基于社会资本理论视角的家族企业治理研究
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摘要
家族企业是一种在世界范围内具有普遍意义的企业组织形态。自从伯利、米恩斯提出“企业所有权和控制权相分离”的命题,以及钱德勒提出“经理式资本主义”的命题以来,治理结构成为家族企业研究中的核心问题之一。已有对家族企业治理结构的研究主要关注的是在所有权和控制权分离的情况下,如何通过相应的激励约束机制来解决委托人和代理人之间的利益冲突,然而由于家族企业的特殊性,家族企业的治理问题与传统委托代理理论的描述存在很大差异。由于家族关系的涉入和社会互动的存在,诸如信任、网络和社会交往等非正式制度因素深刻影响着家族企业的治理行为,从而构成了家族企业治理的重要组成部分。
作为社会科学研究领域一个新的研究范式,社会资本理论强调信任、规范和网络等非正式制度因素对经济行为的影响,这为家族企业治理问题的研究提供了新的分析视角。社会资本作为家族企业中与物质资本和人力资本相并列的一种生产性资源,通过各种非正式制度因素影响着家族企业的治理模式。不同学者尝试从社会资本的视角来分析家族企业的组织特征和治理行为,然而已有研究缺乏对家族企业社会资本相关基本理论的深入分析,而社会资本与家族企业治理的关系问题也处于研究的空白。
本文遵循“制度-行为-绩效”的研究思路,以“家族企业的社会资本与治理行为”作为全文的研究主线,力图探究以下三个紧密联系的问题：第一,家族企业社会资本的理论内涵及其产权问题；第二,社会资本在家族企业治理行为中的作用机制；第三,社会资本与家族企业绩效的关系及影响路径。
本文通过回顾相关文献,首先对家族企业社会资本的基本理论问题进行了研究：界定了家族企业社会资本的概念和“双重三层”结构,并分析了家族企业社会资本的双重物品属性,同时运用产权理论对家族企业社会资本的产权特征和产权结构进行了剖析,并构建了家族企业社会资本与治理结构的基本理论框架。在基本理论框架下,本文从组织内部社会资本、组织间社会资本和企业家社会资本三个层面,分别研究了家族企业内部关系治理、家族企业间网络治理和企业家政治参与这三种治理形式。研究发现：(1)当家族企业内部面临两类异质性代理人和双重委托代理关系时,以组织内部社会资本为基础的关系治理成为家族企业内部治理的重要途径；(2)家族企业之间的网络组织形态,其本质是物质资本、人力资本和社会资本所组成的一组特殊的关系契约,而家族企业间的网络治理结构是在社会资本特定专用性水平下的一种效率选择；(3)在当前转轨经济条件下,政治参与成为中国家族企业中企业家社会资本投资的重要途径,通过对外部利益相关者的治理,家族企业家的政治参与行为有效地提升了企业绩效。
本文主要的理论创新之处在于：第一,将社会资本理论引入家族企业研究领域,系统地研究了家族企业社会资本的基本理论问题。通过对家族企业社会资本的概念界定、构成要素和物品属性的分析,为进一步的相关研究奠定了重要的理论基础,尤其是对家族企业社会资本的产权问题进行的探索研究,对于更好地理解社会资本与物质资本、人力资本的异同提供了新的视角。第二,从社会资本的视角研究了家族企业的内部关系治理、企业间网络治理和企业家政治参与三种治理形式,丰富了家族企业治理结构的研究。本文将社会资本看成是家族企业重要的生产性要素,通过研究社会资本在家族企业治理行为中的作用机制,弥补了以往关于家族企业治理结构研究的不足,有助于深化对中国家族企业治理模式的认识。第三,从企业家政治参与的维度对社会资本与家族企业绩效的关系进行了实证研究,为开展家族企业社会资本的相关实证研究提供了参考。通过以上市家族企业为对象的实证研究,对当前中国家族企业普遍存在的“企业家参政行为”做出了合理解释,具有一定的理论和现实意义。
Family Business is a well developed and well formalized form of enterprise in current business world. Ever since Berle and Means'ideas on the theory of "the separation of ownership and control on enterprise governance" and Chandler's "manageable capitalism" theory, the governance structure inside the academic research of family business field has become the core issue among all related debates. Some researches focus on the condition upon main segregation by ownerships and manageable rights in side enterprise governance structure, and through the assumption of build up system on mutual benefit factors to decrease the conflicts in between the roles of principal and agent. However, depends on its complicacy and uniqueness, the practical governance issue still has certain differences from the traditional principle-agent theory among family business format. In addition, the relationships in between all the jointed members of the family business and their social dynamic convergences such as mutual trust, social networking, and individual connectivity are basic reasons that bring influence to the governance of family business. And through these details they thus constructed the main elements of family business structure.
As trying to define a new paradigm in the research of social science field, the theory of social capital emphasizes trust, regulation, and social networks in which bring the unofficial systematic influence toward economic activities. These influential facts provide a possible analytical perspective on family business'governance structure. Within the social capital resources among family business, both material capital and human capital are co-existing production resources which bring strong impact on the governance structure of family business through unofficial systematic methods. Although, many researches have done effort from social capital influences toward the analytic research of organization character and managing style, still there are some deepen theoretic analyses need to work in. And, the research on relations of social capital and the governance style of family business is worth for academic attention.
This paper is fallowing on the research structure based on "Institution-Behavior-Performance" method. The main theme is around the subject of "social capital and the governance style of family business". The entire research is defining the following questions:First, the discussion on theory and issues are of social capital relations within family business and its basic issues of enterprise ownership. Second, the analysis of functionality when social capital influences the governance structure based on family business system. Third, what is the relation and effectiveness when social capital applies its impacts on the performance issue within the system of family business?
Fundamentally, this paper first analyzes the basic theory on social capital of family business in order to define the concept on social capital of family business, and named it "three layers of double sides" structure. In addition, the research focuses on the dual property attribute characters in the social capital of family business. It also pay attentions on property rights and property structure issues on family business based on the theory of property rights; simultaneously, the main research concept and theory on social capital of family business and its governance structure are based upon it. Within the basic research concept, this paper also focuses on the inner social capital, inter-organizational social capital, and the entrepreneurial social capital to research the relational governance, network governance and entrepreneur political participation of family business. The research results are:(1) when family business faces two different agents and "two sides of principal-agents problem", the relational governance based social capital will be selected as the main governance principle. (2) The basic formations of networking system among family business organizations are material capital, human capital, and social capital. They are in the term of economic definition of contract relation, and among the family business organizations, social network managing structure is toward the preference of increasing social capital resource. (3) In the current economic transformation trend, political participation has become Chinese family business entrepreneurs'major method to increase their social capital and thus through the increased outer mutual benefit managing, it is the major long turn investment for achieving certain profit principles in Chinese family business development research.
The main innovative points in this research are:First, introducing the idea of social capital theory into the family business research field. It systematically analyses the social capital basic theory issues inside family business field. By applying the definitions of social capital, business structure elements, and its analytic material attributes among family business system, it brings the foundations of theoretic development for the related researches. Especially, when the research focuses on the issue of property right within the social capital of family business, it provides wide perspective to understand the co-relations between social capital, material resource, and human capital. Second, from the social capital influential perspective to analyze family business inner relation management, enterprise networking management, and entrepreneur political participations, these three managing developments, enriched the researches of governance structure on family business field. In this research, it emphasis the social capital as the essential productivity of family business, and thus through the understanding of its governance effectiveness and performance, it enforces the other possible ideas for the research on family business governance structure. This will help others to further understand the unique governance pattern among Chinese family business. Third, from the idea of entrepreneurship on participating of social political influence to increase its social capita resource, it testifies the practical result. And it gives many paradigms'research data for related academic considerations. Through toward these well do family business enterprise analysis and researches, the research explains the popular phenomenon that why in current condition, "family business entrepreneurs are willing to participant major political activies" and this certainly comes with meaningful and practical reasons.
作为社会科学研究领域一个新的研究范式,社会资本理论强调信任、规范和网络等非正式制度因素对经济行为的影响,这为家族企业治理问题的研究提供了新的分析视角。社会资本作为家族企业中与物质资本和人力资本相并列的一种生产性资源,通过各种非正式制度因素影响着家族企业的治理模式。不同学者尝试从社会资本的视角来分析家族企业的组织特征和治理行为,然而已有研究缺乏对家族企业社会资本相关基本理论的深入分析,而社会资本与家族企业治理的关系问题也处于研究的空白。
本文遵循“制度-行为-绩效”的研究思路,以“家族企业的社会资本与治理行为”作为全文的研究主线,力图探究以下三个紧密联系的问题：第一,家族企业社会资本的理论内涵及其产权问题；第二,社会资本在家族企业治理行为中的作用机制；第三,社会资本与家族企业绩效的关系及影响路径。
本文通过回顾相关文献,首先对家族企业社会资本的基本理论问题进行了研究：界定了家族企业社会资本的概念和“双重三层”结构,并分析了家族企业社会资本的双重物品属性,同时运用产权理论对家族企业社会资本的产权特征和产权结构进行了剖析,并构建了家族企业社会资本与治理结构的基本理论框架。在基本理论框架下,本文从组织内部社会资本、组织间社会资本和企业家社会资本三个层面,分别研究了家族企业内部关系治理、家族企业间网络治理和企业家政治参与这三种治理形式。研究发现：(1)当家族企业内部面临两类异质性代理人和双重委托代理关系时,以组织内部社会资本为基础的关系治理成为家族企业内部治理的重要途径；(2)家族企业之间的网络组织形态,其本质是物质资本、人力资本和社会资本所组成的一组特殊的关系契约,而家族企业间的网络治理结构是在社会资本特定专用性水平下的一种效率选择；(3)在当前转轨经济条件下,政治参与成为中国家族企业中企业家社会资本投资的重要途径,通过对外部利益相关者的治理,家族企业家的政治参与行为有效地提升了企业绩效。
本文主要的理论创新之处在于：第一,将社会资本理论引入家族企业研究领域,系统地研究了家族企业社会资本的基本理论问题。通过对家族企业社会资本的概念界定、构成要素和物品属性的分析,为进一步的相关研究奠定了重要的理论基础,尤其是对家族企业社会资本的产权问题进行的探索研究,对于更好地理解社会资本与物质资本、人力资本的异同提供了新的视角。第二,从社会资本的视角研究了家族企业的内部关系治理、企业间网络治理和企业家政治参与三种治理形式,丰富了家族企业治理结构的研究。本文将社会资本看成是家族企业重要的生产性要素,通过研究社会资本在家族企业治理行为中的作用机制,弥补了以往关于家族企业治理结构研究的不足,有助于深化对中国家族企业治理模式的认识。第三,从企业家政治参与的维度对社会资本与家族企业绩效的关系进行了实证研究,为开展家族企业社会资本的相关实证研究提供了参考。通过以上市家族企业为对象的实证研究,对当前中国家族企业普遍存在的“企业家参政行为”做出了合理解释,具有一定的理论和现实意义。
Family Business is a well developed and well formalized form of enterprise in current business world. Ever since Berle and Means'ideas on the theory of "the separation of ownership and control on enterprise governance" and Chandler's "manageable capitalism" theory, the governance structure inside the academic research of family business field has become the core issue among all related debates. Some researches focus on the condition upon main segregation by ownerships and manageable rights in side enterprise governance structure, and through the assumption of build up system on mutual benefit factors to decrease the conflicts in between the roles of principal and agent. However, depends on its complicacy and uniqueness, the practical governance issue still has certain differences from the traditional principle-agent theory among family business format. In addition, the relationships in between all the jointed members of the family business and their social dynamic convergences such as mutual trust, social networking, and individual connectivity are basic reasons that bring influence to the governance of family business. And through these details they thus constructed the main elements of family business structure.
As trying to define a new paradigm in the research of social science field, the theory of social capital emphasizes trust, regulation, and social networks in which bring the unofficial systematic influence toward economic activities. These influential facts provide a possible analytical perspective on family business'governance structure. Within the social capital resources among family business, both material capital and human capital are co-existing production resources which bring strong impact on the governance structure of family business through unofficial systematic methods. Although, many researches have done effort from social capital influences toward the analytic research of organization character and managing style, still there are some deepen theoretic analyses need to work in. And, the research on relations of social capital and the governance style of family business is worth for academic attention.
This paper is fallowing on the research structure based on "Institution-Behavior-Performance" method. The main theme is around the subject of "social capital and the governance style of family business". The entire research is defining the following questions:First, the discussion on theory and issues are of social capital relations within family business and its basic issues of enterprise ownership. Second, the analysis of functionality when social capital influences the governance structure based on family business system. Third, what is the relation and effectiveness when social capital applies its impacts on the performance issue within the system of family business?
Fundamentally, this paper first analyzes the basic theory on social capital of family business in order to define the concept on social capital of family business, and named it "three layers of double sides" structure. In addition, the research focuses on the dual property attribute characters in the social capital of family business. It also pay attentions on property rights and property structure issues on family business based on the theory of property rights; simultaneously, the main research concept and theory on social capital of family business and its governance structure are based upon it. Within the basic research concept, this paper also focuses on the inner social capital, inter-organizational social capital, and the entrepreneurial social capital to research the relational governance, network governance and entrepreneur political participation of family business. The research results are:(1) when family business faces two different agents and "two sides of principal-agents problem", the relational governance based social capital will be selected as the main governance principle. (2) The basic formations of networking system among family business organizations are material capital, human capital, and social capital. They are in the term of economic definition of contract relation, and among the family business organizations, social network managing structure is toward the preference of increasing social capital resource. (3) In the current economic transformation trend, political participation has become Chinese family business entrepreneurs'major method to increase their social capital and thus through the increased outer mutual benefit managing, it is the major long turn investment for achieving certain profit principles in Chinese family business development research.
The main innovative points in this research are:First, introducing the idea of social capital theory into the family business research field. It systematically analyses the social capital basic theory issues inside family business field. By applying the definitions of social capital, business structure elements, and its analytic material attributes among family business system, it brings the foundations of theoretic development for the related researches. Especially, when the research focuses on the issue of property right within the social capital of family business, it provides wide perspective to understand the co-relations between social capital, material resource, and human capital. Second, from the social capital influential perspective to analyze family business inner relation management, enterprise networking management, and entrepreneur political participations, these three managing developments, enriched the researches of governance structure on family business field. In this research, it emphasis the social capital as the essential productivity of family business, and thus through the understanding of its governance effectiveness and performance, it enforces the other possible ideas for the research on family business governance structure. This will help others to further understand the unique governance pattern among Chinese family business. Third, from the idea of entrepreneurship on participating of social political influence to increase its social capita resource, it testifies the practical result. And it gives many paradigms'research data for related academic considerations. Through toward these well do family business enterprise analysis and researches, the research explains the popular phenomenon that why in current condition, "family business entrepreneurs are willing to participant major political activies" and this certainly comes with meaningful and practical reasons.
引文
①据统计,世界上迄今为止最古老的家族企业是日本的“金刚组”, 它成立于公元578年,传到第40代,已有1400多年的历史。
②上海证券交易所研究中心.中国公司治理报告(2005)：民营上市公司治理[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2005：25.
①《家族企业》2007年第1期,第59页。
①具体请见：http://www.scccjm.com/Get/canyinrenwu/141224234.htm
①亚里士多德.政治学[M].北京：商务印书馆,1998：35.
①奥利弗·E.威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度[M].北京：商务印书馆,2003：78.
①麦克尼尔.新社会契约论[M].北京：中国政法大学出版社,1994：4.
①路易斯·普特曼,兰德尔·克罗茨纳.企业的经济性质[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2003：148.
②哈罗德·德姆塞茨.所有权、控制与企业——论经济活动的组织[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2006：149.
① Putnam, R.D. The Prosperous Community:Social Capital and Public Life[J]. The American Prospect,1993, 4(13):35-42.
①云冠平,陈乔之.东南亚华人企业经营管理研究[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2000：88.
②按照杜维明的观点,“文化中国”有三个层面的意义：第一个层面包括中国大陆、香港、台湾和新加坡,即主要由文化上和种族上居多数的华人所构成。第二个层面是指散布于世界各地的华人社会,通过群体内的互动,构成了有特色的区域经济组织。第三个层面包括了一批和中国与中华民族既无血缘关系,又无婚姻关系的国际人士,他们尝试了解中国,并把中国文化带入自己的语言社区。本文这里所涉及的主要是第二个层面的含义。
①许多学者直接将企业社会资本定义为“企业家关系网络”,这是极其片面的。如国内最早研究企业社会资本的学者边燕杰和丘海雄就将企业社会资本界定为“企业经营者的社会交往和联系”(边燕杰,丘海雄.企业的社会资本及其功效[J].中国社会科学,2000(2)：87-99.)。
②如本文第5章所分析,华人家族企业主要通过形成区域商人群体的形式来实现企业间网络治理。
①熊彼特提出,企业家的创新主要包括五种活动：引进新产品；引进新技术,即新的生产方法；开辟新市场；控制原材料的新供应来源；实现企业的新组织。(熊彼特.经济发展理论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1990：81-82.)
①Faccio主要从企业家政治参与的角度来界定“政治关联”,即所谓政治关联,是指企业的大股东或高层管理人员在议会或政府任职,或者与政治人物保持密切的联系。
②哈罗德·詹姆斯.家族企业[M].北京：三联书店,2008：125-130.
③哈罗德·詹姆斯.家族企业[M].北京：三联书店,2008：23-25.
④哈罗德·詹姆斯.家族企业[M].北京：三联书店,2008：67-78.
①最典型的就是徽商代表胡雪岩。当然,封建时代的“红顶商人”更多地表现为以官促商、官商勾结,是一种在制度不完备情况下的企业家风险规避方法。
②中华全国工商业联合会.1993-2006中国私营企业大型调查[M].北京：中华工商联合出版社,2007：3；212.
①江泽民.论“三个代表”[M].北京：中央文献出版社,2001：169.
①黄孟复,胡德平.中国民营经济发展报告(2005-2006)[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2006：83-90.
②中华全国工商业联合会.1993-2006中国私营企业大型调查[M].北京：中华工商联合出版社,2007：212.
①与此类似,田国强(1996)提出企业家具备两种能力：“内部管理能力”和“外部管理能力”。汪伟和史晋川(2005)则将企业家能力分为“一般企业家能力”和“政治企业家能力”。
②这也可以解释为什么中国的民营企业家受教育程度普遍不高,却在经营企业方面比较成功。
①对于民营家族企业而言,企业家直接担任政府相关部门领导职务的情况比较少,不具有代表性。当然,尹明善和徐冠巨的任职属于个案。
②中华全国工商业联合会.1993-2006中国私营企业大型调查[M].北京：中华工商联合出版社,2007：155.
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①《家族企业》2007年第1期,第59页。
①具体请见：http://www.scccjm.com/Get/canyinrenwu/141224234.htm
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②按照杜维明的观点,“文化中国”有三个层面的意义：第一个层面包括中国大陆、香港、台湾和新加坡,即主要由文化上和种族上居多数的华人所构成。第二个层面是指散布于世界各地的华人社会,通过群体内的互动,构成了有特色的区域经济组织。第三个层面包括了一批和中国与中华民族既无血缘关系,又无婚姻关系的国际人士,他们尝试了解中国,并把中国文化带入自己的语言社区。本文这里所涉及的主要是第二个层面的含义。
①许多学者直接将企业社会资本定义为“企业家关系网络”,这是极其片面的。如国内最早研究企业社会资本的学者边燕杰和丘海雄就将企业社会资本界定为“企业经营者的社会交往和联系”(边燕杰,丘海雄.企业的社会资本及其功效[J].中国社会科学,2000(2)：87-99.)。
②如本文第5章所分析,华人家族企业主要通过形成区域商人群体的形式来实现企业间网络治理。
①熊彼特提出,企业家的创新主要包括五种活动：引进新产品；引进新技术,即新的生产方法；开辟新市场；控制原材料的新供应来源；实现企业的新组织。(熊彼特.经济发展理论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1990：81-82.)
①Faccio主要从企业家政治参与的角度来界定“政治关联”,即所谓政治关联,是指企业的大股东或高层管理人员在议会或政府任职,或者与政治人物保持密切的联系。
②哈罗德·詹姆斯.家族企业[M].北京：三联书店,2008：125-130.
③哈罗德·詹姆斯.家族企业[M].北京：三联书店,2008：23-25.
④哈罗德·詹姆斯.家族企业[M].北京：三联书店,2008：67-78.
①最典型的就是徽商代表胡雪岩。当然,封建时代的“红顶商人”更多地表现为以官促商、官商勾结,是一种在制度不完备情况下的企业家风险规避方法。
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②中华全国工商业联合会.1993-2006中国私营企业大型调查[M].北京：中华工商联合出版社,2007：212.
①与此类似,田国强(1996)提出企业家具备两种能力：“内部管理能力”和“外部管理能力”。汪伟和史晋川(2005)则将企业家能力分为“一般企业家能力”和“政治企业家能力”。
②这也可以解释为什么中国的民营企业家受教育程度普遍不高,却在经营企业方面比较成功。
①对于民营家族企业而言,企业家直接担任政府相关部门领导职务的情况比较少,不具有代表性。当然,尹明善和徐冠巨的任职属于个案。
②中华全国工商业联合会.1993-2006中国私营企业大型调查[M].北京：中华工商联合出版社,2007：155.
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