政府技术采购中的创新激励机制研究
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摘要
政府技术采购（或公共技术采购）是指各级国家机关、事业单位和团体组织，使用财政性资金对创新技术或产品的直接或间接购买行为。不同于常规的政府采购，政府技术采购中的供应商或承包商需要通过R&D活动研制出在性能或成本方面满足政府需要的创新性产品或技术。按照政府是否是所采购的创新产品或技术的最终使用者，可将政府技术采购分为直接技术采购和间接技术采购，其中直接技术采购是指政府只利用自身的需求去促进技术创新，在购买过程中政府始终是技术或系统的最终用户，例如国防、电信、铁道部门的技术采购；而间接技术采购是指政府只是作为采购的一个组织者，集中与协调众多零散的私人需求，借此形成一个较大的市场来激励供应商的创新行为，促进创新产品的市场扩散，实现一定的经济、社会或环境目标。政府技术采购中的创新激励机制是指委托人即政府设计的一系列机制，通过这些机制的执行促使代理人即承包商或供应商在博弈过程中揭示自己的真实信息，从而激励承包商或供应商采取系统最优的R&D努力。
政府技术采购现已成为世界各国广泛使用的激励创新的政策工具。有研究表明，政府技术采购政策比广泛使用的R&D补贴政策在激励创新上更有效率。这是因为一方面市场需求拉动创新的机制同样适用政府采购市场。另一方面，政府采购市场也具有私人市场所不具有的一些特征，正是这些特征使得政府采购市场在促进技术创新的力量上在某些方面表现得比私人市场更为强大。在政府技术采购中政府采购方面临的主要问题之一就是政府采购方和供应商或承包商之间的信息不对称，即在授予采购合约之前政府采购方无法观测到承包商或供应商的R&D能力或效率，在授予合约之后无法观测到承包商或供应商的R&D努力水平。这会导致逆向选择和道德风险问题，主要表现在以下两方面：（1）为了获得政府采购合同，有些承包商利用政府采购方的信息劣势，夸大自己的技术实力和管理优势，极力隐瞒对自己不利的信息，以获取合同，导致在后期研制过程中，由于实力不济质量指标或项目进度达不到合同规定；（2）在获取合同之后，一些供应商利用自己的信息优势，隐藏自己降低成本的能力信息，或者并不努力的去进行技术创新，尽可能少地披露有关研制和生产信息，或者提供虚假的成本信息资料。
正是由于政府技术采购中信息不对称所导致的逆向选择和道德风险问题的存在，所以政府采购方必须进行机制设计以激励供应商如实的报告自己的信息，并采取最优的R&D努力水平。本文主要利用不完全信息博弈论的分析工具，结合政府技术采购的实践，研究了不同政府技术采购情形中的创新激励机制。本文研究的主要内容和结论如下：
（1）政府技术采购中激励创新的成本分担机制研究。论文分析和比较了信息对称和非对称情形下，风险中性的政府采购方和风险规避的承包商共同分担R&D成本的线性激励契约，发现最优激励契约中最后实际成本的不确定性越强，成本分担系数越小，出现成本超支时政府采购方对超支部分的分担比例越大，对供应商的固定支付也越大；供应商的R&D努力程度皆随成本不确定性的增加而降低，在不确定性程度相同的情况下，信息不对称情形下供应商的R&D努力程度要低于信息对称情形下的努力程度；信息不对称情形下的成本分担系数要小于对称条件下的成本分担系数。
（2）政府技术采购中激励创新的收益共享机制研究。论文考虑了这样一种机制：不具有承包商真实R&D效率信息的采购方在谈判中拥有出价的权力，采购方的不同出价意味着社会总收益在双方之间的不同分配，承包商只能选择接受或拒绝采购方的出价。若接受则交易达成；若拒绝，在下一轮谈判中采购方须出更高的价格。借由这一机制，在每轮出价之后采购方都可以获得更确切的供应方R&D效率信息，并据此信息修正对供应方类型的判断，然后利用这一新判断选择创新的质量以激励承包商采取使得期望社会总收益最大的R&D努力。论文得到了采购方与承包商的精炼贝叶斯均衡策略。研究发现；采购方和承包商希望得到的收益份额都由贴现率决定，且采购方愿意分享的份额要大于承包商希望得到的份额。
（3）政府技术采购中激励创新的研发竞赛机制研究。基于研发质量的不确定性，论文建立了研发竞赛的非合作博弈模型，分别探讨了信息对称和非对称情形下竞赛参与人与竞赛发起者的最优策略。研究发现：竞赛参与人的R&D投入水平在信息对称和非对称情形下都随自身R&D效率的降低而降低；竞赛参与人的类型信息不完全程度越高，参与人的均衡R&D投入越低；无论信息对称与否都存在着最优奖励使得竞赛发起者的期望收益最大。
（4）政府技术采购中激励创新的订单分配机制研究。论文研究了在两个竞争的供应商、一个政府采购机构和最终消费者组成的供应链中，当政府采购机构对供应商的R&D效率具有不对称信息时，如何设计订单分配机制以促进供应商之间的竞争，激励供应商进行R&D来降低生产成本，进而推动创新产品的市场扩散。具体分析了一价密封拍卖、订单均分拍卖、二价密封拍卖三种不同的订单分配机制下供应商的R&D努力情况，结论表明：三种拍卖机制下供应商的均衡R&D努力均随自身R&D效率的提高而增加；两个供应商之间R&D效率的差异越大，政府的期望采购价格越高；相比订单均分拍卖和二价拍卖，一价拍卖对创新产品的市场扩散最为有利。
（5）政府技术采购中激励创新的价格补贴机制研究。在上一部分结论的基础上，论文分析了政府价格补贴对供应商R&D的激励效果。论文构建了一个由两个竞争的供应商、一个政府采购机构和最终消费者组成的供应链模型，采购方通过招标方式向供应商采购物品，供应商的R&D活动可以降低自己的成本。分别考虑对供应商总额补贴、对供应商单位补贴和对消费者单位补贴三种不同形式下政府补贴对供应商的R&D努力和社会剩余的影响。研究发现：对供应商的总额补贴并不能激励供应商增加R&D努力，也不能增进社会剩余；对消费者和供应商的单位补贴在激励供应商的R&D努力和增进社会剩余方面具有相同的效果，且存在着一个最优的单位补贴额度使得总的社会剩余达到最大。
本文的创新之处主要体现在：
（1）论文突破了以往的研究中仅考虑承包商道德风险问题的局限，揭示了政府技术采购中承包商R&D努力与成本的不确定性及成本分担率之间的关系，并得到了线性的成本分担激励契约下政府采购方和承包商的最优策略。
论文考虑到现实的政府技术采购中信息的不对称除了会导致道德风险问题外，还会导致出现逆向选择问题，因而设计了风险中性的政府采购方和风险规避的供应商共同分担超支成本的线性契约，重点探讨了承包商R&D努力与成本的不确定性及成本分担率之间的关系。本文还假设承包商的成本估计和其R&D效率之间具有相关性，因而使得论文的结论更具有合理性。
（2）论文改进了以往的文献关于采购方与承包商保留价值假设的不足，提出了政府技术采购中基于多轮讨价还价的收益共享机制，发现了政府采购方和承包商收益共享率的决定因素，得到了激励创新的政府采购方和承包商的均衡策略。
论文考虑了单边信息不对称下政府采购方和承包商的采购交易后产生的社会总收益的分配，并在模型中假设创新对政府采购方的价值和承包商的创新成本具有一定的关联性，这一关联性是由所采购的创新产品的质量所决定的，因而更符合政府技术采购的实际，然后得出了采购方与承包商的精炼贝叶斯均衡策略。
（3）论文对政府间接采购中不同的订单分配机制和价格补贴机制进行了系统的分析和比较，提出了使得社会总剩余最大的订单分配机制和价格补贴机制，而以往的研究大多仅考虑了某一种订单分配机制或价格补贴机制。
现有的将拍卖机制引入到激励供应商创新行为的文献绝大多数假设采购数量都是事先固定的而不受到供应商投标报价的影响。论文在供应商和政府采购机构组成的两层供应链的基础上引入消费市场，使得零售商的采购数量由供应商的报价决定。论文还克服了以往的研究中大多仅考虑某一种订单分配机制或价格补贴机制的局限，建立了博弈模型探讨供应商的策略，并对三种不同的机制的R&D激励效应进行了比较，发现了其中最优的机制。
Government technology procurement(public technology procurement) is one kind of purchasingbehavior of state organs, institutions and official social organizations at all levels by the use of fiscal funds,directly or indirectly on the innovative technologies or products. In contrast to regular governmentprocurement, in government technology procurement suppliers or contractors need to carry out R&Dactivities to meet the needs of government purchaser on quality or cost. According to whether thegovernment is the end-users of innovative technologies or products, government technology procurementcan be divided into direct technology procurement and indirect technology procurement. In directtechnology procurement the government has always been the end users of procured products, technologiesor systems, such as defense, telecommunications, railway sector, and utilizes their own demands to promotetechnological innovation of suppliers.In indirect technology procurement the government is an organizer ofthe procurement, to gather together and coordinate the needs of many dispersed buyers, to encourage theinnovative behavior of suppliers, to promote the proliferation of innovative products in the market toachieve a certain economic, social or environmental objectives. Innovation incentive mechanism in thegovernment technology procurement refers to a series of mechanisms designed by the principal, namely thegovernment, with which to drive contractors or suppliers to reveal their true information in the game andmotivate contractors or suppliers taking the system optimal R&D efforts.
Government tehnology procurement has been emploied widely all over the world to motivateinnovation. Studies have shown that government technology procurement policies are more efficient thanthe widely used R&D subsidy policies to stimulate innovation. On one hand, government procurementmarket as a market first, the mechanisms that market demand constraints innovation still apply for. On theother hand, the government procurement market have some characteristics which the private market doesnot own, that make the government procurement market more powerful than the private market to promoteindependent innovation in some respects. One of the main problems for government in technologyprocurement is information asymmetry between the government purchasers and suppliers, which willundoubtedly leads to adverse selection and moral hazard. It is displayed mainly in two forms as below.(1)In order to get government procurement contracts, some suppliers often use the “information gaps” ofthe purchaser, to exaggerate their own technical strength and management advantages, try to conceal adverse information to obtain the contract, resulting in subsequent development process, quality indicatorsor progress of the project cannot reach the pre-requirements, or the cost overrun substantially.(2) In theproduction process, some suppliers use their information advantage to hide the ability to reduce costs anddo not seek to carry out technical innovation, or to disclose the development and production of informationas little as possible, or to provide the untrue cost information and list a lot of undue expenditure in the cost.
It is because of the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard incurred by informationasymmetry in government procurement, so it is necessary to design some incentive mechanism to motivatethe supplier truthfully report their information and carry out optimal R&D effort. This dissertation uses theanalytical tools of game theory, combines with government procurement practices, and researches severalincentive mechanisms in different government technology procurement scenarios. The main content andconclusions are as follows.
(1) Cost-sharing mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement. The thirdchapter examines linear incentive contract respectively with symmetric and asymmetric information, thatthe risk-neutral government purchasers and suppliers of risk aversion share cost overruns, and finds out thatunder conditions of asymmetric information cost-sharing coefficient is smaller than under symmetryconditions, the stronger R&D uncertainty the smaller the coefficient of cost-sharing, the less the sharingratio of the cost overruns by the government, and the greater the fixed payment to the supplier. Supplier’sR&D effort reduces with the increasing unceitainty of R&D cost and the effort is less with asymmetricinformation than with symmetric information.
(2) Revenue-sharing mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement. Inrevenue-sharing mechanism, the purchaser does not have the true information on R&D cost type of thecontractor, so the purchaser and contractors negotiate on how to share the total social revenue of thetransaction. In negotiating process the purchaser offers the price, and the supplier can only choose to acceptor reject. After each round of negotiations, the purchaser can obtain new information, upon which to amendthe judgment on the type of supplier and motivate supplier’s optimal R&D effort. Bayesian equilibriumstrategies of the purchaser and supplier are investigated. The study shows that share ratios of purchasersand contractors from the transaction are determined ultimately by the discount rate, and the share ratio thepurchaser is willing to share is greater than the contractors want.
(3) R&D contest mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement.Based onthe randomness of R&D quality, the chapter sets up a non-cooperative game model of R&D contest, and respectively explores the optimal strategy of contest sponsors and contestants under conditions ofincomplete information and incomplete information. The study shows that R&D investment level ofcontestants under conditions of incomplete information and incomplete information reduces as its ownR&D efficiency increases, and the higher the incompletion degree of the information of R&D contestants,the lower the equilibrium R&D investment. There exists an optimal reward to maximize the payoff of thecontest sponsor under each circumstance.
(4) Order-allocating mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement. Thechapter studies how to design the order allocation mechanism in a supply chain consisting of twocompeting suppliers and government purchaser with incomplete information on the supplier's R&Defficiency, for the purchaser to promote the competition between the suppliers and suppliers’ innovation toreduce production costs, and the market diffusion of the innovative products. Three order allocationmechanisms, namely first-price sealed auction, order halving auction, and second-price sealed auction arecompared, and conclusions are reached that equilibrium innovation efforts of the suppliers in the threeauction mechanism all increase with their own R&D efficiency; the greater the discrepancy of innovationefficiency of two suppliers, the higher the expected purchasing price of the government procurement;compared to orders halving auction and second-price sealed auction, first-price sealed auction is mostfavorable to market diffusion of the innovative products.
(5) Price subsidy mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement. Based onthe conclusions above, this chapter takes into account the incentive effects of government price subsidies. Asupply chain model is constructed comprised of two competing suppliers, a government purchaser and theconsumers, in which the government purchases from the supplier through auction, the suppliers’ R&Dactivities can lower their costs. The impact on the supplier's R&D efforts and social welfare of three kindsof subsidy forms, namely the lump sum subsidy to the supplier, unit subsidy to the supplier and unitsubsidy to the consumers are compared. The conclusions are reached that the lump sum subsidy tosuppliers can not motivate the supplier to increase the R&D efforts and also can not promote social welfare;unit subsidy to consumers and suppliers have the same effect on motivating the suppliers’ R&D efforts andimproving social surplus, and there exists an optimal unit subsidy amount maximizing social surplus.
The innovation of this dissertation is mainly reflected in three aspects.
(1)This dissertation breaks through the limitations that previous similar literatures only consider thecontractors' moral hazard problem, reveals the relationship between the uncertainty of contractor’s R&D costs and government purchaser’s cost-sharing ratio in government technology procurement, and findsgovernment purchaser and the contractor's optimal strategy under a linear cost-sharing incentive contract.
This dissertation takes into account the reality of government procurement that informationasymmetry also lead to adverse selection problems besides moral hazard, and thus designs a linear contractthat risk-neutral government procurement and the risk-aversion suppliers share cost overruns, and focus onrelationship between the uncertainty of contractor’s R&D costs and government purchaser’s cost-sharingratio. This dissertation’s assumption on the correlation between contractor's cost estimation and theefficiency of its R&D makes the conclusions of the paper is more reasonable.
(2) The dissertation remedies the deficiencies of the previous literatures’ assumptions on the purchaserand supplier reservation value, proposes a revenue-sharing mechanism based on several rounds ofbargaining in the government technology procurement, finds out the determinants of revenue-sharing ratio,and explores the equilibrium bidding strategy for suppliers and government purchaser.
In this paper, we consider the distribution of social revenue generated by the purchaser and thecontractor's procurement transaction under the unilateral asymmetric information, and assumes that thepurchaser and supplier’s reservation values are correlative, which is determined by the quality of innovativeproducts, and thus more in line with the government procurement practice, and then find out the purchaserand supplier’s equilibrium strategies based on the Bayesian equilibrium model.
(3) Different order-allocation mechanisms and price subsidy mechanism in the government's indirectprocurement have been systemically compared and analyzed. Orders allocation mechanism and pricesubsidy mechanism that maximize social welfare are put forward. While previous studies mostly consideronly a certain kind of order allocation mechanism or price subsidy mechanism.
Most of literatures that introduced auction mechanism to encourage suppliers’ innovation behaviorsmake assumptions that the size of procurement is fixed in advance and not subject to the influence of thesuppliers’ tender. This dissertation introduces the consumer market in the two-tier supply chain suppliersand government purchaser, so that the retailer's purchasing quantity is determined by the supplier offer. Inaddition the dissertation overcomes the deficiency that considers only one mechanism, sets up game modelto explore the strategy of the supplier, and finds out the optimal mechanism.
政府技术采购现已成为世界各国广泛使用的激励创新的政策工具。有研究表明，政府技术采购政策比广泛使用的R&D补贴政策在激励创新上更有效率。这是因为一方面市场需求拉动创新的机制同样适用政府采购市场。另一方面，政府采购市场也具有私人市场所不具有的一些特征，正是这些特征使得政府采购市场在促进技术创新的力量上在某些方面表现得比私人市场更为强大。在政府技术采购中政府采购方面临的主要问题之一就是政府采购方和供应商或承包商之间的信息不对称，即在授予采购合约之前政府采购方无法观测到承包商或供应商的R&D能力或效率，在授予合约之后无法观测到承包商或供应商的R&D努力水平。这会导致逆向选择和道德风险问题，主要表现在以下两方面：（1）为了获得政府采购合同，有些承包商利用政府采购方的信息劣势，夸大自己的技术实力和管理优势，极力隐瞒对自己不利的信息，以获取合同，导致在后期研制过程中，由于实力不济质量指标或项目进度达不到合同规定；（2）在获取合同之后，一些供应商利用自己的信息优势，隐藏自己降低成本的能力信息，或者并不努力的去进行技术创新，尽可能少地披露有关研制和生产信息，或者提供虚假的成本信息资料。
正是由于政府技术采购中信息不对称所导致的逆向选择和道德风险问题的存在，所以政府采购方必须进行机制设计以激励供应商如实的报告自己的信息，并采取最优的R&D努力水平。本文主要利用不完全信息博弈论的分析工具，结合政府技术采购的实践，研究了不同政府技术采购情形中的创新激励机制。本文研究的主要内容和结论如下：
（1）政府技术采购中激励创新的成本分担机制研究。论文分析和比较了信息对称和非对称情形下，风险中性的政府采购方和风险规避的承包商共同分担R&D成本的线性激励契约，发现最优激励契约中最后实际成本的不确定性越强，成本分担系数越小，出现成本超支时政府采购方对超支部分的分担比例越大，对供应商的固定支付也越大；供应商的R&D努力程度皆随成本不确定性的增加而降低，在不确定性程度相同的情况下，信息不对称情形下供应商的R&D努力程度要低于信息对称情形下的努力程度；信息不对称情形下的成本分担系数要小于对称条件下的成本分担系数。
（2）政府技术采购中激励创新的收益共享机制研究。论文考虑了这样一种机制：不具有承包商真实R&D效率信息的采购方在谈判中拥有出价的权力，采购方的不同出价意味着社会总收益在双方之间的不同分配，承包商只能选择接受或拒绝采购方的出价。若接受则交易达成；若拒绝，在下一轮谈判中采购方须出更高的价格。借由这一机制，在每轮出价之后采购方都可以获得更确切的供应方R&D效率信息，并据此信息修正对供应方类型的判断，然后利用这一新判断选择创新的质量以激励承包商采取使得期望社会总收益最大的R&D努力。论文得到了采购方与承包商的精炼贝叶斯均衡策略。研究发现；采购方和承包商希望得到的收益份额都由贴现率决定，且采购方愿意分享的份额要大于承包商希望得到的份额。
（3）政府技术采购中激励创新的研发竞赛机制研究。基于研发质量的不确定性，论文建立了研发竞赛的非合作博弈模型，分别探讨了信息对称和非对称情形下竞赛参与人与竞赛发起者的最优策略。研究发现：竞赛参与人的R&D投入水平在信息对称和非对称情形下都随自身R&D效率的降低而降低；竞赛参与人的类型信息不完全程度越高，参与人的均衡R&D投入越低；无论信息对称与否都存在着最优奖励使得竞赛发起者的期望收益最大。
（4）政府技术采购中激励创新的订单分配机制研究。论文研究了在两个竞争的供应商、一个政府采购机构和最终消费者组成的供应链中，当政府采购机构对供应商的R&D效率具有不对称信息时，如何设计订单分配机制以促进供应商之间的竞争，激励供应商进行R&D来降低生产成本，进而推动创新产品的市场扩散。具体分析了一价密封拍卖、订单均分拍卖、二价密封拍卖三种不同的订单分配机制下供应商的R&D努力情况，结论表明：三种拍卖机制下供应商的均衡R&D努力均随自身R&D效率的提高而增加；两个供应商之间R&D效率的差异越大，政府的期望采购价格越高；相比订单均分拍卖和二价拍卖，一价拍卖对创新产品的市场扩散最为有利。
（5）政府技术采购中激励创新的价格补贴机制研究。在上一部分结论的基础上，论文分析了政府价格补贴对供应商R&D的激励效果。论文构建了一个由两个竞争的供应商、一个政府采购机构和最终消费者组成的供应链模型，采购方通过招标方式向供应商采购物品，供应商的R&D活动可以降低自己的成本。分别考虑对供应商总额补贴、对供应商单位补贴和对消费者单位补贴三种不同形式下政府补贴对供应商的R&D努力和社会剩余的影响。研究发现：对供应商的总额补贴并不能激励供应商增加R&D努力，也不能增进社会剩余；对消费者和供应商的单位补贴在激励供应商的R&D努力和增进社会剩余方面具有相同的效果，且存在着一个最优的单位补贴额度使得总的社会剩余达到最大。
本文的创新之处主要体现在：
（1）论文突破了以往的研究中仅考虑承包商道德风险问题的局限，揭示了政府技术采购中承包商R&D努力与成本的不确定性及成本分担率之间的关系，并得到了线性的成本分担激励契约下政府采购方和承包商的最优策略。
论文考虑到现实的政府技术采购中信息的不对称除了会导致道德风险问题外，还会导致出现逆向选择问题，因而设计了风险中性的政府采购方和风险规避的供应商共同分担超支成本的线性契约，重点探讨了承包商R&D努力与成本的不确定性及成本分担率之间的关系。本文还假设承包商的成本估计和其R&D效率之间具有相关性，因而使得论文的结论更具有合理性。
（2）论文改进了以往的文献关于采购方与承包商保留价值假设的不足，提出了政府技术采购中基于多轮讨价还价的收益共享机制，发现了政府采购方和承包商收益共享率的决定因素，得到了激励创新的政府采购方和承包商的均衡策略。
论文考虑了单边信息不对称下政府采购方和承包商的采购交易后产生的社会总收益的分配，并在模型中假设创新对政府采购方的价值和承包商的创新成本具有一定的关联性，这一关联性是由所采购的创新产品的质量所决定的，因而更符合政府技术采购的实际，然后得出了采购方与承包商的精炼贝叶斯均衡策略。
（3）论文对政府间接采购中不同的订单分配机制和价格补贴机制进行了系统的分析和比较，提出了使得社会总剩余最大的订单分配机制和价格补贴机制，而以往的研究大多仅考虑了某一种订单分配机制或价格补贴机制。
现有的将拍卖机制引入到激励供应商创新行为的文献绝大多数假设采购数量都是事先固定的而不受到供应商投标报价的影响。论文在供应商和政府采购机构组成的两层供应链的基础上引入消费市场，使得零售商的采购数量由供应商的报价决定。论文还克服了以往的研究中大多仅考虑某一种订单分配机制或价格补贴机制的局限，建立了博弈模型探讨供应商的策略，并对三种不同的机制的R&D激励效应进行了比较，发现了其中最优的机制。
Government technology procurement(public technology procurement) is one kind of purchasingbehavior of state organs, institutions and official social organizations at all levels by the use of fiscal funds,directly or indirectly on the innovative technologies or products. In contrast to regular governmentprocurement, in government technology procurement suppliers or contractors need to carry out R&Dactivities to meet the needs of government purchaser on quality or cost. According to whether thegovernment is the end-users of innovative technologies or products, government technology procurementcan be divided into direct technology procurement and indirect technology procurement. In directtechnology procurement the government has always been the end users of procured products, technologiesor systems, such as defense, telecommunications, railway sector, and utilizes their own demands to promotetechnological innovation of suppliers.In indirect technology procurement the government is an organizer ofthe procurement, to gather together and coordinate the needs of many dispersed buyers, to encourage theinnovative behavior of suppliers, to promote the proliferation of innovative products in the market toachieve a certain economic, social or environmental objectives. Innovation incentive mechanism in thegovernment technology procurement refers to a series of mechanisms designed by the principal, namely thegovernment, with which to drive contractors or suppliers to reveal their true information in the game andmotivate contractors or suppliers taking the system optimal R&D efforts.
Government tehnology procurement has been emploied widely all over the world to motivateinnovation. Studies have shown that government technology procurement policies are more efficient thanthe widely used R&D subsidy policies to stimulate innovation. On one hand, government procurementmarket as a market first, the mechanisms that market demand constraints innovation still apply for. On theother hand, the government procurement market have some characteristics which the private market doesnot own, that make the government procurement market more powerful than the private market to promoteindependent innovation in some respects. One of the main problems for government in technologyprocurement is information asymmetry between the government purchasers and suppliers, which willundoubtedly leads to adverse selection and moral hazard. It is displayed mainly in two forms as below.(1)In order to get government procurement contracts, some suppliers often use the “information gaps” ofthe purchaser, to exaggerate their own technical strength and management advantages, try to conceal adverse information to obtain the contract, resulting in subsequent development process, quality indicatorsor progress of the project cannot reach the pre-requirements, or the cost overrun substantially.(2) In theproduction process, some suppliers use their information advantage to hide the ability to reduce costs anddo not seek to carry out technical innovation, or to disclose the development and production of informationas little as possible, or to provide the untrue cost information and list a lot of undue expenditure in the cost.
It is because of the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard incurred by informationasymmetry in government procurement, so it is necessary to design some incentive mechanism to motivatethe supplier truthfully report their information and carry out optimal R&D effort. This dissertation uses theanalytical tools of game theory, combines with government procurement practices, and researches severalincentive mechanisms in different government technology procurement scenarios. The main content andconclusions are as follows.
(1) Cost-sharing mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement. The thirdchapter examines linear incentive contract respectively with symmetric and asymmetric information, thatthe risk-neutral government purchasers and suppliers of risk aversion share cost overruns, and finds out thatunder conditions of asymmetric information cost-sharing coefficient is smaller than under symmetryconditions, the stronger R&D uncertainty the smaller the coefficient of cost-sharing, the less the sharingratio of the cost overruns by the government, and the greater the fixed payment to the supplier. Supplier’sR&D effort reduces with the increasing unceitainty of R&D cost and the effort is less with asymmetricinformation than with symmetric information.
(2) Revenue-sharing mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement. Inrevenue-sharing mechanism, the purchaser does not have the true information on R&D cost type of thecontractor, so the purchaser and contractors negotiate on how to share the total social revenue of thetransaction. In negotiating process the purchaser offers the price, and the supplier can only choose to acceptor reject. After each round of negotiations, the purchaser can obtain new information, upon which to amendthe judgment on the type of supplier and motivate supplier’s optimal R&D effort. Bayesian equilibriumstrategies of the purchaser and supplier are investigated. The study shows that share ratios of purchasersand contractors from the transaction are determined ultimately by the discount rate, and the share ratio thepurchaser is willing to share is greater than the contractors want.
(3) R&D contest mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement.Based onthe randomness of R&D quality, the chapter sets up a non-cooperative game model of R&D contest, and respectively explores the optimal strategy of contest sponsors and contestants under conditions ofincomplete information and incomplete information. The study shows that R&D investment level ofcontestants under conditions of incomplete information and incomplete information reduces as its ownR&D efficiency increases, and the higher the incompletion degree of the information of R&D contestants,the lower the equilibrium R&D investment. There exists an optimal reward to maximize the payoff of thecontest sponsor under each circumstance.
(4) Order-allocating mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement. Thechapter studies how to design the order allocation mechanism in a supply chain consisting of twocompeting suppliers and government purchaser with incomplete information on the supplier's R&Defficiency, for the purchaser to promote the competition between the suppliers and suppliers’ innovation toreduce production costs, and the market diffusion of the innovative products. Three order allocationmechanisms, namely first-price sealed auction, order halving auction, and second-price sealed auction arecompared, and conclusions are reached that equilibrium innovation efforts of the suppliers in the threeauction mechanism all increase with their own R&D efficiency; the greater the discrepancy of innovationefficiency of two suppliers, the higher the expected purchasing price of the government procurement;compared to orders halving auction and second-price sealed auction, first-price sealed auction is mostfavorable to market diffusion of the innovative products.
(5) Price subsidy mechanism motivating innovation in government technology procurement. Based onthe conclusions above, this chapter takes into account the incentive effects of government price subsidies. Asupply chain model is constructed comprised of two competing suppliers, a government purchaser and theconsumers, in which the government purchases from the supplier through auction, the suppliers’ R&Dactivities can lower their costs. The impact on the supplier's R&D efforts and social welfare of three kindsof subsidy forms, namely the lump sum subsidy to the supplier, unit subsidy to the supplier and unitsubsidy to the consumers are compared. The conclusions are reached that the lump sum subsidy tosuppliers can not motivate the supplier to increase the R&D efforts and also can not promote social welfare;unit subsidy to consumers and suppliers have the same effect on motivating the suppliers’ R&D efforts andimproving social surplus, and there exists an optimal unit subsidy amount maximizing social surplus.
The innovation of this dissertation is mainly reflected in three aspects.
(1)This dissertation breaks through the limitations that previous similar literatures only consider thecontractors' moral hazard problem, reveals the relationship between the uncertainty of contractor’s R&D costs and government purchaser’s cost-sharing ratio in government technology procurement, and findsgovernment purchaser and the contractor's optimal strategy under a linear cost-sharing incentive contract.
This dissertation takes into account the reality of government procurement that informationasymmetry also lead to adverse selection problems besides moral hazard, and thus designs a linear contractthat risk-neutral government procurement and the risk-aversion suppliers share cost overruns, and focus onrelationship between the uncertainty of contractor’s R&D costs and government purchaser’s cost-sharingratio. This dissertation’s assumption on the correlation between contractor's cost estimation and theefficiency of its R&D makes the conclusions of the paper is more reasonable.
(2) The dissertation remedies the deficiencies of the previous literatures’ assumptions on the purchaserand supplier reservation value, proposes a revenue-sharing mechanism based on several rounds ofbargaining in the government technology procurement, finds out the determinants of revenue-sharing ratio,and explores the equilibrium bidding strategy for suppliers and government purchaser.
In this paper, we consider the distribution of social revenue generated by the purchaser and thecontractor's procurement transaction under the unilateral asymmetric information, and assumes that thepurchaser and supplier’s reservation values are correlative, which is determined by the quality of innovativeproducts, and thus more in line with the government procurement practice, and then find out the purchaserand supplier’s equilibrium strategies based on the Bayesian equilibrium model.
(3) Different order-allocation mechanisms and price subsidy mechanism in the government's indirectprocurement have been systemically compared and analyzed. Orders allocation mechanism and pricesubsidy mechanism that maximize social welfare are put forward. While previous studies mostly consideronly a certain kind of order allocation mechanism or price subsidy mechanism.
Most of literatures that introduced auction mechanism to encourage suppliers’ innovation behaviorsmake assumptions that the size of procurement is fixed in advance and not subject to the influence of thesuppliers’ tender. This dissertation introduces the consumer market in the two-tier supply chain suppliersand government purchaser, so that the retailer's purchasing quantity is determined by the supplier offer. Inaddition the dissertation overcomes the deficiency that considers only one mechanism, sets up game modelto explore the strategy of the supplier, and finds out the optimal mechanism.
引文
①关于“研究开发”的性质、类型、内容、演变、与技术创新的关系等，具体请参见文献：许庆瑞主编.研究、发展与技术创新管理.北京：高等教育出版社，第2版.
①对机制设计理论更详尽的评述请参见：郭其友,李宝良.机制设计理论:资源最优配置机制性质的解释与应用.外国经济与管理,2007,29(11):1-8.
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