商业银行集团客户授信风险成因及控制
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摘要
随着我国经济、金融的全球化和一体化,国内涌现出一批规模庞大、实力雄厚的大企业集团,其占据了大部分的市场份额,同时也成为了国内各家商业银行重点追逐的群体。但由于我国各商业银行集团客户授信业务规则不是很完善,识别、计量、监测和控制集团客户授信风险的能力较弱,以及存在于授信中较严重的信息不对称问题,极易造成多头授信和过度授信,给商业银行安全、稳健经营留下重大隐患。
目前,造成我国商业银行集团客户授信风险的原因纷繁复杂,从集团客户角度来分析:其公司治理结构不健全、非公允关联交易频繁和财务严重不实是主要原因;从商业银行角度来分析:贷前和贷后的信息不对称性、商业银行之间信息闭塞和恶性竞争、银行授信体系不完善及外部监管的缺位等都是重要原因。
控制集团客户的授信风险是一项系统性的重大工程:应当建设完备的集团客户信息披露平台,以解决商业银行与集团客户间的信息不对称;构建银团授信模式,明确主办行、代理行和参与行的义务和责任,彻底贯彻“信息共享、独立审批、自主决策、风险共担”的原则,加强银行间的信息共享;完善商业银行的授信风险控制体系;建设内外联合互动的监督平台等措施。力求从多层次、多角度对集团客户的授信业务风险加以防范,以达到商业银行安全性、流动性和盈利性的目标,实现我国商业银行又快又好的发展。
As Chinese economy and financial globalization and integration, the emergence of a group of domestic large and powerful group of large enterprises, these enterprises account for the majority of the Group's market share, but also become a domestic commercial banks chase focus groups. However, as Chinese commercial banking group in customer credit business rules is not very perfect,identification, measurement, monitoring and controlling credit risks enterprise group is weak, and the existence of credit in the more serious information asymmetry problems, easily result in long credit, excessive credit, to commercial banks safe and sound operation of major risks remain.
At present, resulting in Chinese commercial banking group in the reasons for customer credit risks of complex and complicated, from the group to analyze the customer point of view: its corporate governance structure is not sound frequency of non-fair related-party transactions and finance is the major cause of serious false; from the perspective of commercial banks in analysis: Group's customers with loan pre-and post-loan information on asymmetry of information between commercial banks, blocking and vicious competition, banking credit system, imperfections and external supervision are the main reason for such absence.
Customer credit risk on the Group's control is a systematic major projects: the construction should be complete disclosure of customer information platform for the group to address the commercial banks and the Group of asymmetric information between enterprises; build syndicated credit model, hosting a clear line, agents and participating in duties and responsibilities of the line, thoroughly implement the "information sharing, independent examination and approval, autonomous decision-making, risk-sharing" principle, to enhance information sharing among banks; sound commercial bank credit risk control system; building a joint interaction of internal and external co - monitoring platform, and so on. From the multi-level, multi-angle on the Group's customers to guard against the risk of credit business in order to achieve commercial banks, safety, liquidity and profitability objectives, to achieve rapid and healthy development of Chinese commercial banks.
目前,造成我国商业银行集团客户授信风险的原因纷繁复杂,从集团客户角度来分析:其公司治理结构不健全、非公允关联交易频繁和财务严重不实是主要原因;从商业银行角度来分析:贷前和贷后的信息不对称性、商业银行之间信息闭塞和恶性竞争、银行授信体系不完善及外部监管的缺位等都是重要原因。
控制集团客户的授信风险是一项系统性的重大工程:应当建设完备的集团客户信息披露平台,以解决商业银行与集团客户间的信息不对称;构建银团授信模式,明确主办行、代理行和参与行的义务和责任,彻底贯彻“信息共享、独立审批、自主决策、风险共担”的原则,加强银行间的信息共享;完善商业银行的授信风险控制体系;建设内外联合互动的监督平台等措施。力求从多层次、多角度对集团客户的授信业务风险加以防范,以达到商业银行安全性、流动性和盈利性的目标,实现我国商业银行又快又好的发展。
As Chinese economy and financial globalization and integration, the emergence of a group of domestic large and powerful group of large enterprises, these enterprises account for the majority of the Group's market share, but also become a domestic commercial banks chase focus groups. However, as Chinese commercial banking group in customer credit business rules is not very perfect,identification, measurement, monitoring and controlling credit risks enterprise group is weak, and the existence of credit in the more serious information asymmetry problems, easily result in long credit, excessive credit, to commercial banks safe and sound operation of major risks remain.
At present, resulting in Chinese commercial banking group in the reasons for customer credit risks of complex and complicated, from the group to analyze the customer point of view: its corporate governance structure is not sound frequency of non-fair related-party transactions and finance is the major cause of serious false; from the perspective of commercial banks in analysis: Group's customers with loan pre-and post-loan information on asymmetry of information between commercial banks, blocking and vicious competition, banking credit system, imperfections and external supervision are the main reason for such absence.
Customer credit risk on the Group's control is a systematic major projects: the construction should be complete disclosure of customer information platform for the group to address the commercial banks and the Group of asymmetric information between enterprises; build syndicated credit model, hosting a clear line, agents and participating in duties and responsibilities of the line, thoroughly implement the "information sharing, independent examination and approval, autonomous decision-making, risk-sharing" principle, to enhance information sharing among banks; sound commercial bank credit risk control system; building a joint interaction of internal and external co - monitoring platform, and so on. From the multi-level, multi-angle on the Group's customers to guard against the risk of credit business in order to achieve commercial banks, safety, liquidity and profitability objectives, to achieve rapid and healthy development of Chinese commercial banks.
引文
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[2]Rajan,R.G.Why banks credit pilicies fluctuate?A theory and some evidence[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,(109):399-411.
[3]Gabriel,J.,Salas,V.and Saurina,J.Determinants of collateral[J]. Journal of Finnancial Economics,2006,(81):255-281
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[6]贾广军,胡振兵.信息约束与信号偏差:集团客户授信的微观风险及宏观效应[J].金融研究,2004,(10):136-142.
[7]廖肇辉.集团客户授信:共同代理问题及其对策初探[J].金融研究,2005,(5):160-165.
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[13]何如.健全风险防范机制控制集团客户风险[J].中国金融,2004,(4):43-45.
[14]江苏省农村金融学会课题组.风险与效益的博弈——对银行强化集团客户信贷风险控制的思考[J].农金纵横,2004,(1):22-27.
[15]中国人民银行乌海市中心支行课题组.商业银行信贷集中问题研究:乌海市个案分析[J].内蒙古金融研究,2009,(9):35-37.
[16]王勇剑,周靖茹.对银行业金融机构信贷集中问题的调查与思考[J].时代金融,2008,(12):62-64.
[17]李婷娜.化解金融机构信贷集中于中小企业融资难矛盾[J].西南金融,2008,(10):21-22.
[18]葛杰.宏观调控形势下泰州市信贷集中问题研究[J].无锡职业技术学院学报,2007,(5):92-94.
[19]易红.银行热衷垒大户信贷风险加速集聚[N].经济参考报,2005-7-11(7).
[20]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004年第1版.
[21]梁琪,郝项超.最终控制人所有权和控制权对企业财务失败预警的影响[J].金融究,2009,(1):107-121.
[22]殷孟波,石琴,梁丹.银行业竞争测度模型评述[J].金融研究,2009,(7):197-206.
[23]邵学峰,张东明.大型国有企业集团公司治理的改革与完善[J].经济研究,2008,(1):153-155.
[24]李敏强等.商业银行的模糊授信决策研究[J].系统工程学报,2001,(12):57-64.
[25]张永娟.信用风险程度模糊综合评价模型[J].金融教学与研究,2004,(2):13-15.
[26]于兆吉,郭亚军.基于信用级别的银行信贷优化模型[J].控制与决策,2006,(12):29-36.
[27]郭英见,吴冲.基于信息融合的商业银行信用风险评估模型研究[J].金融研究,2009,(1):95-106.
[28]孙小淡.基于KMV模型的我国上市公司价值评估实证研究[J].管理工程学报,2008,(22):102-108.
[29]李成,马国,校李佳.基于进化博弈论对我国金融监管协调机制的解读[J].金融研究,2009,(5):186-193.
[30]王青.商业银行集团客户授信的风险与防范[J].中国金融,2008,(4):37-38.
[31]张晓宏.论银团贷款与集团授信客户风险控制[J].投资研究,2009,(5):27-35.
[32]李桂君等.中国商业银行集团客户信贷的项目管理模式研究[J].中国软科学,2009,(6):112-118.
[33]丁荣贵等.政府投资学研究合作项目治理方式研究框架[J].中国软科学,2008,(9):101-102.
[34]陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约[J].经济研究,2008,(3):60-62.
[35]朱宪辰,李妍绮,曾华翔.不完美信息下序贯决策行为的一项实验考察[J].经济研究,2008,(6):145-156.
[36]石长沙.企业集团的法律地位及内外部关系[J].法制与社会,2006,(2):14-15.
[37]彭晓洁.信息不对称与非公平关联交易的透视[J].会计研究,2005,(8):67-71.
[2]Rajan,R.G.Why banks credit pilicies fluctuate?A theory and some evidence[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,(109):399-411.
[3]Gabriel,J.,Salas,V.and Saurina,J.Determinants of collateral[J]. Journal of Finnancial Economics,2006,(81):255-281
[4]刘肖原,贾涛.商业银行集团客户的特征与信贷风险[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2007,(3):44-48.
[5]李航,张华.商业银行集团客户授信业务风险分析[J].金融理论与实践,2005,(2):40-42.
[6]贾广军,胡振兵.信息约束与信号偏差:集团客户授信的微观风险及宏观效应[J].金融研究,2004,(10):136-142.
[7]廖肇辉.集团客户授信:共同代理问题及其对策初探[J].金融研究,2005,(5):160-165.
[8]陈四清,丁岩,陆猛.关联关系分析在银行授信管理中的应用[J].国际金融研究,2002,(8):59-66.
[9]朱厚志.对当前集团客户授信风险的个案研究[J].金融纵横,2004,(11):34-35.
[10]中国银行业监督管理委员会令.商业银行集团客户授信业务风险管理指引[Z].2003年第5号.
[11]赵志宏,袁平,金鹏,李志强.银行全面风险管理体系[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2005年第1版.
[12]王延航.商业银行集团客户信贷风险控制研究[硕士学位论文].山东:中国海洋大学金融系,2008.
[13]何如.健全风险防范机制控制集团客户风险[J].中国金融,2004,(4):43-45.
[14]江苏省农村金融学会课题组.风险与效益的博弈——对银行强化集团客户信贷风险控制的思考[J].农金纵横,2004,(1):22-27.
[15]中国人民银行乌海市中心支行课题组.商业银行信贷集中问题研究:乌海市个案分析[J].内蒙古金融研究,2009,(9):35-37.
[16]王勇剑,周靖茹.对银行业金融机构信贷集中问题的调查与思考[J].时代金融,2008,(12):62-64.
[17]李婷娜.化解金融机构信贷集中于中小企业融资难矛盾[J].西南金融,2008,(10):21-22.
[18]葛杰.宏观调控形势下泰州市信贷集中问题研究[J].无锡职业技术学院学报,2007,(5):92-94.
[19]易红.银行热衷垒大户信贷风险加速集聚[N].经济参考报,2005-7-11(7).
[20]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004年第1版.
[21]梁琪,郝项超.最终控制人所有权和控制权对企业财务失败预警的影响[J].金融究,2009,(1):107-121.
[22]殷孟波,石琴,梁丹.银行业竞争测度模型评述[J].金融研究,2009,(7):197-206.
[23]邵学峰,张东明.大型国有企业集团公司治理的改革与完善[J].经济研究,2008,(1):153-155.
[24]李敏强等.商业银行的模糊授信决策研究[J].系统工程学报,2001,(12):57-64.
[25]张永娟.信用风险程度模糊综合评价模型[J].金融教学与研究,2004,(2):13-15.
[26]于兆吉,郭亚军.基于信用级别的银行信贷优化模型[J].控制与决策,2006,(12):29-36.
[27]郭英见,吴冲.基于信息融合的商业银行信用风险评估模型研究[J].金融研究,2009,(1):95-106.
[28]孙小淡.基于KMV模型的我国上市公司价值评估实证研究[J].管理工程学报,2008,(22):102-108.
[29]李成,马国,校李佳.基于进化博弈论对我国金融监管协调机制的解读[J].金融研究,2009,(5):186-193.
[30]王青.商业银行集团客户授信的风险与防范[J].中国金融,2008,(4):37-38.
[31]张晓宏.论银团贷款与集团授信客户风险控制[J].投资研究,2009,(5):27-35.
[32]李桂君等.中国商业银行集团客户信贷的项目管理模式研究[J].中国软科学,2009,(6):112-118.
[33]丁荣贵等.政府投资学研究合作项目治理方式研究框架[J].中国软科学,2008,(9):101-102.
[34]陈冬华,章铁生,李翔.法律环境、政府管制与隐性契约[J].经济研究,2008,(3):60-62.
[35]朱宪辰,李妍绮,曾华翔.不完美信息下序贯决策行为的一项实验考察[J].经济研究,2008,(6):145-156.
[36]石长沙.企业集团的法律地位及内外部关系[J].法制与社会,2006,(2):14-15.
[37]彭晓洁.信息不对称与非公平关联交易的透视[J].会计研究,2005,(8):67-71.