavior; to find out the main factors influencing the hold out behavior based on the Binary Logistic model; to analyze dynamic characteristics of behavioral evolution of the hold out behavior using structural equation model; to put forward some policy proposes based on research findings.
Study on the research framework, this paper presents the following conclusions:
1. The social context, which continue to occur the land acquisition and demolition boycott incidents, is constituted by social transformation and structural changes, the public awareness of the benefits awakening rights, the stability maintenance system, the high housing prices and the high cost of living, the dissatisfied with the community of the people, and the distrust amongst of some government.
2. Peoples'main expressions, of the holdout behavior in the land acquisition and demolition, are the weak, the rightful resistance, the exposure, the interest, and some specific strategies. The holdout behavior, which is a kind of act with certain against nature, usually uses some artifice, which is fringe or just step on the line do not cross the line.
3. Facing land acquisition and demolition, peoples'willing and expectations is inclined to look forward to. In the process of land acquisition and demolition, most of the holdout behaviors like "nail household","petition", are not because of the people believe the government is robbing the house and land. There is also not much political appeal of the "land acquisition counteractive politics". More time, they just want to get more interest space in the game with the government.
4. The model analysis which based on the sampling questionnaire in Hangzhou shows that individual basic characteristics, social capital, social security and related systems, social background etc. factors, have specific effects on the hold out behavior of land acquisition and demolition.
5. Institutional factor as a visible cause of the holdout behavior in land acquisition and demolition, which activates the accumulated emotion. The society background not bound to lead to all kinds of the hold out behaviors in the land acquisition and demolition, but as a kind of affective motive power acting on the people, and influence their action and mentality. Especially, it influences peoples' consideration to the land acquisition and demolition institutional policies, and then, promotes the the holdout accidents to happen and evolve. Risk perception not only influence peoples'behavior, but also influence peoples' judgment to the exact land acquisition and demolition institutional policies which may influence the hold out behavior happening and evolving as further. So, a few local governments choose all kinds of violent measures, such as verbal threats, interest threats, blowing petition, violent stop, to solute the holdout problem, which measures may reduce the holdout behavior during the land acquisition and demolition on the surface for their own safety and interests concerns., but can't avoid the effect of land acquisition and demolition in the root. Instead, they trigger widespread scepticism of land acquisition and demolition, and intensify contradictions.
Based on the detailed analysis, we draw the following conclusion that, the prevention and control of the hold out behavior in the land acquisition and demolition should unfold from Improving the land acquisition and demolition system, improving governmental credibility, expanding the social capital to build a diversified resolution mechanism, shaping good social public background opinion, and so on.
引文
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