中国银行业制度风险规制研究
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摘要
中国的银行业是我国金融系统的基石,其经营的安全性对于我国金融安全而言具有举重轻重的作用。20世纪90年代后,全球银行业危机频繁爆发和巨大损失迫使各国政府和银行界重新重视银行风险的防范和控制问题。目前,在银行业中得以被广泛应用的防范金融风险的技术方法都是基于技术层面因素的考虑,并没有深入考虑金融系统的制度设计与安排,以及这些制度设计与安排中所蕴藏的各种风险。我国银行业自1978年以来就一直处于改革探索过程中,经过30年的改革,我国已经基本建立起以中国人民银行、中国银行业监督管理委员会为监管层,以股份制商业银行为主体的银行业体系。虽然我国银行业的市场化改革已经取得巨大的成绩,但是新的国际国内形势要求我们不得不重新审视我国银行业的制度风险。
本论文主要从理论研究、经验研究和对策研究三个方面展开对中国银行业制度风险规制的研究。
第一部分是理论研究,主要从理论上分析我国银行业制度风险,主要包括以下几章内容。第1章为导论,主要阐述所选研究课题的背景、目的和意义,研究的主要内容和旨在阐明的问题、结构安排、使用的研究方法以及创新。第2章主要对制度、风险、利润与规制理论范畴及其相互关系的综述与评价。首先对制度、风险、利润和规制的经济学意义进行阐释;其次对国外研究中关于制度、风险和利润关系的思想以及制度、风险和规制关系研究的思想分别进行综述;最后对国内外文献中对银行业风险监管的文献进行述评,主要是从银行经营的微观风险、宏观风险和监管、薪酬激励与风险规制以及金融制度和银行风险等方面予以综述。第3章首先讨论薪酬制度与最优激励契约的问题,分别分析了信息不对称和道德风险情形下薪酬激励的次优均衡后,并讨论了我国商业银行薪酬制度市场化改革和风险规制的问题;其次重点研究了商业银行经营的基层代理人——客户经理的道德风险规制问题,运用KMRW模型分析了不同制度安排下客户经理的博弈行为选择。第4章主要从总体上分析了银行经营风险产生的机制并介绍了银行经营面临的主要风险。银行风险产生的机制主要可以分为内生机制和外生机制,商业银行经营活动中面临的风险主要可以划分为银行经营的国家风险、市场风险、法律风险三大类,市场风险又可细分为信用风险、操作风险、利率风险和外汇风险四种。
第二部分是对中国银行业制度风险的经验研究,主要由以下几章内容构成。第5章主要研究我国银行业经营的宏观经济制度风险。本章首先从我国商业银行体系与我国银行监管体系两个角度介绍了1978年以来我国银行业制度变迁的过程;其次讨论了中国存款保险制度风险;再次,运用博弈论的理论分析各时期监管者与被监管者间的利益博弈以及风险利用(risk-taking)动机。第6章主要尝试从制度的中观层面出发,分析讨论我国商业银行与各级政府间的关系、商业银行与企业间融资关系对商业银行经营风险的影响,主要包括两部分内容:主要讨论政府和银行间的博弈行为中蕴藏的信贷风险和分析资本市场发展以后,商业银行贷款这种关系型融资所面临的距离型融资的竞争产生的潜在风险。第7章主要分析我国利率制度改革过程给我国商业银行经营带来的潜在利率制度风险;并且借鉴国际经验分析研究了我国商业银行经营面临的主要汇率制度风险和我国商业银行汇率制度风险规制。
第8章主要是分析了我国商业银行市场的竞争程度并度量了商业银行的风险程度。鉴于商业银行无清偿能力风险指数和市场风险β值都是很好的度量商业银行风险水平的指标,本章首先运用无清偿能力风险指数估算了我国十四家商业银行的无清偿能力风险;其次利用已上市商业银行的股价交易数据测算我国上市商业银行月度市场风险β值;最后借鉴并修改了托宾q值的估算方法分别测算了我国十四家商业银行的托宾q值。第9章主要利用经验数据实证分析我国商业银行制度风险。首先选用了银行规模、贷款呆账准备金占总贷款的比率、股东权益比率、银行存款占总资产的比率和总贷款占总资产的比率作为衡量我国银行业制度的变量,并利用无清偿能力风险指标以及修正的无清偿能力风险指标测算出的结果进行实证检验我国银行业的宏观制度风险,其结论很好地支持了本文的理论分析结论;其次选用我国已经上市的商业银行的股价交易数据和历史中相似时期日本的数据,基于制度转换模型对我国商业银行的利率制度风险和汇率制度风险进行了实证检验。
最后一部分是本文的对策研究。基于本研究在前面各章中对制度风险的理论研究和实证检验结论,第10章从我国商业银行经营的实际制度环境对如何从制度层面进行风险规制进行了深入思考,并提出了制度规制我国银行业风险的政策建议。鉴于中国国情,本文认为规制中国银行业制度风险应着力以下几方面的制度建设:(1)深化中国银行业改革,完善银行监管体系;(2)建立政企硬约束机制,转变商业银行经营模式;(3)优化利率结构,逐步深入金融体制改革;(4)完善市场化的薪酬制度,建立商业银行经营者的奖惩机制;(5)加快金融产品创新,丰富风险控制手段。
Banking is the core section of Chinese financial system, the operation safety of which is very important to safety of Chinese financial system. Since 1990s, banking crisis have broken out frequently across the world and resulted in a lot of immensity loss. Accordingly, banking risk has won more and more attention from all governments and banking sections. At present, a lot of technical measures have been widely adopted in defending financial risk. However, it has only been designed based on the technical method, but neglected the system or institution factors. Since the reform of China banking industry in 1978, China has set up a regulation system constituted of the People's Bank of China and China Banking Regulation Committee and a banking system which is composed of several commercial banks. Though we have made great progress in the reform of China banking industry, we have to pay more attention to the system risk of Chinese banking so that we will be able to face up to new situations and meet the challenges in the future.
This dissertation mainly studies the regulation of system risk of Chinese banking in theoretical, positive and application aspects.
The first part of this dissertation mainly studies the system risk of Chinese banking in theoretical aspect. Chapter 1, as an introduction, is about the background, purpose and application of the research topics, with a brief description of the main content, structure of this study project, also methodology and new findings from this dissertation.
Chapter 2 summarizes the theoretical category and relationship of the system, risk, profit, and regulation and provides short comments in the end. This chapter particularly explains the concept of system, risk, profit, and regulation in the beginning, then summarizes the idea on the relationship of system, risk, profit and regulation, finally summarizes the literature on the regulation on banking risk, which includes the operation risk of banking, regulation, salary promotion and financing system associated with Chinese banking.
Based on the principal-agent theory, chapter 3 discusses the personnel arrangement and the best promotion-system to improve working efficiency and tries to analyze the reformation of the salary promoting. The last of chapter 3 applies the KMRW model to analyze the game behavior of the customer service manager in different situations.
Chapter 4 mostly analyzes the reason risks can occur in banking and what kind of risk will occur in the operation of banking. The reason why risks occur in banking can be classified as interned-driving mechanism and external-driving mechanism. Risk in Chinese banking mainly contains sovereignty risk, law risk and market risk including credit risk, operation risk, interest risk and foreign exchange risk.
The second part of this dissertation, positive analysis, is made up of chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8 and chapter 9. Chapter 5 mainly researches the macroeconomics system risk of Chinese banking. At the beginning, chapter 5 describes the evolvement of Chinese banking system in two aspects, namely, Chinese commercial banking system and Chinese banking regulation system. It also discusses about the risk of Chinese deposit insurance system, and then applies the game theory to analyze the game between the supervisor and commercial banks and the incentive for bank to take risk in different period.
Chapter 6 mostly analyzes the influence of the relationship between commercial banks and government and the relationship between commercial banks and firms on Chinese banking industry. This chapter is carried out in two sections. First section discusses the credit risk in the game between commercial banks and government. The other section analyses what Chinese banking risk is bond to face when relationship financing is competing with arm-length financing. Chapter 7 mostly focuses on the interest system risk and foreign exchange system risk of Chinese banking.
Chapter 8 analyzes the competence and measures the risk of Chinese banking. As insolvency risk index and system riskβindex are all good indexes to measure the risk level of commercial bank. Chapter 8 also applies insolvency index to calculate the insolvency risk of Chinese banking, and then calculates the month-βindex of Chinese public banks with stock price data, finally applies the modified Tobin q model to calculate the Tobin q of the fourteen banks in China.
Chapter 9 mainly applies econometrics theory to test the system risk of Chinese banking. At the beginning, this chapter applies insolvency risk index to test the macroeconomics risk of Chinese banking as scale of bank, the ratio of loan loss reserve to total loan, ROE, the ratio of total loan to total asset and total deposition to total asset are selected to measure the system of Chinese banking. Then it tests the interest system risk and foreign exchange system risk with the stock transaction data of Chinese and Japanese public banks.
Chapter 10, as the last part, is the policy and application analysis. Based on the theoretical analysis and econometrical analysis, chapter 10 goes deep into the risk regulation according to the system designation and system arrangement. Considering the nation condition of China and regulating Chinese banking system risk, this paper suggests we should pay more attention on the institution building which include deepening the reform of Chinese banking and perfecting supversion system, building constraint mechanism between government and corporation and changing running model of Chinese commercial bank, optimizing interest structure and deepening the reform of Chinese finance system, improving the incentive mechanism of compensation and building the mechanism of rewards and punishments on the operator of commercial bank, speeding the innovation of financial products and enriching the means to control risk.
本论文主要从理论研究、经验研究和对策研究三个方面展开对中国银行业制度风险规制的研究。
第一部分是理论研究,主要从理论上分析我国银行业制度风险,主要包括以下几章内容。第1章为导论,主要阐述所选研究课题的背景、目的和意义,研究的主要内容和旨在阐明的问题、结构安排、使用的研究方法以及创新。第2章主要对制度、风险、利润与规制理论范畴及其相互关系的综述与评价。首先对制度、风险、利润和规制的经济学意义进行阐释;其次对国外研究中关于制度、风险和利润关系的思想以及制度、风险和规制关系研究的思想分别进行综述;最后对国内外文献中对银行业风险监管的文献进行述评,主要是从银行经营的微观风险、宏观风险和监管、薪酬激励与风险规制以及金融制度和银行风险等方面予以综述。第3章首先讨论薪酬制度与最优激励契约的问题,分别分析了信息不对称和道德风险情形下薪酬激励的次优均衡后,并讨论了我国商业银行薪酬制度市场化改革和风险规制的问题;其次重点研究了商业银行经营的基层代理人——客户经理的道德风险规制问题,运用KMRW模型分析了不同制度安排下客户经理的博弈行为选择。第4章主要从总体上分析了银行经营风险产生的机制并介绍了银行经营面临的主要风险。银行风险产生的机制主要可以分为内生机制和外生机制,商业银行经营活动中面临的风险主要可以划分为银行经营的国家风险、市场风险、法律风险三大类,市场风险又可细分为信用风险、操作风险、利率风险和外汇风险四种。
第二部分是对中国银行业制度风险的经验研究,主要由以下几章内容构成。第5章主要研究我国银行业经营的宏观经济制度风险。本章首先从我国商业银行体系与我国银行监管体系两个角度介绍了1978年以来我国银行业制度变迁的过程;其次讨论了中国存款保险制度风险;再次,运用博弈论的理论分析各时期监管者与被监管者间的利益博弈以及风险利用(risk-taking)动机。第6章主要尝试从制度的中观层面出发,分析讨论我国商业银行与各级政府间的关系、商业银行与企业间融资关系对商业银行经营风险的影响,主要包括两部分内容:主要讨论政府和银行间的博弈行为中蕴藏的信贷风险和分析资本市场发展以后,商业银行贷款这种关系型融资所面临的距离型融资的竞争产生的潜在风险。第7章主要分析我国利率制度改革过程给我国商业银行经营带来的潜在利率制度风险;并且借鉴国际经验分析研究了我国商业银行经营面临的主要汇率制度风险和我国商业银行汇率制度风险规制。
第8章主要是分析了我国商业银行市场的竞争程度并度量了商业银行的风险程度。鉴于商业银行无清偿能力风险指数和市场风险β值都是很好的度量商业银行风险水平的指标,本章首先运用无清偿能力风险指数估算了我国十四家商业银行的无清偿能力风险;其次利用已上市商业银行的股价交易数据测算我国上市商业银行月度市场风险β值;最后借鉴并修改了托宾q值的估算方法分别测算了我国十四家商业银行的托宾q值。第9章主要利用经验数据实证分析我国商业银行制度风险。首先选用了银行规模、贷款呆账准备金占总贷款的比率、股东权益比率、银行存款占总资产的比率和总贷款占总资产的比率作为衡量我国银行业制度的变量,并利用无清偿能力风险指标以及修正的无清偿能力风险指标测算出的结果进行实证检验我国银行业的宏观制度风险,其结论很好地支持了本文的理论分析结论;其次选用我国已经上市的商业银行的股价交易数据和历史中相似时期日本的数据,基于制度转换模型对我国商业银行的利率制度风险和汇率制度风险进行了实证检验。
最后一部分是本文的对策研究。基于本研究在前面各章中对制度风险的理论研究和实证检验结论,第10章从我国商业银行经营的实际制度环境对如何从制度层面进行风险规制进行了深入思考,并提出了制度规制我国银行业风险的政策建议。鉴于中国国情,本文认为规制中国银行业制度风险应着力以下几方面的制度建设:(1)深化中国银行业改革,完善银行监管体系;(2)建立政企硬约束机制,转变商业银行经营模式;(3)优化利率结构,逐步深入金融体制改革;(4)完善市场化的薪酬制度,建立商业银行经营者的奖惩机制;(5)加快金融产品创新,丰富风险控制手段。
Banking is the core section of Chinese financial system, the operation safety of which is very important to safety of Chinese financial system. Since 1990s, banking crisis have broken out frequently across the world and resulted in a lot of immensity loss. Accordingly, banking risk has won more and more attention from all governments and banking sections. At present, a lot of technical measures have been widely adopted in defending financial risk. However, it has only been designed based on the technical method, but neglected the system or institution factors. Since the reform of China banking industry in 1978, China has set up a regulation system constituted of the People's Bank of China and China Banking Regulation Committee and a banking system which is composed of several commercial banks. Though we have made great progress in the reform of China banking industry, we have to pay more attention to the system risk of Chinese banking so that we will be able to face up to new situations and meet the challenges in the future.
This dissertation mainly studies the regulation of system risk of Chinese banking in theoretical, positive and application aspects.
The first part of this dissertation mainly studies the system risk of Chinese banking in theoretical aspect. Chapter 1, as an introduction, is about the background, purpose and application of the research topics, with a brief description of the main content, structure of this study project, also methodology and new findings from this dissertation.
Chapter 2 summarizes the theoretical category and relationship of the system, risk, profit, and regulation and provides short comments in the end. This chapter particularly explains the concept of system, risk, profit, and regulation in the beginning, then summarizes the idea on the relationship of system, risk, profit and regulation, finally summarizes the literature on the regulation on banking risk, which includes the operation risk of banking, regulation, salary promotion and financing system associated with Chinese banking.
Based on the principal-agent theory, chapter 3 discusses the personnel arrangement and the best promotion-system to improve working efficiency and tries to analyze the reformation of the salary promoting. The last of chapter 3 applies the KMRW model to analyze the game behavior of the customer service manager in different situations.
Chapter 4 mostly analyzes the reason risks can occur in banking and what kind of risk will occur in the operation of banking. The reason why risks occur in banking can be classified as interned-driving mechanism and external-driving mechanism. Risk in Chinese banking mainly contains sovereignty risk, law risk and market risk including credit risk, operation risk, interest risk and foreign exchange risk.
The second part of this dissertation, positive analysis, is made up of chapter 5, chapter 6, chapter 7, chapter 8 and chapter 9. Chapter 5 mainly researches the macroeconomics system risk of Chinese banking. At the beginning, chapter 5 describes the evolvement of Chinese banking system in two aspects, namely, Chinese commercial banking system and Chinese banking regulation system. It also discusses about the risk of Chinese deposit insurance system, and then applies the game theory to analyze the game between the supervisor and commercial banks and the incentive for bank to take risk in different period.
Chapter 6 mostly analyzes the influence of the relationship between commercial banks and government and the relationship between commercial banks and firms on Chinese banking industry. This chapter is carried out in two sections. First section discusses the credit risk in the game between commercial banks and government. The other section analyses what Chinese banking risk is bond to face when relationship financing is competing with arm-length financing. Chapter 7 mostly focuses on the interest system risk and foreign exchange system risk of Chinese banking.
Chapter 8 analyzes the competence and measures the risk of Chinese banking. As insolvency risk index and system riskβindex are all good indexes to measure the risk level of commercial bank. Chapter 8 also applies insolvency index to calculate the insolvency risk of Chinese banking, and then calculates the month-βindex of Chinese public banks with stock price data, finally applies the modified Tobin q model to calculate the Tobin q of the fourteen banks in China.
Chapter 9 mainly applies econometrics theory to test the system risk of Chinese banking. At the beginning, this chapter applies insolvency risk index to test the macroeconomics risk of Chinese banking as scale of bank, the ratio of loan loss reserve to total loan, ROE, the ratio of total loan to total asset and total deposition to total asset are selected to measure the system of Chinese banking. Then it tests the interest system risk and foreign exchange system risk with the stock transaction data of Chinese and Japanese public banks.
Chapter 10, as the last part, is the policy and application analysis. Based on the theoretical analysis and econometrical analysis, chapter 10 goes deep into the risk regulation according to the system designation and system arrangement. Considering the nation condition of China and regulating Chinese banking system risk, this paper suggests we should pay more attention on the institution building which include deepening the reform of Chinese banking and perfecting supversion system, building constraint mechanism between government and corporation and changing running model of Chinese commercial bank, optimizing interest structure and deepening the reform of Chinese finance system, improving the incentive mechanism of compensation and building the mechanism of rewards and punishments on the operator of commercial bank, speeding the innovation of financial products and enriching the means to control risk.
引文
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[39].6C 即为:Character,Capacity,Capital or Cash,Collateral,Condition and Continuity。
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[8]、此处假定银行所有的客户经理都是具有编制人事制度安排,如果是没有编制的人事制度安排,则在现实的中是不可行,这点在后面的论述中将得以证明。
[1]、来源:上海证券报,2006-10-20,雅虎网。
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[1]、道格拉斯·G·诺斯.经济史中的结构与变迁[M].上海:上海人民出版社,上海三联书店,P20.
[2]、数据来源:《中国金融年鉴》2005年。
[3]、注:9大区行分别是上海、天津、南京、沈阳、广州、济南、武汉、西安和成都,2个营业部是北京和重庆。
[4]、何光辉.存款保险制度研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社.2000.P204.
[5]、根据《中国金融年鉴》(2005)整理而得。
[6]、存款保险制度委员会.存款保险制度[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2003.
[7]、当x和y都很小时,(1+x)(1+y)=1+x+y;由于P_I、C_I、γ、i_I都小于1的很小的数,所以P_IC_Iγi_I近似等于0。
[8]、P_IC_Ii_I和P_uC_ui_u都很小,化简过程被近似等于0。
[9]、John C.Cox,Stephen A.Ross,Mark Rubinstein,Option pricing:a simplified approach.Journal of Financial Economics,1979,229-263.
[10]、George Pennacchi,Deposit insurance,bank regulation,and financial system risks,Journal of Monetary Economics 53(2006),1-30.
[11]、让·梯若尔.金融危机、流动性与国际货币体制[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2003年。P80。
[12]、P是监管当局对违规经营的名义惩罚,θP是监管当局对违规经营银行的实际惩罚。当我国商业银行与政府一体化时,θ=0,银行违规经营实际上不受任何惩罚;而当银行作为市场主体自主经营时,θ=1,违规经营。
[13]、杨松.巴塞尔新资本协议(草案):有关商业银行信息披露的要求.[J].中国金融,2002(6).P33.
[1]、周小川.关于国有商业银行改革的几个问题[N].金融时报,2004-6.
[2]、成思危.成思危论金融改革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2006年.P360.
[3]、成思危.成思危论金融改革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2006年.P364-365.
[4]、事实上,商业银行上级行对下级行的负责人的行政任命不仅体现在四大国有商业银行中,在股份制商业银行的人事任命中也存在着此情形,则是表现为一种更复杂的晋升制度。
[5]、风险和收益是一对相应的概念,高风险对应于高收益。对银行而言,存款、贷款的数量和利息收入是衡量银行经营绩效的重要指标,因此短期从事高风险的项目新加坡元可以显著提高存款量、贷款量和利息收入。
[6]、作为经济人的居民在做出迁移至其他地区时也是基于成本收益考虑,当原居住地区税赋加重后,迁移到税赋相对轻的地区,税赋的下降就相当于获得了一项收益。
[7]、此处的大股东只是指出资的相对份额,并非出资的绝对数额。
[8]、这种社会损失是银明显的,例如一个企业经营失败后,大批工人失业,带米社会福利支出的上升以及社会稳定等等。
[9]、前文的第一个假定已经强调,在不存在干预时,商业银行是不会向高风险项目授信的,逆向思考,可以认为商业银行向高风险项目授信意味着当期存在着潜在的损失。
[10]、企业若通过银行融资,银行对信贷资金的监控势必会定期向放贷企业进行检查,以确保信贷使用的合规性和安全性,此时银行就会干预企业经营,从某种意义上讲银行充当了内部人的角色;而企业通过距离型融资,即直接向资本市场高资,支经营活动将不受任何外部人的干预。
[11]、此处并没有列出所有年的十四家商业的存款额和贷款额并比较存贷差,只是列出了三年,是出于这二年基本反映了我国商业银行存贷差的基本情况和趋势。
[12]、参考夏大慰主编.产业组织学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.P31.
[13]、q不仅仅反映财务报表所提供的信息,它还反映了企业的规模、信用以及一系列影响企业债务偿还能力的因素。
[14]、此外的成本p不仅仅指利息支付,还包括关系型融资中银行对企业经营的干预和监督带米的额外成本。
[15]、事实上,我国很多上市公司只是整个企业集团的一部分,即其所属的母公司将质量较好的项目上市融资,而其他次优项目的资金需求转向银行融资。
[16]、转引自:青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海:远东出版社.2001年.P343。
[1]、“不管怎样,必须把平均利润率看成是利息最后决定作用的最高界限。……就利息率由利润率决定来说,利息率是由一般利润率决定的,而不是由可能特殊产业部门内占统治地位的特殊利润率决定的,……一般利润率的决定和市场利润率的决定不同,市场利息率是由供求关系直接的,不通过任何中介决定的。”马克思:《资本论》(第三卷),人民出版社,2004年。P401-412。
[2]、虽然企业的融资项目质量较低,但如果银行拥有对企业经营很强的干预能力,那么银行就可以从企业未来的经营盈余中获得一个较人的部分,从而对低质量融资项目的评价就会上升。
[3]、Kaminsky&Reinhart(1999)经验研究了银行危机与货币危机间的关系。
[4]、事实上,在某些年份人民币对美元的汇率是完全固定的。
[5]、美洲银行第一阶段投资25亿美元购买中央汇金投资有限公司持有的中国建设银行的股份,第二阶段在建行IPO时认购5亿美元的股份。
[6]、http:money.business.sohu.com/2006年3月27日/n242487359.shtml
[7]、戈登斯坦.控制新兴市场国家的货币错配.[M]北京:中国社科文献出版社,2005。
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[39].6C 即为:Character,Capacity,Capital or Cash,Collateral,Condition and Continuity。
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[8]、此处假定银行所有的客户经理都是具有编制人事制度安排,如果是没有编制的人事制度安排,则在现实的中是不可行,这点在后面的论述中将得以证明。
[1]、来源:上海证券报,2006-10-20,雅虎网。
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[2]、数据来源:《中国金融年鉴》2005年。
[3]、注:9大区行分别是上海、天津、南京、沈阳、广州、济南、武汉、西安和成都,2个营业部是北京和重庆。
[4]、何光辉.存款保险制度研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社.2000.P204.
[5]、根据《中国金融年鉴》(2005)整理而得。
[6]、存款保险制度委员会.存款保险制度[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2003.
[7]、当x和y都很小时,(1+x)(1+y)=1+x+y;由于P_I、C_I、γ、i_I都小于1的很小的数,所以P_IC_Iγi_I近似等于0。
[8]、P_IC_Ii_I和P_uC_ui_u都很小,化简过程被近似等于0。
[9]、John C.Cox,Stephen A.Ross,Mark Rubinstein,Option pricing:a simplified approach.Journal of Financial Economics,1979,229-263.
[10]、George Pennacchi,Deposit insurance,bank regulation,and financial system risks,Journal of Monetary Economics 53(2006),1-30.
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[12]、P是监管当局对违规经营的名义惩罚,θP是监管当局对违规经营银行的实际惩罚。当我国商业银行与政府一体化时,θ=0,银行违规经营实际上不受任何惩罚;而当银行作为市场主体自主经营时,θ=1,违规经营。
[13]、杨松.巴塞尔新资本协议(草案):有关商业银行信息披露的要求.[J].中国金融,2002(6).P33.
[1]、周小川.关于国有商业银行改革的几个问题[N].金融时报,2004-6.
[2]、成思危.成思危论金融改革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2006年.P360.
[3]、成思危.成思危论金融改革[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社.2006年.P364-365.
[4]、事实上,商业银行上级行对下级行的负责人的行政任命不仅体现在四大国有商业银行中,在股份制商业银行的人事任命中也存在着此情形,则是表现为一种更复杂的晋升制度。
[5]、风险和收益是一对相应的概念,高风险对应于高收益。对银行而言,存款、贷款的数量和利息收入是衡量银行经营绩效的重要指标,因此短期从事高风险的项目新加坡元可以显著提高存款量、贷款量和利息收入。
[6]、作为经济人的居民在做出迁移至其他地区时也是基于成本收益考虑,当原居住地区税赋加重后,迁移到税赋相对轻的地区,税赋的下降就相当于获得了一项收益。
[7]、此处的大股东只是指出资的相对份额,并非出资的绝对数额。
[8]、这种社会损失是银明显的,例如一个企业经营失败后,大批工人失业,带米社会福利支出的上升以及社会稳定等等。
[9]、前文的第一个假定已经强调,在不存在干预时,商业银行是不会向高风险项目授信的,逆向思考,可以认为商业银行向高风险项目授信意味着当期存在着潜在的损失。
[10]、企业若通过银行融资,银行对信贷资金的监控势必会定期向放贷企业进行检查,以确保信贷使用的合规性和安全性,此时银行就会干预企业经营,从某种意义上讲银行充当了内部人的角色;而企业通过距离型融资,即直接向资本市场高资,支经营活动将不受任何外部人的干预。
[11]、此处并没有列出所有年的十四家商业的存款额和贷款额并比较存贷差,只是列出了三年,是出于这二年基本反映了我国商业银行存贷差的基本情况和趋势。
[12]、参考夏大慰主编.产业组织学[M].上海:复旦大学出版社.P31.
[13]、q不仅仅反映财务报表所提供的信息,它还反映了企业的规模、信用以及一系列影响企业债务偿还能力的因素。
[14]、此外的成本p不仅仅指利息支付,还包括关系型融资中银行对企业经营的干预和监督带米的额外成本。
[15]、事实上,我国很多上市公司只是整个企业集团的一部分,即其所属的母公司将质量较好的项目上市融资,而其他次优项目的资金需求转向银行融资。
[16]、转引自:青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海:远东出版社.2001年.P343。
[1]、“不管怎样,必须把平均利润率看成是利息最后决定作用的最高界限。……就利息率由利润率决定来说,利息率是由一般利润率决定的,而不是由可能特殊产业部门内占统治地位的特殊利润率决定的,……一般利润率的决定和市场利润率的决定不同,市场利息率是由供求关系直接的,不通过任何中介决定的。”马克思:《资本论》(第三卷),人民出版社,2004年。P401-412。
[2]、虽然企业的融资项目质量较低,但如果银行拥有对企业经营很强的干预能力,那么银行就可以从企业未来的经营盈余中获得一个较人的部分,从而对低质量融资项目的评价就会上升。
[3]、Kaminsky&Reinhart(1999)经验研究了银行危机与货币危机间的关系。
[4]、事实上,在某些年份人民币对美元的汇率是完全固定的。
[5]、美洲银行第一阶段投资25亿美元购买中央汇金投资有限公司持有的中国建设银行的股份,第二阶段在建行IPO时认购5亿美元的股份。
[6]、http:money.business.sohu.com/2006年3月27日/n242487359.shtml
[7]、戈登斯坦.控制新兴市场国家的货币错配.[M]北京:中国社科文献出版社,2005。
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