基于供应链契约的供应链博弈与协调研究
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摘要
由于供应链中的各成员分属于不同的企业,他们都是基于局部目标进行决策,为了使成员的行为与供应链系统的最优策略相一致,必须通过设计适当的激励机制对成员的决策行为进行协调和约束。国内外学者的研究文献将供应链契约作为平衡供应链成员冲突、激励协作、提高供应链整体绩效的一个有效的管理工具。如何从现实中供应链管理遇到的问题出发,基于供应链系统协调的角度,研究供应链节点企业的合作与博弈,谋求双赢,是供应链契约研究的重要课题。
本学位论文以当前全球化、分布式供应链运作的协调管理为背景,从供应链成员个体信息不对称与风险规避、库存与定价协调、地方性广告与订货、供应链企业的创新投入等方面,对基于供应链契约的供应链系统协调进行了定量化的建模研究与分析。
结合供应链管理与信息经济学的委托代理理论,对不对称信息下销售商促销努力存在道德风险时的供应链契约进行了研究,分析了在这种情况下减少信息租金、对供应链更有效率的契约。对市场需求随机、供应商具有“向下的风险规避约束”(downside-risk-averse)下供应商的生产能力预留决策进行了分析,研究了风险规避成员对供应链绩效的影响,建立了在这种情况下的供应链协调模型和协调策略。对价格与需求相关下基于库存与定价的供应链协调契约进行了分析和总结。根据现实中不同产品的特点,建立确定型和随机型两种需求模型,对这两种需求模型下协调供应链的契约进行了比较。进一步,建立了供应商居于主导地位,经销商建立二级市场交易余缺库存的定价和库存转运的stackelberg博弈模型,对此时的供应链协调契约进行了初步探讨。研究了市场进行非价格竞争(广告)下,制造商和零售商之间垂直合作广告的供应链协调问题,建立了单制造商单零售商随机需求下供应链协调模型,研究了协调供应链的契约。进一步,建立了多零售商竞争条件下,单制造商多零售商的供应链协调模型并研究了供应链协调契约,给出了模型的具体实证算例。从提高供应链整体协调性和绩效水平出发,建立了市场需求对价格敏感,上游制造商创新投入的上下游企业博弈模型。首先研究了单制造商单销售商组成的两级供应链,研究发现上游企业创新投入与市场性质、上下游企业在供应链中的地位、上游企业的保留利润都有关,比较了不同市场性质下供应链整体利润之间的关系,提出了上游企业和下游企业分别作为领导者情况下使上游企业的创新投入达到供应链最优的协调契约。随后研究了存在两个相异的竞争零售商的情形,基于Stackelberg主从博弈研究了零售商竞争对上游创新投入的影响。研究发现上游制造商创新投入具有外部(外溢)性,并且零售商的竞争性越强,制造商的创新投入越大。证明了在分散决策情况下,制造商的创新投入无法达到供应链最优,提出使供应链达到协调的基于数量折扣的混合契约,并指出了该契约可以为各方接受的条件。
Because supply chain (SC) members are independent enterprises, they make decisions to optimize their own local objectives. In order that the enterprises’behavior aligned with the optimal actions of the SC system, it is necessary to design appropriate incentive mechanism to restrain and coordinate the entities on the SC. The literature of SC management applies SC contracts as an effective managing tool to control incentive conflicts and improve the SC performance. The study of SC enterprises’game and cooperation problems from perspective of SC coordination stemmed from SC management in reality to reach win-win is an important research area of SC contract.
In this dissertation the SC coordination problems based on SC contract about SC member’s asymmetric information and risk-averse, inventory and pricing decision, local advertising and ordering, SC innovation investment in globalized and decentralized SC circumstance are studied through quantitative modeling and analyzing. The main contents could be summarized as follows:
By adopting theories of SC and principal agent theory of Information Economics, the problem about how a supplier to design a supply contract when there exists retailer’s moral hazard about his sale effort is studied. The contracts of decreasing information rent and being more efficient for the SC are analyzed. And also, a downside-risk-averse supplier’capacity reservation decision model under stochastic demand is investigated, and the SC performance with such a participant is analyzed. Moreover, a SC coordination model and policy under this circumstance are proposed. The SC coordination contracts based on inventory and pricing with price dependent demand are analyzed and summarized. After the demands from downstream enterprises are divided into two kinds: deterministic demands and stochastic demands according to product character, the research has compared the SC coordination contracts in these two scenarios. A Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader and transshipment occurs among retailers via secondary market is further studied. The local advertising input and order policy coordination of SC with retailers’non-price competing (advertising) is considered. And the SC coordination models under both single retailer and multiple competing retailers are proposed. Then the contracts to coordinate the SC are studied, and the results are verified by numerical example. To promote the coordination and overall performance of SC, a SC game model about upstream innovation investment to decrease operating costs under price-sensitivity demand is constructed. Firstly, the research studies the single retailer scenario, and shows that market character, leadership of SC and reserve profits of upstream enterprise all have great influence on upstream innovation input. The profits of SC among different market character are compared. The SC contracts of innovation input that coordinates the whole SC made by different leaders are proposed. Then by using a Stackelberg game model, two competing heterogeneous retailers scenario is considered. The research illustrates that the innovation investment creates vertical externality within the channel, and the more retailers’competition intensity, the more the manufacturer will invest. The research also shows that the decentralized decision cannot coordinate the SC innovation investment. A compound contract of SC coordination based on quantity-discount schedule is proposed and the conditions that are feasible to all supply chain members are pointed out.
本学位论文以当前全球化、分布式供应链运作的协调管理为背景,从供应链成员个体信息不对称与风险规避、库存与定价协调、地方性广告与订货、供应链企业的创新投入等方面,对基于供应链契约的供应链系统协调进行了定量化的建模研究与分析。
结合供应链管理与信息经济学的委托代理理论,对不对称信息下销售商促销努力存在道德风险时的供应链契约进行了研究,分析了在这种情况下减少信息租金、对供应链更有效率的契约。对市场需求随机、供应商具有“向下的风险规避约束”(downside-risk-averse)下供应商的生产能力预留决策进行了分析,研究了风险规避成员对供应链绩效的影响,建立了在这种情况下的供应链协调模型和协调策略。对价格与需求相关下基于库存与定价的供应链协调契约进行了分析和总结。根据现实中不同产品的特点,建立确定型和随机型两种需求模型,对这两种需求模型下协调供应链的契约进行了比较。进一步,建立了供应商居于主导地位,经销商建立二级市场交易余缺库存的定价和库存转运的stackelberg博弈模型,对此时的供应链协调契约进行了初步探讨。研究了市场进行非价格竞争(广告)下,制造商和零售商之间垂直合作广告的供应链协调问题,建立了单制造商单零售商随机需求下供应链协调模型,研究了协调供应链的契约。进一步,建立了多零售商竞争条件下,单制造商多零售商的供应链协调模型并研究了供应链协调契约,给出了模型的具体实证算例。从提高供应链整体协调性和绩效水平出发,建立了市场需求对价格敏感,上游制造商创新投入的上下游企业博弈模型。首先研究了单制造商单销售商组成的两级供应链,研究发现上游企业创新投入与市场性质、上下游企业在供应链中的地位、上游企业的保留利润都有关,比较了不同市场性质下供应链整体利润之间的关系,提出了上游企业和下游企业分别作为领导者情况下使上游企业的创新投入达到供应链最优的协调契约。随后研究了存在两个相异的竞争零售商的情形,基于Stackelberg主从博弈研究了零售商竞争对上游创新投入的影响。研究发现上游制造商创新投入具有外部(外溢)性,并且零售商的竞争性越强,制造商的创新投入越大。证明了在分散决策情况下,制造商的创新投入无法达到供应链最优,提出使供应链达到协调的基于数量折扣的混合契约,并指出了该契约可以为各方接受的条件。
Because supply chain (SC) members are independent enterprises, they make decisions to optimize their own local objectives. In order that the enterprises’behavior aligned with the optimal actions of the SC system, it is necessary to design appropriate incentive mechanism to restrain and coordinate the entities on the SC. The literature of SC management applies SC contracts as an effective managing tool to control incentive conflicts and improve the SC performance. The study of SC enterprises’game and cooperation problems from perspective of SC coordination stemmed from SC management in reality to reach win-win is an important research area of SC contract.
In this dissertation the SC coordination problems based on SC contract about SC member’s asymmetric information and risk-averse, inventory and pricing decision, local advertising and ordering, SC innovation investment in globalized and decentralized SC circumstance are studied through quantitative modeling and analyzing. The main contents could be summarized as follows:
By adopting theories of SC and principal agent theory of Information Economics, the problem about how a supplier to design a supply contract when there exists retailer’s moral hazard about his sale effort is studied. The contracts of decreasing information rent and being more efficient for the SC are analyzed. And also, a downside-risk-averse supplier’capacity reservation decision model under stochastic demand is investigated, and the SC performance with such a participant is analyzed. Moreover, a SC coordination model and policy under this circumstance are proposed. The SC coordination contracts based on inventory and pricing with price dependent demand are analyzed and summarized. After the demands from downstream enterprises are divided into two kinds: deterministic demands and stochastic demands according to product character, the research has compared the SC coordination contracts in these two scenarios. A Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader and transshipment occurs among retailers via secondary market is further studied. The local advertising input and order policy coordination of SC with retailers’non-price competing (advertising) is considered. And the SC coordination models under both single retailer and multiple competing retailers are proposed. Then the contracts to coordinate the SC are studied, and the results are verified by numerical example. To promote the coordination and overall performance of SC, a SC game model about upstream innovation investment to decrease operating costs under price-sensitivity demand is constructed. Firstly, the research studies the single retailer scenario, and shows that market character, leadership of SC and reserve profits of upstream enterprise all have great influence on upstream innovation input. The profits of SC among different market character are compared. The SC contracts of innovation input that coordinates the whole SC made by different leaders are proposed. Then by using a Stackelberg game model, two competing heterogeneous retailers scenario is considered. The research illustrates that the innovation investment creates vertical externality within the channel, and the more retailers’competition intensity, the more the manufacturer will invest. The research also shows that the decentralized decision cannot coordinate the SC innovation investment. A compound contract of SC coordination based on quantity-discount schedule is proposed and the conditions that are feasible to all supply chain members are pointed out.
引文
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