基于食品安全的政府规制与农户生产行为研究
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摘要
农产品作为人们生活消费的必需品,其质量安全程度直接关系到人们的生命健康和生活质量。一方面,伴随着我国经济的发展,人民生活水平的提高,消费者对农产品质量安全越来越关注,对优质安全农产品的需求在不断增加。另一方面,由于农产品市场中生产者与消费者存在着质量信息不对称问题,生产者容易受利益动机驱使而采取违反规制的生产行为,并以普通或劣质农产品充斥安全农产品市场。由于安全农产品市场中生产者与消费者存在着质量信息不对称而导致的市场失灵状况,市场经济本身不能解决由市场失灵造成的农产品质量安全问题,必须依靠政府的参与来弥补市场自我调节下的不足。因此政府需要通过制定保障农产品质量安全的政策措施来引导、监督和管理农产品生产者的生产行为。本研究即围绕着政府规制与农户生产行为二者关系展开分析,运用基本经济学理论,以及环境经济学、制度经济学、信息经济学等相关原理,采用宏观与微观、规范研究与实证研究、定性分析与定量分析相结合的方法,揭示政府规制对农户生产行为的影响。研究结论对完善农产品质量安全的政府规制具有重要的理论和实践意义。
在借鉴国内外相关研究的基础上,本研究首先对农产品质量安全现状和农产品质量安全的影响因素进行了阐述,探明政府规制和农户生产行为对农产品质量安全的影响;分析了我国农产品质量安全的政府规制作用、现状及存在的问题;从理论角度深刻剖析了政府规制与农户生产行为的关系,揭示政府规制应该从吸引普通农产品生产者参加无公害农产品生产和防范无公害农产品生产者生产中的道德风险行为两个方面同时入手;在此基础上,运用实地调查的农户数据,从实证角度分析了农户无公害蔬菜生产意愿的影响因素和农户无公害蔬菜生产中道德风险行为的影响因素;最后,结合发达国家对农产品质量安全的规制经验,提出加强我国农产品质量安全政府规制的政策建议。全文共由九章内容组成,具体如下:
第一章,导论。在介绍本研究的研究背景的基础上提出了研究问题,明确了本研究的目的和意义,阐述本研究的基本框架、主要内容、研究方法和数据来源,探讨本研究可能存在的创新与不足。
第二章,文献综述及理论基础。首先通过对国内外的研究文献进行回顾,指出已有研究可以提供的借鉴和存在的不足,在此基础上提出本研究的思路。其次,对市场失灵理论、政府规制理论和农户生产行为理论三个理论基础进行分析,结合本研究的内容表明三个理论之间存在的关系。
第三章,农产品质量安全现状及影响因素分析。我国农产品质量安全现状从检测结果看是逐步趋好的,但是农产品质量安全突发的事件频繁发生,并且农产品出口受到技术贸易壁垒的影响很大。从生产者的角度来考察影响农产品质量安全的因素主要有环境因素、技术因素、制度因素和经济因素,其中环境因素一方面受到自然条件的约束,也会受到技术因素、制度因素和经济因素的影响,而技术因素取决于农户的生产行为,农户的生产行为不仅受到经济因素的影响,还受到政府制定的制度因素的影响,本文主要从农户生产行为和政府规制入手研究农产品质量安全问题。
第四章,我国农产品质量安全的政府规制作用、现状及存在的问题。政府规制对农产品质量安全具有保障作用,我国政府在加强农产品质量安全规制方面做了大量工作,在农产品质量安全管理机构、示范推广体系、法律法规体系、标准体系、认证体系和检验检测体系的建设中取得了一定的成效。但由于我国目前的农产品质量安全政府规制体系还很不完善,在建设中存在许多问题,农产品质量安全的政府规制需要进一步加强。
第五章,政府规制与农户生产行为的理论分析。理论分析表明,要使得农户效用最大化的目标和政府社会福利最大化目标相一致,要同时满足参与约束和激励相容约束,即一方面要鼓励农户参加无公害农产品的生产,另一方面要对无公害农产品的生产者行为进行防范。农户从事道德风险活动时所能得到的额外收益、不参加认证所能得到的收益、未来收益的贴现率、按照标准进行生产所能得到的收益、被发现违反标准进行生产的罚金和政府对农户的道德风险行为的监督程度都会影响农户的道德风险程度。通过进一步分析发现,政府其对农户生产行为监督程度的高低会影响其他因素对道德风险程度的影响。
第六章,农户无公害蔬菜生产意愿的影响因素分析。研究结果表明:虽然大多数农户听说过无公害农产品,但是对无公害蔬菜的了解程度比较低。农户存在潜在的生产无公害蔬菜的意愿。影响其无公害蔬菜生产意愿的因素中,代表农户个体特征的教育水平,代表农户家庭特征的家庭结构,代表农户经济特征的家庭收入水平和劳动力机会成本,代表农户信息渠道的是否参加了农业合作组织,农户的信息水平都对其无公害蔬菜的生产意愿有显著影响。
第七章,农户无公害蔬菜生产中道德风险行为的影响因素分析。研究结果表明:部分农户在无公害蔬菜生产中会发生道德风险行为。影响其无公害蔬菜生产中道德风险行为的因素中,代表农户个体特征的性别,代表农户家庭特征的家庭结构、种植面积以及无公害蔬菜收入比重,代表农户生产特征变量的是否参加了质量安全控制培训和是否参加了农业合作组织,无公害蔬菜的商品化程度,农户对食品安全的态度,政府规制变量都对农户无公害蔬菜生产中道德风险行为的影响显著。地区虚拟变量中,苏北比苏中更容易发生道德风险行为,苏南相反。
第八章,发达国家农产品质量安全规制体系及经验总结。对美国、欧盟和日本三个发达国家(地区)的农产品质量安全规制体系进行详细的介绍,总结他们在完善农产品质量安全管理体制、健全农产品质量安全法律法规体系、推行从“田头到餐桌”的全程管理体系、重视农产品质量安全的风险管理、建立农产品质量安全溯源制度五个方面的经验,为我国提高农产品质量安全规制水平提供了借鉴。
第九章,加强我国农产品质量安全政府规制的政策建议。在前面研究内容的基础上,从微观层面提出提高普通蔬菜生产者无公害蔬菜的生产意愿和防范农户无公害蔬菜生产中的道德风险行为的政策建议,从宏观层面提出完善我国农产品质量安全政府规制体系的政策建议。
As the consumptive necessary of people's living, the quality and safety degree of Agro-product directly affect people's life health and life quality. On the one hand, going with the economical development of our country, the improving of people's standard of living, consumer pay more and more attention to the quality and safety of agro-product, the demand to high quality and safety agro-product is increasing. On the other hand, because the dissymmetry of quality information between the producer and consumer, producer adopt the production behavior that disobeying regulations easily driving by benefit incentive, and flood the safety agro-product market with the common or low quality agro-product. The market failure because the dissymmetry of quality information between the producer and consumer, market economy can not solve the quality and safety of agro-product problem because of the market failure by itself, must depend on the government's participating to make up the shortage of market adjust. So government need induct, supervise and manage the production behaviors of farmer getting across establish policy to ensure the quality and safety of agro-product. The research spread the analysis enclosing the connection between the government regulation and the farmer's production behavior, by using the basic economic theories as well as the relevant principles of environmental economy, institutional economy and information economy, methods of macroscopy and microscopy, empirical and normative researches, qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper reveals the effect of government regulation to the farmer's production behavior. The results have important significance of theory and practice in the aspects of perfecting the government regulation to quality and safety of agro-product.
Based on the relative researches of Chinese and foreign, this paper expatiates the situation and effectible factors of quality and safety of agro-product, proves up the effect to quality and safety of agro-product of government regulation and farmer's production behavior; analyses the function, situation and existent problems of the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country; anatomises the connection between the government regulation and farmer's production behavior deeply from the theoretics point of view, it opens out that the government regulation should start with attracting the producer of common agro-products to attend the production of pollution-free agricultural product and keeping away the moral hazard of the producer of pollution-free agricultural product synchronously; on this basis, by using the farmer households data gained from field survey and empirical research, this paper analyses the factors that affect the farmer's willingness to choose to produce pollution-free vegetable and the moral hazard behavior in the production of pollution-free vegetable; finally, by summarizing the experiences of government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in developed country, it puts forward the suggestion that enhancing the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product. This paper is composed with nine chapters. The major contents of each part are as follows:
Chapter one, introduction. On the basis of introducing background of the research brings forward the research question, definitudes the purpose and meaning of this research, expatiated base frame and major contents, research methods and data resources, discusses the possible innovation and shortcoming.
Chapter two, literature summarization and theories base. Firstly, by reviewing the literature of Chinese and foreign, points out the using for reference and the existent shortage, on this basis puts forward the thought of the paper. Secondly, analyses the market failure theory, government regulation theory and farmer's production behavior theory, combines this research's content to make clear the relationship of the three theories.
Chapter three, the situation and effectible factors of quality and safety of agro-product. The situation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country is up and up from the checking results, but the gusty events of quality and safety of agro-product occurred frequently, and the technical barriers to trade effected the export of agro-product awfully. From producer's point of view review the factors that affect the quality and safety of agro-product mostly have environment factors, technology factors, system factors and economic factors, the environment factors not only are restricted by nature condition, but also are affected by technology factors, system factors and economic factors, and that the technology factors lie on the farmer's production behavior, the farmer's production behavior are affected not only by economic factors,but also by the system factors, this paper study the problem of quality safety of agro-products mainly to start with the farmer's production behavior and government regulation.
Chapter four, The function, situation and existent problems of the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country. government Regulation have protective function to the quality and safety of agro-product. The government make a lot of work in strengthening the regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country, gained some effect in building administrant institution, demonstration and generalizing system, law and code system, standard system, attestation system and inspection system. But because the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product is not perfect in our country, exist many problems in building, it need more enhancement.
Chapter five, academic analysis of the government regulation and the farmer's production behavior. Academic analysis indicate that if wanting to make the farmer's aim of most avail to accord with the government's aim of most social welfare, must satisfy the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint simultaneously, on the one hand, need encourage farmers to attend the production of pollution-free agricultural product, on the other hand, need keep away the production behavior of pollution-free agricultural product. The extra income by engaging moral hazard, the income of nonparticipating attestation, the future income discount, the income of standard production, the fine to disobey the standard and the monitor of government can effect the degree of moral hazard. The further research reveal as the principal, the degree of government monitoring farmer production can influence the degree of other factors affecting moral hazard.
Chapter six, the analysis of the factors which influenced the farmer's willingness to produce pollution-free vegetable. The results indicate: though most of the farmers have heard about pollution-free vegetable, but the degree of understanding is low. The potential willing to produce is existent. In the factors that affect the willingness to produce pollution-free vegetable, the education in the farmer's unit diagnostic, the family scale in the farmer's family diagnostic, the income level and the opportunity cost of labour in the farmer's economy diagnostic, the contact with agriculture cooperating organization and the degree of understanding are the mostly influencing factors.
Chapter seven, the analysis of the factors which influenced the farmer's moral hazard behavior in producing pollution-free vegetable. The results indicate: Some of the producers of pollution-free vegetable didn't plant in term of the standard of pollution-free vegetable. The sex in the farmer's unit diagnostic, the family configuration, planting areas and the proportion of pollution-free vegetable income in the farmer's family diagnostic, the quality control education and agricultural cooperate organization in the farmer's production diagnostic, the degree of commodity, the afraid of food safety, the realizing degree of monitoring and punishment of disobeying the standard are the mostly factors to effect the moral hazard behavior of the producers. In the region dummy variables, the north of Jiangsu is easier to happen moral hazard behaviors than the middle of Jiangsu, the south of Jiangsu is reverse.
Chapter eight, the system of the regulation of quality and safety of agro-product of the developed countries and the experiences. Introduce the system of the regulation of quality and safety of agro-product of America, Europe and Japan detailedly, summarize their experiences in perfecting the management system of quality safety of agro-products, perfecting the law and code system of quality safety of agro-products, pushing whole management system from the field to table, regarding the risk management of quality safety of agro-products, establishing traceability system of quality safety of agro-products, they can be use for reference by our country to advance the level of regulation.
Chapter nine, the policy advice which can strengthen the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country. On the basis of ahead research, bring forward the policy advice from the microcosmic lay which are to attract the producer of common agro-products to attend the production of pollution-free vegetable and keep away the moral hazard of the producer of pollution-free vegetable, bring forward the policy advice from the macrocosmic lay which is to perfect the system of government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product.
在借鉴国内外相关研究的基础上,本研究首先对农产品质量安全现状和农产品质量安全的影响因素进行了阐述,探明政府规制和农户生产行为对农产品质量安全的影响;分析了我国农产品质量安全的政府规制作用、现状及存在的问题;从理论角度深刻剖析了政府规制与农户生产行为的关系,揭示政府规制应该从吸引普通农产品生产者参加无公害农产品生产和防范无公害农产品生产者生产中的道德风险行为两个方面同时入手;在此基础上,运用实地调查的农户数据,从实证角度分析了农户无公害蔬菜生产意愿的影响因素和农户无公害蔬菜生产中道德风险行为的影响因素;最后,结合发达国家对农产品质量安全的规制经验,提出加强我国农产品质量安全政府规制的政策建议。全文共由九章内容组成,具体如下:
第一章,导论。在介绍本研究的研究背景的基础上提出了研究问题,明确了本研究的目的和意义,阐述本研究的基本框架、主要内容、研究方法和数据来源,探讨本研究可能存在的创新与不足。
第二章,文献综述及理论基础。首先通过对国内外的研究文献进行回顾,指出已有研究可以提供的借鉴和存在的不足,在此基础上提出本研究的思路。其次,对市场失灵理论、政府规制理论和农户生产行为理论三个理论基础进行分析,结合本研究的内容表明三个理论之间存在的关系。
第三章,农产品质量安全现状及影响因素分析。我国农产品质量安全现状从检测结果看是逐步趋好的,但是农产品质量安全突发的事件频繁发生,并且农产品出口受到技术贸易壁垒的影响很大。从生产者的角度来考察影响农产品质量安全的因素主要有环境因素、技术因素、制度因素和经济因素,其中环境因素一方面受到自然条件的约束,也会受到技术因素、制度因素和经济因素的影响,而技术因素取决于农户的生产行为,农户的生产行为不仅受到经济因素的影响,还受到政府制定的制度因素的影响,本文主要从农户生产行为和政府规制入手研究农产品质量安全问题。
第四章,我国农产品质量安全的政府规制作用、现状及存在的问题。政府规制对农产品质量安全具有保障作用,我国政府在加强农产品质量安全规制方面做了大量工作,在农产品质量安全管理机构、示范推广体系、法律法规体系、标准体系、认证体系和检验检测体系的建设中取得了一定的成效。但由于我国目前的农产品质量安全政府规制体系还很不完善,在建设中存在许多问题,农产品质量安全的政府规制需要进一步加强。
第五章,政府规制与农户生产行为的理论分析。理论分析表明,要使得农户效用最大化的目标和政府社会福利最大化目标相一致,要同时满足参与约束和激励相容约束,即一方面要鼓励农户参加无公害农产品的生产,另一方面要对无公害农产品的生产者行为进行防范。农户从事道德风险活动时所能得到的额外收益、不参加认证所能得到的收益、未来收益的贴现率、按照标准进行生产所能得到的收益、被发现违反标准进行生产的罚金和政府对农户的道德风险行为的监督程度都会影响农户的道德风险程度。通过进一步分析发现,政府其对农户生产行为监督程度的高低会影响其他因素对道德风险程度的影响。
第六章,农户无公害蔬菜生产意愿的影响因素分析。研究结果表明:虽然大多数农户听说过无公害农产品,但是对无公害蔬菜的了解程度比较低。农户存在潜在的生产无公害蔬菜的意愿。影响其无公害蔬菜生产意愿的因素中,代表农户个体特征的教育水平,代表农户家庭特征的家庭结构,代表农户经济特征的家庭收入水平和劳动力机会成本,代表农户信息渠道的是否参加了农业合作组织,农户的信息水平都对其无公害蔬菜的生产意愿有显著影响。
第七章,农户无公害蔬菜生产中道德风险行为的影响因素分析。研究结果表明:部分农户在无公害蔬菜生产中会发生道德风险行为。影响其无公害蔬菜生产中道德风险行为的因素中,代表农户个体特征的性别,代表农户家庭特征的家庭结构、种植面积以及无公害蔬菜收入比重,代表农户生产特征变量的是否参加了质量安全控制培训和是否参加了农业合作组织,无公害蔬菜的商品化程度,农户对食品安全的态度,政府规制变量都对农户无公害蔬菜生产中道德风险行为的影响显著。地区虚拟变量中,苏北比苏中更容易发生道德风险行为,苏南相反。
第八章,发达国家农产品质量安全规制体系及经验总结。对美国、欧盟和日本三个发达国家(地区)的农产品质量安全规制体系进行详细的介绍,总结他们在完善农产品质量安全管理体制、健全农产品质量安全法律法规体系、推行从“田头到餐桌”的全程管理体系、重视农产品质量安全的风险管理、建立农产品质量安全溯源制度五个方面的经验,为我国提高农产品质量安全规制水平提供了借鉴。
第九章,加强我国农产品质量安全政府规制的政策建议。在前面研究内容的基础上,从微观层面提出提高普通蔬菜生产者无公害蔬菜的生产意愿和防范农户无公害蔬菜生产中的道德风险行为的政策建议,从宏观层面提出完善我国农产品质量安全政府规制体系的政策建议。
As the consumptive necessary of people's living, the quality and safety degree of Agro-product directly affect people's life health and life quality. On the one hand, going with the economical development of our country, the improving of people's standard of living, consumer pay more and more attention to the quality and safety of agro-product, the demand to high quality and safety agro-product is increasing. On the other hand, because the dissymmetry of quality information between the producer and consumer, producer adopt the production behavior that disobeying regulations easily driving by benefit incentive, and flood the safety agro-product market with the common or low quality agro-product. The market failure because the dissymmetry of quality information between the producer and consumer, market economy can not solve the quality and safety of agro-product problem because of the market failure by itself, must depend on the government's participating to make up the shortage of market adjust. So government need induct, supervise and manage the production behaviors of farmer getting across establish policy to ensure the quality and safety of agro-product. The research spread the analysis enclosing the connection between the government regulation and the farmer's production behavior, by using the basic economic theories as well as the relevant principles of environmental economy, institutional economy and information economy, methods of macroscopy and microscopy, empirical and normative researches, qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper reveals the effect of government regulation to the farmer's production behavior. The results have important significance of theory and practice in the aspects of perfecting the government regulation to quality and safety of agro-product.
Based on the relative researches of Chinese and foreign, this paper expatiates the situation and effectible factors of quality and safety of agro-product, proves up the effect to quality and safety of agro-product of government regulation and farmer's production behavior; analyses the function, situation and existent problems of the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country; anatomises the connection between the government regulation and farmer's production behavior deeply from the theoretics point of view, it opens out that the government regulation should start with attracting the producer of common agro-products to attend the production of pollution-free agricultural product and keeping away the moral hazard of the producer of pollution-free agricultural product synchronously; on this basis, by using the farmer households data gained from field survey and empirical research, this paper analyses the factors that affect the farmer's willingness to choose to produce pollution-free vegetable and the moral hazard behavior in the production of pollution-free vegetable; finally, by summarizing the experiences of government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in developed country, it puts forward the suggestion that enhancing the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product. This paper is composed with nine chapters. The major contents of each part are as follows:
Chapter one, introduction. On the basis of introducing background of the research brings forward the research question, definitudes the purpose and meaning of this research, expatiated base frame and major contents, research methods and data resources, discusses the possible innovation and shortcoming.
Chapter two, literature summarization and theories base. Firstly, by reviewing the literature of Chinese and foreign, points out the using for reference and the existent shortage, on this basis puts forward the thought of the paper. Secondly, analyses the market failure theory, government regulation theory and farmer's production behavior theory, combines this research's content to make clear the relationship of the three theories.
Chapter three, the situation and effectible factors of quality and safety of agro-product. The situation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country is up and up from the checking results, but the gusty events of quality and safety of agro-product occurred frequently, and the technical barriers to trade effected the export of agro-product awfully. From producer's point of view review the factors that affect the quality and safety of agro-product mostly have environment factors, technology factors, system factors and economic factors, the environment factors not only are restricted by nature condition, but also are affected by technology factors, system factors and economic factors, and that the technology factors lie on the farmer's production behavior, the farmer's production behavior are affected not only by economic factors,but also by the system factors, this paper study the problem of quality safety of agro-products mainly to start with the farmer's production behavior and government regulation.
Chapter four, The function, situation and existent problems of the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country. government Regulation have protective function to the quality and safety of agro-product. The government make a lot of work in strengthening the regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country, gained some effect in building administrant institution, demonstration and generalizing system, law and code system, standard system, attestation system and inspection system. But because the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product is not perfect in our country, exist many problems in building, it need more enhancement.
Chapter five, academic analysis of the government regulation and the farmer's production behavior. Academic analysis indicate that if wanting to make the farmer's aim of most avail to accord with the government's aim of most social welfare, must satisfy the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint simultaneously, on the one hand, need encourage farmers to attend the production of pollution-free agricultural product, on the other hand, need keep away the production behavior of pollution-free agricultural product. The extra income by engaging moral hazard, the income of nonparticipating attestation, the future income discount, the income of standard production, the fine to disobey the standard and the monitor of government can effect the degree of moral hazard. The further research reveal as the principal, the degree of government monitoring farmer production can influence the degree of other factors affecting moral hazard.
Chapter six, the analysis of the factors which influenced the farmer's willingness to produce pollution-free vegetable. The results indicate: though most of the farmers have heard about pollution-free vegetable, but the degree of understanding is low. The potential willing to produce is existent. In the factors that affect the willingness to produce pollution-free vegetable, the education in the farmer's unit diagnostic, the family scale in the farmer's family diagnostic, the income level and the opportunity cost of labour in the farmer's economy diagnostic, the contact with agriculture cooperating organization and the degree of understanding are the mostly influencing factors.
Chapter seven, the analysis of the factors which influenced the farmer's moral hazard behavior in producing pollution-free vegetable. The results indicate: Some of the producers of pollution-free vegetable didn't plant in term of the standard of pollution-free vegetable. The sex in the farmer's unit diagnostic, the family configuration, planting areas and the proportion of pollution-free vegetable income in the farmer's family diagnostic, the quality control education and agricultural cooperate organization in the farmer's production diagnostic, the degree of commodity, the afraid of food safety, the realizing degree of monitoring and punishment of disobeying the standard are the mostly factors to effect the moral hazard behavior of the producers. In the region dummy variables, the north of Jiangsu is easier to happen moral hazard behaviors than the middle of Jiangsu, the south of Jiangsu is reverse.
Chapter eight, the system of the regulation of quality and safety of agro-product of the developed countries and the experiences. Introduce the system of the regulation of quality and safety of agro-product of America, Europe and Japan detailedly, summarize their experiences in perfecting the management system of quality safety of agro-products, perfecting the law and code system of quality safety of agro-products, pushing whole management system from the field to table, regarding the risk management of quality safety of agro-products, establishing traceability system of quality safety of agro-products, they can be use for reference by our country to advance the level of regulation.
Chapter nine, the policy advice which can strengthen the government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product in our country. On the basis of ahead research, bring forward the policy advice from the microcosmic lay which are to attract the producer of common agro-products to attend the production of pollution-free vegetable and keep away the moral hazard of the producer of pollution-free vegetable, bring forward the policy advice from the macrocosmic lay which is to perfect the system of government regulation of quality and safety of agro-product.
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