政府应对禽流感突发事件的扑杀补偿政策研究
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摘要
近年来,禽流感疫情在全球范围不断暴发和蔓延,给世界经济带来了重大损失,给人类生命安全造成了严重威胁,而且这种威胁在未来仍会继续存在。在未来相当长的时期内,扑杀疫区(点)家禽仍将是扑灭禽流感疫情的最直接有效的措施,对禽主的扑杀损失进行补偿仍将是我国的一项长期国策,扑杀补偿政策将走向法律化。本文旨在对扑杀补偿政策的激励相容性和禽主对扑杀政策行动的配合意愿进行分析,提出基于市价补偿的新的扑杀补偿机制,为政府决策提供理论依据和政策建议,具有重要的理论及实践意义。
本文从经济学视角来研究政府应对禽流感的扑杀补偿政策,采用实证分析与规范分析相结合、定性分析与定量分析相结合、实地调查、案例分析、计量经济模型等方法来开展研究。在相关概念界定和文献综述的基础上,按照“现状描述-理论分析-实证分析-政策建议”的思路进行写作,研究内容主要包括六个部分:第一部分,对我国禽流感概况及现行的扑杀补偿政策作简要分析,总结我国近年来禽流感疫情的突出特点,理清我国各地不同的扑杀补偿政策。第二部分,依据委托-代理理论、机制设计理论、风险偏好理论、效用理论,分析禽流感疫情不同阶段的信息特征,并运用激励相容的一般模型化方法,对不同信息特征下扑杀补偿政策的激励相容性进行分析。第三部分,围绕扑杀补偿政策目标的实现路径,对我国现行扑杀补偿政策的目标、补偿标准、补偿范围、金额计算、补偿款发放程序及执行监督等各方面进行全面评价。第四部分,依据调查数据,对养殖户的扑杀配合意愿进行实证分析,对影响禽主配合意愿的因素进行显著性检验。第五部分,在前述各章研究的基础上,提出完善我国现行扑杀补偿政策的市价补偿设计方案。第六部分,分析市价补偿政策的成本最小化机制,研究市价补偿成本最小化的途径。
研究结论表明:第一,我国2004年以来的禽流感疫情在暴发的时间、空间、频率、及禽情发现方面存在着鲜明的特点。第二,我国目前各地的扑杀补偿政策呈现出补偿标准和补偿方法不统一的混乱现状。第三,总的说来,我国现行的扑杀补偿政策激励相容性较差,尽管在禽情的不同阶段,扑杀补偿政策的激励相容性存在着差异。第四,我国现行扑杀补偿政策缺乏激励相容性的根本原因在于其存在的诸多缺陷,如补偿标准过低,补偿范围太小等。第五,养殖户的扑杀配合意愿受多种因素的影响,但无论家庭养殖户还是规模养殖户,“对补偿满意度”是影响他们配合意愿的最显著因素。第六,实行市价补偿是我国扑杀补偿政策发展和完善的方向。
上述研究结论具有很好的政策意义:第一,尽快制定我国专门的禽流感扑杀补偿法,对扑杀补偿政策进行统一和规范。第二,以市价补偿为核心,对扑杀补偿政策进行重新设计。第三,对禽主进行禽流感知识、科学养殖知识的教育与培训。第四,加大扑杀补偿政策的宣传力度。第五,对扑杀补偿工作进行全过程监管,防止虚报和截留补偿款现象的发生。第六,积极探索家禽疫病政策保险,建立责任分层、成本分担的禽主扑杀损失赔补机制。第七,提高补偿政策执行效率,减少补偿政策的执行时滞。
In recent years, avian influenza(AI)occurred and spread periodically around the world, bringing about great losses to the world economy and a severe threat to human life. For a long period of time in the future, such a threat will remain and eradication will still be the most direct but also the most effective measure to put down AI. So compensation to the poultry owners will continue to be a long-term national policy against avian influenza in China. The purposes of this paper are to analyze the incentive compatibility of the current compensation policy and the willingness of poultry owners to cooperate with the government, and to propose a new compensation system based on market price of the poultry, which provides a theoretical basis for government’s decision making. So the study is of some theoretical and practical significance.
Compensation policy is studied in this paper from the perspective of economics. The main methodologies involved include normative study, empirical study, case study, field survey and econometric approach. After concept definition and literature review, the study is carried on from six aspects, following the route of“background-theory-demonstration-policy”. First, an overview is presented in this paper about China’s AI and its characteristics as well as her compensation policies in different provinces. Then, based on theories, say, principal - agent theory, mechanism design theory, risk theory and utility theory, this paper analyzed different characteristics of information at different stages of AI and the incentive compatibility of the current compensation policy in such information environments by incentive compatibility model. The third section of the paper mainly deals with a comprehensive comment on the current compensation policy, involving its goal, standard, range, calculation (of the amount ), procedures and supervision, while the forth section is mainly about an empirical study of poultry owners’willingness to cooperate with the government and a significant test of factors affecting it. All the data needed are from the author’s investigation. After all the above study and analysis, a new compensation plan, called market-price compensation plan, is designed in the fifth section, and the ways to minimize the new plan’s cost are further discussed in the last section.
The research results show that: 1) AI in China has presented distinctive characteristics in the time, space, frequency of its outbreak and the way of its disclosure. 2) Compensation policies in each province are quite different from each other. 3) Generally speaking, China’s compensation policy has little incentive compatibility though it shows differently at different stages of AI. 4) The reason why the current compensation policy is less compatible lies in the fact that it has many defects in its goal, its compensation standard and scope, etc. 5) the level of poultry owners’satisfaction to the compensation is the most significant of all the factors that have much effect on poultry farmers’willingness of cooperation. 6) To raise the compensation standard to market price is the way to improve our country’s current compensation policy.
The policy implications based on the above research results are to: 1) make a unified compensation law as soon as possible to regulate the compensation of the country. 2) Raise the compensation standard by the implementation of market-price compensation policy. 3) Provide training course to poultry owners with knowledge of AI and scientific feeding. 4) Strengthen the propaganda of the compensation policy. 5) Strengthen the supervision of the compensation process so as to prevent false report and other illegal activities. 6) Probe fowl disease insurance and establish a cost share mechanism to make up for the owners’loss caused by eradication. 7) Enhance the efficiency of policy execution to reduce time lag.
本文从经济学视角来研究政府应对禽流感的扑杀补偿政策,采用实证分析与规范分析相结合、定性分析与定量分析相结合、实地调查、案例分析、计量经济模型等方法来开展研究。在相关概念界定和文献综述的基础上,按照“现状描述-理论分析-实证分析-政策建议”的思路进行写作,研究内容主要包括六个部分:第一部分,对我国禽流感概况及现行的扑杀补偿政策作简要分析,总结我国近年来禽流感疫情的突出特点,理清我国各地不同的扑杀补偿政策。第二部分,依据委托-代理理论、机制设计理论、风险偏好理论、效用理论,分析禽流感疫情不同阶段的信息特征,并运用激励相容的一般模型化方法,对不同信息特征下扑杀补偿政策的激励相容性进行分析。第三部分,围绕扑杀补偿政策目标的实现路径,对我国现行扑杀补偿政策的目标、补偿标准、补偿范围、金额计算、补偿款发放程序及执行监督等各方面进行全面评价。第四部分,依据调查数据,对养殖户的扑杀配合意愿进行实证分析,对影响禽主配合意愿的因素进行显著性检验。第五部分,在前述各章研究的基础上,提出完善我国现行扑杀补偿政策的市价补偿设计方案。第六部分,分析市价补偿政策的成本最小化机制,研究市价补偿成本最小化的途径。
研究结论表明:第一,我国2004年以来的禽流感疫情在暴发的时间、空间、频率、及禽情发现方面存在着鲜明的特点。第二,我国目前各地的扑杀补偿政策呈现出补偿标准和补偿方法不统一的混乱现状。第三,总的说来,我国现行的扑杀补偿政策激励相容性较差,尽管在禽情的不同阶段,扑杀补偿政策的激励相容性存在着差异。第四,我国现行扑杀补偿政策缺乏激励相容性的根本原因在于其存在的诸多缺陷,如补偿标准过低,补偿范围太小等。第五,养殖户的扑杀配合意愿受多种因素的影响,但无论家庭养殖户还是规模养殖户,“对补偿满意度”是影响他们配合意愿的最显著因素。第六,实行市价补偿是我国扑杀补偿政策发展和完善的方向。
上述研究结论具有很好的政策意义:第一,尽快制定我国专门的禽流感扑杀补偿法,对扑杀补偿政策进行统一和规范。第二,以市价补偿为核心,对扑杀补偿政策进行重新设计。第三,对禽主进行禽流感知识、科学养殖知识的教育与培训。第四,加大扑杀补偿政策的宣传力度。第五,对扑杀补偿工作进行全过程监管,防止虚报和截留补偿款现象的发生。第六,积极探索家禽疫病政策保险,建立责任分层、成本分担的禽主扑杀损失赔补机制。第七,提高补偿政策执行效率,减少补偿政策的执行时滞。
In recent years, avian influenza(AI)occurred and spread periodically around the world, bringing about great losses to the world economy and a severe threat to human life. For a long period of time in the future, such a threat will remain and eradication will still be the most direct but also the most effective measure to put down AI. So compensation to the poultry owners will continue to be a long-term national policy against avian influenza in China. The purposes of this paper are to analyze the incentive compatibility of the current compensation policy and the willingness of poultry owners to cooperate with the government, and to propose a new compensation system based on market price of the poultry, which provides a theoretical basis for government’s decision making. So the study is of some theoretical and practical significance.
Compensation policy is studied in this paper from the perspective of economics. The main methodologies involved include normative study, empirical study, case study, field survey and econometric approach. After concept definition and literature review, the study is carried on from six aspects, following the route of“background-theory-demonstration-policy”. First, an overview is presented in this paper about China’s AI and its characteristics as well as her compensation policies in different provinces. Then, based on theories, say, principal - agent theory, mechanism design theory, risk theory and utility theory, this paper analyzed different characteristics of information at different stages of AI and the incentive compatibility of the current compensation policy in such information environments by incentive compatibility model. The third section of the paper mainly deals with a comprehensive comment on the current compensation policy, involving its goal, standard, range, calculation (of the amount ), procedures and supervision, while the forth section is mainly about an empirical study of poultry owners’willingness to cooperate with the government and a significant test of factors affecting it. All the data needed are from the author’s investigation. After all the above study and analysis, a new compensation plan, called market-price compensation plan, is designed in the fifth section, and the ways to minimize the new plan’s cost are further discussed in the last section.
The research results show that: 1) AI in China has presented distinctive characteristics in the time, space, frequency of its outbreak and the way of its disclosure. 2) Compensation policies in each province are quite different from each other. 3) Generally speaking, China’s compensation policy has little incentive compatibility though it shows differently at different stages of AI. 4) The reason why the current compensation policy is less compatible lies in the fact that it has many defects in its goal, its compensation standard and scope, etc. 5) the level of poultry owners’satisfaction to the compensation is the most significant of all the factors that have much effect on poultry farmers’willingness of cooperation. 6) To raise the compensation standard to market price is the way to improve our country’s current compensation policy.
The policy implications based on the above research results are to: 1) make a unified compensation law as soon as possible to regulate the compensation of the country. 2) Raise the compensation standard by the implementation of market-price compensation policy. 3) Provide training course to poultry owners with knowledge of AI and scientific feeding. 4) Strengthen the propaganda of the compensation policy. 5) Strengthen the supervision of the compensation process so as to prevent false report and other illegal activities. 6) Probe fowl disease insurance and establish a cost share mechanism to make up for the owners’loss caused by eradication. 7) Enhance the efficiency of policy execution to reduce time lag.
引文
①根据卢秀琼(2006)、刘亚清(2007)等相关文献整理。
②除特别注明外,有关数据均根据农业部官方网站正式公布的数据资料整理而成。
①资料来源:中国统计年鉴(2005-2006)。
①根据加拿大Canada Gaxette ,Vol.138,No.12(CIF,2004)及Vol.134,No.13(CIF,2000)整理。
①根据美国农业部提供的《National Animal Health Emergency Management System Guidelines》及《Operational Guidelines: Appraisal and Compensation》等相关文献整理。
①舒尔茨:改造传统农业,梁小民译.北京:商务印书馆,2006年4月.
①根据林祥金(2005)、石尚柏(2007)、亦戈(2007)等相关文献整理。
①根据查贵有(2008)、刘亚清(2007)、刘纪成(2006)等相关文献整理。
①根据蔡蕊(2007)、李绍钰(2007)、谢荣国(2008)等相关文献整理。
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②除特别注明外,有关数据均根据农业部官方网站正式公布的数据资料整理而成。
①资料来源:中国统计年鉴(2005-2006)。
①根据加拿大Canada Gaxette ,Vol.138,No.12(CIF,2004)及Vol.134,No.13(CIF,2000)整理。
①根据美国农业部提供的《National Animal Health Emergency Management System Guidelines》及《Operational Guidelines: Appraisal and Compensation》等相关文献整理。
①舒尔茨:改造传统农业,梁小民译.北京:商务印书馆,2006年4月.
①根据林祥金(2005)、石尚柏(2007)、亦戈(2007)等相关文献整理。
①根据查贵有(2008)、刘亚清(2007)、刘纪成(2006)等相关文献整理。
①根据蔡蕊(2007)、李绍钰(2007)、谢荣国(2008)等相关文献整理。
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