股权结构、利益相关者行为与代理成本
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摘要
股权结构作为公司治理微观结构中最重要的因素，一直受到学术界的关注，股权结构及其引发的形形色色的利益侵害与投资者保护问题始终是公司治理研究的核心问题。中国独特的制度背景为丰富这类研究内容提供了一个非常好的研究场所。本文遵循“股权结构—利益相关者行为—代理成本”(简称SCC)这样一个研究思路，在对中国上市公司股权结构系统考察的基础上，分析了不同股权结构下，上市公司主要利益相关者——股东(控股股东)、债权人和经理人可能的代理行为，并对因此导致的代理成本提出了假说。在此基础上，对中国上市公司股权结构与权益代理成本、债务代理成本以及大股东与中小股东之间代理成本的关系进行了实证检验。对股权结构考察的结果显示，尽管中国上市公司通过IPO、股权再融资和股权收购等方式使得股权集中度呈逐年下降趋势，民营控股公司逐年增多，但是股权结构仍呈高度集中状态，国有控股上市公司仍占绝大部分，股权结构具有很强的壁垒效应。国有控股公司股权集中度高于民营控股公司，而民营控股公司的控制结构比国有控股公司复杂，控制权与现金流权的分离度较高。对不同股权结构下利益相关者行为及中国上市公司代理成本的分析研究表明，大股东的存在可以起到监督经理人的作用，股权结构为垄断型的公司在削弱权益代理成本方面与其他类型公司相比具有明显优势。国有控股上市公司权益代理成本显著低于民营控股上市公司。在股权高度集中的公司，债权人与控股股东可能存在合谋行为，其债务代理成本较低。在中国目前的法律环境下，民营控股上市公司与国有控股上市公司相比，控股股东更可能侵占外部投资者利益，因而债务代理成本较高，而其中通过买壳方式上市的公司其债务代理成本又显著高于直接上市类公司。上市公司控股股东通过关联交易、股利政策、股权再融资等方式侵占中小股东利益，最终控制人所持有的现金流权与控股股东的控制权私利成负相关关系；控制权与现金流权的分离度与控股股东的控制权私利成正相关关系。寡头型股权结构的公司其大股东与中小股东之间的代理问题并未得到遏制，随着股权制衡度的提高，控股股东与中小股东之间的代理成本反而提高。国有控股上市公司控股股东与中小股东代理成本要低于民营控股公司；买壳上市的民营控股股东比直接上市的民营控股股东有更强的动机掠夺中小股东。本文的研究表明，基于中国上市公司股权结构的公司治理研究，既应遵从LLSV范式，也不能脱离Berle和Means范式。
As the most important element of corporate governance microstructure, ownership structure has always been the focus of the academe. The various damages to the interests of outside investors' incurred by insiders misappropriations of companies' assets make ownership structure and protection for outside investors' interests the core issue of corporate governance. The special situation resulting from the particular regime of China provides an ideal ground to enrich the study in this area. Along the route of "ownership structure-stakeholder conduct-agency cost", this thesis has systematically examined different ownership structures of companies listed on exchanges of China and analyzed their principal stakeholders' corresponding conducts respectively. Based on these, we proposed some hypotheses about agency costs under different ownership structures in China listed companies and test them using the empirical data. The result of our research shows that although the concentration of ownership is declining through IPO, SEO and M&A and more and more privately controlled listed companies occur, the high concentration of ownership still prevails in the market in general and state controlled listed companies are the biggest part of the pie so far. The ownership structure of China listed companies has strong entrenchment effects. The ownership concentration of state controlled listed companies is higher than that of privately controlled listed companies, and the control structure of privately controlled listed companies is more complicated than that of state controlled listed companies. The theoretical analysis and the empirical study reveal that large shareholders can supervise management effectively, and monopoly ownership structure has significant advantage over the other of ownership structures in decreasing the conflict of interest between the management and the shareholder. The agency cost of the management in state controlled listed companies is lower than that in privately controlled listed companies. In companies with high ownership concentration, collusion may exists between creditors and controlling shareholders, and this may be one of the reasons of the lower level conflict of interest between them. In the present legal environment of China, controlling shareholders of privately controlled listed companies have stronger incentives to expropriate outsider investors than those of state controlled listed companies. This explains distinguishing higher agency cost in these companies, especially in those privately controlled listed companies going public by buyout of shell companies. So both the conflict of interests between creditors and shareholders and the conflict of interests between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders are more intense in privately controlled listed companies (specially those going public by buyout of shell companies) than that in state controlled listed companies. The controlling shareholders in China listed companies usually snatch the private benefits through manipulating affiliated transactions, SEO and dividend policies. There exists a direct relationship between controlling shareholders' private benefits and the degree of separation of cash flow ownership from right of control, whereas controlling shareholders' private benefits has a negative relationship with the level of cash flow ownership. Oligopoly shareholders cannot hold back the conflict of interest between the large shareholders and the minority shareholders. The ownership balance does not put a stop on the agency problem. On the contrary, the agency costs increase with the rise of rate of ownership balance, which is the total shares of the second and third largest shareholders divided by the shares of the largest shareholder. The study of this thesis reveals that both LLSV's model and Berle and Means's model should be followed when we study corporate governance based on ownership structures of China listed companies.
As the most important element of corporate governance microstructure, ownership structure has always been the focus of the academe. The various damages to the interests of outside investors' incurred by insiders misappropriations of companies' assets make ownership structure and protection for outside investors' interests the core issue of corporate governance. The special situation resulting from the particular regime of China provides an ideal ground to enrich the study in this area. Along the route of "ownership structure-stakeholder conduct-agency cost", this thesis has systematically examined different ownership structures of companies listed on exchanges of China and analyzed their principal stakeholders' corresponding conducts respectively. Based on these, we proposed some hypotheses about agency costs under different ownership structures in China listed companies and test them using the empirical data. The result of our research shows that although the concentration of ownership is declining through IPO, SEO and M&A and more and more privately controlled listed companies occur, the high concentration of ownership still prevails in the market in general and state controlled listed companies are the biggest part of the pie so far. The ownership structure of China listed companies has strong entrenchment effects. The ownership concentration of state controlled listed companies is higher than that of privately controlled listed companies, and the control structure of privately controlled listed companies is more complicated than that of state controlled listed companies. The theoretical analysis and the empirical study reveal that large shareholders can supervise management effectively, and monopoly ownership structure has significant advantage over the other of ownership structures in decreasing the conflict of interest between the management and the shareholder. The agency cost of the management in state controlled listed companies is lower than that in privately controlled listed companies. In companies with high ownership concentration, collusion may exists between creditors and controlling shareholders, and this may be one of the reasons of the lower level conflict of interest between them. In the present legal environment of China, controlling shareholders of privately controlled listed companies have stronger incentives to expropriate outsider investors than those of state controlled listed companies. This explains distinguishing higher agency cost in these companies, especially in those privately controlled listed companies going public by buyout of shell companies. So both the conflict of interests between creditors and shareholders and the conflict of interests between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders are more intense in privately controlled listed companies (specially those going public by buyout of shell companies) than that in state controlled listed companies. The controlling shareholders in China listed companies usually snatch the private benefits through manipulating affiliated transactions, SEO and dividend policies. There exists a direct relationship between controlling shareholders' private benefits and the degree of separation of cash flow ownership from right of control, whereas controlling shareholders' private benefits has a negative relationship with the level of cash flow ownership. Oligopoly shareholders cannot hold back the conflict of interest between the large shareholders and the minority shareholders. The ownership balance does not put a stop on the agency problem. On the contrary, the agency costs increase with the rise of rate of ownership balance, which is the total shares of the second and third largest shareholders divided by the shares of the largest shareholder. The study of this thesis reveals that both LLSV's model and Berle and Means's model should be followed when we study corporate governance based on ownership structures of China listed companies.
引文
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[121]张祥建、徐晋，“股权再融资与大股东控制的‘隧道效应’”，管理世界，2005，第11期。
[122]鹿小楠、张卫东，“中国民营上市公司发展研究”，上证研究报告，2004，第2辑。
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