政府控制国有上市公司影响因素及经济后果研究
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摘要
长期以来,国有企业改革始终是我国经济体制改革的中心,内生于整个渐进式改革的路径中(罗仲伟,2009)。随着国企改革的深入,尽管国有企业已经建立起多元化的产权结构,但是政府仍然掌握着国有企业的绝对控制权,尤其是大部分上市公司始终被政府所控制。在市场中,政府对国有企业的行为仍然存在严重的干预(Fan et al.,2011)。并且,国有企业经营效率低下的问题并没有从根本上得到解决,公司治理结构也没有发挥应有的作用。那么,哪些因素才是影响国有企业改革的关键呢?政府干预是否以及如何影响国有企业的治理结构和公司价值呢?综合国内外理论文献,笔者发现,尽管现有研究已经从不同角度检验了政府控制与国有企业行为的关系,但至少以下几点仍没有深入：一是政府控制国有企业会受到哪些因素的影响?二是政府控制基于什么具体路径影响了国有企业的价值,即政府控制影响国有企业经营以及公司价值的传导机制尚未清晰；三是没有具体考察不同层级政府控制国有企业的影响是否存在差异?
鉴于此,基于我国特殊制度背景,深入考察了政府与国有企业之间的关系,探索政府干预、政府控制对国有企业行为的影响在我国具有重要的理论意义和实践价值。本文立足于我国经济转轨加新兴的特殊制度背景,沿着“影响因素——控制程度——国企经营行为”的研究思路,结合政府具有“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”的双重角色,借助理论分析、实证检验等手段,揭示了政府控制国有企业的传导机制,丰富了当前有关国有企业政企关系的理论研究文献,为未来国有企业改革探索提供了理论支持和改革建议。
本研究共分八章,具体研究内容如下：
第一章是导论。本章对全文的研究背景、研究思路、研究方法和研究内容进行了总体介绍。
第二章是基础理论回顾与制度背景分析。本章首先系统回顾了公司所有权研究方面的基础理论,这包括契约理论、产权理论和公司治理理论等,现有的相关理论研究为本文提供了重要的理论支撑。然后,本章简要概述了我国国有企业30多年的改革变迁过程。最后,本章基于我国行政分权和财政分权改革的实践,围绕政治经济学提出的中国特色联邦主义理论和晋升激励理论,系统总结了国内外学者对中国经济增长之谜的解释,展现出中国政府治理和内部激励机制在中国经济发展中所发挥的重要作用。上述两部分内容为本文后续的实证分析提供了制度背景的铺垫。
第三章是终极所有权结构与公司价值的研究综述。本章系统回顾了所有权结构与公司价值的已有研究,着重分析了国内外学者在终极控制人视角下有关政府控制、公司治理与公司绩效的关系。整个文献整理的过程有助于我们全面理解和理清政府与国有企业的逻辑关系,这为后文围绕政府行为所进行的四部分实证分析提供了重要的经验证据和研究基础。
第四章是国企改革策略、政绩诉求与政府控制。本章采用上市公司披露的终极控制权比例作为衡量政府控制国有企业的代理变量,实证检验了国企改革策略、政绩诉求对国有企业公司治理结构形成的影响。考虑到政府控制主体的差异,本章首先检验了“抓大放小”和“战略调整”的国企改革策略对不同层级政府控制国有企业程度的影响；然后,本章借鉴“政治晋升锦标赛”的理论,进一步分析了以GDP增长为基础的“政绩观”诉求对地方政府控制国有企业的影响。
第五章是政府控制、政府层级与边际社会性支出。结合“掠夺之手”的观点,本章进一步考察了政府控制国有企业的经济后果。一方面,本章从非效率投资和冗余雇员两个具体角度考察政府控制给企业带来的直接影响,实证检验政府干预是否使国有上市公司承担了更多的诸如非效率投资、冗员等边际社会性支出。另一方面,由于我国各级政府的职能和权利不同,那么政府干预国有上市公司的目的和程度也就不同,所以本章从理论和实证的角度的检验了不同层级政府控制对国有企业的影响。
第六章是政府控制、企业融资约束与政府补贴。本章主要结合政府存在“扶持之手”的观点,重点讨论了政府控制国有企业所带来的“政治庇护”对国企经营行为的影响。本章从融资约束和政府补贴两个具体角度实证分析了政府控制国有企业的经济后果。同时,本章借鉴“关系产权”理论,重点研究了政府控制对国有企业所获得的“额外收益”是否会受到政府层级的影响。总之,本章的实证结论有力支持了政府对国有企业存在“扶持之手”的效应,进一步拓展了该领域的研究。
第七章是政府控制与公司价值。在前几章实证研究的基础上,本章综合考察了政府控制和公司价值的关系,进一步验证了政府控制对国有上市公司价值的最终影响。本章重点解决两个问题：(1)政府控制对国有企业的价值是损害还是促进?(2)对于不同政府层级来说,政府控制对国有企业价值的影响是否存在差异?本章的实证设计紧紧围绕上述两个问题展开,详细分析了政府控制对公司价值的影响,为有关制度环境影响企业价值的研究提供了微观层面的经验证据。
第八章是全文的结束章。本章主要总结了全文的研究结论,进而阐述从实证结论中得到的政策启示,指出了本研究的创新和研究局限,并展望了政府控制与国企经营行为的未来研究方向。
本研究的主要研究结论如下：
第一,国家基于公司规模、公司绩效和行业特征所采取的“抓大放小”和“战略调整”的国企改革策略对国有企业公司治理结构的形成具有重要影响(主要体现在终极控制权比例上)。而我国地方官员处在一个相互经济竞争的政治晋升的博弈之中,地方政府以提高GDP增长和促进就业的“政绩观”诉求对地方政府控制国有企业同样具有重要影响；
第二,随着政府控制程度的加强,国有企业存在较为严重的非效率投资和冗余雇员的现象。也就是说,政府干预使国有上市公司承担了更多的诸如非效率投资、冗员等边际社会性支出。同时,由于我国各级政府的职能和权利不同,政府干预国有上市公司的目的和程度也不尽相同,所以政府控制对国有企业行为的影响会随着政府层级的不同而存在差异；
第三,政府干预国有上市公司的行为同时存在“扶持之手”的效应,即随着政府控制程度的加强,国有企业会得到更多的“政治庇护”。一方面,政府控制可以缓解国有企业的融资约束,使企业更加容易获得银行贷款；另一方面,国有企业由于和政府存在天然的“政治联系”,所以企业还会获得相对较多的政府补贴。并且,在我国行政分权的背景下,政府控制给国有企业带来的正面影响会随着政府层级的提高而减弱；
第四,政府控制会显著影响国有企业的公司价值。在中央政府作为终极控股股东的国有上市公司中,政府控制与公司价值显著正相关；在地方政府作为终极控股股东的国有上市公司中,政府控制与公司价值显著负相关。总之,随着政府层级的降低,政府控制会显著损害国有企业的公司价值。
本文研究的创新之处在于,从制度背景影响企业行为的视角入手,对政府控制国有企业的影响因素、经济后果以及影响路径进行了研究。不同于以往研究视角仅仅定位在讨论政府行为的“掠夺之手”效应,本研究基于终极产权论的观点,结合政府“掠夺之手”和“扶持之手”的双重角色,系统分析了政府干预、政府控制对国企经营行为的影响,具体包括：
首先,在研究思路方面,以往文献大都考察政府对国有企业控制所导致的经济后果,忽视了对政府控制国有企业影响因素的分析。因此,本文从讨论政府控制国有企业的影响因素入手,沿着“影响因素—控制程度—国企经营行为”的逻辑思路展开,有效考察了政府控制影响国有企业经营行为以及公司价值的具体机制。同时,本文的研究框架从“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”两个角度来考察政府的行为,特别是从政绩诉求的角度综合考察外部环境变量与企业特征变量对政府控制程度的综合效应,揭示了政绩诉求导致政府控制的因果逻辑。本研究为理解我国政府与国有企业关系提供了大量的理论和实证证据,在研究思路和整个研究框架的设计上具有创新和突破；
其次,在研究视角上,已有研究大多基于代理理论的观点,从终极控股股东的性质或者两权分离度的视角来研究政府控股对企业行为的影响。然而,现有研究存在一个问题,即政府作为终极控股股东,其对国有企业实施控制并不仅仅是为了攫取控制权私利。基于此,本研究在关注代理问题的同时还考虑了制度背景的影响,实证检验了企业行为对于制度的反应,这为很多理论研究提供了微观层面的经验证据,而这种研究视角在以前的文献中是相当匮乏的；
最后,在研究方法上,一方面考虑到西方财务理论在我国特殊经济背景中的适用性,另一方面考虑到实证研究需要解决结论稳健性的问题,本文在实证分析部分基本上采用多个模型设计以及多种变量设计的思路,从而保证了实证检验结论的稳健性和结论的可靠性。同时,本文在整个实证模型设计中采用终极控制权比例来衡量政府控制国有企业的程度,并尝试采用工具变量的方法实证检验了当地方政府面对地区就业压力和经济增长压力时,政府控制对公司价值的影响,这种方法有效缓解了实证模型设计中存在的内生性问题,在现有的研究中具有一定的创新性。
Within the entire incremental reform, state-owned enterprises reform has always been the key of China's economic reform for a long time (Luo Zhongwei,2009). Through the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform, the SOEs have already established diversified structure of property rights. However, the government still has majority control of SOEs. Particularly, most listed companies have been controlled by the government. The government intervenes the activities of SOEs in the market (Fan et al,2011). Moreover, the problem of inefficiency of SOEs has not been solved and corporate governance structure does not work out. So, what factors will affect the control of SOEs? Does government intervention influence SOEs' governance structure and performance? And how does it take effect? Through the literature review, it is found that although existing studies have examined the relationship between government intervention and the behavior of SOEs from different perspectives, there are still a few problems which are unresolved. Firstly, what is the motivation of government to control SOEs? Secondly, how does the government affect the value of SOEs? Thirdly, what is the difference between different levels of government control?
In order to clarify these problems, this research starts from the special institutional background of China's economic transition and explores the motive of government control of SOEs. The path of this research is "motives of government control-level of government control-firm operation". Moreover, combined with the model of "helping hand" and "grabbing hand", this research discusses the motives, mechanism and results of government control through theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. The contribution of this research is to enrich the literature of government-corporate relationships and to give support to SOEs reforms in the future.
In this study, there are eight chapters:
Chapter1is introduction. In this chapter, it introduces research background, research methods and research contents.
Chapter2is literature review and institution analysis. It reviews the theoretical background of corporate rights, including contract theory, property rights and corporate governance. Then, it discusses the process of SOEs reforms in past30years. Finally, based on the practice of administrative and financial decentralization, this chapter reviews the Federalism Chinese Style and Promotion Tournament Model, as as well explains the reason of China's economic growth. That is, internal motivation mechanism plays a big role in Chinese government governance. Chapter1and Chapter2provide the basis of empirical research for this dissertation.
Chapter3is the literate review of ownership structure and firm value. This chapter focuses on the relationships among government control, corporate governance and performance from the perspective of ultimate controller. This chapter helps to understand the relationship between government and SOEs furthermore provides important experimental evidence for the following four empirical parts.
Chapter4discusses SOE Reform Strategy, Political Achievement Demands and Government Control. This chapter takes the ratio of ultimate control that listed companies disclose as proxy variable of government control. It discusses how SOE Reform Strategy and Political Achievement Demands affect the Gorporate Governance of SOEs. Based on the SOEs reform of "encounter" and "strategic adjustment", this chapter investigates how the SOE Reform Strategy affects the government control. Moreover, this chapter explores the influence of the Political Achievement Demands on Local government controlling SOEs.
Chapter5is about the relationship among government control, government control level and marginal social expenditure. To further examine the economic consequences of government control, this chapter discuses the effect of government control on company from the view of non-efficient investments and redundancies, which is based on the model of "helping hand". Furthermore, because of the different functions and power of government, the degree and motive of government control varies. Therefore, this chapter explore the impact of government control on listed SOEs varies from the levels of government.
Chapter6is on the relationship among government control, corporate finance and government subsidies. To test whether the government has helping hand to SOEs, this chapter investigates the economic results of government control from the view of from financing constraints and government subsidies. Meanwhile, based on the theory of relationship-property, this chapter also analysis the additional profit of government control on listed SOEs varies from the levels of government.
Chapter7is about the relationship between government control and firm value. This chapter further verifies the ultimate impact of government control on listed SOEs. This research plan to resolve following two problems:Firstly, government control whether harms the firm value. Secondly, for the different levels of government, the government control whether has the same impacting on firm value.This chapter provides experimental evidence for the research of institutional impact on firm value.
Chapter8is conclusion. This chapter concludes the results of all the researches and gives the policy implication. It points the limitation of this research and future directions.
The main conclusions of this study are as follows:
First, the SOE Reform Strategy, which is based on company size, performance and industrial characteristics, affects the Corporate Governance of SOES. Local government officials have been in the competition of political promotion for a long time. Also, the motive of local government control is to increase GDP and employment.
Second, this research finds that with the increase of government control, SOEs have the problems of non-efficiency investment and redundancy. That is to say, government control makes the SOEs to undertake marginal social expenditure, such as non-efficiency investment and redundancy. Meanwhile, because of the different function and power of government, the purpose and level of government intervention varies. Therefore, government control varies from the level of government.
Third, government intervention also has helping hand on SOEs. That is to say, with the increase of government control, SOEs will get more political protect from the government. For on thing, government control eases the financial constrain of SOEs. For another, SOEs gets more subsidiaries from the government. Moreover, with the background of administrative decentralization, the positive impact of government control on SOEs decreases with the increase of government level.
Fourth, the government control will significantly affect firm value of SOEs. For those SOEs whose ultimate control belongs to central government, government control has significantly positive relations with firm value. For those whose ultimate control belongs to local government, government control has significantly negative relations with firm value. All in all, the lower the level of government, the more damage that government control have on firm value.
The contribution of this research is that this paper explores that influencing factors, results and mechanism of government control on SOEs from the view of corporate behavior. Previous research mainly takes government control as grabbing hand. This research tests that government control have helping hand on SOEs from the view of ultimate property right. Meanwhile, combined with helping hand and grabbing hand, this paper analyzes the impact of government control on the behavior of enterprise.
First, previous researches discuss the economic consequence of government control on SOEs, which ignores that motive of government control. However, this paper starts from the motives of government control and raises the path of "motive of government control-level of government control-firm operation". Meanwhile, it explains the behavior of government control from the view of helping hand and grabbing hand. Specifically, it tests the comprehensive effect of external variables and company characteristics on government control. This research reveals that government control results in political performance. This research provides a large number of therotical and empirical evidence for future research.
Secondly, based on agency theory, existing research mostly discusses government control on corporate behavior from the perspective of ultimate controller or the separation of ownership. However, this exists one problem. That is, as the ultimate stakeholder, the government is not mean to get private benefits. Therefore, this research not only takes agency cost into account, but also institutional background. The content of this research provides experiential evidence for theoretical research.
Finally, in research method, this paper discusses the applicability of western financial theory in China's special economic background. Also, it takes robustness of conclusion into account in empirical research. Therefore, based on empirical analysis, this research designs various models and variables to ensure the robustness and reliability of the conclusion. Specifically, based on the view of ultimate controller, this paper takes ultimate control right as the level of government control and uses proxy variable to test the impact of local government control on SOEs.
鉴于此,基于我国特殊制度背景,深入考察了政府与国有企业之间的关系,探索政府干预、政府控制对国有企业行为的影响在我国具有重要的理论意义和实践价值。本文立足于我国经济转轨加新兴的特殊制度背景,沿着“影响因素——控制程度——国企经营行为”的研究思路,结合政府具有“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”的双重角色,借助理论分析、实证检验等手段,揭示了政府控制国有企业的传导机制,丰富了当前有关国有企业政企关系的理论研究文献,为未来国有企业改革探索提供了理论支持和改革建议。
本研究共分八章,具体研究内容如下：
第一章是导论。本章对全文的研究背景、研究思路、研究方法和研究内容进行了总体介绍。
第二章是基础理论回顾与制度背景分析。本章首先系统回顾了公司所有权研究方面的基础理论,这包括契约理论、产权理论和公司治理理论等,现有的相关理论研究为本文提供了重要的理论支撑。然后,本章简要概述了我国国有企业30多年的改革变迁过程。最后,本章基于我国行政分权和财政分权改革的实践,围绕政治经济学提出的中国特色联邦主义理论和晋升激励理论,系统总结了国内外学者对中国经济增长之谜的解释,展现出中国政府治理和内部激励机制在中国经济发展中所发挥的重要作用。上述两部分内容为本文后续的实证分析提供了制度背景的铺垫。
第三章是终极所有权结构与公司价值的研究综述。本章系统回顾了所有权结构与公司价值的已有研究,着重分析了国内外学者在终极控制人视角下有关政府控制、公司治理与公司绩效的关系。整个文献整理的过程有助于我们全面理解和理清政府与国有企业的逻辑关系,这为后文围绕政府行为所进行的四部分实证分析提供了重要的经验证据和研究基础。
第四章是国企改革策略、政绩诉求与政府控制。本章采用上市公司披露的终极控制权比例作为衡量政府控制国有企业的代理变量,实证检验了国企改革策略、政绩诉求对国有企业公司治理结构形成的影响。考虑到政府控制主体的差异,本章首先检验了“抓大放小”和“战略调整”的国企改革策略对不同层级政府控制国有企业程度的影响；然后,本章借鉴“政治晋升锦标赛”的理论,进一步分析了以GDP增长为基础的“政绩观”诉求对地方政府控制国有企业的影响。
第五章是政府控制、政府层级与边际社会性支出。结合“掠夺之手”的观点,本章进一步考察了政府控制国有企业的经济后果。一方面,本章从非效率投资和冗余雇员两个具体角度考察政府控制给企业带来的直接影响,实证检验政府干预是否使国有上市公司承担了更多的诸如非效率投资、冗员等边际社会性支出。另一方面,由于我国各级政府的职能和权利不同,那么政府干预国有上市公司的目的和程度也就不同,所以本章从理论和实证的角度的检验了不同层级政府控制对国有企业的影响。
第六章是政府控制、企业融资约束与政府补贴。本章主要结合政府存在“扶持之手”的观点,重点讨论了政府控制国有企业所带来的“政治庇护”对国企经营行为的影响。本章从融资约束和政府补贴两个具体角度实证分析了政府控制国有企业的经济后果。同时,本章借鉴“关系产权”理论,重点研究了政府控制对国有企业所获得的“额外收益”是否会受到政府层级的影响。总之,本章的实证结论有力支持了政府对国有企业存在“扶持之手”的效应,进一步拓展了该领域的研究。
第七章是政府控制与公司价值。在前几章实证研究的基础上,本章综合考察了政府控制和公司价值的关系,进一步验证了政府控制对国有上市公司价值的最终影响。本章重点解决两个问题：(1)政府控制对国有企业的价值是损害还是促进?(2)对于不同政府层级来说,政府控制对国有企业价值的影响是否存在差异?本章的实证设计紧紧围绕上述两个问题展开,详细分析了政府控制对公司价值的影响,为有关制度环境影响企业价值的研究提供了微观层面的经验证据。
第八章是全文的结束章。本章主要总结了全文的研究结论,进而阐述从实证结论中得到的政策启示,指出了本研究的创新和研究局限,并展望了政府控制与国企经营行为的未来研究方向。
本研究的主要研究结论如下：
第一,国家基于公司规模、公司绩效和行业特征所采取的“抓大放小”和“战略调整”的国企改革策略对国有企业公司治理结构的形成具有重要影响(主要体现在终极控制权比例上)。而我国地方官员处在一个相互经济竞争的政治晋升的博弈之中,地方政府以提高GDP增长和促进就业的“政绩观”诉求对地方政府控制国有企业同样具有重要影响；
第二,随着政府控制程度的加强,国有企业存在较为严重的非效率投资和冗余雇员的现象。也就是说,政府干预使国有上市公司承担了更多的诸如非效率投资、冗员等边际社会性支出。同时,由于我国各级政府的职能和权利不同,政府干预国有上市公司的目的和程度也不尽相同,所以政府控制对国有企业行为的影响会随着政府层级的不同而存在差异；
第三,政府干预国有上市公司的行为同时存在“扶持之手”的效应,即随着政府控制程度的加强,国有企业会得到更多的“政治庇护”。一方面,政府控制可以缓解国有企业的融资约束,使企业更加容易获得银行贷款；另一方面,国有企业由于和政府存在天然的“政治联系”,所以企业还会获得相对较多的政府补贴。并且,在我国行政分权的背景下,政府控制给国有企业带来的正面影响会随着政府层级的提高而减弱；
第四,政府控制会显著影响国有企业的公司价值。在中央政府作为终极控股股东的国有上市公司中,政府控制与公司价值显著正相关；在地方政府作为终极控股股东的国有上市公司中,政府控制与公司价值显著负相关。总之,随着政府层级的降低,政府控制会显著损害国有企业的公司价值。
本文研究的创新之处在于,从制度背景影响企业行为的视角入手,对政府控制国有企业的影响因素、经济后果以及影响路径进行了研究。不同于以往研究视角仅仅定位在讨论政府行为的“掠夺之手”效应,本研究基于终极产权论的观点,结合政府“掠夺之手”和“扶持之手”的双重角色,系统分析了政府干预、政府控制对国企经营行为的影响,具体包括：
首先,在研究思路方面,以往文献大都考察政府对国有企业控制所导致的经济后果,忽视了对政府控制国有企业影响因素的分析。因此,本文从讨论政府控制国有企业的影响因素入手,沿着“影响因素—控制程度—国企经营行为”的逻辑思路展开,有效考察了政府控制影响国有企业经营行为以及公司价值的具体机制。同时,本文的研究框架从“扶持之手”和“掠夺之手”两个角度来考察政府的行为,特别是从政绩诉求的角度综合考察外部环境变量与企业特征变量对政府控制程度的综合效应,揭示了政绩诉求导致政府控制的因果逻辑。本研究为理解我国政府与国有企业关系提供了大量的理论和实证证据,在研究思路和整个研究框架的设计上具有创新和突破；
其次,在研究视角上,已有研究大多基于代理理论的观点,从终极控股股东的性质或者两权分离度的视角来研究政府控股对企业行为的影响。然而,现有研究存在一个问题,即政府作为终极控股股东,其对国有企业实施控制并不仅仅是为了攫取控制权私利。基于此,本研究在关注代理问题的同时还考虑了制度背景的影响,实证检验了企业行为对于制度的反应,这为很多理论研究提供了微观层面的经验证据,而这种研究视角在以前的文献中是相当匮乏的；
最后,在研究方法上,一方面考虑到西方财务理论在我国特殊经济背景中的适用性,另一方面考虑到实证研究需要解决结论稳健性的问题,本文在实证分析部分基本上采用多个模型设计以及多种变量设计的思路,从而保证了实证检验结论的稳健性和结论的可靠性。同时,本文在整个实证模型设计中采用终极控制权比例来衡量政府控制国有企业的程度,并尝试采用工具变量的方法实证检验了当地方政府面对地区就业压力和经济增长压力时,政府控制对公司价值的影响,这种方法有效缓解了实证模型设计中存在的内生性问题,在现有的研究中具有一定的创新性。
Within the entire incremental reform, state-owned enterprises reform has always been the key of China's economic reform for a long time (Luo Zhongwei,2009). Through the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform, the SOEs have already established diversified structure of property rights. However, the government still has majority control of SOEs. Particularly, most listed companies have been controlled by the government. The government intervenes the activities of SOEs in the market (Fan et al,2011). Moreover, the problem of inefficiency of SOEs has not been solved and corporate governance structure does not work out. So, what factors will affect the control of SOEs? Does government intervention influence SOEs' governance structure and performance? And how does it take effect? Through the literature review, it is found that although existing studies have examined the relationship between government intervention and the behavior of SOEs from different perspectives, there are still a few problems which are unresolved. Firstly, what is the motivation of government to control SOEs? Secondly, how does the government affect the value of SOEs? Thirdly, what is the difference between different levels of government control?
In order to clarify these problems, this research starts from the special institutional background of China's economic transition and explores the motive of government control of SOEs. The path of this research is "motives of government control-level of government control-firm operation". Moreover, combined with the model of "helping hand" and "grabbing hand", this research discusses the motives, mechanism and results of government control through theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. The contribution of this research is to enrich the literature of government-corporate relationships and to give support to SOEs reforms in the future.
In this study, there are eight chapters:
Chapter1is introduction. In this chapter, it introduces research background, research methods and research contents.
Chapter2is literature review and institution analysis. It reviews the theoretical background of corporate rights, including contract theory, property rights and corporate governance. Then, it discusses the process of SOEs reforms in past30years. Finally, based on the practice of administrative and financial decentralization, this chapter reviews the Federalism Chinese Style and Promotion Tournament Model, as as well explains the reason of China's economic growth. That is, internal motivation mechanism plays a big role in Chinese government governance. Chapter1and Chapter2provide the basis of empirical research for this dissertation.
Chapter3is the literate review of ownership structure and firm value. This chapter focuses on the relationships among government control, corporate governance and performance from the perspective of ultimate controller. This chapter helps to understand the relationship between government and SOEs furthermore provides important experimental evidence for the following four empirical parts.
Chapter4discusses SOE Reform Strategy, Political Achievement Demands and Government Control. This chapter takes the ratio of ultimate control that listed companies disclose as proxy variable of government control. It discusses how SOE Reform Strategy and Political Achievement Demands affect the Gorporate Governance of SOEs. Based on the SOEs reform of "encounter" and "strategic adjustment", this chapter investigates how the SOE Reform Strategy affects the government control. Moreover, this chapter explores the influence of the Political Achievement Demands on Local government controlling SOEs.
Chapter5is about the relationship among government control, government control level and marginal social expenditure. To further examine the economic consequences of government control, this chapter discuses the effect of government control on company from the view of non-efficient investments and redundancies, which is based on the model of "helping hand". Furthermore, because of the different functions and power of government, the degree and motive of government control varies. Therefore, this chapter explore the impact of government control on listed SOEs varies from the levels of government.
Chapter6is on the relationship among government control, corporate finance and government subsidies. To test whether the government has helping hand to SOEs, this chapter investigates the economic results of government control from the view of from financing constraints and government subsidies. Meanwhile, based on the theory of relationship-property, this chapter also analysis the additional profit of government control on listed SOEs varies from the levels of government.
Chapter7is about the relationship between government control and firm value. This chapter further verifies the ultimate impact of government control on listed SOEs. This research plan to resolve following two problems:Firstly, government control whether harms the firm value. Secondly, for the different levels of government, the government control whether has the same impacting on firm value.This chapter provides experimental evidence for the research of institutional impact on firm value.
Chapter8is conclusion. This chapter concludes the results of all the researches and gives the policy implication. It points the limitation of this research and future directions.
The main conclusions of this study are as follows:
First, the SOE Reform Strategy, which is based on company size, performance and industrial characteristics, affects the Corporate Governance of SOES. Local government officials have been in the competition of political promotion for a long time. Also, the motive of local government control is to increase GDP and employment.
Second, this research finds that with the increase of government control, SOEs have the problems of non-efficiency investment and redundancy. That is to say, government control makes the SOEs to undertake marginal social expenditure, such as non-efficiency investment and redundancy. Meanwhile, because of the different function and power of government, the purpose and level of government intervention varies. Therefore, government control varies from the level of government.
Third, government intervention also has helping hand on SOEs. That is to say, with the increase of government control, SOEs will get more political protect from the government. For on thing, government control eases the financial constrain of SOEs. For another, SOEs gets more subsidiaries from the government. Moreover, with the background of administrative decentralization, the positive impact of government control on SOEs decreases with the increase of government level.
Fourth, the government control will significantly affect firm value of SOEs. For those SOEs whose ultimate control belongs to central government, government control has significantly positive relations with firm value. For those whose ultimate control belongs to local government, government control has significantly negative relations with firm value. All in all, the lower the level of government, the more damage that government control have on firm value.
The contribution of this research is that this paper explores that influencing factors, results and mechanism of government control on SOEs from the view of corporate behavior. Previous research mainly takes government control as grabbing hand. This research tests that government control have helping hand on SOEs from the view of ultimate property right. Meanwhile, combined with helping hand and grabbing hand, this paper analyzes the impact of government control on the behavior of enterprise.
First, previous researches discuss the economic consequence of government control on SOEs, which ignores that motive of government control. However, this paper starts from the motives of government control and raises the path of "motive of government control-level of government control-firm operation". Meanwhile, it explains the behavior of government control from the view of helping hand and grabbing hand. Specifically, it tests the comprehensive effect of external variables and company characteristics on government control. This research reveals that government control results in political performance. This research provides a large number of therotical and empirical evidence for future research.
Secondly, based on agency theory, existing research mostly discusses government control on corporate behavior from the perspective of ultimate controller or the separation of ownership. However, this exists one problem. That is, as the ultimate stakeholder, the government is not mean to get private benefits. Therefore, this research not only takes agency cost into account, but also institutional background. The content of this research provides experiential evidence for theoretical research.
Finally, in research method, this paper discusses the applicability of western financial theory in China's special economic background. Also, it takes robustness of conclusion into account in empirical research. Therefore, based on empirical analysis, this research designs various models and variables to ensure the robustness and reliability of the conclusion. Specifically, based on the view of ultimate controller, this paper takes ultimate control right as the level of government control and uses proxy variable to test the impact of local government control on SOEs.
引文
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