高科技企业经营者财务监控研究
|
摘要
高科技企业在全球范围内已迅速发展起来,成为重要的经济增长推动力量。由于高科技企业在技术、运作模式等方面所具备的特殊性,使得运用传统财务监控模式对高科技企业经营者财务监控的效果并不理想。一些资料显示高科技企业的发展除面临技术、市场、资金等外部风险之外,还面临着由经营者产生的内部风险。同时由于企业内部制度不健全、经营者的不善管理、以及监控不到位等因素,造成高科技企业核心技术人员流失,从而导致企业的核心竞争力下降,直接损害了股东、政府以及其他利益相关者的利益。本文从高科技企业经营者财务监控问题出发,探索财务监控主体监控模式、监控模型的构建以及监控环境的评价等领域内容,为高科技企业经营者舞弊行为监控提供核心技术和支撑环境,以便推动企业的健康稳定发展。
首先,本文对经营者财务舞弊问题的监控进行了框架性研究,把高科技企业经营者财务监控系统划分为主体系统、运行系统、环境系统三个子系统,并以此为基础构建了本文的研究框架。
其次,对三个子系统进行深入研究。主体系统方面,依据财务收益索取权,本文确定高科技企业的监控主体。通过对高科技企业发展过程中的融资方式、人力资本特征、以及政府功能比较分析,按照资金来源不同,提出了高科技企业监控主体系统的新型分阶段形态,即股权持有者、政府、人力资本所有者组成的的无借贷资本形态和由股权持有者、政府、人力资本持有者、债权人组成的有借贷资本形态。同时,引入不确定环境下的博弈模型作为监控主体间博弈分析的基本模型,提出确定政府代表作为博弈过程的调解员,由博弈分析得出使总体利益最大的最优策略。最后依据各个主体的特征构建了各个主体的监控模式。
再次,本文将环境系统定义为支撑主体系统与运行系统发挥作用的制度保障体系。在对前人研究分析的基础上,设计一组问券调查,并对问券调查结果进行了的分析,针对高科技企业的特征、选择有代表性的指标建立环境系统的评价指标体系,采用层次分析法确定指标的权重并以可拓学的多级物元作为基本概念,构建环境系统评价模型。最后以哈尔滨科力电力有限公司作为实证样本,对模型进行验证。验证发现,本文所建立的模型对高科技企业经营者有较好的评价效果,能有效的评价高科技企业经营者财务监控的环境系统。
最后,运行系统解决的是监控方法的问题,本文除了对现有的监控手段进行比较分析之外,构建了基于神经网络的适时监控系统。选择反映财务舞弊的指标,以大量的上市公司数据作为训练样本,培植出具有高分辨率的适时财务监控神经网络。通过对已有数据的验证,发现网络的有效分辨率达到94.3%。能较好的通过财务数据反映财务舞弊情况,提高监控主体的事前预判能力。
As the rapid development of high-tech enterprises in the word, it has become the main engine of economic increasing . Because of the uniqueness of high-tech enterprises’technology and operational mode, the traditional financial supervision mode is not suitable. Besides the external risks of technology, market and assets, high-tech enterprises alse face to internal risks caused by the operators. Datas show that due to the imperfections of the institutions, the poor management of operators and the lack of supervision, the core technical person leave frequently, which decreased the core competitiveness. And this damaged the benefits of shareholders, the govement and other stakeholders. This paper concentrated on studying the fiancial supervision system model, the model construction and supervision environment evaluation to improve the enterprise development.There are four parts in this paper.
Firstly, this paper research on the financial fraud supervising framework, and divides the financial supervision system into main system, operating system and environment system.
Secondly, the paper takes the right of benefits as the standard to build up the main system of high-tech enterprise. By analyzing of financing capital, human capital and govement function during the develop process of high-tech enterprise, the paper develops the stage model of the main system includeing non-loan capital—contains of shareholders, govement and human capital holders, and loan capital—contains of shareholders, govement, human capital holders and creditors. By introduction of the game under uncertain environment as a basic model, the paper points out that the operators determine the mediation process to achieve strategy of maximize profits. Then we construct the main system supervising model based on main characteristic of each stage.
Thirdly, in the environment system part, the paper defines the environment syetem as instituations security system to support the main system and operating syetem. According to previous research and the high-tech enterprises characteristics, making a set of questionnaire to environment system of the high-tech enterprises, we select some respective indexes to construct the evluation indexes system of environment system. Then this paper uses AHP to fix the weights and build up the environment evluation system model based on the multilevel matter element of comprehensive extension evaluation.we choose Harbin Keli electrical company as a demonstration to verify the model. The results show that the model has a good effect on the environment system estimation of high-tech enterprise.
Finally, the operating syetem can resolve the problem of supervision method. By compared analysis of existing financial supervising, this paper constructs the real time supervision system based on neural network. Then we selected financial fraud indicator, based on the training samples of listed companies, and constructed a timely financial supervision neural nerwork which was effective. Past data show that the network differentiates the financial fraud from the financial date at an effective rate of 94.3%. And the nueral network can also improve the prior predict capacity of supervision main.
首先,本文对经营者财务舞弊问题的监控进行了框架性研究,把高科技企业经营者财务监控系统划分为主体系统、运行系统、环境系统三个子系统,并以此为基础构建了本文的研究框架。
其次,对三个子系统进行深入研究。主体系统方面,依据财务收益索取权,本文确定高科技企业的监控主体。通过对高科技企业发展过程中的融资方式、人力资本特征、以及政府功能比较分析,按照资金来源不同,提出了高科技企业监控主体系统的新型分阶段形态,即股权持有者、政府、人力资本所有者组成的的无借贷资本形态和由股权持有者、政府、人力资本持有者、债权人组成的有借贷资本形态。同时,引入不确定环境下的博弈模型作为监控主体间博弈分析的基本模型,提出确定政府代表作为博弈过程的调解员,由博弈分析得出使总体利益最大的最优策略。最后依据各个主体的特征构建了各个主体的监控模式。
再次,本文将环境系统定义为支撑主体系统与运行系统发挥作用的制度保障体系。在对前人研究分析的基础上,设计一组问券调查,并对问券调查结果进行了的分析,针对高科技企业的特征、选择有代表性的指标建立环境系统的评价指标体系,采用层次分析法确定指标的权重并以可拓学的多级物元作为基本概念,构建环境系统评价模型。最后以哈尔滨科力电力有限公司作为实证样本,对模型进行验证。验证发现,本文所建立的模型对高科技企业经营者有较好的评价效果,能有效的评价高科技企业经营者财务监控的环境系统。
最后,运行系统解决的是监控方法的问题,本文除了对现有的监控手段进行比较分析之外,构建了基于神经网络的适时监控系统。选择反映财务舞弊的指标,以大量的上市公司数据作为训练样本,培植出具有高分辨率的适时财务监控神经网络。通过对已有数据的验证,发现网络的有效分辨率达到94.3%。能较好的通过财务数据反映财务舞弊情况,提高监控主体的事前预判能力。
As the rapid development of high-tech enterprises in the word, it has become the main engine of economic increasing . Because of the uniqueness of high-tech enterprises’technology and operational mode, the traditional financial supervision mode is not suitable. Besides the external risks of technology, market and assets, high-tech enterprises alse face to internal risks caused by the operators. Datas show that due to the imperfections of the institutions, the poor management of operators and the lack of supervision, the core technical person leave frequently, which decreased the core competitiveness. And this damaged the benefits of shareholders, the govement and other stakeholders. This paper concentrated on studying the fiancial supervision system model, the model construction and supervision environment evaluation to improve the enterprise development.There are four parts in this paper.
Firstly, this paper research on the financial fraud supervising framework, and divides the financial supervision system into main system, operating system and environment system.
Secondly, the paper takes the right of benefits as the standard to build up the main system of high-tech enterprise. By analyzing of financing capital, human capital and govement function during the develop process of high-tech enterprise, the paper develops the stage model of the main system includeing non-loan capital—contains of shareholders, govement and human capital holders, and loan capital—contains of shareholders, govement, human capital holders and creditors. By introduction of the game under uncertain environment as a basic model, the paper points out that the operators determine the mediation process to achieve strategy of maximize profits. Then we construct the main system supervising model based on main characteristic of each stage.
Thirdly, in the environment system part, the paper defines the environment syetem as instituations security system to support the main system and operating syetem. According to previous research and the high-tech enterprises characteristics, making a set of questionnaire to environment system of the high-tech enterprises, we select some respective indexes to construct the evluation indexes system of environment system. Then this paper uses AHP to fix the weights and build up the environment evluation system model based on the multilevel matter element of comprehensive extension evaluation.we choose Harbin Keli electrical company as a demonstration to verify the model. The results show that the model has a good effect on the environment system estimation of high-tech enterprise.
Finally, the operating syetem can resolve the problem of supervision method. By compared analysis of existing financial supervising, this paper constructs the real time supervision system based on neural network. Then we selected financial fraud indicator, based on the training samples of listed companies, and constructed a timely financial supervision neural nerwork which was effective. Past data show that the network differentiates the financial fraud from the financial date at an effective rate of 94.3%. And the nueral network can also improve the prior predict capacity of supervision main.
引文
1张宇星,胡国良.我国国有高新技术企业薪酬制度对策研究.现代管理科学. 2006, ( 10): 94-95
2刘志彪,陈柳.论创业雇员的进入行为与竞争政策.经济研究. 2006, (1): 57-64
3王砚书.我国上市公司内部财务监控机制若干问题探讨.中央财经大学学报. 2004, (5): 70-76
4金永红,奚玉芹,张立.风险投资与中小高科技企业R&D融资研究.上海企业. 2006, (7): 36-38
5张慧一.风险投资与高科技企业的相关分析.现代商业. 2007, (17): 43-44
6惠调艳,杨乃定.工作满意度与绩效关系研究.中国软科学. 2006, (4): 66-69
7 G. Guimaraes. Temporal Knowledge Discovery for Multivariate Time Series with Enhanced Self-Organizing Maps. Proceedings of the IEEE-INNS-ENNS International Joint Conference on Neural Networks. 2000: 165-170
8龚艳萍,隋月红.价值链管理研究的新发展.现代管理科学2006, ( 4). 82-84
9高闯,邵剑兵:高科技企业的资本构成及其治理结构——一个基于资产专用性理论的分析框架.经济管理. 2001, (24): 10-16
10朱武祥.高科技企业法律所有权与价值驱动因素控制权分离及公司治理问题.管理世界. 2002, (4): 115-121
11舒尔茨.论人力资本投资.北京经济学院出版社, 1990
12 Stigle. G, and C. Friedman, "The Literature of Economics, The Case of Berle and Means". Journal of Law and Economics. 1983, (26): 237-268
13田银华,李莉,暨朝满.我国高科技企业的权力结构与治理机制研究——基于企业生命周期的视角.中国民营科技与经济. 2007, (1): 91-95
14杨颖,张纯纯,王辉.经营者道德风险行为的收益与成本分析.中国乡镇企业会计. 2007, (2): 94-95
15 Pakes, A, and S Nitzan. Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of Rivalenterprises. Journal of Labor Economics. 1983, (1): 345-365
16 Andrew E, and Ted, T. Can Reduced Entry Barriers Worsen Market Performance: A Model of Employee Entry. International, Journal of Industrial Organization. 2001, (19): 695-704
17李思平.高科技风险企业的委托代理关系与激励约束机制.暨南大学经济学院出版社, 2006, (1): 42-44
18李斌,吴桂珍等.代理成本与资本结构分析.数量经济技术经济研究. 2002, (2): 44-47
19陈晓红,王小丁,曾江洪.高管薪酬激励方式对中小企业成长性的影响——基于分解法视角的实证研究.经济问题探索. 2007, (3): 150-155
20 Balkin, David B, and Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. Compensation Practices in High-Technology Industries, The Personnel Administrator, Berea: 1985, 30 (6): 111
21曹兴,曾欣荣.高新技术企业薪酬体系设计原则分析.硬质合金. 2002, (4): 244-247
22龙文滨.论股票期权制在我国高科技企业的适用性:微软公司以股权换期权计划的原因探析.管理现代化. 2005, (2): 8-11
23刘渝林,曾国平.试析资本资产定价模型在人力资本定价中的应用.财经问题研究. 2002, (4): 60-64
24 Core J, R. Holthausen, and D. Larcker. Corporate Governance. Chief Executive Officer Compensation and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics. 1999, (51): 371-406
25 Sloan Richard G. Financial Accounting and Corporate Governance: A Discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2001: 335-347
26 Holthausen, Larcker, Sloan. Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 1995, 19 (1): 29-74
27 S. Poshakwale, J. Courtis. Disclosure Level and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from the Banking Industry. Managerial and Decision Economics, 2005, 26(7): 431-444
28 Borokhovich Parmo and Trapany. Trapa outside Directors and CEO Selection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 1996, (9): 337~355
29 Crutchley E. Claire, et al. An Examination of Board Stability and the Long 2 term Performance of Initial Public Offerings. Financial Management 2002, (Auturmn): 63-90
30 Richard M. Cyert, Sok-Hyon Kang, Praveen Kumar. Corporate Governance. Takeovers and Top-Management Compensation. Theory and Evidence. Management Science. 2002, (4): 453-469
31 Noel O Sullivan. The impact of Board Composition and Ownership on Audit Quality. Evidence from Large UK Companies. British Accounting Review. 2000, 32 (4): 397-414
32 Joseph. E. Stilitz约瑟夫.斯蒂格利兹.经济学(中译本).中国人民大学出版社, 2005: 356-364
33 Tricker, R. I. Corporate Governance, Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1984, (4): 236-252
34李豫湘,甘霖.中国上市公司各种主体治理机制的相关性和有效性实证研究.系统工程理论与实践. 2004, (6): 33-40
35汤谷良.财务控制新论.财经研究. 2000, (3): 115
36李心合.利益相关者与公司财务控制.财经研究. 2001, (9): 57-63
37于东智,池国华.董事会规模?稳定性与公司绩效:理论与经验分析.经济研究. 2004, (4): 70-79
38杨瑞龙,周业安.企业利益相关者理论及其应用.经济科学出版社, 2000.
9: 325-337
39李维安.如何构造适合国情的公司治理监控机制——论我国监事会的功能定位.当代经济科学. 2002, (3): 43-47
40赵黎鲲,赵艳灵,王静.财务控制论.北方经济(学术版). 2006, (6): 54-55
41韩东平,张慧江.基于原型化方法的利益相关者共同治理机制的设计.学术交流. 2005, (5): 85-88
42张洪石,付玉秀.创业投资中的委托代理冲突与缓解机制研究.技术经济. 2004, (12): 40-42
43唐明哲.如何进行风险投资的理性决策——风险投资利润评价函数的引入.复旦学报(社会科学版). 2001, (1): 85-89
44熊风华.高新技术企业人力资本激励机制研究.企业研究. 2007, (1):76-77
45 William T. Dickens, Lawrence F. Katz, Kvin Long, Lawrence H. Summers. Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle. Journal of Labor Economics. 1989, (3): 331-347
46 Bennedsen Morten, Wolfenzon Daniel. The balances of Power Inclose Corporations. Washington D. C, Havard University. 1999, (6): 112-132
47 Lee. Fleming, and Matt. Marx. N0-competes and Regional Inventor Mobility. Haward Business School. Working Paper. 2005: 213-221
48 Agrawal A, Knoeber C. Firm Performance & Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis. 1996, 31 (3): 377-398
49宋建波.企业会计控制原理及应用.中国财政经济出版社, 2001: 63-88
50阎达五,宋健波.双元控制主体构架下现代企业会计控制的新思考.会计研究. 2000, (3): 2-6
51王砚书.我国上市公司内部财务监控机制若干问题探讨.中央财经大学学报. 2004, (5): 70-76
52伍中信,肖美英.信息?产权与博弈.会计监控的经济学.会计研究. 1997, (12): 14-17
53李豫湘,杜莉,彭正新.上市公司股权集中的适度性对治理效率的影响.重庆大学学报. 2002, (11): 23-26
54黄渝祥,孙艳,邵颖红,王树娟.股权制衡与公司治理研究.同济大学学报. 2003, (9): 102-106
55刘红娟,陈永忠,刘红刚.大股东特征与董事会结构关系的实证分析.统计观察. 2004, (7): 34-35
56张慧,张茂德.债务结构?企业绩效与上市公司治理问题的实证研究.改革. 2003, (5): 77-81
57衣龙新,何武强.财务治理的涵义与相关范畴辨析.四川会计. 2003, (10): 9
58刘兵.企业经营者激励制约理论与实务.天津大学出版社, 2002: 30-43
59唐清泉.企业中的代理问题与信息管理.中国财政经济出版社, 2002: 6-32
60刘松林,肖建军,蒋瑛.论国有企业经营行为的财务控制.时代财会. 2001, (6): 28-30
61刘茂松,周婷.中国人才中介组织发展模式研究.湖湘论坛. 2007, 20 (3): 66-68.
62熊义杰,姜江.企业家队伍职业化建设.现代企业. 2006, (12): 38-39
63赵国庆.我国企业家职业化的障碍分析.中国工业经济. 1997, (4): 66-68
64吴淑琨,刘忠明,范建强.非执行董事与公司绩效的实证研究.中国工业经济. 2001, (9): 69-76
65谈毅,冯宗宪.高新技术风险投资过程中监控模式设计.中国软科学. 2000, (2): 67-70
66邱华炳,庞任平.风险投资交易设计研究.财经论丛. 2000, (9): 65-71
67张泽一,周常兰.高科技企业人力资本激励制度的探讨.集团经济研究. 2007, (10S): 340
68陈红川.关于高新技术企业的产权制度创新的思考.商场现代化. 2007, (03Z): 103-104
69 Diamond, Douglas W. and Robert E. Verrecchia,“Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital”. Journal of Finance. September 1991, 46 (4): 1325-1359
70 Leuz. C, Verrecchia. R. The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research in Press. 2000, (38): 73-79
71 J. Graham, C. Harvey, S. Rajgopal. The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2005, 40(1-3): 3-73
72 Holthausen, Larcker, Sloan. Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 1995, 19 (1): 129-174
73 Garry D. Bruton, David Ahistrom, Kuang S. Yeh, 2004‘Understanding Venture Capital in East Asian: the Impact of Institutions on the Industry Today and Tomorrow’. 2004, (39): 72-88
74 N. Garleanu, L. Pedersen. Adverse Selection and the Required Return. Review of Financial Studies, 2004, 17(3): 643-666
75 Lowell. W. Busenitz, James. O. Fiet, Douglas D. Moesel: Reconsidering the Venture Capitalists“Value Added”Proposition: An Interorganizational Learning Perspective. Journal of Business Venturing. 2004, (19): 787-807
76 Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan, Jonathan Linton: The relationship between Governance Structure and Risk Management Approaches in Japanese Venture Capital Firms. Journal of Business Venturing. 2004. (19): 831-849
77 Core, J. E, W. R. Guay, and R. E. Verrecchia, Price vs. Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts, The Accounting Review. 2003, (4): 957-981
78 Jay Pil Choi, Marcel Thum. The Dynamics of Corruption with the Ratchet Effect. Journal of Public Economics . 2003, (87): 427-443
79 Balkin. D. B, Swift. M. Top Management Team Compensation in High-Growth Technology Ventures. Human Resource Management Review, 2006, (16): 1-11
80 Anil Arya, John Fellingham, Jonathan Glover, K. Sivaramakrishnan. Capital Budgeting, the Hold-up Problem, and Information System Design. Management Science. 2000, 46 (2): 205-216
81 Robert M. Bushman, Abbie J. Smith. Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2001, 32 (12): 237-333
82 T. Dvorrak. Do Domestic Investors Have an Information Advantage? Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Finance. 2005, 60(2): 817-839
83 R. Lambert, C. Leuz, R. Verrecchia. Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital. University of Pennsylvania working paper, 2005, http://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/Delivery. cfm/SSRN_ID823504_code18004. pdf
84唐家海,侯艳丽,宋武斌.对实时财务监控目标的探析.商场现代化. 2007. (06S):373
85李维安,程新生.公司治理评价及其数据库建设.中国会计评论. 2005, 3(2): 387-400
86傅元略.适时财务监控机制的涵义?特性及结构.厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版). 2003, (2): 107-113
87傅元略.价值管理的新方法:基于价值流的战略管理会计.会计研究. 2004, (6): 48-52
88 Alman E I, Financial Ratios . Discrminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankmptcy. Journal of Finance. 1998
89 Tony Van Gestel. Each Bayesian Kernel Based Classification for Financial Distress Detection Emopean. Journal of Operational Research. 2006, (10): 54-57
90周首华.论财务危机预警分析—F分数模式.会计研究. 1990, (5): 35-37
91张玲,曾志坚.上市公司重组绩效的评价及财务困境预测实证研究.管理评论. 2003, 15(5): 48-51
92毛政珍. Excel在财务危机预警分析中的应用.财会通讯. 2007, (2): 70-71
93 Benzing, Cythia. Using Discriminanl Analysis to Predict Financial Distress. International Advances in Economic Research. 2000, (6): 591-593
94 Niculescu, Stefan P. Artificial Neural Networks and Genetic Algorithms inOSAR. Journal of Molecular Structure. 2003, 622 (1-2): 71-83
95 Eunju Kim A, Wooju Kim B, Yillbyung Lee. Combination of Multiple Classifiers for the Customer, s Purchase Behavior Prediction. Decision Support Systems. 2002, 34 (2): 167-175
96刘春林,彭纪生.基于专利期限的技术创新激励模型研究.科研管理. 2004, 25 (1): 29-33
97 Christ of Beuselinck, Marc Deloof. Sophie Manigart: Venture Capital, Private Equity and Earning Quality. Vlerick Leuven Gent Working Paper Series. 2004, (2): 75-81
98于长春.弥补国有企业出资人财务监督缺位的几个问题.会计研究. 2003, (6): 2-7
99李平,唐小我.基于委托代理模型的企业年薪制研究.南京理工大学学报. 2004, 28 (2): 212-215
100徐玖平,陈书建.不对称信息下风险投资的委托代理模型研究.系统工程理论与实践. 2004: 19-24
101黄健柏,钟美瑞.解雇威胁条件下的经营者风险分担与激励设计.中国管理科学. 2005, 13 (4): 87-94
102常民庆,张永辉.高科技企业的生命阶段?风险及融资特征.经营与管理. 2005, (6): 32-33
103 Balkin. D. B, Swift. M. Top Management Team Compensation in High-Growth Technology Ventures. Human Resource Management Review, 2006, 16: 1-11
104任佩瑜,宋伟,张莉.论管理墒?管理耗散结构与我国企业文化的重塑. 四川大学学报. 2000, (4): 75-79
105胡实秋,宋化民.高技术产业发展的系统动力学研究.科技进步与对策. 2001, 10: 121-125
106罗成汉.基于MATLAB神经网络工具箱的BP网络实现. 2004, (5): 109-111
107魏海坤.神经网络结构设计的理论与方法国防工业出版社, 2005, 2: 97-111
108 Prendergast. C. The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature. 1999, 37 (3): 7-63
109 Dixit, A. Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector. The Journal ofHuman Resource. 2002, 37(4): 696-727
110毛刚.非营利组织团队激励机制.西南交通大学学报. 2004, 39 (1): 56-60
111王艳,孙培源.杨忠直.经理层过渡投资与股权激励的契约模型研究.中国管理科学. 2005, 13(1): 127-131
112 Gibbons, Robert. Incentives between Firms (and Within). Management Science, 2005, 51(1): 2-17
113韩建军,郭耀煌,蓝敏.基于不对称信息的代理人私自交易及管制.西南交通大学学报. 2004, 39(4): 521-524
114油晓峰.基于共同治理的管理者财务激励模型研究.中国软科学. 2007, 11(10):143-148
115程新生.企业财务系统的运行与演变.财会月刊(理论版)2007, ( 2):70-72
116程新生,王薇,尹芳.公司财务监控系统治理绩效的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的证据.管理评论. 2007, 19(7): 33-37
117程新生.公司治理中的内部控制.会计之友. 2006, (12S): 4-5
118 Vesa Kanniainen, Christian Keuschnigg: Start-up Investment with Scarce Venture Capital supporting. Journal of Banking & Finance. 2004, (28): 1939-1959
119 Rachel M. Hayes. Scott Schaefer. Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance. BAND Journal of Economics. 2000: 243-251
120杨珊华.加强我国国有企业内部控制的建设的若干建议.商业会计. 2005, (20): 23-24
121陈传永.现代企业激励理论分析框架构建.企业管理. 2007, (2):46-47
122毕茜,刘娜.对经理人激励理论与实践的重新思考.现代财经. 2007, (8): 41-44
123蒲勇健.植入“公平博弈”的委托-代理模型当代财经. 2007, (3): 5-11
124阿德里安.卡德伯里(Adrian Cadbury),陈海威唐艳辉/译.公司治理和董事会主席:仁智之见,北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2005: 105-111
125徐金海.公司治理结构与独立董事制度.江南大学学报:人文社会科学版, 2004, (2): 74-77
126吴有玉.代理问题的行为经济学分析.武汉:武汉大学经济学院. 2005: 66-69
127蒋晓荣,崔影慧.民营高科技企业组织文化建设探析.企业管理. 2005,(8):194-195.
128李国红.企业财务管理制度规范化与创新性初探.会计之友. 2006, (10):70-71
129胡嘉将.计算机财务监控研究.财会月刊. 2003(9): 24
130陈柏福.国有企业经营者的市场声誉模型研究.财经理论与实践. 2007, (3): 103-107
131唐家海,候艳丽.对实时财务监控目标的探析.商场现代化. 2007, (6): 373
132 Juan Florin: Is Venture Capital Worth it? Effects on firm Performance and Founder Returns. Journal of Business Venturing. 2005, (20): 113-135
133王泽霞.识别上市公司管理舞弊之预警信号.上海三联书店. 2007, (5): 22-25
2刘志彪,陈柳.论创业雇员的进入行为与竞争政策.经济研究. 2006, (1): 57-64
3王砚书.我国上市公司内部财务监控机制若干问题探讨.中央财经大学学报. 2004, (5): 70-76
4金永红,奚玉芹,张立.风险投资与中小高科技企业R&D融资研究.上海企业. 2006, (7): 36-38
5张慧一.风险投资与高科技企业的相关分析.现代商业. 2007, (17): 43-44
6惠调艳,杨乃定.工作满意度与绩效关系研究.中国软科学. 2006, (4): 66-69
7 G. Guimaraes. Temporal Knowledge Discovery for Multivariate Time Series with Enhanced Self-Organizing Maps. Proceedings of the IEEE-INNS-ENNS International Joint Conference on Neural Networks. 2000: 165-170
8龚艳萍,隋月红.价值链管理研究的新发展.现代管理科学2006, ( 4). 82-84
9高闯,邵剑兵:高科技企业的资本构成及其治理结构——一个基于资产专用性理论的分析框架.经济管理. 2001, (24): 10-16
10朱武祥.高科技企业法律所有权与价值驱动因素控制权分离及公司治理问题.管理世界. 2002, (4): 115-121
11舒尔茨.论人力资本投资.北京经济学院出版社, 1990
12 Stigle. G, and C. Friedman, "The Literature of Economics, The Case of Berle and Means". Journal of Law and Economics. 1983, (26): 237-268
13田银华,李莉,暨朝满.我国高科技企业的权力结构与治理机制研究——基于企业生命周期的视角.中国民营科技与经济. 2007, (1): 91-95
14杨颖,张纯纯,王辉.经营者道德风险行为的收益与成本分析.中国乡镇企业会计. 2007, (2): 94-95
15 Pakes, A, and S Nitzan. Optimum Contracts for Research Personnel, Research Employment, and the Establishment of Rivalenterprises. Journal of Labor Economics. 1983, (1): 345-365
16 Andrew E, and Ted, T. Can Reduced Entry Barriers Worsen Market Performance: A Model of Employee Entry. International, Journal of Industrial Organization. 2001, (19): 695-704
17李思平.高科技风险企业的委托代理关系与激励约束机制.暨南大学经济学院出版社, 2006, (1): 42-44
18李斌,吴桂珍等.代理成本与资本结构分析.数量经济技术经济研究. 2002, (2): 44-47
19陈晓红,王小丁,曾江洪.高管薪酬激励方式对中小企业成长性的影响——基于分解法视角的实证研究.经济问题探索. 2007, (3): 150-155
20 Balkin, David B, and Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. Compensation Practices in High-Technology Industries, The Personnel Administrator, Berea: 1985, 30 (6): 111
21曹兴,曾欣荣.高新技术企业薪酬体系设计原则分析.硬质合金. 2002, (4): 244-247
22龙文滨.论股票期权制在我国高科技企业的适用性:微软公司以股权换期权计划的原因探析.管理现代化. 2005, (2): 8-11
23刘渝林,曾国平.试析资本资产定价模型在人力资本定价中的应用.财经问题研究. 2002, (4): 60-64
24 Core J, R. Holthausen, and D. Larcker. Corporate Governance. Chief Executive Officer Compensation and Firm Performance. Journal of Financial Economics. 1999, (51): 371-406
25 Sloan Richard G. Financial Accounting and Corporate Governance: A Discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2001: 335-347
26 Holthausen, Larcker, Sloan. Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 1995, 19 (1): 29-74
27 S. Poshakwale, J. Courtis. Disclosure Level and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from the Banking Industry. Managerial and Decision Economics, 2005, 26(7): 431-444
28 Borokhovich Parmo and Trapany. Trapa outside Directors and CEO Selection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 1996, (9): 337~355
29 Crutchley E. Claire, et al. An Examination of Board Stability and the Long 2 term Performance of Initial Public Offerings. Financial Management 2002, (Auturmn): 63-90
30 Richard M. Cyert, Sok-Hyon Kang, Praveen Kumar. Corporate Governance. Takeovers and Top-Management Compensation. Theory and Evidence. Management Science. 2002, (4): 453-469
31 Noel O Sullivan. The impact of Board Composition and Ownership on Audit Quality. Evidence from Large UK Companies. British Accounting Review. 2000, 32 (4): 397-414
32 Joseph. E. Stilitz约瑟夫.斯蒂格利兹.经济学(中译本).中国人民大学出版社, 2005: 356-364
33 Tricker, R. I. Corporate Governance, Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1984, (4): 236-252
34李豫湘,甘霖.中国上市公司各种主体治理机制的相关性和有效性实证研究.系统工程理论与实践. 2004, (6): 33-40
35汤谷良.财务控制新论.财经研究. 2000, (3): 115
36李心合.利益相关者与公司财务控制.财经研究. 2001, (9): 57-63
37于东智,池国华.董事会规模?稳定性与公司绩效:理论与经验分析.经济研究. 2004, (4): 70-79
38杨瑞龙,周业安.企业利益相关者理论及其应用.经济科学出版社, 2000.
9: 325-337
39李维安.如何构造适合国情的公司治理监控机制——论我国监事会的功能定位.当代经济科学. 2002, (3): 43-47
40赵黎鲲,赵艳灵,王静.财务控制论.北方经济(学术版). 2006, (6): 54-55
41韩东平,张慧江.基于原型化方法的利益相关者共同治理机制的设计.学术交流. 2005, (5): 85-88
42张洪石,付玉秀.创业投资中的委托代理冲突与缓解机制研究.技术经济. 2004, (12): 40-42
43唐明哲.如何进行风险投资的理性决策——风险投资利润评价函数的引入.复旦学报(社会科学版). 2001, (1): 85-89
44熊风华.高新技术企业人力资本激励机制研究.企业研究. 2007, (1):76-77
45 William T. Dickens, Lawrence F. Katz, Kvin Long, Lawrence H. Summers. Employee Crime and the Monitoring Puzzle. Journal of Labor Economics. 1989, (3): 331-347
46 Bennedsen Morten, Wolfenzon Daniel. The balances of Power Inclose Corporations. Washington D. C, Havard University. 1999, (6): 112-132
47 Lee. Fleming, and Matt. Marx. N0-competes and Regional Inventor Mobility. Haward Business School. Working Paper. 2005: 213-221
48 Agrawal A, Knoeber C. Firm Performance & Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis. 1996, 31 (3): 377-398
49宋建波.企业会计控制原理及应用.中国财政经济出版社, 2001: 63-88
50阎达五,宋健波.双元控制主体构架下现代企业会计控制的新思考.会计研究. 2000, (3): 2-6
51王砚书.我国上市公司内部财务监控机制若干问题探讨.中央财经大学学报. 2004, (5): 70-76
52伍中信,肖美英.信息?产权与博弈.会计监控的经济学.会计研究. 1997, (12): 14-17
53李豫湘,杜莉,彭正新.上市公司股权集中的适度性对治理效率的影响.重庆大学学报. 2002, (11): 23-26
54黄渝祥,孙艳,邵颖红,王树娟.股权制衡与公司治理研究.同济大学学报. 2003, (9): 102-106
55刘红娟,陈永忠,刘红刚.大股东特征与董事会结构关系的实证分析.统计观察. 2004, (7): 34-35
56张慧,张茂德.债务结构?企业绩效与上市公司治理问题的实证研究.改革. 2003, (5): 77-81
57衣龙新,何武强.财务治理的涵义与相关范畴辨析.四川会计. 2003, (10): 9
58刘兵.企业经营者激励制约理论与实务.天津大学出版社, 2002: 30-43
59唐清泉.企业中的代理问题与信息管理.中国财政经济出版社, 2002: 6-32
60刘松林,肖建军,蒋瑛.论国有企业经营行为的财务控制.时代财会. 2001, (6): 28-30
61刘茂松,周婷.中国人才中介组织发展模式研究.湖湘论坛. 2007, 20 (3): 66-68.
62熊义杰,姜江.企业家队伍职业化建设.现代企业. 2006, (12): 38-39
63赵国庆.我国企业家职业化的障碍分析.中国工业经济. 1997, (4): 66-68
64吴淑琨,刘忠明,范建强.非执行董事与公司绩效的实证研究.中国工业经济. 2001, (9): 69-76
65谈毅,冯宗宪.高新技术风险投资过程中监控模式设计.中国软科学. 2000, (2): 67-70
66邱华炳,庞任平.风险投资交易设计研究.财经论丛. 2000, (9): 65-71
67张泽一,周常兰.高科技企业人力资本激励制度的探讨.集团经济研究. 2007, (10S): 340
68陈红川.关于高新技术企业的产权制度创新的思考.商场现代化. 2007, (03Z): 103-104
69 Diamond, Douglas W. and Robert E. Verrecchia,“Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital”. Journal of Finance. September 1991, 46 (4): 1325-1359
70 Leuz. C, Verrecchia. R. The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research in Press. 2000, (38): 73-79
71 J. Graham, C. Harvey, S. Rajgopal. The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2005, 40(1-3): 3-73
72 Holthausen, Larcker, Sloan. Annual Bonus Schemes and the Manipulation of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 1995, 19 (1): 129-174
73 Garry D. Bruton, David Ahistrom, Kuang S. Yeh, 2004‘Understanding Venture Capital in East Asian: the Impact of Institutions on the Industry Today and Tomorrow’. 2004, (39): 72-88
74 N. Garleanu, L. Pedersen. Adverse Selection and the Required Return. Review of Financial Studies, 2004, 17(3): 643-666
75 Lowell. W. Busenitz, James. O. Fiet, Douglas D. Moesel: Reconsidering the Venture Capitalists“Value Added”Proposition: An Interorganizational Learning Perspective. Journal of Business Venturing. 2004, (19): 787-807
76 Toru Yoshikawa, Phillip H. Phan, Jonathan Linton: The relationship between Governance Structure and Risk Management Approaches in Japanese Venture Capital Firms. Journal of Business Venturing. 2004. (19): 831-849
77 Core, J. E, W. R. Guay, and R. E. Verrecchia, Price vs. Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts, The Accounting Review. 2003, (4): 957-981
78 Jay Pil Choi, Marcel Thum. The Dynamics of Corruption with the Ratchet Effect. Journal of Public Economics . 2003, (87): 427-443
79 Balkin. D. B, Swift. M. Top Management Team Compensation in High-Growth Technology Ventures. Human Resource Management Review, 2006, (16): 1-11
80 Anil Arya, John Fellingham, Jonathan Glover, K. Sivaramakrishnan. Capital Budgeting, the Hold-up Problem, and Information System Design. Management Science. 2000, 46 (2): 205-216
81 Robert M. Bushman, Abbie J. Smith. Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 2001, 32 (12): 237-333
82 T. Dvorrak. Do Domestic Investors Have an Information Advantage? Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Finance. 2005, 60(2): 817-839
83 R. Lambert, C. Leuz, R. Verrecchia. Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital. University of Pennsylvania working paper, 2005, http://papers. ssrn. com/sol3/Delivery. cfm/SSRN_ID823504_code18004. pdf
84唐家海,侯艳丽,宋武斌.对实时财务监控目标的探析.商场现代化. 2007. (06S):373
85李维安,程新生.公司治理评价及其数据库建设.中国会计评论. 2005, 3(2): 387-400
86傅元略.适时财务监控机制的涵义?特性及结构.厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版). 2003, (2): 107-113
87傅元略.价值管理的新方法:基于价值流的战略管理会计.会计研究. 2004, (6): 48-52
88 Alman E I, Financial Ratios . Discrminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankmptcy. Journal of Finance. 1998
89 Tony Van Gestel. Each Bayesian Kernel Based Classification for Financial Distress Detection Emopean. Journal of Operational Research. 2006, (10): 54-57
90周首华.论财务危机预警分析—F分数模式.会计研究. 1990, (5): 35-37
91张玲,曾志坚.上市公司重组绩效的评价及财务困境预测实证研究.管理评论. 2003, 15(5): 48-51
92毛政珍. Excel在财务危机预警分析中的应用.财会通讯. 2007, (2): 70-71
93 Benzing, Cythia. Using Discriminanl Analysis to Predict Financial Distress. International Advances in Economic Research. 2000, (6): 591-593
94 Niculescu, Stefan P. Artificial Neural Networks and Genetic Algorithms inOSAR. Journal of Molecular Structure. 2003, 622 (1-2): 71-83
95 Eunju Kim A, Wooju Kim B, Yillbyung Lee. Combination of Multiple Classifiers for the Customer, s Purchase Behavior Prediction. Decision Support Systems. 2002, 34 (2): 167-175
96刘春林,彭纪生.基于专利期限的技术创新激励模型研究.科研管理. 2004, 25 (1): 29-33
97 Christ of Beuselinck, Marc Deloof. Sophie Manigart: Venture Capital, Private Equity and Earning Quality. Vlerick Leuven Gent Working Paper Series. 2004, (2): 75-81
98于长春.弥补国有企业出资人财务监督缺位的几个问题.会计研究. 2003, (6): 2-7
99李平,唐小我.基于委托代理模型的企业年薪制研究.南京理工大学学报. 2004, 28 (2): 212-215
100徐玖平,陈书建.不对称信息下风险投资的委托代理模型研究.系统工程理论与实践. 2004: 19-24
101黄健柏,钟美瑞.解雇威胁条件下的经营者风险分担与激励设计.中国管理科学. 2005, 13 (4): 87-94
102常民庆,张永辉.高科技企业的生命阶段?风险及融资特征.经营与管理. 2005, (6): 32-33
103 Balkin. D. B, Swift. M. Top Management Team Compensation in High-Growth Technology Ventures. Human Resource Management Review, 2006, 16: 1-11
104任佩瑜,宋伟,张莉.论管理墒?管理耗散结构与我国企业文化的重塑. 四川大学学报. 2000, (4): 75-79
105胡实秋,宋化民.高技术产业发展的系统动力学研究.科技进步与对策. 2001, 10: 121-125
106罗成汉.基于MATLAB神经网络工具箱的BP网络实现. 2004, (5): 109-111
107魏海坤.神经网络结构设计的理论与方法国防工业出版社, 2005, 2: 97-111
108 Prendergast. C. The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature. 1999, 37 (3): 7-63
109 Dixit, A. Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector. The Journal ofHuman Resource. 2002, 37(4): 696-727
110毛刚.非营利组织团队激励机制.西南交通大学学报. 2004, 39 (1): 56-60
111王艳,孙培源.杨忠直.经理层过渡投资与股权激励的契约模型研究.中国管理科学. 2005, 13(1): 127-131
112 Gibbons, Robert. Incentives between Firms (and Within). Management Science, 2005, 51(1): 2-17
113韩建军,郭耀煌,蓝敏.基于不对称信息的代理人私自交易及管制.西南交通大学学报. 2004, 39(4): 521-524
114油晓峰.基于共同治理的管理者财务激励模型研究.中国软科学. 2007, 11(10):143-148
115程新生.企业财务系统的运行与演变.财会月刊(理论版)2007, ( 2):70-72
116程新生,王薇,尹芳.公司财务监控系统治理绩效的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的证据.管理评论. 2007, 19(7): 33-37
117程新生.公司治理中的内部控制.会计之友. 2006, (12S): 4-5
118 Vesa Kanniainen, Christian Keuschnigg: Start-up Investment with Scarce Venture Capital supporting. Journal of Banking & Finance. 2004, (28): 1939-1959
119 Rachel M. Hayes. Scott Schaefer. Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance. BAND Journal of Economics. 2000: 243-251
120杨珊华.加强我国国有企业内部控制的建设的若干建议.商业会计. 2005, (20): 23-24
121陈传永.现代企业激励理论分析框架构建.企业管理. 2007, (2):46-47
122毕茜,刘娜.对经理人激励理论与实践的重新思考.现代财经. 2007, (8): 41-44
123蒲勇健.植入“公平博弈”的委托-代理模型当代财经. 2007, (3): 5-11
124阿德里安.卡德伯里(Adrian Cadbury),陈海威唐艳辉/译.公司治理和董事会主席:仁智之见,北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2005: 105-111
125徐金海.公司治理结构与独立董事制度.江南大学学报:人文社会科学版, 2004, (2): 74-77
126吴有玉.代理问题的行为经济学分析.武汉:武汉大学经济学院. 2005: 66-69
127蒋晓荣,崔影慧.民营高科技企业组织文化建设探析.企业管理. 2005,(8):194-195.
128李国红.企业财务管理制度规范化与创新性初探.会计之友. 2006, (10):70-71
129胡嘉将.计算机财务监控研究.财会月刊. 2003(9): 24
130陈柏福.国有企业经营者的市场声誉模型研究.财经理论与实践. 2007, (3): 103-107
131唐家海,候艳丽.对实时财务监控目标的探析.商场现代化. 2007, (6): 373
132 Juan Florin: Is Venture Capital Worth it? Effects on firm Performance and Founder Returns. Journal of Business Venturing. 2005, (20): 113-135
133王泽霞.识别上市公司管理舞弊之预警信号.上海三联书店. 2007, (5): 22-25
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |