我国上市公司定向增发定价偏好及经济后果研究
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摘要
一、研究背景与目的
定向增发,作为股权分置改革取得阶段性成果后我国资本市场上出现的新型股权再融资方式,一经推出便得到市场的青睐,逐渐成为近年来我国资本市场上股权再融资的主流和广大投资者追捧的热点。2006年至2007年两年内,我国资本市场上市公司通过定向增发方式募集资金高达3600多亿(2006年为936亿,2007年为2670亿),几乎占据2006年和2007年两年内整个资本市场股权再融资金额的九成以上。
总体而言,定向增发方式未正式推出之前,我国资本市场上并不遵循西方经典的“啄食理论”,而极度偏好股权再融资的其他方式(包括公开增发、配股等),并且向市场传递着负面、消极的信号——即具有负的短期、长期市场反应;股权再融资的绩效低下;股权再融资常被作为上市公司或上市公司股东“圈钱”的工具。定向增发方式正式推出之后,便受到国内学者和实务界人士的强烈关注,其定价过程中存在一个有趣的现象,即偏好低价发行;另外,其是否与股权再融资的其他方式一样,向市场传递负面、消极的信号呢?定向增发对上市公司未来经营绩效会产生什么样的影响呢?带着这些疑问,国内众多学者对其进行了尝试性研究与探索,但受时间、数据等因素的制约,对其的研究尚处于起步阶段,也未形成系统的研究体系和结论。本文拟以我国实施定向增发的上市公司为研究对象,从理论与实证两个角度系统、深入的研究定向增发的定价偏好和经济后果两大方面,为以后学者进一步研究该问题提供视角,权作抛砖引玉之用罢。
二、论文主要内容
本文针对定向增发定价偏好和经济后果两方面的研究,是对目前关于定向增发核心问题的研究,采用规范研究与实证分析相结合的方法,相继分析定向增发的制度背景与理论基础、定价偏好及经济后果等内容。全文共分为七章,各章内容安排与主要结论如下:
第一章,导论。本章主要阐述论文的研究背景、研究目的和意义、研究思路、研究的主要内容与框架以及本文研究的主要创新之处。
第二章,文献综述。本章主要对国内外股权再融资相关研究与国内外关于定向增发的研究文献进行回顾与评述。其中,主要阐述国内外关于定向增发定价问题及经济后果两大方面的研究文献。一方面,关于股权再融资行为的研究主要集中于股权再融资的方式选择、再融资效应及其解释两大方面,研究成果及体系相对丰富与成熟,这为本文全面、系统、深入研究定向增发提供了很好的框架思路;另一方面,关于定向增发的研究主要集中于定向增发定价问题、经济后果问题(包括市场反应及其解释、定向增发对上市公司未来经营绩效的影响两大方面)两大内容,研究成果及体系相对较少与分散,特别是国内的研究以规范演绎分析为主,实证研究较少,这为本文拓展、丰富定向增发行为的研究提供了绝好的契机。
第三章为理论基础与制度背景。本部分主要运用信息不对称理论及代理理论的框架并结合我国特有的制度背景(股权再融资的历史沿革、股权分置改革、整体上市)对定向增发定价偏好及经济后果进行系统、深入的剖析。研究结果显示,在我国特有的制度背景下,定向增发在理论上存在着以较低的对价向大股东输送利益,实现大股东侵害中小股东利益的可能;但这一可能并不能被市场所识别,仍然具有积极、正面的市场反应以及未来经营绩效的提高。因此,本文认为,定向增发实质上是一把“双刃剑”,只有当相应的理论和制度前提得到满足时,才能更好的发挥作用。
第四章,研究定向增发定价偏好问题。该章旨在提供前述理论分析结果的经验证据。具体而言,将采用微观分析的手段,建立“股东利益均衡”的分析模型,探讨定向增发过程中发行定价的偏好选择问题,并在此基础上分析影响定价偏好选择的核心因素;在此基础上,最后从实证的角度检验了定向增发过程中,因股东利益均衡的博弈,给中小股东所带来的利益侵害程度。
第五章,研究定向增发的经济后果之一:市场反应。该章首先运用事件研究法描述与分析定向增发所具有的市场“宣告效应”;其次采用多元回归的方法分析其所具有的市场反应与公司对资产流动性的需要和股权集中度的稀释有关,并以此来解释这一市场反应。这一研究是对我国关于定向增发市场反应解释的重要补充。
第六章,研究定向增发的经济后果之二:财务效应。该章主要分析定向增发对上市公司经营绩效的影响。该部分首先对公司定向增发前后共三年间的经营绩效的变化做比较分析,发现定向增发前后三年间公司整体经营绩效呈不断上升的趋势;其次,对定向增发后对公司整体经营绩效的影响进行实证分析,发现公司未来整体经营绩效与公司定向增发前第一大股东持股比例、发行对象、募资用途、注入资产类型显著正相关;公司未来整体经营绩效与定向增发对象和注入资产类型的交叉项显著正相关;公司未来整体经营绩效与定向增发对象和第一大股东持股比例的交叉项负相关;公司整体经营绩效与公司定向增发前资产负债率、定向增发前公司的成长性显著正相关,并对之进行了详细的解释与说明。
第七章为全文总结部分。包括研究结论与政策建议、研究的局限性以及未来值得进一步研究的方向和课题。本章是对全文结论的概括性总结。主要阐述三点:其一,归纳本文主要研究结论,阐明研究局限性,概括本文研究的主要创新点与贡献;其二,总结本文对定向增发行为的全面研究所带来的若干启示。主要归纳为:股权分置改革是定向增发受市场青睐的前提条件或前奏;整体上市是定向增发受市场青睐强有力的推动剂;定向增发是一把名副其实的“双刃剑”。随后据此提出本文的政策建议;其三,对定向增发行为未来研究的方向进行了展望。
三、主要创新与学术贡献
本文的主要创新与学术贡献如下:
(1)通过剖析我国上市公司定向增发的现有定价机制,发现了定向增发定价具有低价发行的强烈偏好。研究中,以定向增发利益相关者利益均衡为视角,针对定向增发不同的发行对象构建定向增发股东利益均衡模型,分析认为在信息不对称和股权集中的公司治理背景下,我国上市公司定向增发具有低价发行的强烈偏好,且这一偏好在定向增发发行对象涉及大股东或大股东关联方时更为明显。
(2)通过对定向增发的低价发行偏好进行分析,揭示了我国资本市场定向增发定价机制的不合理性与不公平性。一方面,对定向增发而言,上市公司大股东与中小股东具有不平等的投资机会,加上《上市公司证券发行管理办法》中过于模糊的九折定价规则导致我国上市公司定向增发定价机制的“失衡”;另一方面,定向增发不公平的定价机制,会在定向增发各利益主体之间利益的重新分配中,造成对中小股东利益的侵害。研究中,本文尝试性的构建了衡量定向增发定价偏好对中小股东未来财富影响的指标Expropriation。结果显示,定向增发不公平的定价机制造成对中小股东未来财富的不同程度的侵占。这一尝试性研究,为学者将来更为准确的研究定向增发所带来的利益侵害或财富损失提供了思路或方向。
(3)通过对定向增发经济后果的研究,发现一方面,定向增发所具有的积极、正面的市场反应可以用资产流动性的需要和股权集中度的稀释予以解释;另一方面,定向增发后上市公司经营绩效明显提升,并且定向增发后经营绩效的明显提升与上市公司定向增发前第一大股东持股比例、注入资产类型、募资用途、发行前资产负债率、公司成长性存在显著的相关关系。这两大发现,理论上进一步丰富了有关定向增发理论研究的文献积累,实践中可以进一步明确定向增发与公司治理、整体上市及定向增发制度本身之间的关系,为推进定向增发制度的完善、改善公司治理、推动企业集团以定向增发方式实现整体上市提供理论和经验证据。
(4)本文关于定向增发定价偏好和经济后果的研究,使监管层和广大的投资者更为清晰的理解定向增发是一把“双刃剑”的实质;既可以为资本市场上广大的投资者更清晰、准确的理解定向增发行为奠定坚实的基础,也可以为监管层更好的监管定向增发的行为、保护中小股东的利益以及不断的完善股权再融资方式提供借鉴性的思路。
First,Research Background and Purpose.
Directional Private Placement as split share structure reform, the results have been achieved to refinance a new way of equity after the emergence of China's capital market upon the introduction of markets would be favored .In recent years it has gradually become stake in China's capital market to refinance the mainstream and the general investment from the hot pursuit. From 2006 to 2007 within two years, China's listed firms through the capital market-oriented way to raise additional funds of up to more than 3600 million(in 2006 to 93.6 billion,in 2007 to 267 billion). It almost occupied in 2006 and 2007, the entire equity capital markets to refinance more than the amount of ninety discount.
Overall, China's capital markets do not follow the classic Western "eating theory" before directional private placement manner has been formally launched. The extreme preference shares of the other means of refinancing (including a public issuance, allotment, etc.), and to the market transmission of a negative, a negative signal - that is, with negative short-term and long-term market reaction. Equity refinancing poor performance; equity refinancing is often listed as a listed company or the shareholders of the Company "Expropriation" tool. Directional Private Placement after the issuance of the formal launch of the way, they practice by domestic scholars and professionals concerned about the strong, the pricing process, there is a interesting phenomenon, namely, low-cost distribution preferences; In addition, whether equity refinancing and other means, the negative transfer to the market, the negative signal it? Directional Private Placement to the future operating performance of listed companies will have what kind of impact? With these questions, many domestic scholars to conduct a trial of its research and exploration, but by the time, data and other factors, the research is still in its infancy, did not form a system and conclusions of the research system. This paper intended to study the issue further to provide perspective with additional research from both theoretical and empirical point of view system. This paper gives implement the orientation of China's listed companies, in-depth study of the pricing of Directional Private Placement preferences and economic consequences of the two major aspects for future scholars , using the right stop for start.
Second,Main Content.
In this paper additional pricing orientation preferences and economic consequences of the two studies is the orientation of the current on the core issue of additional research.This paper studies and standardizes the use of a combination of empirical analysis methods and have analyzed the system of Directional Private Placement background and theoretical foundation of preferences and economic consequences of pricing and so on. This paper is divided into seven chapters, each chapter with the main conclusions are as follows:
Chapter 1, Introduction. The main thesis of this chapter propose the research background, purpose and significance of study, research ideas and research with the framework and main contents of the main innovations .
Chapter 2, Literature Review. This chapter, the main refinancing of domestic and international equity research at home and abroad on the orientation of the research literature for additional review and comment. among them. Mainly on the orientation of additional domestic and foreign pricing and economic consequences of the two major aspects of the research literature. On the one hand, acts on the refinancing equity research focuses on equity refinancing options, refinancing and to explain the two effects, the study results and the relatively rich and mature system, which in this article a comprehensive, systematic study directed by made the framework provided a good idea; On the other hand, acts on the Directional Private Placement research focused on the pricing of additional orientation, the economic consequences of the problem (including the market response and explanation, additional orientation to the future operating performance of listed companies in both the aspect of the impact of) the two elements, research results and a relatively small and decentralized systems, in particular, the study is to standardize the interpretation of the main analysis, less empirical research, which this article to expand and enrich acts directed additional studies provide an excellent opportunity.
Chapter 3, The theoretical basis for the context and system. Some of the major use of the asymmetric information theory and agency theory framework and system of our country-specific background (ownership history of refinancing, the equity division reform, the overall market) on the orientation of additional mechanisms and economic consequences of pricing systems, in-depth analysis.The results showed that the system in our country-specific context, additional orientation exists in theory for a lower price to the transport interests of major shareholders, major shareholders to achieve the interests of shareholders against the possibility of small and medium-sized; However, this may not be market recognition, still has a positive market response as well as the future operating performance. Therefore, this paper argues that, in essence, an additional orientation is a "double-edged sword," only when the corresponding premise of the theory and system are met, in order to better play its role.
Chapter 4, Study on the orientation of additional pricing mechanism. The chapter seeks to provide a theoretical analysis of the results of the above empirical evidence. In particular, the micro-analysis will be used to establish "balance the interests of shareholders" of the analysis model to explore the process of issue-oriented pricing of additional preference options, and on the basis of analysis of the impact of pricing preferences to choose a core element; in this based on evidence from the perspective of the final test of the additional process-oriented, balanced the interests of shareholders because of the game, to small and medium-sized shareholders against the benefits of the degree.
Chapter 5, Study on the economic consequences of additional directional one: the market response. The first chapter describes the use of event study and analysis of additional targeted market has "declared" effect; Second, the use of multiple regression analysis of the market reaction they have with the company's liquidity needs and equity dilution of the concentration, and in order to explain the market reaction. The study on the orientation of our country's response to additional markets as an important complement to the interpretation.
Chapter 6, Study on the orientation of the economic consequences of an additional two: Directional Private Placement performance of listed companies affected. The first part of the company targeted a total of three years after issuance of the operating performance to do a comparative analysis of the changes and found that after three years of Directional Private Placement the company's overall operating performance was rising; Secondly, after the issuance of the company directed the overall business impact of the performance of empirical analysis, we found the overall operating performance of the company's future orientation with the company's largest shareholder before the issuance of shares held, the issue object, Prospectus uses the type of asset into a significant positive related; the company's future operating performance and directed the overall object and inject the assets of additional types of cross-term significant positive correlation; the company's future overall business performance and additional object-oriented and the first large cross-shareholding ratio of negative correlation; the company's overall operating performance-oriented with the company before the issuance of asset-liability ratio, orientation of additional growth before the company a significant positive correlation, and of a detailed explanation and description.
Chapter 7, The conclusion about this paper. Research conclusions and policy recommendations, research limitations and future directions worthy of further study and issues. The full text of this chapter is a general summary of conclusions. Mainly on three points: First, the main conclusion of the study summarized in this article, studies to clarify the limitations of this study summarized the main innovation and contribution; Second, the summary of this paper, the overall Directional Private Placement acts brought about by a number of Enlightenment Institute. Which are summarized as follows: share-trading reform is favored by the market orientation of the issuance of the most important cause of the system; Directional Private Placement is a true "double-edged sword." Subsequently put forward policy recommendations of this article; Third, acts of targeted additional direction for future research in future.
Third,Main Innovation and Contribution.
This paper attempts in the below aspect to from the characteristic and realize the innovation:
(1) We found that China's capital market-oriented pricing mechanism is not an additional fair and reasonable based on the orientation of China's listed companies in the pricing mechanism of additional research.“The issuance of securities of listed companies management”of the pricing system ninty percent discout rules and background of China's unique system, in particular equity focus on the governance structure of listed companies in China led to additional pricing mechanism targeted natural "imbalance." This will inevitably lead to additional targeted listed companies, the majority shareholder of a lower price to obtain more shares to dilute the interests of small shareholders.
(2) Directional Private Placement is not fair and reasonable pricing mechanism directed between the issuance of the interests of all stakeholders in the re-allocation can achieve the interests of small shareholders against .Study, this article attempts to construct a measure of the pricing of Directional Private Placement preference shareholders of small and medium-sized impact on the future of the indicators of wealth Expropriation. The results showed that targeted additional unfair pricing mechanism for small and medium-sized shareholders of the future caused by the different levels of wealth occupying. This attempt to study for scholars in future research more accurate orientation of the benefits of additional or wealth losses against the idea or direction.
(3)Through the issuance of the economic consequences of targeted research, We found that on the one hand, directed the issuance by the positive market reaction could be the need for liquidity and equity dilution concentration explained; On the other hand, directional after issuance of the operating performance of listed companies has improved significantly, and additional targeted operating performance of listed companies has improved significantly with the orientation before the first major shareholder additional share issue targeted into the type of asset, Prospectus use, distribution of assets and liabilities before the rate of growth of the company, there was a significant correlation between. Found these two, in theory, further enrich the theoretical study of the orientation of the literature of additional accumulation, the practice can be further clarified with additional targeted corporate governance, the overall market and the Directional Private Placement relationship between the system itself, in order to promote additional system-oriented Perfection, to improve corporate governance, promote the enterprise groups in order to achieve the overall orientation of additional market to provide theoretical and empirical evidence.
(4) This paper can help the investors and the general goverment clearer understanding of Directional Private Placement is a "double-edged sword" of the substance based on the study pricing mechanism on the orientation of additional research and economic consequences, can think that the majority of the capital markets investors a more clear, accurate understanding of the additional conduct directed to lay a solid foundation, can also better goverment supervision, as well as additional targeted continuously improve the delivery of equity from the refinancing of ideas.
定向增发,作为股权分置改革取得阶段性成果后我国资本市场上出现的新型股权再融资方式,一经推出便得到市场的青睐,逐渐成为近年来我国资本市场上股权再融资的主流和广大投资者追捧的热点。2006年至2007年两年内,我国资本市场上市公司通过定向增发方式募集资金高达3600多亿(2006年为936亿,2007年为2670亿),几乎占据2006年和2007年两年内整个资本市场股权再融资金额的九成以上。
总体而言,定向增发方式未正式推出之前,我国资本市场上并不遵循西方经典的“啄食理论”,而极度偏好股权再融资的其他方式(包括公开增发、配股等),并且向市场传递着负面、消极的信号——即具有负的短期、长期市场反应;股权再融资的绩效低下;股权再融资常被作为上市公司或上市公司股东“圈钱”的工具。定向增发方式正式推出之后,便受到国内学者和实务界人士的强烈关注,其定价过程中存在一个有趣的现象,即偏好低价发行;另外,其是否与股权再融资的其他方式一样,向市场传递负面、消极的信号呢?定向增发对上市公司未来经营绩效会产生什么样的影响呢?带着这些疑问,国内众多学者对其进行了尝试性研究与探索,但受时间、数据等因素的制约,对其的研究尚处于起步阶段,也未形成系统的研究体系和结论。本文拟以我国实施定向增发的上市公司为研究对象,从理论与实证两个角度系统、深入的研究定向增发的定价偏好和经济后果两大方面,为以后学者进一步研究该问题提供视角,权作抛砖引玉之用罢。
二、论文主要内容
本文针对定向增发定价偏好和经济后果两方面的研究,是对目前关于定向增发核心问题的研究,采用规范研究与实证分析相结合的方法,相继分析定向增发的制度背景与理论基础、定价偏好及经济后果等内容。全文共分为七章,各章内容安排与主要结论如下:
第一章,导论。本章主要阐述论文的研究背景、研究目的和意义、研究思路、研究的主要内容与框架以及本文研究的主要创新之处。
第二章,文献综述。本章主要对国内外股权再融资相关研究与国内外关于定向增发的研究文献进行回顾与评述。其中,主要阐述国内外关于定向增发定价问题及经济后果两大方面的研究文献。一方面,关于股权再融资行为的研究主要集中于股权再融资的方式选择、再融资效应及其解释两大方面,研究成果及体系相对丰富与成熟,这为本文全面、系统、深入研究定向增发提供了很好的框架思路;另一方面,关于定向增发的研究主要集中于定向增发定价问题、经济后果问题(包括市场反应及其解释、定向增发对上市公司未来经营绩效的影响两大方面)两大内容,研究成果及体系相对较少与分散,特别是国内的研究以规范演绎分析为主,实证研究较少,这为本文拓展、丰富定向增发行为的研究提供了绝好的契机。
第三章为理论基础与制度背景。本部分主要运用信息不对称理论及代理理论的框架并结合我国特有的制度背景(股权再融资的历史沿革、股权分置改革、整体上市)对定向增发定价偏好及经济后果进行系统、深入的剖析。研究结果显示,在我国特有的制度背景下,定向增发在理论上存在着以较低的对价向大股东输送利益,实现大股东侵害中小股东利益的可能;但这一可能并不能被市场所识别,仍然具有积极、正面的市场反应以及未来经营绩效的提高。因此,本文认为,定向增发实质上是一把“双刃剑”,只有当相应的理论和制度前提得到满足时,才能更好的发挥作用。
第四章,研究定向增发定价偏好问题。该章旨在提供前述理论分析结果的经验证据。具体而言,将采用微观分析的手段,建立“股东利益均衡”的分析模型,探讨定向增发过程中发行定价的偏好选择问题,并在此基础上分析影响定价偏好选择的核心因素;在此基础上,最后从实证的角度检验了定向增发过程中,因股东利益均衡的博弈,给中小股东所带来的利益侵害程度。
第五章,研究定向增发的经济后果之一:市场反应。该章首先运用事件研究法描述与分析定向增发所具有的市场“宣告效应”;其次采用多元回归的方法分析其所具有的市场反应与公司对资产流动性的需要和股权集中度的稀释有关,并以此来解释这一市场反应。这一研究是对我国关于定向增发市场反应解释的重要补充。
第六章,研究定向增发的经济后果之二:财务效应。该章主要分析定向增发对上市公司经营绩效的影响。该部分首先对公司定向增发前后共三年间的经营绩效的变化做比较分析,发现定向增发前后三年间公司整体经营绩效呈不断上升的趋势;其次,对定向增发后对公司整体经营绩效的影响进行实证分析,发现公司未来整体经营绩效与公司定向增发前第一大股东持股比例、发行对象、募资用途、注入资产类型显著正相关;公司未来整体经营绩效与定向增发对象和注入资产类型的交叉项显著正相关;公司未来整体经营绩效与定向增发对象和第一大股东持股比例的交叉项负相关;公司整体经营绩效与公司定向增发前资产负债率、定向增发前公司的成长性显著正相关,并对之进行了详细的解释与说明。
第七章为全文总结部分。包括研究结论与政策建议、研究的局限性以及未来值得进一步研究的方向和课题。本章是对全文结论的概括性总结。主要阐述三点:其一,归纳本文主要研究结论,阐明研究局限性,概括本文研究的主要创新点与贡献;其二,总结本文对定向增发行为的全面研究所带来的若干启示。主要归纳为:股权分置改革是定向增发受市场青睐的前提条件或前奏;整体上市是定向增发受市场青睐强有力的推动剂;定向增发是一把名副其实的“双刃剑”。随后据此提出本文的政策建议;其三,对定向增发行为未来研究的方向进行了展望。
三、主要创新与学术贡献
本文的主要创新与学术贡献如下:
(1)通过剖析我国上市公司定向增发的现有定价机制,发现了定向增发定价具有低价发行的强烈偏好。研究中,以定向增发利益相关者利益均衡为视角,针对定向增发不同的发行对象构建定向增发股东利益均衡模型,分析认为在信息不对称和股权集中的公司治理背景下,我国上市公司定向增发具有低价发行的强烈偏好,且这一偏好在定向增发发行对象涉及大股东或大股东关联方时更为明显。
(2)通过对定向增发的低价发行偏好进行分析,揭示了我国资本市场定向增发定价机制的不合理性与不公平性。一方面,对定向增发而言,上市公司大股东与中小股东具有不平等的投资机会,加上《上市公司证券发行管理办法》中过于模糊的九折定价规则导致我国上市公司定向增发定价机制的“失衡”;另一方面,定向增发不公平的定价机制,会在定向增发各利益主体之间利益的重新分配中,造成对中小股东利益的侵害。研究中,本文尝试性的构建了衡量定向增发定价偏好对中小股东未来财富影响的指标Expropriation。结果显示,定向增发不公平的定价机制造成对中小股东未来财富的不同程度的侵占。这一尝试性研究,为学者将来更为准确的研究定向增发所带来的利益侵害或财富损失提供了思路或方向。
(3)通过对定向增发经济后果的研究,发现一方面,定向增发所具有的积极、正面的市场反应可以用资产流动性的需要和股权集中度的稀释予以解释;另一方面,定向增发后上市公司经营绩效明显提升,并且定向增发后经营绩效的明显提升与上市公司定向增发前第一大股东持股比例、注入资产类型、募资用途、发行前资产负债率、公司成长性存在显著的相关关系。这两大发现,理论上进一步丰富了有关定向增发理论研究的文献积累,实践中可以进一步明确定向增发与公司治理、整体上市及定向增发制度本身之间的关系,为推进定向增发制度的完善、改善公司治理、推动企业集团以定向增发方式实现整体上市提供理论和经验证据。
(4)本文关于定向增发定价偏好和经济后果的研究,使监管层和广大的投资者更为清晰的理解定向增发是一把“双刃剑”的实质;既可以为资本市场上广大的投资者更清晰、准确的理解定向增发行为奠定坚实的基础,也可以为监管层更好的监管定向增发的行为、保护中小股东的利益以及不断的完善股权再融资方式提供借鉴性的思路。
First,Research Background and Purpose.
Directional Private Placement as split share structure reform, the results have been achieved to refinance a new way of equity after the emergence of China's capital market upon the introduction of markets would be favored .In recent years it has gradually become stake in China's capital market to refinance the mainstream and the general investment from the hot pursuit. From 2006 to 2007 within two years, China's listed firms through the capital market-oriented way to raise additional funds of up to more than 3600 million(in 2006 to 93.6 billion,in 2007 to 267 billion). It almost occupied in 2006 and 2007, the entire equity capital markets to refinance more than the amount of ninety discount.
Overall, China's capital markets do not follow the classic Western "eating theory" before directional private placement manner has been formally launched. The extreme preference shares of the other means of refinancing (including a public issuance, allotment, etc.), and to the market transmission of a negative, a negative signal - that is, with negative short-term and long-term market reaction. Equity refinancing poor performance; equity refinancing is often listed as a listed company or the shareholders of the Company "Expropriation" tool. Directional Private Placement after the issuance of the formal launch of the way, they practice by domestic scholars and professionals concerned about the strong, the pricing process, there is a interesting phenomenon, namely, low-cost distribution preferences; In addition, whether equity refinancing and other means, the negative transfer to the market, the negative signal it? Directional Private Placement to the future operating performance of listed companies will have what kind of impact? With these questions, many domestic scholars to conduct a trial of its research and exploration, but by the time, data and other factors, the research is still in its infancy, did not form a system and conclusions of the research system. This paper intended to study the issue further to provide perspective with additional research from both theoretical and empirical point of view system. This paper gives implement the orientation of China's listed companies, in-depth study of the pricing of Directional Private Placement preferences and economic consequences of the two major aspects for future scholars , using the right stop for start.
Second,Main Content.
In this paper additional pricing orientation preferences and economic consequences of the two studies is the orientation of the current on the core issue of additional research.This paper studies and standardizes the use of a combination of empirical analysis methods and have analyzed the system of Directional Private Placement background and theoretical foundation of preferences and economic consequences of pricing and so on. This paper is divided into seven chapters, each chapter with the main conclusions are as follows:
Chapter 1, Introduction. The main thesis of this chapter propose the research background, purpose and significance of study, research ideas and research with the framework and main contents of the main innovations .
Chapter 2, Literature Review. This chapter, the main refinancing of domestic and international equity research at home and abroad on the orientation of the research literature for additional review and comment. among them. Mainly on the orientation of additional domestic and foreign pricing and economic consequences of the two major aspects of the research literature. On the one hand, acts on the refinancing equity research focuses on equity refinancing options, refinancing and to explain the two effects, the study results and the relatively rich and mature system, which in this article a comprehensive, systematic study directed by made the framework provided a good idea; On the other hand, acts on the Directional Private Placement research focused on the pricing of additional orientation, the economic consequences of the problem (including the market response and explanation, additional orientation to the future operating performance of listed companies in both the aspect of the impact of) the two elements, research results and a relatively small and decentralized systems, in particular, the study is to standardize the interpretation of the main analysis, less empirical research, which this article to expand and enrich acts directed additional studies provide an excellent opportunity.
Chapter 3, The theoretical basis for the context and system. Some of the major use of the asymmetric information theory and agency theory framework and system of our country-specific background (ownership history of refinancing, the equity division reform, the overall market) on the orientation of additional mechanisms and economic consequences of pricing systems, in-depth analysis.The results showed that the system in our country-specific context, additional orientation exists in theory for a lower price to the transport interests of major shareholders, major shareholders to achieve the interests of shareholders against the possibility of small and medium-sized; However, this may not be market recognition, still has a positive market response as well as the future operating performance. Therefore, this paper argues that, in essence, an additional orientation is a "double-edged sword," only when the corresponding premise of the theory and system are met, in order to better play its role.
Chapter 4, Study on the orientation of additional pricing mechanism. The chapter seeks to provide a theoretical analysis of the results of the above empirical evidence. In particular, the micro-analysis will be used to establish "balance the interests of shareholders" of the analysis model to explore the process of issue-oriented pricing of additional preference options, and on the basis of analysis of the impact of pricing preferences to choose a core element; in this based on evidence from the perspective of the final test of the additional process-oriented, balanced the interests of shareholders because of the game, to small and medium-sized shareholders against the benefits of the degree.
Chapter 5, Study on the economic consequences of additional directional one: the market response. The first chapter describes the use of event study and analysis of additional targeted market has "declared" effect; Second, the use of multiple regression analysis of the market reaction they have with the company's liquidity needs and equity dilution of the concentration, and in order to explain the market reaction. The study on the orientation of our country's response to additional markets as an important complement to the interpretation.
Chapter 6, Study on the orientation of the economic consequences of an additional two: Directional Private Placement performance of listed companies affected. The first part of the company targeted a total of three years after issuance of the operating performance to do a comparative analysis of the changes and found that after three years of Directional Private Placement the company's overall operating performance was rising; Secondly, after the issuance of the company directed the overall business impact of the performance of empirical analysis, we found the overall operating performance of the company's future orientation with the company's largest shareholder before the issuance of shares held, the issue object, Prospectus uses the type of asset into a significant positive related; the company's future operating performance and directed the overall object and inject the assets of additional types of cross-term significant positive correlation; the company's future overall business performance and additional object-oriented and the first large cross-shareholding ratio of negative correlation; the company's overall operating performance-oriented with the company before the issuance of asset-liability ratio, orientation of additional growth before the company a significant positive correlation, and of a detailed explanation and description.
Chapter 7, The conclusion about this paper. Research conclusions and policy recommendations, research limitations and future directions worthy of further study and issues. The full text of this chapter is a general summary of conclusions. Mainly on three points: First, the main conclusion of the study summarized in this article, studies to clarify the limitations of this study summarized the main innovation and contribution; Second, the summary of this paper, the overall Directional Private Placement acts brought about by a number of Enlightenment Institute. Which are summarized as follows: share-trading reform is favored by the market orientation of the issuance of the most important cause of the system; Directional Private Placement is a true "double-edged sword." Subsequently put forward policy recommendations of this article; Third, acts of targeted additional direction for future research in future.
Third,Main Innovation and Contribution.
This paper attempts in the below aspect to from the characteristic and realize the innovation:
(1) We found that China's capital market-oriented pricing mechanism is not an additional fair and reasonable based on the orientation of China's listed companies in the pricing mechanism of additional research.“The issuance of securities of listed companies management”of the pricing system ninty percent discout rules and background of China's unique system, in particular equity focus on the governance structure of listed companies in China led to additional pricing mechanism targeted natural "imbalance." This will inevitably lead to additional targeted listed companies, the majority shareholder of a lower price to obtain more shares to dilute the interests of small shareholders.
(2) Directional Private Placement is not fair and reasonable pricing mechanism directed between the issuance of the interests of all stakeholders in the re-allocation can achieve the interests of small shareholders against .Study, this article attempts to construct a measure of the pricing of Directional Private Placement preference shareholders of small and medium-sized impact on the future of the indicators of wealth Expropriation. The results showed that targeted additional unfair pricing mechanism for small and medium-sized shareholders of the future caused by the different levels of wealth occupying. This attempt to study for scholars in future research more accurate orientation of the benefits of additional or wealth losses against the idea or direction.
(3)Through the issuance of the economic consequences of targeted research, We found that on the one hand, directed the issuance by the positive market reaction could be the need for liquidity and equity dilution concentration explained; On the other hand, directional after issuance of the operating performance of listed companies has improved significantly, and additional targeted operating performance of listed companies has improved significantly with the orientation before the first major shareholder additional share issue targeted into the type of asset, Prospectus use, distribution of assets and liabilities before the rate of growth of the company, there was a significant correlation between. Found these two, in theory, further enrich the theoretical study of the orientation of the literature of additional accumulation, the practice can be further clarified with additional targeted corporate governance, the overall market and the Directional Private Placement relationship between the system itself, in order to promote additional system-oriented Perfection, to improve corporate governance, promote the enterprise groups in order to achieve the overall orientation of additional market to provide theoretical and empirical evidence.
(4) This paper can help the investors and the general goverment clearer understanding of Directional Private Placement is a "double-edged sword" of the substance based on the study pricing mechanism on the orientation of additional research and economic consequences, can think that the majority of the capital markets investors a more clear, accurate understanding of the additional conduct directed to lay a solid foundation, can also better goverment supervision, as well as additional targeted continuously improve the delivery of equity from the refinancing of ideas.
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