集聚经济、区域政策竞争与FDI空间分布：理论分析与基于中国数据的实证
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摘要
中国引进的FDI在空间和行业分布上有一些明显特征：空间分布上主要集中在东部沿海地区,FDI来源地源于东亚、北美和西欧的少数国家和地区,产业分布上主要集中于二产的少数行业。空间分布是集聚抑或分散,需要测度,而不同集聚类型需选择合适集聚指数。利用全局和局部Moran指数和Getis指数测度中国FDI的空间相关性,发现FDI的空间集聚模式倾向于高-高和低-低型。利用EG指数测度FDI在产业层面的集聚,发现外资企业和内资企业的产业集聚程度都在提高,但外资企业高度集聚的行业与内资企业高度集聚的行业有明显不同。如果将外资企业细分为污染密集型和非污染密集型两种类型,则污染密集型行业的外企要比非污染密集型行业的外企其集聚程度要高,且污染密集型行业外企的集聚程度的提升明显快于非污染密集型行业外企集聚程度的提升。这里的一大原因在于污染密集型外企的集聚类型在从低度、中度集聚向高度集聚转移。和FDI集聚的此类特征事实并存的是地方政府对FDI的竞争。若分阶段考察FDI之地方竞争,便会发现,不同阶段地方政府竞争FDI的政策工具亦不同,过去30多年以来地区间这方面的竞争是随着时间的推移而加剧的。这些特征事实的一大寓意是：不断强化的FDI地区间竞争,可能是影响FDI空间分布的重要因素。其中关于地方政府竞争FDI之手段,聚焦最多的是地方财政政策和环境规制。已有研究大都将FDI财政竞争和FDI环境规制竞争视为不同的竞争方式,而缺乏一种综合视野。此外,现有关于FDI地区间竞争的研究大多忽略了集聚经济对地方政府竞争策略的影响。考虑到集聚经济因素,则不难想到,那些已经有了大量FDI企业集聚的地区,可以利用集聚经济吸引外资,而那些鲜有FDI集聚的地区,则只能更加依赖于地方政府政策优惠。这样,在FDI之空间分布中,至少存在着两种影响因素：地方政府竞争和集聚经济落差。本文主旨,就在于以一种综合视野,同时考虑集聚经济、地方政府政策竞争和FDI空间分布的互动联系,理出相应机理并予以模型刻画,同时引入中国数据予以实证检验。其中地方政府政策竞争主要考虑两方面政策,分别为面向FDI的财政税收政策和环境规制。
理论上,本文构建了一个模型,用以刻画集聚经济、地区FDI竞争政策策略之间的互动关系。模型以地方政府永续存在和FDI因折旧而非永续的两期假定为出发点,由此引出地方政府须不断参与对FDI的竞争。进而引入已有FDI之集聚经济优势,地方政府的政策等变量。模型基本情景是：当期的集聚经济优势会影响当期的政策优惠大小,而当期的政策优惠大小又会影响到下一期集聚经济是继续保持或丧失,集聚经济和政策优惠就形成了一种无穷反复的交互互动。由此可以采用马尔可夫完美均衡方法来处理这个无限期动态博弈。首先,忽略区位差异,采用同质区域假定,分析发现：所有其他保持一致,拥有集聚经济的地区相比没有集聚经济的地区,可以对外资课征更高税率,同时获得更多的税收收入其次,通过将区位优势和集聚经济统合成总体竞争优势,将区位差异纳入。研究揭示：总体竞争优势较大的地区可以对外资课征更高税率,或者给予更少的政策优惠；如果区位优势保持不变,集聚经济的变化将会加剧或者弱化地区之间的FDI竞争。
实证方面,考虑到集聚经济和地方政府策略工具之间的互动,引入了这两者的交互项,规避了以往实证研究中可能存在的遗漏变量偏误问题,所得结论更具稳健性。同时考虑到各地方政府之间的策略互动以及集聚经济、市场潜能等可能存在的空间效应,采用了空间面板的计量模型设定。实证分三大块两个层面展开：(1)关于地区间FDI税收竞争的存在及其空间互动的实证研究；(2)分别基于省际和地级市层级的集聚经济和地区间FDI税收竞争的实证研究；(3)集聚经济和地区间FDI环境规制竞争的实证研究。估计结果显示：(1)各地区相互之间确实在进行策略互补型的FDI税收竞争；(2)集聚经济在中国东部地区吸引FDI的效应更加明显,对外企征收的平均税率也比中西部要高；(3)税收仍然是吸引FDI的一个重要因素,但其重要性趋于减弱。中西部地区的FDI对税率更为敏感,而劳工成本和交通状况改善对FDI的吸引作用在中西部也更为明显；(4)集聚经济的存在削弱了地区间的FDI税收竞争；(5)环境规制强度对东部地区的非污染密集型外企以及对中西部地区的污染密集型外企的作用较明显,东部地区的非污染密集型外企偏好于更严格的环境规制,而中西部地区的污染密集型外企则偏好于更宽松的环境规制。对东部地区的非污染密集型外企来说,集聚经济削弱了对外企的环境规制竞争。而对中西部地区的污染密集型外企来说,集聚经济也削弱了对外企的环境规制竞争。
实证结果表明中国东部和中西部地区在吸引FDI上已经处于不同的阶段,政策建议是：(1)中国东部地区应该在加强制度建设、提升软环境上用力,不宜再进行粗放型的税价竞争,甚至可以通过减少税收优惠形成筛选机制,来提升FDI的引资质量；(2)中国中西部地区则可以在加强基础建设和继续保持相对较低工资上着力,以此来承接东部转移过来的FDI。这样整个中国可以实现对FDI从高到低的不同层次不同梯度的充分利用；(3)由于环境规制提供了一个筛选机制,更严格的环境规制将吸引到非污染密集型外企,而相对宽松的环境规制则会吸引到污染密集型外企。一个地区如果既想吸引外资发展经济又要控制环境污染,也许可以选择强化环境规制。
For FDI in China, there are some obvious features of the distribution of space and industry. FDI is mainly concentrated in the eastern coastal regions, and comes from a small number of countries and regions such as East Asia, North America and Western Europe. And FDI is mainly focused on sub-sectors of manufacturing sector. For FDI's spatial correlation, making use of spatial statistical indicators of global and local Moran index and Getis index, we find that FDI's spatial concentration patterns tend to be high-high and low-low. For FDI agglomeration in the industry level, we calculate EG Index and find that the degree of agglomeration of FDI enterprises and domestic ones are both increased, but the high-agglomerated industries are significantly different for the both. If FDI is broken into two types of pollution-intensive and non-pollution intensive, the former is more agglomerated and its agglomeration speed is also more than the latter, which lies in the agglomeration type of pollution-intensive industries transfer from low-type agglomeration and moderate-type one to high-type one. Competition for FDI among regions coexists with the stylized facts of FDI agglomeration. If investigate competition for FDI with different stages, we will find that the competing policy tools vary with stages and competition becomes fierce with time along the past30years. These stylized facts imply that more intensified competition for FDI is the most important factor affecting the spatial distribution of FDI. Some scholars realize the relation and carry on some studies. In all the competing tools of local governments, fiscal policy and environment regulation are focus of research. It's worth noting that most such studies investigate only one factor and lack comprehensive vision. In addition, previous studies almost overlook an important factor, which are agglomeration economies.Agglomeration economies considered, it's not difficult inferring that regions with large stock of FDI can rely on agglomeration economies, but the ones with few stock of FDI depend on more preferential policy. Thus there are at least two factors affecting the spatial distribution of FDI, which are competition of local governments and agglomeration economies.The purpose of this paper is that taking into account the interaction of agglomeration economies, competition of local government and spatial distribution, appropriate mechanism is sorted out and model formed in comprehensive vision.
A theoretical model is constructed to analyze the interaction between agglomeration economies and regional competition policy for FDI. The starting points of this model are:the local governments are long-lived, foreign capital is short-lived in two periods due to depreciation and other reasons. So the local governments must continue to participate in the competition for FDI. The basic logic of the model is simple. The stock of incumbent FDI can produce agglomeration economies and be helpful for attracting new FDI. At the same time, local governments'preferential policies also attract new FDI. The current agglomeration economies will affect the current preferential policies, and the current preferential policies will affect the keep or lose of agglomeration economies at the next period. Thus agglomeration economies and preferential policies form an infinite repeated interaction. We use a Markov perfect equilibrium method to deal with this indefinitely dynamic game. First, regional differences ignored, the analysis indicates:all others keep same, regions owning agglomeration economies, compared other regions owning no one, can impose a higher tax rate on foreign capital, or more broadly, can give a less preferential policy and get more tax revenue at the same time. Location advantages and agglomeration economies integrated into competitive advantage, we can include the differences in location advantages. We get the similar conclusion:regions owning competitive advantage can levy higher taxes on foreign capital, or give less preferential policies; if location advantages remain unchanged, the change of agglomeration economies will intensify or weaken the FDI competition among regions.
For the existence of interaction of agglomeration economies and the policy tools of local governments, we introduce interaction terms of the two to avoid omitted variable bias in previous empirical studies and to get more robust conclusion. And taking into account of the strategic interaction among local governments and the spatial effects of agglomeration economies and market potential, we adopt spatial panel econometric models. Our empirical studies expand into three parts and two levels:(1) empirical research on the existence of tax competition for FDI among regions and the spatial relation;(2) empirical research on location, agglomeration and competition for FDI among regions based on the level of provinces and prefecture-level cities;(3) empirical research on agglomeration economies and regional environmental regulation competition for FDI. Taking into account the strategic interaction of local governments and spatial spillover effects of agglomeration economies and market potential, we adopt the spatial panel econometric models. We find that:(1) tax competition for FDI among regions do exist and its type is strategy complementary;(2) the effect of agglomeration economies attracting FDI is more obvious in the eastern region of China, and the average tax rate levied on foreign companies is higher than the one of Mid-west of China;(3) tax remains an important factor in attracting FDI, but its importance tend to diminish. FDI in central and western regions are more sensitive to tax rates, and labor costs and improved traffic conditions be more effective in attracting FDI in the Midwest;(4) the presence of agglomeration economies strengthen regional tax competition for FDI;(5) regulation intensity is more effective on the eastern non-pollution-intensive foreign companies as well as pollution-intensive foreign companies on the central and western regions. The eastern non-pollution-intensive foreign companies prefer to more stringent environmental regulation, while the mid-western pollution-intensive foreign companies prefer a more relaxed environmental regulation. For the eastern non-pollution-intensive foreign companies, agglomeration economies weaken environmental regulation competition for foreign companies. Pollution-intensive foreign companies in the central and western regions, agglomeration economies do the same.
The empirical results show that eastern China and mid-western regions in attracting FDI has been at a different stage, so our policy recommendations are:(1) eastern region should strengthen the institution construction, improve the soft enviromnent and not appropriate to carry out the extensive tax price competition again, and even reduce tax incentives to improve the quality of FDI by forming a filter mechanism;(2) mid-western regions can strengthen the infrastructure and continue to keep the relatively low wages in order to undertake the migrating FDI from eastern regions. So that the whole of China can take full advantage of the different levels of FDI from high to low gradient;(3)For the operation of a filter mechanism due to environmental regulation, more stringent environmental regulation will attract the non-pollution-intensive foreign companies, while the relatively loose environmental regulation the pollution-intensive foreign companies. If a region wants to attract foreign capital for developing her economy and has to control environmental pollution, she could choose to strengthen environmental regulation.
理论上,本文构建了一个模型,用以刻画集聚经济、地区FDI竞争政策策略之间的互动关系。模型以地方政府永续存在和FDI因折旧而非永续的两期假定为出发点,由此引出地方政府须不断参与对FDI的竞争。进而引入已有FDI之集聚经济优势,地方政府的政策等变量。模型基本情景是：当期的集聚经济优势会影响当期的政策优惠大小,而当期的政策优惠大小又会影响到下一期集聚经济是继续保持或丧失,集聚经济和政策优惠就形成了一种无穷反复的交互互动。由此可以采用马尔可夫完美均衡方法来处理这个无限期动态博弈。首先,忽略区位差异,采用同质区域假定,分析发现：所有其他保持一致,拥有集聚经济的地区相比没有集聚经济的地区,可以对外资课征更高税率,同时获得更多的税收收入其次,通过将区位优势和集聚经济统合成总体竞争优势,将区位差异纳入。研究揭示：总体竞争优势较大的地区可以对外资课征更高税率,或者给予更少的政策优惠；如果区位优势保持不变,集聚经济的变化将会加剧或者弱化地区之间的FDI竞争。
实证方面,考虑到集聚经济和地方政府策略工具之间的互动,引入了这两者的交互项,规避了以往实证研究中可能存在的遗漏变量偏误问题,所得结论更具稳健性。同时考虑到各地方政府之间的策略互动以及集聚经济、市场潜能等可能存在的空间效应,采用了空间面板的计量模型设定。实证分三大块两个层面展开：(1)关于地区间FDI税收竞争的存在及其空间互动的实证研究；(2)分别基于省际和地级市层级的集聚经济和地区间FDI税收竞争的实证研究；(3)集聚经济和地区间FDI环境规制竞争的实证研究。估计结果显示：(1)各地区相互之间确实在进行策略互补型的FDI税收竞争；(2)集聚经济在中国东部地区吸引FDI的效应更加明显,对外企征收的平均税率也比中西部要高；(3)税收仍然是吸引FDI的一个重要因素,但其重要性趋于减弱。中西部地区的FDI对税率更为敏感,而劳工成本和交通状况改善对FDI的吸引作用在中西部也更为明显；(4)集聚经济的存在削弱了地区间的FDI税收竞争；(5)环境规制强度对东部地区的非污染密集型外企以及对中西部地区的污染密集型外企的作用较明显,东部地区的非污染密集型外企偏好于更严格的环境规制,而中西部地区的污染密集型外企则偏好于更宽松的环境规制。对东部地区的非污染密集型外企来说,集聚经济削弱了对外企的环境规制竞争。而对中西部地区的污染密集型外企来说,集聚经济也削弱了对外企的环境规制竞争。
实证结果表明中国东部和中西部地区在吸引FDI上已经处于不同的阶段,政策建议是：(1)中国东部地区应该在加强制度建设、提升软环境上用力,不宜再进行粗放型的税价竞争,甚至可以通过减少税收优惠形成筛选机制,来提升FDI的引资质量；(2)中国中西部地区则可以在加强基础建设和继续保持相对较低工资上着力,以此来承接东部转移过来的FDI。这样整个中国可以实现对FDI从高到低的不同层次不同梯度的充分利用；(3)由于环境规制提供了一个筛选机制,更严格的环境规制将吸引到非污染密集型外企,而相对宽松的环境规制则会吸引到污染密集型外企。一个地区如果既想吸引外资发展经济又要控制环境污染,也许可以选择强化环境规制。
For FDI in China, there are some obvious features of the distribution of space and industry. FDI is mainly concentrated in the eastern coastal regions, and comes from a small number of countries and regions such as East Asia, North America and Western Europe. And FDI is mainly focused on sub-sectors of manufacturing sector. For FDI's spatial correlation, making use of spatial statistical indicators of global and local Moran index and Getis index, we find that FDI's spatial concentration patterns tend to be high-high and low-low. For FDI agglomeration in the industry level, we calculate EG Index and find that the degree of agglomeration of FDI enterprises and domestic ones are both increased, but the high-agglomerated industries are significantly different for the both. If FDI is broken into two types of pollution-intensive and non-pollution intensive, the former is more agglomerated and its agglomeration speed is also more than the latter, which lies in the agglomeration type of pollution-intensive industries transfer from low-type agglomeration and moderate-type one to high-type one. Competition for FDI among regions coexists with the stylized facts of FDI agglomeration. If investigate competition for FDI with different stages, we will find that the competing policy tools vary with stages and competition becomes fierce with time along the past30years. These stylized facts imply that more intensified competition for FDI is the most important factor affecting the spatial distribution of FDI. Some scholars realize the relation and carry on some studies. In all the competing tools of local governments, fiscal policy and environment regulation are focus of research. It's worth noting that most such studies investigate only one factor and lack comprehensive vision. In addition, previous studies almost overlook an important factor, which are agglomeration economies.Agglomeration economies considered, it's not difficult inferring that regions with large stock of FDI can rely on agglomeration economies, but the ones with few stock of FDI depend on more preferential policy. Thus there are at least two factors affecting the spatial distribution of FDI, which are competition of local governments and agglomeration economies.The purpose of this paper is that taking into account the interaction of agglomeration economies, competition of local government and spatial distribution, appropriate mechanism is sorted out and model formed in comprehensive vision.
A theoretical model is constructed to analyze the interaction between agglomeration economies and regional competition policy for FDI. The starting points of this model are:the local governments are long-lived, foreign capital is short-lived in two periods due to depreciation and other reasons. So the local governments must continue to participate in the competition for FDI. The basic logic of the model is simple. The stock of incumbent FDI can produce agglomeration economies and be helpful for attracting new FDI. At the same time, local governments'preferential policies also attract new FDI. The current agglomeration economies will affect the current preferential policies, and the current preferential policies will affect the keep or lose of agglomeration economies at the next period. Thus agglomeration economies and preferential policies form an infinite repeated interaction. We use a Markov perfect equilibrium method to deal with this indefinitely dynamic game. First, regional differences ignored, the analysis indicates:all others keep same, regions owning agglomeration economies, compared other regions owning no one, can impose a higher tax rate on foreign capital, or more broadly, can give a less preferential policy and get more tax revenue at the same time. Location advantages and agglomeration economies integrated into competitive advantage, we can include the differences in location advantages. We get the similar conclusion:regions owning competitive advantage can levy higher taxes on foreign capital, or give less preferential policies; if location advantages remain unchanged, the change of agglomeration economies will intensify or weaken the FDI competition among regions.
For the existence of interaction of agglomeration economies and the policy tools of local governments, we introduce interaction terms of the two to avoid omitted variable bias in previous empirical studies and to get more robust conclusion. And taking into account of the strategic interaction among local governments and the spatial effects of agglomeration economies and market potential, we adopt spatial panel econometric models. Our empirical studies expand into three parts and two levels:(1) empirical research on the existence of tax competition for FDI among regions and the spatial relation;(2) empirical research on location, agglomeration and competition for FDI among regions based on the level of provinces and prefecture-level cities;(3) empirical research on agglomeration economies and regional environmental regulation competition for FDI. Taking into account the strategic interaction of local governments and spatial spillover effects of agglomeration economies and market potential, we adopt the spatial panel econometric models. We find that:(1) tax competition for FDI among regions do exist and its type is strategy complementary;(2) the effect of agglomeration economies attracting FDI is more obvious in the eastern region of China, and the average tax rate levied on foreign companies is higher than the one of Mid-west of China;(3) tax remains an important factor in attracting FDI, but its importance tend to diminish. FDI in central and western regions are more sensitive to tax rates, and labor costs and improved traffic conditions be more effective in attracting FDI in the Midwest;(4) the presence of agglomeration economies strengthen regional tax competition for FDI;(5) regulation intensity is more effective on the eastern non-pollution-intensive foreign companies as well as pollution-intensive foreign companies on the central and western regions. The eastern non-pollution-intensive foreign companies prefer to more stringent environmental regulation, while the mid-western pollution-intensive foreign companies prefer a more relaxed environmental regulation. For the eastern non-pollution-intensive foreign companies, agglomeration economies weaken environmental regulation competition for foreign companies. Pollution-intensive foreign companies in the central and western regions, agglomeration economies do the same.
The empirical results show that eastern China and mid-western regions in attracting FDI has been at a different stage, so our policy recommendations are:(1) eastern region should strengthen the institution construction, improve the soft enviromnent and not appropriate to carry out the extensive tax price competition again, and even reduce tax incentives to improve the quality of FDI by forming a filter mechanism;(2) mid-western regions can strengthen the infrastructure and continue to keep the relatively low wages in order to undertake the migrating FDI from eastern regions. So that the whole of China can take full advantage of the different levels of FDI from high to low gradient;(3)For the operation of a filter mechanism due to environmental regulation, more stringent environmental regulation will attract the non-pollution-intensive foreign companies, while the relatively loose environmental regulation the pollution-intensive foreign companies. If a region wants to attract foreign capital for developing her economy and has to control environmental pollution, she could choose to strengthen environmental regulation.
引文
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