煤矿安全监察进化博弈分析
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摘要
近年来,煤矿安全监察问题受到社会各界广泛关注。但目前对煤矿安全监察的研究主要集中在对监察与被监察双方静态特征的描述上,而对双方行为动态进化过程的研究相对较少。研究煤矿安全监察双方行为的动态进化过程,可以探索到双方行为进化的路径选择及其稳定状态,为寻求有效的煤矿安全监察提供重要途径,并可实现对利益相关者权益的有效保护。
现实中的煤矿安全监察双方是有限理性的,本研究引入生物进化论中“适者生存”的思想,将煤矿安全监察视为煤矿与安全监察双方行为动态进化的生态系统。首先,应用进化博弈论中的单群体(Monomorphic Population)动态模型建立煤炭企业行为的进化博弈模型,并对进化系统的稳定状态特征及其影响因素进行分析,认为加大对煤矿企业违规行为的处罚力度、减少执行安全规则的成本,增加事故赔偿额度等措施,可以有效促进煤矿企业的安全生产行为;其次,根据我国煤矿安全监察系统结构,对煤矿安全监察人员行为进化的稳定状态进行了分析,认为对加大煤矿违规行为的处罚力度,及加大对监察部门失职行为的惩罚力度,将增加监察人员认真执法的概率,而增加监察费用,及煤矿贿赂金额的增加将降低监察人员认真执法的概率;然后,通过建立煤矿安全监察双方的多群体(Polymorphic Populations)动态模型,分析了存在腐败的情况下博弈双方各自行为取向的稳定状态,特别是从社会现实角度出发,分析了两种特殊受贿概率下(受贿概率恒定和受贿风险最小的概率情况下)的煤矿安全监察人员监察行为的稳定状态,当受贿概率恒定时,增加对煤矿和监察违规行为的惩罚力度,可能增加监察执行概率,但如果行贿额度增加,则可能降低执行概率,当最小风险受贿概率下,只有增强对执法人员的监察力度才能减少受贿概率;最后,引用案例对上述研究结论进行了映证分析。
本研究的创新在于把进化博弈理念与煤矿安全监察的实际情况有机结合起来进行研究,系统阐述了煤矿安全监察双方的行为取向。
Coal mine safety is a hot topic in China's economic construction, caused widespread concern from the government and the people. However, there is lack of study on dynamic evolutionary behave process of both Coal mine corporation side and Supervision side, At present, coal mine safety supervision research is still mainly focused on describing static characteristics of coal mine and supervision organization. After studying on dynamic evolutionary behave process of Coal mine corporation side and supervision organization side, we can explore the evolutionary path and stabile state of the coal cine corporation and cupervision organization, whicn can provide an important method to supervision soal mine safety effectively and also can achieve effective protection to relevant interests-holders. Therefore, the study has important theoretical and practical significance.
In reality, both coal mine safety supervision sides are limited rational, the study had introduced "survival of the fittest" thinking of biological evolution, regarded soal mine safety supervision as a soal mine safety supervision behavior dynamic evolutionary ecosystem. First, applied Monomorphic Population dynamic model in evolutionary game theory to build coal enterprises beehive's evolutionary game model, and analyzed the steady-state characteristics and its affecting factors of evolutionary system; Second, based on the structure of China's soal mine safety supervision, analyzed evolutionary behave stability of coal mine safety inspectors; Third , from social reality angle, the steady state of evolutionary behave which under two special bribery probability of coal mine safety inspectors was analyzed; Forth, through Polymorphic Populations Dynamic model of both coal mine cafety cupervision sides, behave tropism of game two parties under different circumstances which exist bribery or not were analyzed. Finally, the study concluded above cited case with demonstration analysis.
Innovative ideas in this study is combined evolutionary game theory with actual situation of coal mine cafety cupervision, systematically explained the behavior tropism of both sides in coal mine safety supervision.
现实中的煤矿安全监察双方是有限理性的,本研究引入生物进化论中“适者生存”的思想,将煤矿安全监察视为煤矿与安全监察双方行为动态进化的生态系统。首先,应用进化博弈论中的单群体(Monomorphic Population)动态模型建立煤炭企业行为的进化博弈模型,并对进化系统的稳定状态特征及其影响因素进行分析,认为加大对煤矿企业违规行为的处罚力度、减少执行安全规则的成本,增加事故赔偿额度等措施,可以有效促进煤矿企业的安全生产行为;其次,根据我国煤矿安全监察系统结构,对煤矿安全监察人员行为进化的稳定状态进行了分析,认为对加大煤矿违规行为的处罚力度,及加大对监察部门失职行为的惩罚力度,将增加监察人员认真执法的概率,而增加监察费用,及煤矿贿赂金额的增加将降低监察人员认真执法的概率;然后,通过建立煤矿安全监察双方的多群体(Polymorphic Populations)动态模型,分析了存在腐败的情况下博弈双方各自行为取向的稳定状态,特别是从社会现实角度出发,分析了两种特殊受贿概率下(受贿概率恒定和受贿风险最小的概率情况下)的煤矿安全监察人员监察行为的稳定状态,当受贿概率恒定时,增加对煤矿和监察违规行为的惩罚力度,可能增加监察执行概率,但如果行贿额度增加,则可能降低执行概率,当最小风险受贿概率下,只有增强对执法人员的监察力度才能减少受贿概率;最后,引用案例对上述研究结论进行了映证分析。
本研究的创新在于把进化博弈理念与煤矿安全监察的实际情况有机结合起来进行研究,系统阐述了煤矿安全监察双方的行为取向。
Coal mine safety is a hot topic in China's economic construction, caused widespread concern from the government and the people. However, there is lack of study on dynamic evolutionary behave process of both Coal mine corporation side and Supervision side, At present, coal mine safety supervision research is still mainly focused on describing static characteristics of coal mine and supervision organization. After studying on dynamic evolutionary behave process of Coal mine corporation side and supervision organization side, we can explore the evolutionary path and stabile state of the coal cine corporation and cupervision organization, whicn can provide an important method to supervision soal mine safety effectively and also can achieve effective protection to relevant interests-holders. Therefore, the study has important theoretical and practical significance.
In reality, both coal mine safety supervision sides are limited rational, the study had introduced "survival of the fittest" thinking of biological evolution, regarded soal mine safety supervision as a soal mine safety supervision behavior dynamic evolutionary ecosystem. First, applied Monomorphic Population dynamic model in evolutionary game theory to build coal enterprises beehive's evolutionary game model, and analyzed the steady-state characteristics and its affecting factors of evolutionary system; Second, based on the structure of China's soal mine safety supervision, analyzed evolutionary behave stability of coal mine safety inspectors; Third , from social reality angle, the steady state of evolutionary behave which under two special bribery probability of coal mine safety inspectors was analyzed; Forth, through Polymorphic Populations Dynamic model of both coal mine cafety cupervision sides, behave tropism of game two parties under different circumstances which exist bribery or not were analyzed. Finally, the study concluded above cited case with demonstration analysis.
Innovative ideas in this study is combined evolutionary game theory with actual situation of coal mine cafety cupervision, systematically explained the behavior tropism of both sides in coal mine safety supervision.
引文
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