后金融危机时代我国金融监管以及金融风险的博弈研究
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摘要
本文在国内外学者关于金融监管以及金融风险研究成果的基础上，运用博弈理论和方法对我国金融监管以及金融风险等相关问题进行了系统的理论分析和实证研究，取得了一些具有重要理论意义和现实意义的结论，并对现实问题给出了政策建议。
(一)进入21世界，我国经济发展必将面对更为复杂严峻的国内外形势，而对我国经济发展有着至关重要的金融市场如何发展，是直接影响到我国宏观经济能否实现可持续健康发展的关键因素之一。必须进一步提高对我国金融市场的重视程度。本文从分析我国金融市场发展现状入手，以金融市场可操纵性和不可操纵性的双重视角来研究我国金融市场的均衡问题。在贝纳西的非均衡理论框架下，构建金融机构与融资企业之间的供求关系模型，探究影响金融机构和融资企业策略选择的主要因素，拟从理论上解决以下几个重大现实问题：第一，由于目前我国金融体系尚不完善，当融资企业的融资需求得不到满足时，在不可操纵市场配额下融资企业的融资水平如何分配？第二，在可操纵市场配额下融资企业的所给出的数量信号对整个金融市场有什么样的影响？第三，在我国金融市场未来的发展中，如何确保金融市场的长期稳定发展？本文的主要理论贡献是以我国金融市场中融资配给的实际情况为基础，从非均衡的角度对我国金融市场进行分析。在模型求解的基础上，期望从理论上对这几个重大的现实问题做出解答，得出对我国金融市场发展有重要启示意义的结论。
研究结果表明：在不可操纵的金融市场中，融资企业的融资需求不会扩大金融风险；在可操纵的金融市场中容易出现金融风险扩大的问题。为了促进稳定我国金融市场的健康发展，需要尽快建立金融市场机构的现代企业制度，丰富金融市场交易种类，拓宽投资选择类型和投资者范围，不断改革和完善金融市场制度，形成全面的金融市场体系，防范金融市场风险，提高金融机构抗风险能力，加强金触市场监管，同时改革金融市场监管格局。
(二)我国经济正处于转型期，防范可能发生的金融风险十分必要。为了探究金融风险的转嫁和金融风险积累过程，构建商业银行与融资企业之间的博弈模型，以及商业银行与中央银行之间博弈模型探究影响金融风险产生与金融风险转嫁的主要因素，拟从理论上解决以下几个重大现实问题：第一，由于目前我国金融市场发展还不成熟，金融市场中存在明显融资配给问题，那么如何理解我国金融风险的内涵？第二，企业有持续融资的需求，为了促进经济发展需要商业银行更多的对企业进行间接融资，金融风险如何在融资中逐渐积累？影响我国融资风险积累的主要因素有那些？第三，商业银行与中央银行之间的金融风险转嫁内在机制和影响因素有哪些？期望从理论上对这几个重大的现实问题做出解答，得出对我国金融风险转嫁和金融风险积累相关问题有重要启示意义的结论。
通过模型的求解和分析得出结论：在企业向金融机构融资的过程中，由于银企之间的信息不对称以及金融决策主体的预算软约束，造成了企业高负债和银行形成巨额不良债权；而商业银行与中央银行之间的博弈结果也必将是中央银行负债增加和货币增发。控制金融风险的形成需要：增加商业银行与融资企业之间的信息透明度；完善商业银行内部管理体制和提高融资技术，同时严格控制违规操作等问题；提升企业预防金融风险的意识和建立相应的防范金融风险措施；企业需要依据自身发展需求培养出更多，能够以国际角度看待融资过程中，可能发生的金融风险问题的金融人才；进一步完善我国与金融行业相关的各项法律法规制度建设，弥补我国金融市场整体的金融法律制度环境存在的诸多缺陷；完善我国金融机构的信息披露制度。构建一套完整的能够对金融风险进行准确识别、预警以及评价的方法体系。
(三)发达国家宽松的金融监管和过度的金融创新，最终导致在金融危机中遭受重创。目前我国金融监管基础还非常薄弱，而政府和监管机构又是区域金融创新的主要推动力量。运用演化博弈理论和方法分析我国金融机构与监管机构在相互博弈过程中的策略选择问题。通过构建金融机构与监管机构之间的博弈模型，探究影响金融机构和监管机构策略选择的主要因素，拟从理论上解决以下几个重大现实问题：第一，由于目前我国金融体系尚不完善，很多问题的解决仍需要金融创新，那么社会福利性是否是我国金融机构的金融创新内在驱动力？第二，我国需要持续的金融创新，这要求放松金融监管，但是为了金融系统的稳定又不能忽视可能出现的金融风险，那么影响我国监管机构策略选择的主要因素有那些？第三，在我国金融创新和金融监管未来的发展中，如何使金融监管成为金融创新的制度保障，如何发挥合理金融创新节约监管资源、提高监管效率的作用，最终实现我国金融创新与金融监管之间的相互补充。在模型求解的基础上，运用数值仿真对模型中各参数变化对金融机构和监管机构策略选择的影响做进一步分析，期望从理论上对这几个重大的现实问题做出解答，得出对我国金融创新和金融监管有重要启示意义的结论。
模型解析和数值仿真得出结论：监管资源消耗过大导致监管机构对金融创新的监管略显不足；缺乏对社会整体福利的考虑以及创新的成本较低造成金融机构对金融创新的投入旺盛；过度创新获得的高收益和惩罚水平较低是金融机构选择过度创新的最主要原因。对于后金融危机时代我国的金融创新与金融监管:继续加强金融监管的同时注重提高监管效率；适度加大金融创新，不能忽视对金融机构合理创新的积极引导；努力推进金融监管和金融创新平衡发展；加强金融消费者权益保护。
(四)目前我国金融监管基础还非常薄弱，在全民参与的金融活动中，金融系统风险被无限放大。运用演化博弈理论和方法分析中国人民银行与三家金融监管机构之间的金融监管合作问题，揭示在我国金融监管过程中影响金融监管主体策略选择与合作效率的深层次原因。国际金融危机持续难解和国内金融风险无限放大的现实，给我国金融监管合作提出一些亟待解决新问题：首先，在我国金融市场中，中国人民银行与三家监管机构都有各自的监管领域，市场经济体制使得金融监管主体都以追求自身利益最大化为最根本目标，那么在金融监管问题上选择监管合作策略是否是双方最优策略选择？其次，在如今的金融市场环境和金融体制下，由于中国人民银行与三家监管机构之间的信息不对称，双方在金融监管过程中主动选择监管合作策略的可能性有多大？最后，金融监管协调对实现监管主体选择监管合作策略的作用机理，目前我国的金融监管体制存在哪些体制缺陷，需要哪些措施来完善金融监管体制？现实问题的需要和这几方面理论研究的空白，使得研究我国金融监管合作问题具有重大的理论意义和现实意义。基于以上分析，本文系统考虑中国人民银行和三家监管机构之间金融监管合作的成本支出、收益分配等因素，构建演化博弈模型对我国金融监管合作问题进行分析，再引入惩罚和保障机制对模型做进一步讨论。探究各参数变化对金融监管主体的策略选择带来哪些影响，希望从理论上对这几个重大的现实问题做出解答，得出对我国金融监管和金融发展有重要启示意义的结论。
模型解析和数值仿真得出结论：“机会主义”和金融监管协调机制不健全是造成我国金融监管中合作行为长期处于低效率状态的主要原因；金融监管主体的初始收益大小直接影响监管主体的策略选择，但是仍然有很大的可能出现“囚徒困境”；金融监管合作中引入惩罚和保障机制后，监管主体的策略选择有了明显改变；构建完整的金融监管协调机构，加强金融监管各方信息共享可以有效改善金融监管合作的制度环境。
(五)在后金融危机时代，探究国际金融监管发展的新理念和新趋势，指出中国在这一历史契机中政策的选择具有深刻的理论和现实意义。通过构建国际金融监管演化博弈模型，分析在国际金融监管过程中金融监管主体的策略选择问题。拟从理论上深入剖析以下几个非常重要的现实问题：首先，国际金融监管过程中每个国家作为单独的个体都是以实现自身利益最大化为目标，在现有的国际金融监管体系和国际金融监管协调机制下，选择监管合作策略否是金融监管主体的最优选择？其次，金融国际化发展的背景下，为了应对可能再次出现的国际金融危机，国际上对金融监管合作的要求越来越迫切，那么每个国家的金融监管机构选择监管合作策略的可能性有多大以及哪些因素影响其策略选择？最后，在深入解析国际金融监管问题实质的基础上，认清国际间既有矛盾冲突又有相互依赖关系的事实，中国作为一个正在迅速和平崛起的经济大国在未来的国际金融监管中如何定位？可以说对国际金融监管问题的研究兼具合理性与适用性。基于此，本文构建国际金融监管演化博弈模型，研究在国际金融监管过程中金融监管主体的策略选择问题，并对中国在这一历史契机中政策的选择进行分析。
模型求解和数值仿真结果表明：在国际金融监管中，金融监管主体注重短期利益会选择监管竞争策略，注重长期利益则会选择监管合作策略；由于很难改变多数监管主体追求短期利益的现状，致使在国际金融监管过程中“囚徒困境”问题依然存在；中国面对复杂多变的国际金融环境，应该积极参与国际金融监管合作，促进国际金融机构改革和国际金融监管体系的构建，提升中国在国际金融体系中的地位以及在国际金融监管规则制定中的话语权。
Scholars at home and abroad on the basis of research on financial risks and financialregulation, the use of game theory and methods of China's financial risks and financialregulatory issues related to the theoretical analysis and empirical research has made someimportant theoretical significance andconclusions of practical significance, and practicalissues policy recommendations.
(1) Entering the21st century, China's economic development will face more complexand severe domestic and international situation, China's economic development has a crucialfinancial market development, will directly affect our ability to achieve sustainablemacroeconomic the healthy development of the key factors. Must further enhance the degreeof attention of the country's financial market, we start from the analysis of the status quo ofChina's financial market development, financial markets operability and maneuverability ofthe dual perspective of China's financial market equilibrium problem. Benassynon-equilibrium framework to construct the model of supply and demand relationshipbetween financial institutions and financial enterprises, explore the main factors affectingfinancial institutions and the finance corporate strategy selected, the following significantpractical problems to be solved theoretically: First, China's financial system is not perfect,financing enterprise needs are not met, the level of financing the financing of enterprises inthe non-market manipulation under the quota allocation? Second, given the number of financecompanies can manipulate the market quota signal to the entire financial market what kind ofimpact? Third, in the future development of the country's financial market, how to ensure the long-term and stable development of the financial markets? The main theoretical contributionof this paper is based on the actual situation of China's financial market financing rationingbased on China's financial markets from the point of view of non-equilibrium analysis. Expectthis theory on the basis of the model solution, several major practical problems in answeringdraw conclusions have important implications for the development of China's financialmarket.
The results show that: in the financial markets can not be manipulated; prone toexpansion of financial risk in the financial markets steerable. In order to promote the healthydevelopment of the stability of China's financial market as soon as possible to establish amodern enterprise system of financial market institutions, rich Kim Seung types of marketand broaden the types of investment options and the investor base, continue to reform andimprove the market system of the golden touch, to form a comprehensive range of financialmarket system, guard against financial market risk, improve the ability to resist risks offinancial institutions, strengthen market supervision of the golden touch, while reform KimSeung pattern of market supervision.
(2) China's economy is in transition, is necessary to guard against financial risks thatmay occur. In order to explore the financial risk to pass and financial risk accumulationprocess, we build a model of the game between the commercial banks and finance companies,as well as the game between the commercial banks and the central bank model explore theimpact of financial risk and shift the financial risks of the main factors contemplated fromtheoretically solve the following significant practical problems: First, China's financial systemis not perfect, obviously financing to accompany the problem exists in the financial markets,then see how the connotation of China's financial risks? Second, enterprises have continuedfinancing needs, in order to promote the economic development needs of the commercialbanks more indirect financing the enterprise, how the financial risk in financing the gradualaccumulation? Those are the main factors affecting the financing risks accumulated? Third,shift the financial risk between the commercial banks and the Central Bank of the internalmechanism and factors influencing what? Expectations theory these great practical problemsin answering important implications of financial risk transfer and accumulation of financialrisks related issues conclusions.
Concluded by the solution of the model and analysis: in the process of corporate financeto financial institutions, due to asymmetric information between banks and enterprises, and financial decision-making body of the soft budget constraint, resulting in a high debt and thebank formed a huge amount of non-performing loans;the results of the game between thecommercial banks and the central bank will also increase in the liabilities of the central bankand currency issuance. Formed from the control of financial risks: increased transparency ofinformation between the commercial banks and finance companies; improve the internalmanagement system of commercial banks and financing technology, strict control of illegaloperations; enhance awareness to the prevention of financial risks and to establish theappropriate measures to guard against financial risks; companies need to cultivate the basis oftheir own development needs and more able to look at all the financial risks that may occur inthe process of financing talent from an international perspective; further improve China'sfinancial industry laws and regulations system construction, to make up for our many defectsexisting financial laws and institutional environment of the financial market as a whole;improve our financial institutions the information disclosure system. Construction of acomplete set of accurate identification, early warning, as well as evaluating the financial riskmethodology.
(3) the developed countries loose financial regulation and excessive financial innovation,which eventually led suffered heavy losses in the financial crisis. China's financial regulatoryinfrastructure is still very weak, and government and regulatory agencies is the main drivingforce of the regional financial innovation. In this paper, evolutionary game theory and methodof analysis of China's financial institutions and regulatory bodies in the course of the gamebetween the strategic choice. We build the game model between the financial institutions andregulatory bodies, to explore the main factors to affect the strategic choices of financialinstitutions and regulatory bodies, following significant practical problems to be solvedtheoretically: First, China's financial system is not perfect, many problems still need financialinnovation, social welfare is financial innovation, internal driving force of China's financialinstitutions? Second, China needs to continue financial innovation, which requires financialderegulation, but for the stability of the financial system can not ignore the financial risks thatmay arise, then the impact of the strategic choices of the main factors of China's regulatorybodies are those? Third, the future development of China's financial innovation and financialsupervision, how to make the financial regulatory system to protect financial innovation, howto play a reasonable financial innovation saves regulatory resources, enhance the role ofregulatory efficiency, and ultimately China's financial innovation and financial supervision of the between each other. On the basis of the model solution, the use of numerical simulation onthe model parameters affect the strategic choices of financial institutions and regulatorybodies for further analysis, the expectations from theory to make answer these several majorpractical problems, come to our country financial innovation and financial supervisionconclusions have important implications.
Model analytical and numerical simulation concluded: regulatory resource consumptionis too large to slightly less than the supervision of regulatory bodies for financial innovation;lack of consideration for the welfare of the community as a whole as well as innovative lowercost resulting in strong financial institutions on financial innovation inputs; excessive thelower level of innovation for the high-yield and punish financial institutions to choose themost important reason for excessive innovation. For the post-crisis era, China's financialinnovation and financial supervision: to continue to strengthen financial regulation to focus onimproving the efficiency of supervision; moderately increased financial innovation, andactively guide the reasonable innovation of financial institutions can not be ignored; efforts topromote balanced development of financial regulation and financial innovation; strengthenfinancial consumer protection.
(4) China's financial regulatory infrastructure is still very weak, and all the peopleinvolved in financial activities, the risk of the financial system is hugely magnified. In thispaper, evolutionary game theory and method of analysis of the financial regulatorycooperation between the People's Bank of China and three financial regulators, reveal thedeep-seated reasons affecting financial regulatory body strategy selection and the efficiencyof cooperation in China's financial regulatory process. The international financial crisiscontinued to obscure the reality of the domestic financial risk hugely magnified to China'scooperation in financial regulation some problems to solve new problems: First of all, in thecountry's financial market, the People's Bank of China and the three regulatory agencies havetheir respective areas of regulatory, market economic system makes financial regulatory bodyto pursue their own interests to maximize the most fundamental goal, then select on the issueof financial regulation Regulatory Cooperation The strategy is the optimal strategy of bothsides choose? Secondly, in today's financial market environment and financial system, due toinformation asymmetry between the People's Bank of China and the three regulatory bodies inthe process of financial regulation, the two sides actively choose the possibility of regulatorycooperation strategy be? Finally, select the mechanism of action of regulatory cooperation strategy for achieving the regulatory body, the coordination of financial supervision of thefinancial regulatory system exists which institutional weaknesses, what is needed to improvethe financial regulatory system? The needs of real-world problems and theoretical researchgaps in these areas, making the study of China's financial regulatory cooperation has greattheoretical and practical significance. Based on the above analysis, the paper systematicallyconsider the costs of the financial regulatory cooperation between the People's Bank of Chinaand the three regulatory agencies, factors such as income distribution, to build evolutionarygame model analysis of China's financial regulatory cooperation, the introduction of penaltiesand protection mechanism to do the model further discussion. Explore the parameters changewhat impact the strategic choices of the financial regulatory body theory these great practicalproblems in answering the important implications of China's financial supervision andfinancial developments conclusion.
Model analytical and numerical simulation concluded:"opportunism" and coordinationof financial supervision mechanism is not perfect is the main cause of China's financialsupervision and long-term cooperative behavior in the low efficiency of state; initial return ofthe financial regulatory body directly affects the size of the regulatory body strategic choices,but there are still a lot of possible "prisoner's Dilemma"; cooperation in financial regulation,the introduction of punishment and protection mechanisms, the strategic choices of theregulatory body has been significantly changed; build a complete coordination of financialsupervision institutions, strengthen financial supervision and parties information sharing caneffectively improve the institutional environment of cooperation in financial regulation.
(5) To explore the development of international financial regulation in the post-crisis era,new ideas and new trends, pointed out that China has profound theoretical and practicalsignificance in the historical opportunity policy choices. In this paper, by constructing theinternational financial regulatory evolution game model of strategic choice in the process ofinternational financial regulation financial regulatory body. This paper theoretically-depthanalysis of the following very important practical problem: First, each country in theinternational financial regulatory process in order to achieve their own interests as a separateindividual maximization as the goal, the existing international financial regulatory system andinternational financial regulatory coordination mechanism to select regulatory cooperationstrategy No financial regulatory bodythe optimal choice? Secondly, the financial internationaldevelopment context, in order to cope with the possible re-emergence of the international financial crisis, international cooperation in financial regulation more and more urgent, thenhow likely each country's financial regulators to select regulatory cooperation strategy andwhat factors affect their strategic choices? Finally, in-depth analysis of international financialregulation, the substance of the matter based on a clear understanding of both internationalconflicts and interdependencies fact, China's peaceful rise as a rapidly largest economy in thefuture of international financial regulation how to locate? It can be said that the internationalfinancial regulatory issues both rationality and applicability. Based on this, we build theinternational financial regulatory evolution game model to study the financial regulatory bodyin the process of international financial regulatory policy choice, and analysis of the policyoptions in this historic opportunity.
Model solution and numerical simulation results show that: in international financialregulation, financial regulation, the main focus on short-term interests will choose regulatorycompetition strategy, focus on the long-term benefits will be chosen regulatory cooperationstrategy; Because it is difficult to change the majority of the regulatory body the pursuit ofshort-term interests of the status quo, resulting in the face of complex and volatileinternational financial environment, should actively participate in international cooperation infinancial regulation, and promote the reform of the international financial institutions andinternational financial regulatory system, improve China's international in the process ofinternational financial regulation "prisoner's dilemma" problem still exits’ position in thefinancial system, and the right to speak in the international financial regulatory rulemaking.
(一)进入21世界，我国经济发展必将面对更为复杂严峻的国内外形势，而对我国经济发展有着至关重要的金融市场如何发展，是直接影响到我国宏观经济能否实现可持续健康发展的关键因素之一。必须进一步提高对我国金融市场的重视程度。本文从分析我国金融市场发展现状入手，以金融市场可操纵性和不可操纵性的双重视角来研究我国金融市场的均衡问题。在贝纳西的非均衡理论框架下，构建金融机构与融资企业之间的供求关系模型，探究影响金融机构和融资企业策略选择的主要因素，拟从理论上解决以下几个重大现实问题：第一，由于目前我国金融体系尚不完善，当融资企业的融资需求得不到满足时，在不可操纵市场配额下融资企业的融资水平如何分配？第二，在可操纵市场配额下融资企业的所给出的数量信号对整个金融市场有什么样的影响？第三，在我国金融市场未来的发展中，如何确保金融市场的长期稳定发展？本文的主要理论贡献是以我国金融市场中融资配给的实际情况为基础，从非均衡的角度对我国金融市场进行分析。在模型求解的基础上，期望从理论上对这几个重大的现实问题做出解答，得出对我国金融市场发展有重要启示意义的结论。
研究结果表明：在不可操纵的金融市场中，融资企业的融资需求不会扩大金融风险；在可操纵的金融市场中容易出现金融风险扩大的问题。为了促进稳定我国金融市场的健康发展，需要尽快建立金融市场机构的现代企业制度，丰富金融市场交易种类，拓宽投资选择类型和投资者范围，不断改革和完善金融市场制度，形成全面的金融市场体系，防范金融市场风险，提高金融机构抗风险能力，加强金触市场监管，同时改革金融市场监管格局。
(二)我国经济正处于转型期，防范可能发生的金融风险十分必要。为了探究金融风险的转嫁和金融风险积累过程，构建商业银行与融资企业之间的博弈模型，以及商业银行与中央银行之间博弈模型探究影响金融风险产生与金融风险转嫁的主要因素，拟从理论上解决以下几个重大现实问题：第一，由于目前我国金融市场发展还不成熟，金融市场中存在明显融资配给问题，那么如何理解我国金融风险的内涵？第二，企业有持续融资的需求，为了促进经济发展需要商业银行更多的对企业进行间接融资，金融风险如何在融资中逐渐积累？影响我国融资风险积累的主要因素有那些？第三，商业银行与中央银行之间的金融风险转嫁内在机制和影响因素有哪些？期望从理论上对这几个重大的现实问题做出解答，得出对我国金融风险转嫁和金融风险积累相关问题有重要启示意义的结论。
通过模型的求解和分析得出结论：在企业向金融机构融资的过程中，由于银企之间的信息不对称以及金融决策主体的预算软约束，造成了企业高负债和银行形成巨额不良债权；而商业银行与中央银行之间的博弈结果也必将是中央银行负债增加和货币增发。控制金融风险的形成需要：增加商业银行与融资企业之间的信息透明度；完善商业银行内部管理体制和提高融资技术，同时严格控制违规操作等问题；提升企业预防金融风险的意识和建立相应的防范金融风险措施；企业需要依据自身发展需求培养出更多，能够以国际角度看待融资过程中，可能发生的金融风险问题的金融人才；进一步完善我国与金融行业相关的各项法律法规制度建设，弥补我国金融市场整体的金融法律制度环境存在的诸多缺陷；完善我国金融机构的信息披露制度。构建一套完整的能够对金融风险进行准确识别、预警以及评价的方法体系。
(三)发达国家宽松的金融监管和过度的金融创新，最终导致在金融危机中遭受重创。目前我国金融监管基础还非常薄弱，而政府和监管机构又是区域金融创新的主要推动力量。运用演化博弈理论和方法分析我国金融机构与监管机构在相互博弈过程中的策略选择问题。通过构建金融机构与监管机构之间的博弈模型，探究影响金融机构和监管机构策略选择的主要因素，拟从理论上解决以下几个重大现实问题：第一，由于目前我国金融体系尚不完善，很多问题的解决仍需要金融创新，那么社会福利性是否是我国金融机构的金融创新内在驱动力？第二，我国需要持续的金融创新，这要求放松金融监管，但是为了金融系统的稳定又不能忽视可能出现的金融风险，那么影响我国监管机构策略选择的主要因素有那些？第三，在我国金融创新和金融监管未来的发展中，如何使金融监管成为金融创新的制度保障，如何发挥合理金融创新节约监管资源、提高监管效率的作用，最终实现我国金融创新与金融监管之间的相互补充。在模型求解的基础上，运用数值仿真对模型中各参数变化对金融机构和监管机构策略选择的影响做进一步分析，期望从理论上对这几个重大的现实问题做出解答，得出对我国金融创新和金融监管有重要启示意义的结论。
模型解析和数值仿真得出结论：监管资源消耗过大导致监管机构对金融创新的监管略显不足；缺乏对社会整体福利的考虑以及创新的成本较低造成金融机构对金融创新的投入旺盛；过度创新获得的高收益和惩罚水平较低是金融机构选择过度创新的最主要原因。对于后金融危机时代我国的金融创新与金融监管:继续加强金融监管的同时注重提高监管效率；适度加大金融创新，不能忽视对金融机构合理创新的积极引导；努力推进金融监管和金融创新平衡发展；加强金融消费者权益保护。
(四)目前我国金融监管基础还非常薄弱，在全民参与的金融活动中，金融系统风险被无限放大。运用演化博弈理论和方法分析中国人民银行与三家金融监管机构之间的金融监管合作问题，揭示在我国金融监管过程中影响金融监管主体策略选择与合作效率的深层次原因。国际金融危机持续难解和国内金融风险无限放大的现实，给我国金融监管合作提出一些亟待解决新问题：首先，在我国金融市场中，中国人民银行与三家监管机构都有各自的监管领域，市场经济体制使得金融监管主体都以追求自身利益最大化为最根本目标，那么在金融监管问题上选择监管合作策略是否是双方最优策略选择？其次，在如今的金融市场环境和金融体制下，由于中国人民银行与三家监管机构之间的信息不对称，双方在金融监管过程中主动选择监管合作策略的可能性有多大？最后，金融监管协调对实现监管主体选择监管合作策略的作用机理，目前我国的金融监管体制存在哪些体制缺陷，需要哪些措施来完善金融监管体制？现实问题的需要和这几方面理论研究的空白，使得研究我国金融监管合作问题具有重大的理论意义和现实意义。基于以上分析，本文系统考虑中国人民银行和三家监管机构之间金融监管合作的成本支出、收益分配等因素，构建演化博弈模型对我国金融监管合作问题进行分析，再引入惩罚和保障机制对模型做进一步讨论。探究各参数变化对金融监管主体的策略选择带来哪些影响，希望从理论上对这几个重大的现实问题做出解答，得出对我国金融监管和金融发展有重要启示意义的结论。
模型解析和数值仿真得出结论：“机会主义”和金融监管协调机制不健全是造成我国金融监管中合作行为长期处于低效率状态的主要原因；金融监管主体的初始收益大小直接影响监管主体的策略选择，但是仍然有很大的可能出现“囚徒困境”；金融监管合作中引入惩罚和保障机制后，监管主体的策略选择有了明显改变；构建完整的金融监管协调机构，加强金融监管各方信息共享可以有效改善金融监管合作的制度环境。
(五)在后金融危机时代，探究国际金融监管发展的新理念和新趋势，指出中国在这一历史契机中政策的选择具有深刻的理论和现实意义。通过构建国际金融监管演化博弈模型，分析在国际金融监管过程中金融监管主体的策略选择问题。拟从理论上深入剖析以下几个非常重要的现实问题：首先，国际金融监管过程中每个国家作为单独的个体都是以实现自身利益最大化为目标，在现有的国际金融监管体系和国际金融监管协调机制下，选择监管合作策略否是金融监管主体的最优选择？其次，金融国际化发展的背景下，为了应对可能再次出现的国际金融危机，国际上对金融监管合作的要求越来越迫切，那么每个国家的金融监管机构选择监管合作策略的可能性有多大以及哪些因素影响其策略选择？最后，在深入解析国际金融监管问题实质的基础上，认清国际间既有矛盾冲突又有相互依赖关系的事实，中国作为一个正在迅速和平崛起的经济大国在未来的国际金融监管中如何定位？可以说对国际金融监管问题的研究兼具合理性与适用性。基于此，本文构建国际金融监管演化博弈模型，研究在国际金融监管过程中金融监管主体的策略选择问题，并对中国在这一历史契机中政策的选择进行分析。
模型求解和数值仿真结果表明：在国际金融监管中，金融监管主体注重短期利益会选择监管竞争策略，注重长期利益则会选择监管合作策略；由于很难改变多数监管主体追求短期利益的现状，致使在国际金融监管过程中“囚徒困境”问题依然存在；中国面对复杂多变的国际金融环境，应该积极参与国际金融监管合作，促进国际金融机构改革和国际金融监管体系的构建，提升中国在国际金融体系中的地位以及在国际金融监管规则制定中的话语权。
Scholars at home and abroad on the basis of research on financial risks and financialregulation, the use of game theory and methods of China's financial risks and financialregulatory issues related to the theoretical analysis and empirical research has made someimportant theoretical significance andconclusions of practical significance, and practicalissues policy recommendations.
(1) Entering the21st century, China's economic development will face more complexand severe domestic and international situation, China's economic development has a crucialfinancial market development, will directly affect our ability to achieve sustainablemacroeconomic the healthy development of the key factors. Must further enhance the degreeof attention of the country's financial market, we start from the analysis of the status quo ofChina's financial market development, financial markets operability and maneuverability ofthe dual perspective of China's financial market equilibrium problem. Benassynon-equilibrium framework to construct the model of supply and demand relationshipbetween financial institutions and financial enterprises, explore the main factors affectingfinancial institutions and the finance corporate strategy selected, the following significantpractical problems to be solved theoretically: First, China's financial system is not perfect,financing enterprise needs are not met, the level of financing the financing of enterprises inthe non-market manipulation under the quota allocation? Second, given the number of financecompanies can manipulate the market quota signal to the entire financial market what kind ofimpact? Third, in the future development of the country's financial market, how to ensure the long-term and stable development of the financial markets? The main theoretical contributionof this paper is based on the actual situation of China's financial market financing rationingbased on China's financial markets from the point of view of non-equilibrium analysis. Expectthis theory on the basis of the model solution, several major practical problems in answeringdraw conclusions have important implications for the development of China's financialmarket.
The results show that: in the financial markets can not be manipulated; prone toexpansion of financial risk in the financial markets steerable. In order to promote the healthydevelopment of the stability of China's financial market as soon as possible to establish amodern enterprise system of financial market institutions, rich Kim Seung types of marketand broaden the types of investment options and the investor base, continue to reform andimprove the market system of the golden touch, to form a comprehensive range of financialmarket system, guard against financial market risk, improve the ability to resist risks offinancial institutions, strengthen market supervision of the golden touch, while reform KimSeung pattern of market supervision.
(2) China's economy is in transition, is necessary to guard against financial risks thatmay occur. In order to explore the financial risk to pass and financial risk accumulationprocess, we build a model of the game between the commercial banks and finance companies,as well as the game between the commercial banks and the central bank model explore theimpact of financial risk and shift the financial risks of the main factors contemplated fromtheoretically solve the following significant practical problems: First, China's financial systemis not perfect, obviously financing to accompany the problem exists in the financial markets,then see how the connotation of China's financial risks? Second, enterprises have continuedfinancing needs, in order to promote the economic development needs of the commercialbanks more indirect financing the enterprise, how the financial risk in financing the gradualaccumulation? Those are the main factors affecting the financing risks accumulated? Third,shift the financial risk between the commercial banks and the Central Bank of the internalmechanism and factors influencing what? Expectations theory these great practical problemsin answering important implications of financial risk transfer and accumulation of financialrisks related issues conclusions.
Concluded by the solution of the model and analysis: in the process of corporate financeto financial institutions, due to asymmetric information between banks and enterprises, and financial decision-making body of the soft budget constraint, resulting in a high debt and thebank formed a huge amount of non-performing loans;the results of the game between thecommercial banks and the central bank will also increase in the liabilities of the central bankand currency issuance. Formed from the control of financial risks: increased transparency ofinformation between the commercial banks and finance companies; improve the internalmanagement system of commercial banks and financing technology, strict control of illegaloperations; enhance awareness to the prevention of financial risks and to establish theappropriate measures to guard against financial risks; companies need to cultivate the basis oftheir own development needs and more able to look at all the financial risks that may occur inthe process of financing talent from an international perspective; further improve China'sfinancial industry laws and regulations system construction, to make up for our many defectsexisting financial laws and institutional environment of the financial market as a whole;improve our financial institutions the information disclosure system. Construction of acomplete set of accurate identification, early warning, as well as evaluating the financial riskmethodology.
(3) the developed countries loose financial regulation and excessive financial innovation,which eventually led suffered heavy losses in the financial crisis. China's financial regulatoryinfrastructure is still very weak, and government and regulatory agencies is the main drivingforce of the regional financial innovation. In this paper, evolutionary game theory and methodof analysis of China's financial institutions and regulatory bodies in the course of the gamebetween the strategic choice. We build the game model between the financial institutions andregulatory bodies, to explore the main factors to affect the strategic choices of financialinstitutions and regulatory bodies, following significant practical problems to be solvedtheoretically: First, China's financial system is not perfect, many problems still need financialinnovation, social welfare is financial innovation, internal driving force of China's financialinstitutions? Second, China needs to continue financial innovation, which requires financialderegulation, but for the stability of the financial system can not ignore the financial risks thatmay arise, then the impact of the strategic choices of the main factors of China's regulatorybodies are those? Third, the future development of China's financial innovation and financialsupervision, how to make the financial regulatory system to protect financial innovation, howto play a reasonable financial innovation saves regulatory resources, enhance the role ofregulatory efficiency, and ultimately China's financial innovation and financial supervision of the between each other. On the basis of the model solution, the use of numerical simulation onthe model parameters affect the strategic choices of financial institutions and regulatorybodies for further analysis, the expectations from theory to make answer these several majorpractical problems, come to our country financial innovation and financial supervisionconclusions have important implications.
Model analytical and numerical simulation concluded: regulatory resource consumptionis too large to slightly less than the supervision of regulatory bodies for financial innovation;lack of consideration for the welfare of the community as a whole as well as innovative lowercost resulting in strong financial institutions on financial innovation inputs; excessive thelower level of innovation for the high-yield and punish financial institutions to choose themost important reason for excessive innovation. For the post-crisis era, China's financialinnovation and financial supervision: to continue to strengthen financial regulation to focus onimproving the efficiency of supervision; moderately increased financial innovation, andactively guide the reasonable innovation of financial institutions can not be ignored; efforts topromote balanced development of financial regulation and financial innovation; strengthenfinancial consumer protection.
(4) China's financial regulatory infrastructure is still very weak, and all the peopleinvolved in financial activities, the risk of the financial system is hugely magnified. In thispaper, evolutionary game theory and method of analysis of the financial regulatorycooperation between the People's Bank of China and three financial regulators, reveal thedeep-seated reasons affecting financial regulatory body strategy selection and the efficiencyof cooperation in China's financial regulatory process. The international financial crisiscontinued to obscure the reality of the domestic financial risk hugely magnified to China'scooperation in financial regulation some problems to solve new problems: First of all, in thecountry's financial market, the People's Bank of China and the three regulatory agencies havetheir respective areas of regulatory, market economic system makes financial regulatory bodyto pursue their own interests to maximize the most fundamental goal, then select on the issueof financial regulation Regulatory Cooperation The strategy is the optimal strategy of bothsides choose? Secondly, in today's financial market environment and financial system, due toinformation asymmetry between the People's Bank of China and the three regulatory bodies inthe process of financial regulation, the two sides actively choose the possibility of regulatorycooperation strategy be? Finally, select the mechanism of action of regulatory cooperation strategy for achieving the regulatory body, the coordination of financial supervision of thefinancial regulatory system exists which institutional weaknesses, what is needed to improvethe financial regulatory system? The needs of real-world problems and theoretical researchgaps in these areas, making the study of China's financial regulatory cooperation has greattheoretical and practical significance. Based on the above analysis, the paper systematicallyconsider the costs of the financial regulatory cooperation between the People's Bank of Chinaand the three regulatory agencies, factors such as income distribution, to build evolutionarygame model analysis of China's financial regulatory cooperation, the introduction of penaltiesand protection mechanism to do the model further discussion. Explore the parameters changewhat impact the strategic choices of the financial regulatory body theory these great practicalproblems in answering the important implications of China's financial supervision andfinancial developments conclusion.
Model analytical and numerical simulation concluded:"opportunism" and coordinationof financial supervision mechanism is not perfect is the main cause of China's financialsupervision and long-term cooperative behavior in the low efficiency of state; initial return ofthe financial regulatory body directly affects the size of the regulatory body strategic choices,but there are still a lot of possible "prisoner's Dilemma"; cooperation in financial regulation,the introduction of punishment and protection mechanisms, the strategic choices of theregulatory body has been significantly changed; build a complete coordination of financialsupervision institutions, strengthen financial supervision and parties information sharing caneffectively improve the institutional environment of cooperation in financial regulation.
(5) To explore the development of international financial regulation in the post-crisis era,new ideas and new trends, pointed out that China has profound theoretical and practicalsignificance in the historical opportunity policy choices. In this paper, by constructing theinternational financial regulatory evolution game model of strategic choice in the process ofinternational financial regulation financial regulatory body. This paper theoretically-depthanalysis of the following very important practical problem: First, each country in theinternational financial regulatory process in order to achieve their own interests as a separateindividual maximization as the goal, the existing international financial regulatory system andinternational financial regulatory coordination mechanism to select regulatory cooperationstrategy No financial regulatory bodythe optimal choice? Secondly, the financial internationaldevelopment context, in order to cope with the possible re-emergence of the international financial crisis, international cooperation in financial regulation more and more urgent, thenhow likely each country's financial regulators to select regulatory cooperation strategy andwhat factors affect their strategic choices? Finally, in-depth analysis of international financialregulation, the substance of the matter based on a clear understanding of both internationalconflicts and interdependencies fact, China's peaceful rise as a rapidly largest economy in thefuture of international financial regulation how to locate? It can be said that the internationalfinancial regulatory issues both rationality and applicability. Based on this, we build theinternational financial regulatory evolution game model to study the financial regulatory bodyin the process of international financial regulatory policy choice, and analysis of the policyoptions in this historic opportunity.
Model solution and numerical simulation results show that: in international financialregulation, financial regulation, the main focus on short-term interests will choose regulatorycompetition strategy, focus on the long-term benefits will be chosen regulatory cooperationstrategy; Because it is difficult to change the majority of the regulatory body the pursuit ofshort-term interests of the status quo, resulting in the face of complex and volatileinternational financial environment, should actively participate in international cooperation infinancial regulation, and promote the reform of the international financial institutions andinternational financial regulatory system, improve China's international in the process ofinternational financial regulation "prisoner's dilemma" problem still exits’ position in thefinancial system, and the right to speak in the international financial regulatory rulemaking.
引文
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