中国股份制企业会计监督体系创新研究
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摘要
股份制企业会计监督是保证企业会计信息真实性的手段,会计监督职能充分有效的发挥作用,有赖于股份制企业会计监督体系的健全和完善。本文以会计监督理论为指导,在深入分析中国股份制企业会计监督体系内在监督关系的基础之上,借鉴市场经济发达国家会计监督体系的模式经验,就中国股份制企业会计监督体系创新的有关问题进行了研究和探讨,全文共分五章。
本文第一章是有关股份制企业的特征、会计监督的内涵,以及股份制企业会计监督必要性的理论概述。主要阐述了股份制企业产权明晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学的特征,明确了会计监督的真正内涵应是一个多层次的监督体系,进一步分析了股份制企业会计监督的经济理论依据和现实意义。
本文第二章首先阐明了现阶段中国股份制企业实行“三位一体”的会计监督体系,并在此基础上,分析了中国股份制企业会计监督职能弱化的表现及原因,以及现行会计监督体系的局限性。分析表明,中国股份制企业现行会计监督体系的各个层面都依然存在一些问题,必须建立一个更加完善的、有效的、相互约束的新型会计监督体系。
本文第三章运用了博弈的研究方法,重点分析了股份制企业会计监督体系中层层委托代理的相互监督关系,通过分析信息提供者与信息使用者、经营管理者与会计人员、监管者与经营管理者、社会中介机构与经营管理者以及监管者与社会中介机构之间的相互博弈关系,表明股份制企业会计监督体系的完善,也是多次重复博弈的均衡结果。
本文第四章通过对股份制企业会计监督体系国际模式的利弊比较,借鉴美国会计监督体系的模式发展经验,提出了中国股份制企业会计监督体系模式创新的基本原则,在确定会计监督主体及其监督权的基础之上,按照企业所有权观,创建了以内部会计监督为基础,以外部会计监督为再监督,以民间审计为媒介的中国股份制企业会计监督体系新模式。
本文第五章提出了中国股份制企业会计监督体系的两大创新途径:首先优化监督体系的内外环境,包括法制环境的优化、企业制度环境的优化、会计职业道德环境的优化和会计技术环境的优化;其次,建立协调有序的监督机制,包括内部约束机制、内部控制机制、政府监督机制、民间审计监督机制、会计人员管理机制以及社会舆论监督机制的健全和完善,从而保障股份制企业会计监督体系的有效运作。
Accountant surveillance is the way to ensure the facticity of accountant information in stock enterprises, and the function of accountant surveillance going into effect adequately and effectually depends on the healthiness and consummation of the accountant surveillance system. On the basis of deeply analysis of the surveillance relations in the accountant surveillance system of Chinese stock enterprises, this article absorbs the advanced experiences of the accountant surveillance system's mode of some developed market economy countries, and tries to probe into the innovation of Chinese stock enterprises' accountant surveillance system, according to the correlative Theory of Accountant Surveillance. The whole article includes five chapters.The characteristics of stock enterprises, the meaning of accountant surveillance and the necessary of accountant surveillance in stock enterprises are stated in the paper. The first chapter mostly expounds the characteristics of stock enterprises: transparent property right, clear responsibility, divided government and enterprise, and scientific management. The genuine meaning of accountant surveillance has been ascertained, which should be a multilayer surveillance system. And more, the economic academic gist and the realistic significances of stock enterprises' accountant surveillance have been analyzed in this chapter.The elucidation above all in the second chapter The analysis that Chinese stock-enterprises put into accountant "triune" surveillance system practice in present phase. And on the basis of this conclusion, I analyze the exhibition and the cause of the accountant surveillance's function what has been weakened in Chinese stock enterprises, and the localizations of the actual accountant surveillance system. The analysis indicates that there are some problems in every lay of the actual Chinese stock enterprises' accountant surveillance system. We should establish a new accountant surveillance system with more perfect and effective, and which can be held in one another.The game research process is used to try to analyze the mutual surveillance relations of commission-surrogate ring upon ring in the accountant surveillance
system of Chinese stock enterprises in the third chapter. I study the mutual game relations between information- provider and information- user, proprietor and accountant, surveillant and proprietor, social agency and proprietor, surveillant and social agency, and the analysis indicates the repeated games and equilibriums between each actor can healthiness and perfect the accountant surveillance system of Chinese stock enterprises.By comparing advantages and disadvantages of accountant surveillance's international model, absorbing America experience in developing model of accountant surveillance system, the fourth chapter puts forward the principia of accountant surveillance system innovating in Chinese stock enterprises. On the basis of ascertaining the main body and surveillance rights of accountant surveillance, according the enterprise's proprietorial conception, this part builds a new model of accountant surveillance system for Chinese stock enterprises. The new system make the civil audit surveillance as a intermedium, base on the inner accountant surveillance, and with re-surveillance of the exterior accountant surveillance.Two avenues are mentioned to innovate the accountant surveillance system of Chinese stock enterprises in the last chapter. The first avenue is optimize the environment inside and outside the surveillance system, include legal system environment, enterprise system environment, accountant professional moral environment and accountant technology environment. Then we should set up concerted and well-ordered surveillance mechanism, healthiness and perfect the inner restriction mechanism, inner control mechanism, governmental surveillance mechanism, civilian audit surveillance mechanism, supervise accountant mechanism and social consensus surveillance mechanism, and accordingly to ensure the accountant surveillance system of Chinese st
本文第一章是有关股份制企业的特征、会计监督的内涵,以及股份制企业会计监督必要性的理论概述。主要阐述了股份制企业产权明晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学的特征,明确了会计监督的真正内涵应是一个多层次的监督体系,进一步分析了股份制企业会计监督的经济理论依据和现实意义。
本文第二章首先阐明了现阶段中国股份制企业实行“三位一体”的会计监督体系,并在此基础上,分析了中国股份制企业会计监督职能弱化的表现及原因,以及现行会计监督体系的局限性。分析表明,中国股份制企业现行会计监督体系的各个层面都依然存在一些问题,必须建立一个更加完善的、有效的、相互约束的新型会计监督体系。
本文第三章运用了博弈的研究方法,重点分析了股份制企业会计监督体系中层层委托代理的相互监督关系,通过分析信息提供者与信息使用者、经营管理者与会计人员、监管者与经营管理者、社会中介机构与经营管理者以及监管者与社会中介机构之间的相互博弈关系,表明股份制企业会计监督体系的完善,也是多次重复博弈的均衡结果。
本文第四章通过对股份制企业会计监督体系国际模式的利弊比较,借鉴美国会计监督体系的模式发展经验,提出了中国股份制企业会计监督体系模式创新的基本原则,在确定会计监督主体及其监督权的基础之上,按照企业所有权观,创建了以内部会计监督为基础,以外部会计监督为再监督,以民间审计为媒介的中国股份制企业会计监督体系新模式。
本文第五章提出了中国股份制企业会计监督体系的两大创新途径:首先优化监督体系的内外环境,包括法制环境的优化、企业制度环境的优化、会计职业道德环境的优化和会计技术环境的优化;其次,建立协调有序的监督机制,包括内部约束机制、内部控制机制、政府监督机制、民间审计监督机制、会计人员管理机制以及社会舆论监督机制的健全和完善,从而保障股份制企业会计监督体系的有效运作。
Accountant surveillance is the way to ensure the facticity of accountant information in stock enterprises, and the function of accountant surveillance going into effect adequately and effectually depends on the healthiness and consummation of the accountant surveillance system. On the basis of deeply analysis of the surveillance relations in the accountant surveillance system of Chinese stock enterprises, this article absorbs the advanced experiences of the accountant surveillance system's mode of some developed market economy countries, and tries to probe into the innovation of Chinese stock enterprises' accountant surveillance system, according to the correlative Theory of Accountant Surveillance. The whole article includes five chapters.The characteristics of stock enterprises, the meaning of accountant surveillance and the necessary of accountant surveillance in stock enterprises are stated in the paper. The first chapter mostly expounds the characteristics of stock enterprises: transparent property right, clear responsibility, divided government and enterprise, and scientific management. The genuine meaning of accountant surveillance has been ascertained, which should be a multilayer surveillance system. And more, the economic academic gist and the realistic significances of stock enterprises' accountant surveillance have been analyzed in this chapter.The elucidation above all in the second chapter The analysis that Chinese stock-enterprises put into accountant "triune" surveillance system practice in present phase. And on the basis of this conclusion, I analyze the exhibition and the cause of the accountant surveillance's function what has been weakened in Chinese stock enterprises, and the localizations of the actual accountant surveillance system. The analysis indicates that there are some problems in every lay of the actual Chinese stock enterprises' accountant surveillance system. We should establish a new accountant surveillance system with more perfect and effective, and which can be held in one another.The game research process is used to try to analyze the mutual surveillance relations of commission-surrogate ring upon ring in the accountant surveillance
system of Chinese stock enterprises in the third chapter. I study the mutual game relations between information- provider and information- user, proprietor and accountant, surveillant and proprietor, social agency and proprietor, surveillant and social agency, and the analysis indicates the repeated games and equilibriums between each actor can healthiness and perfect the accountant surveillance system of Chinese stock enterprises.By comparing advantages and disadvantages of accountant surveillance's international model, absorbing America experience in developing model of accountant surveillance system, the fourth chapter puts forward the principia of accountant surveillance system innovating in Chinese stock enterprises. On the basis of ascertaining the main body and surveillance rights of accountant surveillance, according the enterprise's proprietorial conception, this part builds a new model of accountant surveillance system for Chinese stock enterprises. The new system make the civil audit surveillance as a intermedium, base on the inner accountant surveillance, and with re-surveillance of the exterior accountant surveillance.Two avenues are mentioned to innovate the accountant surveillance system of Chinese stock enterprises in the last chapter. The first avenue is optimize the environment inside and outside the surveillance system, include legal system environment, enterprise system environment, accountant professional moral environment and accountant technology environment. Then we should set up concerted and well-ordered surveillance mechanism, healthiness and perfect the inner restriction mechanism, inner control mechanism, governmental surveillance mechanism, civilian audit surveillance mechanism, supervise accountant mechanism and social consensus surveillance mechanism, and accordingly to ensure the accountant surveillance system of Chinese st
引文
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[2] 李爽.会计信息失真的现状、成因与对策研究.北京:经济科学出版社,2002
[3] 王殿龙.会计委派制理论与实务.北京:新华出版社,2001
[4] 赵保卿.会计监督实务.北京:中华工商联合出版社,2001
[5] 聂顺江.会计信息质量检验、决定及保证.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003
[6] 中国会计学会.会计监管专题.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2003
[7] 唐清泉.企业中的代理问题与信息管理.北京:中国财政经济出版社2002
[8] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海:三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996
[9] 段景泉.会计信息质量与会计监督检查.北京:中国财政经济出版社,2001
[10] 陶良虎,贸茂清.市场经济与会计监督.北京:经济科学出版社,2004
[11] 胡代光.西方经济学说的演变及其影响.北京:北京大学出版社,1998
[12] [美]H.T麦吉尔,G.J.普雷维特,T.R.鲁宾逊著,耿建新等译.注册会计师职业机遇、责任和服务范围.北京:世界图书出版公司,2001
[13] [美]科斯,哈特,斯蒂格利茨.契约经济学.北京:经济科学出版社(中译本),1999
[14] [美]哈罗德·德姆塞茨著,梁小民译.企业经济学.北京:中国社会科学出版社,1999
[15] 周剑丽,王若虹.现代企业制度与会计监督.现代审计与会计,2001.6
[16] 王海民.对政府会计监管问题的几点看法.会计研究,2001.12
[17] 齐艳芬.浅谈现代企业制度下的会计监督.内蒙古电大学刊,2002.1
[18] 黄万清.论企业内部控制.四川会计,2000.12
[19] 谢得仁.注册会计师行业管制模式理论分析.会计研究,2002.2
[20] 徐经长,唐圣林.从安然事件看会计监管.中国注册会计师,2002.5
[21] 李艳芹,张晓丽.现代企业制度下如何有效实施会计监督.河北财会,2003.1
[22] 韩启忠,李洁.对市场经济条件下会计监督的再认识.河南科技,2002.11
[23] 全承相.会计监督乏力的法制原因及其强化与创新.现代财经,2000.7
[24] 程小可.注册会计师审计风险的博弈分析.中国注册会计师,2000.8
[25] 杜兴强.注册会计师审计中的监督博弈及保险问题——安然事件的启示.审计研究,2002.3
[26] 武书萍.会计监督在现代企业制度中的作用.山西煤炭管理干部学院学报,2001.1
[27] 郑常虹,涂伟.从博弈论角度看会计制度和会计监督.武汉科技大学学报(社会科学版),2000.9
[28] 孙建强,贸莉,李莉.会计信息供求博弈分析.经济师,2002.4
[29] 姚海鑫,尹波,李正.关于上市公司会计监管的不完全信息博弈分析.会计研究,2003.5
[30] 姚永智.博弈中的会计监督.会计之友,2002.6
[31] 高振翔.试论会计监督职能与现代企业制度的相关性.经济师,2003.1
[32] 臧巍,于占洋.强化会计监督职能,保证经济活动顺利进行.审计理论与实践,2001.9
[33] 郑超.健全会计监督体系之我见.山西统计,2002.11
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