基于非对称信息的专利许可机制研究
|
摘要
随着以创新为基础的竞争日益激烈、技术的快速发展以及更完善的知识产权保护,专利许可逐渐成为实现技术转移的重要渠道之一。专利许可,其实质是专利权人将其拥有的专利使用权有偿地转移给被许可者的一种契约。因此,专利权人的许可行为在本质上是一种机制设计行为。那么,对于专利权人而言,应如何设计一个有效率的许可机制呢?这是当前专利许可理论研究的热点之一。现有理论文献虽然已经认识到非对称信息对于专利许可机制的重要影响,却仍然缺乏对该问题的深入研究。另一方面,许多文献在讨论许可机制时往往假设交易双方就专利使用权的转让进行谈判,但相关实践表明,以拍卖的方式完成专利许可已逐渐成为拓宽技术转移渠道一种积极的尝试和探索。可以说,这两个研究局限大大地限制了相关文献解决专利许可实际问题的能力。本文以不对称信息下,专利权人与潜在被许可者之间在专利许可过程中形成的委托-代理关系作为出发点,旨在解决该过程中所面临的一些难题,围绕着这一目标,许多有意义的结论被获得。
首先,在第一章对全文的写作做一个概览。包括研究背景、学术意义、研究的基本思路与研究的主要内容,以及相关研究理论方法的评述等。
论文第一部分从专利权人与唯一的潜在被许可者之间形成的二人博弈关系这一角度出发,研究了各种不对称信息情况下的专利许可行为机制。其中,包括当被许可者在事前隐藏信息时专利权人的最优许可方式选择;当事前的非对称信息存在于专利权人时的声誉机制以及许可过程中的道德风险问题。第2章,通过假定被许可者拥有关于生产成本的非对称信息,分别讨论了专利权人在统一定价和差别定价方式下的最优许可契约(组合)。第3章则针对专利权人拥有关于专利质量的非对称信息的情形,构造了一个专利许可的无限期重复博弈模型,给出了声誉降低非对称信息程度的条件。第4章,首先一般性地分析了技术转移过程中所存在的双边道德风险问题,刻画了防范道德风险的最优许可契约特征。在此基础上,针对高校通过专利许可进行技术转移的情形,建立基于道德风险的高校专利许可博弈模型,分析了对高校发明者的激励约束机制。
论文第二部分则围绕专利权人与来自同一竞争性产业的多个潜在被许可者之间所形成的多人博弈关系,对专利权人拍卖专利使用许可证的许可行为机制展开研究。其中,包括不完全信息下许可证的最优拍卖机制以及基于潜在被许可者信号传递行为的拍卖模型。第5章,首先对当潜在被许可者来自同一竞争性产业时,许可所导致的负外部效应进行了分析;在此基础上,设计了基于外部性的许可证最优拍卖机制,分析了外部效应对于最优许可行为的扭曲。第6章,假设潜在被许可者在许可证竞买过程中拥有关于创新规模的私有信息,重点研究了潜在被许可者们通过竞价向其竞争对手传递信号的行为,以及由此对拍卖机制的绩效和配置效率产生的影响。
本论文的创新之处在于:
第一,在重复博弈的框架下,分析了当专利权人拥有发明专利质量的私有信息时的声誉机制。研究结果表明,如果专利权人能够连续地获得发明而形成足够大的发明流,那么在一定条件下声誉会激励专利权人“搁置”低质量专利,从而降低信息不对称程度。研究结论为我国国家技术转移中心等一类技术中介机构如何促进科技成果转化给出了一个新的理论解释。
第二,针对高校通过专利许可进行技术转移的情况,建立基于高校发明者和被许可企业道德风险的博弈模型,揭示了道德风险导致高校专利转化低效的可能性,提出了相应的激励约束机制。研究结果表明,企业向发明者提供后续研究赞助并不能实现有效激励,而应设计与专利转化的产出挂钩的许可契约;同时增加发明者分享许可费的比例,有助于提高专利实施的效率。
第三,基于专利使用许可证的竞买者来自同一竞争性产业的假设,考察了专利使用许可证拍卖的两个相关问题。首先,分析了当专利权人对竞争性产业进行许可时所可能产生的负外部效应,考察了外部效应下许可证的最优拍卖机制。研究结果表明,在最优许可机制中,外部性的存在导致专利权人对于许可证的定价过高而阻碍了创新知识的传播。其次,构建了一个许可证拍卖的不完全信息动态博弈模型,分析了竞买者在信号传递动机下的策略性竞价行为对于拍卖机制的绩效及其配置效率的影响。研究结论对于专利使用权的拍卖实践有较好的指导意义。
With the increasingly fierce competition based on innovation, the swift technology development and the more perfect protection on intellectual property, patent licensing has become one of the most important channels for technology transfer. Patent licensing, virtually is a contract with which a patent holder transfers the use of his patent to the licensees. Thus, licensing behavior is essentially a behavior of mechanism design. How to design an efficient licensing mechanism? This is one hot topic for the present theoretical study of patent. However, after sorting out the theoretical documents, we have found that although more and more experts have recognized the significance of asymmetric information on patent licensing, their exploitation of this field is not in deep enough. One the other hand, they always assume that negotiation is a pricing mechanism of patent use, but related practice shows that auctioning licenses has becomes an active attempt and exploration to broaden channels for technology transfer. It is these two limitations that has displayed in the practice of patent licensing. Hence, this thesis, based on the asymmetric information and the principal-agent relation between a patent holder and potential licensees in the course of licensing, is to provide a further study for solving the problems in the course of the licensing. Centered on the goal, many constructive conclusions have been drawn.
This thesis spreads out in the following chapters.
Chapter One is a brief introduction to the thesis, including the relative background information, the academic significance, the content and the basic thought of the thesis, as well as the comments of the relative methods of the theoretical research.
Formal analyses of the thesis can be divided into two parts. Focusing on the two persons’interaction between the licensor and the only potential licensee, the first part mainly analyzes mechanism of licensing, including the optimal contract when the licensee has the asymmetric information, repeated game and the reputation mechanism when the private information lies in the licensor and moral hazard problem in the course of licensing. The first part includes Chapter Two, Chapter Three and Chapter Four.
Chapter Two analyses the optimal licensing contract under uniform pricing and optimal contract combination under price discrimination, on the condition that the licensee has the private information about his own production cost.
Chapter Three analyses the case that licensor has information advantage about the quality of invention by building up a will infinite reputation repeated game between the licensor and the licensee.Through analyzing the model, the condition of reputation effects can reducing the asymmetric information comes out.
Chapter Four generally discusses the double moral hazard problems involved in the technology transfer. And we depict the characteristics of optimal licensing contract in preventing moral hazard. Then, aiming at special case about universities’transferring their technology though patent licensing, a game model based on moral hazard is built up and incentive together with restraint mechanisms for inventors is analyzed in detail.
Focusing on the interactions among the patent holder and the multi-licensees coming from the same competitive industry, the second part of the thesis, including Chapter Five& Chapter Six mainly studies the licensing behavior by auctioning licenses, which includes a licenses’optimal auction mechanism based on negative externality and a license’s auction model based on signaling.
Chapter Five firstly analyzes the negative externality induced by licensing when potential licensees from the same competitive industry. Then, founded on the externality, an optimal auction mechanism of licenses is designed. Hence, the distortion of externality on licensing behavior is analyzed.
On the assumption that they have private information about their own innovation size, Chapter Six deals with the case that the potential licensees’signal by their biddings. And the effects on performance and allocative efficiency of an auction imposed by licensees’signaling motivation are also analyzed. The inclusions are instructive in related auction practice.
The innovation of this paper lies in:
Firstly, using a repeated game framework, study the role of reputation effect in reducing asymmetric information when the patent holder has private information in course of the licensing. It shows that under some conditions reputation will motivate the patent holder“shelve”some of the projects, thus reducing the asymmetric information problem and accelerating technology transfer, if only he has available a sequence of inventions by achieving inventions continuously. This conclusion provides a new theoretical argument on the the role of some technology transfer intermediaries, such as our country’s national technology transfer centers in promote science and technology fruits’commercialization.
Secondly, aiming at the case universities commercialize their patents through licensing, develop a game model of patent licensing based on moral hazard coexisting in the inventor and the licensee, which shows that it is the moral hazard leading to inefficiency of patents implement. Following this argument, some incentive and restraint mechanisms on inventors are brought forward. The results indicate that sponsor outlay for inventors’continuous researches can not provide any incentives, but contracts based on output can motivate inventors by reflecting their residual rights. Besides this, increasing proportion of licensing revenue an inventor can enjoy will promote the cooperation between them.
Thirdly, examine two problems about auctioning patent licenses on the premise that the potential licensees coming from the same competitive market. On the first place, we analyze the negative externality induced by licensing. Based on it an optimal auction mechanism is provided. In the optimal licensing mechanism it is shown that externalities can make licensors ask for high reservation price, thus baffling the dissemination of innovation knowledge. On the second place, builds up an incomplete information dynamic game model to examine licensees’tactical bidding behavior under their signaling motivation. Then, we analyze the effects of tactical bidding on performance and allocative efficiency of an auction.
首先,在第一章对全文的写作做一个概览。包括研究背景、学术意义、研究的基本思路与研究的主要内容,以及相关研究理论方法的评述等。
论文第一部分从专利权人与唯一的潜在被许可者之间形成的二人博弈关系这一角度出发,研究了各种不对称信息情况下的专利许可行为机制。其中,包括当被许可者在事前隐藏信息时专利权人的最优许可方式选择;当事前的非对称信息存在于专利权人时的声誉机制以及许可过程中的道德风险问题。第2章,通过假定被许可者拥有关于生产成本的非对称信息,分别讨论了专利权人在统一定价和差别定价方式下的最优许可契约(组合)。第3章则针对专利权人拥有关于专利质量的非对称信息的情形,构造了一个专利许可的无限期重复博弈模型,给出了声誉降低非对称信息程度的条件。第4章,首先一般性地分析了技术转移过程中所存在的双边道德风险问题,刻画了防范道德风险的最优许可契约特征。在此基础上,针对高校通过专利许可进行技术转移的情形,建立基于道德风险的高校专利许可博弈模型,分析了对高校发明者的激励约束机制。
论文第二部分则围绕专利权人与来自同一竞争性产业的多个潜在被许可者之间所形成的多人博弈关系,对专利权人拍卖专利使用许可证的许可行为机制展开研究。其中,包括不完全信息下许可证的最优拍卖机制以及基于潜在被许可者信号传递行为的拍卖模型。第5章,首先对当潜在被许可者来自同一竞争性产业时,许可所导致的负外部效应进行了分析;在此基础上,设计了基于外部性的许可证最优拍卖机制,分析了外部效应对于最优许可行为的扭曲。第6章,假设潜在被许可者在许可证竞买过程中拥有关于创新规模的私有信息,重点研究了潜在被许可者们通过竞价向其竞争对手传递信号的行为,以及由此对拍卖机制的绩效和配置效率产生的影响。
本论文的创新之处在于:
第一,在重复博弈的框架下,分析了当专利权人拥有发明专利质量的私有信息时的声誉机制。研究结果表明,如果专利权人能够连续地获得发明而形成足够大的发明流,那么在一定条件下声誉会激励专利权人“搁置”低质量专利,从而降低信息不对称程度。研究结论为我国国家技术转移中心等一类技术中介机构如何促进科技成果转化给出了一个新的理论解释。
第二,针对高校通过专利许可进行技术转移的情况,建立基于高校发明者和被许可企业道德风险的博弈模型,揭示了道德风险导致高校专利转化低效的可能性,提出了相应的激励约束机制。研究结果表明,企业向发明者提供后续研究赞助并不能实现有效激励,而应设计与专利转化的产出挂钩的许可契约;同时增加发明者分享许可费的比例,有助于提高专利实施的效率。
第三,基于专利使用许可证的竞买者来自同一竞争性产业的假设,考察了专利使用许可证拍卖的两个相关问题。首先,分析了当专利权人对竞争性产业进行许可时所可能产生的负外部效应,考察了外部效应下许可证的最优拍卖机制。研究结果表明,在最优许可机制中,外部性的存在导致专利权人对于许可证的定价过高而阻碍了创新知识的传播。其次,构建了一个许可证拍卖的不完全信息动态博弈模型,分析了竞买者在信号传递动机下的策略性竞价行为对于拍卖机制的绩效及其配置效率的影响。研究结论对于专利使用权的拍卖实践有较好的指导意义。
With the increasingly fierce competition based on innovation, the swift technology development and the more perfect protection on intellectual property, patent licensing has become one of the most important channels for technology transfer. Patent licensing, virtually is a contract with which a patent holder transfers the use of his patent to the licensees. Thus, licensing behavior is essentially a behavior of mechanism design. How to design an efficient licensing mechanism? This is one hot topic for the present theoretical study of patent. However, after sorting out the theoretical documents, we have found that although more and more experts have recognized the significance of asymmetric information on patent licensing, their exploitation of this field is not in deep enough. One the other hand, they always assume that negotiation is a pricing mechanism of patent use, but related practice shows that auctioning licenses has becomes an active attempt and exploration to broaden channels for technology transfer. It is these two limitations that has displayed in the practice of patent licensing. Hence, this thesis, based on the asymmetric information and the principal-agent relation between a patent holder and potential licensees in the course of licensing, is to provide a further study for solving the problems in the course of the licensing. Centered on the goal, many constructive conclusions have been drawn.
This thesis spreads out in the following chapters.
Chapter One is a brief introduction to the thesis, including the relative background information, the academic significance, the content and the basic thought of the thesis, as well as the comments of the relative methods of the theoretical research.
Formal analyses of the thesis can be divided into two parts. Focusing on the two persons’interaction between the licensor and the only potential licensee, the first part mainly analyzes mechanism of licensing, including the optimal contract when the licensee has the asymmetric information, repeated game and the reputation mechanism when the private information lies in the licensor and moral hazard problem in the course of licensing. The first part includes Chapter Two, Chapter Three and Chapter Four.
Chapter Two analyses the optimal licensing contract under uniform pricing and optimal contract combination under price discrimination, on the condition that the licensee has the private information about his own production cost.
Chapter Three analyses the case that licensor has information advantage about the quality of invention by building up a will infinite reputation repeated game between the licensor and the licensee.Through analyzing the model, the condition of reputation effects can reducing the asymmetric information comes out.
Chapter Four generally discusses the double moral hazard problems involved in the technology transfer. And we depict the characteristics of optimal licensing contract in preventing moral hazard. Then, aiming at special case about universities’transferring their technology though patent licensing, a game model based on moral hazard is built up and incentive together with restraint mechanisms for inventors is analyzed in detail.
Focusing on the interactions among the patent holder and the multi-licensees coming from the same competitive industry, the second part of the thesis, including Chapter Five& Chapter Six mainly studies the licensing behavior by auctioning licenses, which includes a licenses’optimal auction mechanism based on negative externality and a license’s auction model based on signaling.
Chapter Five firstly analyzes the negative externality induced by licensing when potential licensees from the same competitive industry. Then, founded on the externality, an optimal auction mechanism of licenses is designed. Hence, the distortion of externality on licensing behavior is analyzed.
On the assumption that they have private information about their own innovation size, Chapter Six deals with the case that the potential licensees’signal by their biddings. And the effects on performance and allocative efficiency of an auction imposed by licensees’signaling motivation are also analyzed. The inclusions are instructive in related auction practice.
The innovation of this paper lies in:
Firstly, using a repeated game framework, study the role of reputation effect in reducing asymmetric information when the patent holder has private information in course of the licensing. It shows that under some conditions reputation will motivate the patent holder“shelve”some of the projects, thus reducing the asymmetric information problem and accelerating technology transfer, if only he has available a sequence of inventions by achieving inventions continuously. This conclusion provides a new theoretical argument on the the role of some technology transfer intermediaries, such as our country’s national technology transfer centers in promote science and technology fruits’commercialization.
Secondly, aiming at the case universities commercialize their patents through licensing, develop a game model of patent licensing based on moral hazard coexisting in the inventor and the licensee, which shows that it is the moral hazard leading to inefficiency of patents implement. Following this argument, some incentive and restraint mechanisms on inventors are brought forward. The results indicate that sponsor outlay for inventors’continuous researches can not provide any incentives, but contracts based on output can motivate inventors by reflecting their residual rights. Besides this, increasing proportion of licensing revenue an inventor can enjoy will promote the cooperation between them.
Thirdly, examine two problems about auctioning patent licenses on the premise that the potential licensees coming from the same competitive market. On the first place, we analyze the negative externality induced by licensing. Based on it an optimal auction mechanism is provided. In the optimal licensing mechanism it is shown that externalities can make licensors ask for high reservation price, thus baffling the dissemination of innovation knowledge. On the second place, builds up an incomplete information dynamic game model to examine licensees’tactical bidding behavior under their signaling motivation. Then, we analyze the effects of tactical bidding on performance and allocative efficiency of an auction.
引文
[1] 中国国家知识产权局. 专利统计简报[EB/OL]. http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/,2007-02-12.
[2] 唐要家,孙路. 专利转化中的“专利沉睡”及其治理分析[J]. 中国软科学,2006(8):73-78.
[3] 陈晓东. 我国技术产权交易市场的形成及功能研究[J]. 软科学,2002(6):46-48.
[4] 匡跃平. 知识经济时代跨国公司的科学技术管理[J]. 科研管理,2000,21(2):27-34.
[5] 吴文华,张佳林. 知识产权与大学技术转移——美国和日本比较研究[J]. 软科学,2006,16(5):67-71.
[6] 中国国家知识产权局. 完善我国专利制度为新世纪技术创新提供有效保护[EB/OL]. http://www.sipo.gov.cn /sipo/,2001-09-27.
[7] 王子君,张伟. 外商直接投资、技术许可与技术创新[J]. 经济研究,2002(3):69-75.
[8] 雷朝滋,黄应刚. 中外大学技术转移比较[J]. 研究与发展管理,2003,15(5):45-52.
[9] 岳贤平,顾海英. 逆向选择条件下技术许可非排他性价格契约研究[J]. 财经研究,2007,33(3):101-112.
[10] 张弘,寇宗来. 自主创新能力、专利许可与市场结构[J]. 产业经济研究,2005,24(5):1-7.
[11] 寇宗来. 专利制度的功能和绩效:一个不完全契约理论的方法[D]. 复旦大学博士学位论文,2002:2.
[12] 康佑发. 知识产权许可中的反法律问题研究[D]. 西南大学硕士论文,2004:26-27.
[13] 郭红珍. 基于非合作寡占模型的技术许可研究[D]. 华北电力大学博士学位论文,2006.
[14] Arrow K.J. Economic Welfare and The Allocation of Resources for Invention[M]. In: R.R.Nelson ed., The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press,1962.
[15] Kamien M.I., Tauman Y. The Private Value of A Patent: A Game Theoretic Analysis[J]. Journal of Economics (Supplement). 1984(4): 93-118.
[16] Kamien M.I., Tauman Y. Fees versus Royalties and The Private Value of A Patent[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986,101: 471-491.
[17] Katz M., C.Shapiro. On the Licensing of Innovations[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1985(16): 504- 520.
[18] Rostoker M. A Survey of Corporate Licensing. IDEA, 1984(24):59-92.
[19] Taylor C., Silberston Z. The Economic Impact of The Patent System: A Study of The British Experience[M]. Cambridge University Press, 1973.
[20] Bousquet A., Cremer H.,Ivaldi M. and Wolkowicz M. Risk Sharing in Licensing[J].International Journal of industrial Organization, 1998(16):535-554.
[21] Muto S. On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1993(5): 257-267.
[22] Fauli-Oller R., J Sandonis. Welfare Reducing Licensing[J].Games and Economic Behavior, 2002,41:192- 205.
[23] Wang X.H. Fee versus Royalty Licensing in A Cournot Duopoly Model[J]. Economic Letters, 1998, 60: 55-62.
[24] Wang H. Fee versus Royalty Licensing in a Differentiated Cournot Duopoly[J]. Journal of Economics and Business, 2002, 54(2): 253-266.
[25] Sen D. Monopoly Profit in a Cournot Oligopoly[J].Economics Bulletin, 2004, 4(6):1-6.
[26] Filippini L. Process Innovation and Licensing. mimeo, Department of Economics, Universita Cattolica, Milano, Italy,2002.
[27] Kabiraj T. Technology Transfer in a Stackelberg Structure:Licensing Contracts and Welfare.Draft, 2004.
[28] Gallini N.T., Wright B.D.Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1990(21):147-160.
[29] Macho-Stadler I., Pérez-Castrillo D. Contracts de licence et asymétrie d’information Annales d’Economie et de Statistique[J].1991,24:189-208.
[30] Beggs A.W. The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information[J].International Journal of industrial Organization, 1992(10): 171-191.
[31] Poddar S., Sinha U.B.The Role of Fixed Fee and Royalty in Patent Licensing. Working paper No. 0211, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore,2002.
[32] Macho-Stadler I., Martinez-Giralt S.and Perez-Castrillo J.D. The Role of Information in Licensing Contract Design[J]. Research Policy,1994,25: 43-57.
[33] Choi J.P.Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001, 19: 249-266.
[34] Tek-Ang L., R.Veugelersy. On Equity as a Payment Device in Technology Licensing with Moral Hazard. Working Paper, 2003.
[35] Elfenbein D.The Market for Embryonic Technologies: Lessons from University Licensing. Working Paper, 2003.
[36] Bessy C., Brousseau E. Technology Licensing Contracts: Features and Diversity[J].International Review of Law and Economics, 1998(18): 451-489.
[37] Anand B.N., Khanna T. Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Structure[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2000, 48(1):103-135.
[38] Arora A. Patents, Licensing, And Market Structure in Chemicals[J]. Research Policy, 1997, 26: 391-403.
[39] Katz M., C. Shapiro. How to License Intangible Property[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986, 101(3): 567-589.
[40] Kamien, M. I., S. S. Oren and Y. Tauman. Optimal Licensing of Cost-Reducing Innovation[J]. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1992, 21(5): 483-508.
[41] Moldovanu .B, Sela A. Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003(21):1-13.
[42] Schmitz P. W.On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 106(1):177-189.
[43] Jehiel P., B. Moldovanu and E. Stacchetti. How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons[J]. American Economic Review, 1996, 86 (4): 814-829.
[44] Jehiel P. , B. Moldovanu.Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2000, 31(4):768-791.
[45] Jehiel P., B. Moldovanu. Efficient Sesign with Interdependent Valuations[J]. Econometrica, 2001, 69 (5): 1237-1259.
[46] Das Varma G. Bidding for A Process Innovation under Alternate Modes of Competition[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization 2003, 21(1):15-37.
[47] Goeree J. K.Bidding for The Future: Signalling in Auctions with An Aftermarket[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 108: 345-364.
[48] Gallini N. Deterrence by Market Sharing:A Strategic Incentive for Licensing[J]. American Economic Review, 1984,74: 931-941.
[49] Gallini N, Winter R. Licensing in The Theory of Innovation[J].Rand Journal of Economics, 1985 (16): 237-252.
[50] Youn T. The Role of Licensing in a Vertically Differentiated Product Market. Working Paper, 1998.
[51] Yi S. Entry, Licensing and Research Joint Venture[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1999, 17:1-24.
[52] 张元鹏. 科技创新与最优专利转让方式的选择问题[J]. 经济科学,2005(2):109-118.
[53] 岳贤平,顾海英. 国外企业专利许可行为及其机理研究[J]. 中国软科学,2005(5):98-94.
[54] 张凤香,黄瑞华. 企业间专利技术交易中的道德风险博弈分析[J]. 科学管理研究,2004,22(2):36-40.
[55] 朱桂龙,李卫民. 国际技术在中国技术转移影响因素分析[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理,2004(6):31-35.
[56] 谭红平,石建民. 浅论跨国公司与国际技术转移[J]. 经济评论,1997(3):14-17.
[57] 穆荣平. 国际技术转移影响因素分析[J]. 科学学研究,1997(4):68-73.
[58] 季学猷. 清华大学的技术转移——合同模式和衍生模式研究[D]. 清华大学硕士论文,2005.
[59] Wilson R. The Structure of Incentives for Decentralization under Uncertainty[M]. La Decision, 1969.
[60] Spence M. Job Market Signaling[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973, 87:355 -374.
[61] Mirrlees J. Note on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty. In Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty, Balch, McFadden and Wu, eds. Amsterdam: North Holland,1974.
[62] Ross S. The Economic Theory of Agency: the Principal’s Problem[J]. American Economic Review, 1973, 63:134-139.
[63] 张维迎. 企业的企业家——契约理论[M]. 上海:上海三联出版社,1995.
[64] Myerson R. Mechanism Design By an Informed Principal[J]. Econometrica, 1983, 51(6): 1767-1769.
[65] Maskin E., J. Tirole. The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal:The Case of Private Values[J]. Econometrica, 1990(58):379-409.
[66] 张维迎. 博弈论与信息经济学[M]. 上海:上海三联书店,1996.
[67] Myerson R. Optimal Auction Design[M]. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981 (6):58-73.
[68] Riley J. G., W. F. Samuelson. Optimal Auctions[J]. American Economic Review 1981,71: 381- 392.
[69] Matthews S. A. Comparing Auctions for Risk-Averse Buyers: A Buyers’s Point of View[J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55:633-646.
[70] Milgrom P. R., Weber R. J. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding[J]. Econometrica, 1982, 50(5): 1089-1122.
[71] McAfee R. P., J.McMillan. Auctions and Bidding[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1987,25: 699-738.
[72] Robinson M.S. Collusion and the Choice of Auction[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1985(16): 141-145.
[73] 许永国. 拍卖经济理论综述[J]. 经济研究,2002(9):84-95.
[74] Kamien M., Schwartz N. Market Structure and Innovation[M]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1982.
[75] 李仁耀,黄金树. 专利权人在非对称信息下的技术授权策略选择[J]. 经济研究,2006(10):44-51.
[76] Sen D. On The Coexistence of Different Licensing Schemes[J]. International Review of Economics and Finance, 2005(14):393-413.
[77] 董正英. 技术交易、中介与中国技术市场的发展. 复旦大学博士论文[D]. 2003:46-58.
[78] 方世建,史春茂. 信息非对称中的技术中介效率[J]. 研究与发展管理,2003,15(3):44-49.
[79] 和金生,姜秀莲,汪晓华. 技术中介机构运行模式探讨[J]. 天津大学学报(社会科学版),2001,3(4):351-355.
[80] Friedman B M. The Future of Monetary Policy: The Central Bank as An Army with only A Signal corps[ J ]. International Finance, 1999,2 : 321-338.
[81] Hoppe and Ozdenoren. Intermediation in Innovation. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4891, 2005.
[82] 王建华. 大学中介性组织研究[D]. 厦门大学硕士论文,2002.
[83] 叶桂林. 大学技术转移中心运行模式研究[J]. 经济问题探索,2002(4):92-95.
[84] Kamien M.I. Patent Licensing[M]. In: R.J. Aumann and S. Hart eds., Handbook of Game Theory, Elsevier Science Publishers,1992.
[85] Cohen W. M, Levinthal D.A. Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D[J]. Economic Journal, 1989, 99: 569-596.
[86] Teece D. Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of Transferring Technological Know-How[J]. The Economic Journal, 1977, 346 (87): 242-261.
[87] 江南 . 重论文轻专利 75% 高校专利申请近于零 [EB/OL]. http://learning.sohu.com/, 2005-6-17.
[88] 高校技术转移的机理、过程和政策分析课题组. 提高高等学校科技成果转化动态过程的实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,1997,9 (1):23-28.
[89] 王之梓. 高校专利实施的实证分析及其对策[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2002,2(9): 12-17.
[90] 梅 元 红 , 郑 永 平 , 嵇 世 山 . 高 校 专 利 实 施 的 制 约 因 素 及 对 策 [EB/OL]. http://www.paper.edu.cn/,2006-03-16.
[91] Jensen R., Thursby M. Proofs of Prototypes for Sale: The Tales of University Licensing[J]. American Economic Review, 2001, 9(1): 240-259.
[92] 原长弘,贾一伟. 高校技术转移:从营销视角考察[J]. 研究与发展管理,2002,14(5):55-59.
[93] Teece D.J. Managing Intellectual Capital: Managing Intellectual Capital: Organizational, Strategic and Policy Dimensions[M]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000:93.
[94] 翁君奕. 美日中高校技术转移激励政策比较[J]. 高等教育研究,2000(4):98-102.
[95] 中国科技信息研究所.大学知识商业化的机制[EB/OL]. http://www.softscience.gov.cn,2004-07-21.
[96] 2006中国移动通信产业高峰论坛[EB/OL]. http://www.c114.net/zhuanti_simple/Read_board,2006-04-13.
[97] Greenwald B.C. Adverse Selection in The Labour Market[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1986,53: 325-347.
[98] Haile P.A Auctions with Private Uncertainty and Resale Opportunities[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003,108 (1): 72-110.
[99] Katzman B., M. Rhodes-Kropf. The Consequences of Information Revealed in Auctions. Working paper, 2002, Columbia University.
[100] Hongjun Zhong. License Auctions with Post-bid Market Competition. 第五界经济学年会.
[101] 张璞,张学东.科技成果转化不畅问题的制度创新[J].科学学研究,2001,19(1):40-44.
[102] 徐棣枫,厉宁. 专利领域中的反垄断问题研究——试论滥用专利权[J]. 南京大学学报(哲学、 人文、社会科学),1998 (4):146-154.
[103] 武长海 . 知 识产权摩 擦, 我国 如 何 转 守 为 攻 [EB/OL]. http://www.xinhuanet.com/, 2006-08-02.
[104] 傅家骥. 技术创新学[M]. 北京:清华大学出版社,1999.
[105] 让-雅克?拉丰,大卫?马赫蒂摩. 激励理论(第一卷)委托-代理模型. 北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[2] 唐要家,孙路. 专利转化中的“专利沉睡”及其治理分析[J]. 中国软科学,2006(8):73-78.
[3] 陈晓东. 我国技术产权交易市场的形成及功能研究[J]. 软科学,2002(6):46-48.
[4] 匡跃平. 知识经济时代跨国公司的科学技术管理[J]. 科研管理,2000,21(2):27-34.
[5] 吴文华,张佳林. 知识产权与大学技术转移——美国和日本比较研究[J]. 软科学,2006,16(5):67-71.
[6] 中国国家知识产权局. 完善我国专利制度为新世纪技术创新提供有效保护[EB/OL]. http://www.sipo.gov.cn /sipo/,2001-09-27.
[7] 王子君,张伟. 外商直接投资、技术许可与技术创新[J]. 经济研究,2002(3):69-75.
[8] 雷朝滋,黄应刚. 中外大学技术转移比较[J]. 研究与发展管理,2003,15(5):45-52.
[9] 岳贤平,顾海英. 逆向选择条件下技术许可非排他性价格契约研究[J]. 财经研究,2007,33(3):101-112.
[10] 张弘,寇宗来. 自主创新能力、专利许可与市场结构[J]. 产业经济研究,2005,24(5):1-7.
[11] 寇宗来. 专利制度的功能和绩效:一个不完全契约理论的方法[D]. 复旦大学博士学位论文,2002:2.
[12] 康佑发. 知识产权许可中的反法律问题研究[D]. 西南大学硕士论文,2004:26-27.
[13] 郭红珍. 基于非合作寡占模型的技术许可研究[D]. 华北电力大学博士学位论文,2006.
[14] Arrow K.J. Economic Welfare and The Allocation of Resources for Invention[M]. In: R.R.Nelson ed., The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press,1962.
[15] Kamien M.I., Tauman Y. The Private Value of A Patent: A Game Theoretic Analysis[J]. Journal of Economics (Supplement). 1984(4): 93-118.
[16] Kamien M.I., Tauman Y. Fees versus Royalties and The Private Value of A Patent[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986,101: 471-491.
[17] Katz M., C.Shapiro. On the Licensing of Innovations[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1985(16): 504- 520.
[18] Rostoker M. A Survey of Corporate Licensing. IDEA, 1984(24):59-92.
[19] Taylor C., Silberston Z. The Economic Impact of The Patent System: A Study of The British Experience[M]. Cambridge University Press, 1973.
[20] Bousquet A., Cremer H.,Ivaldi M. and Wolkowicz M. Risk Sharing in Licensing[J].International Journal of industrial Organization, 1998(16):535-554.
[21] Muto S. On Licensing Policies in Bertrand Competition[J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1993(5): 257-267.
[22] Fauli-Oller R., J Sandonis. Welfare Reducing Licensing[J].Games and Economic Behavior, 2002,41:192- 205.
[23] Wang X.H. Fee versus Royalty Licensing in A Cournot Duopoly Model[J]. Economic Letters, 1998, 60: 55-62.
[24] Wang H. Fee versus Royalty Licensing in a Differentiated Cournot Duopoly[J]. Journal of Economics and Business, 2002, 54(2): 253-266.
[25] Sen D. Monopoly Profit in a Cournot Oligopoly[J].Economics Bulletin, 2004, 4(6):1-6.
[26] Filippini L. Process Innovation and Licensing. mimeo, Department of Economics, Universita Cattolica, Milano, Italy,2002.
[27] Kabiraj T. Technology Transfer in a Stackelberg Structure:Licensing Contracts and Welfare.Draft, 2004.
[28] Gallini N.T., Wright B.D.Technology Transfer under Asymmetric Information[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1990(21):147-160.
[29] Macho-Stadler I., Pérez-Castrillo D. Contracts de licence et asymétrie d’information Annales d’Economie et de Statistique[J].1991,24:189-208.
[30] Beggs A.W. The Licensing of Patents under Asymmetric Information[J].International Journal of industrial Organization, 1992(10): 171-191.
[31] Poddar S., Sinha U.B.The Role of Fixed Fee and Royalty in Patent Licensing. Working paper No. 0211, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore,2002.
[32] Macho-Stadler I., Martinez-Giralt S.and Perez-Castrillo J.D. The Role of Information in Licensing Contract Design[J]. Research Policy,1994,25: 43-57.
[33] Choi J.P.Technology Transfer with Moral Hazard[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2001, 19: 249-266.
[34] Tek-Ang L., R.Veugelersy. On Equity as a Payment Device in Technology Licensing with Moral Hazard. Working Paper, 2003.
[35] Elfenbein D.The Market for Embryonic Technologies: Lessons from University Licensing. Working Paper, 2003.
[36] Bessy C., Brousseau E. Technology Licensing Contracts: Features and Diversity[J].International Review of Law and Economics, 1998(18): 451-489.
[37] Anand B.N., Khanna T. Intellectual Property Rights and Contract Structure[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2000, 48(1):103-135.
[38] Arora A. Patents, Licensing, And Market Structure in Chemicals[J]. Research Policy, 1997, 26: 391-403.
[39] Katz M., C. Shapiro. How to License Intangible Property[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986, 101(3): 567-589.
[40] Kamien, M. I., S. S. Oren and Y. Tauman. Optimal Licensing of Cost-Reducing Innovation[J]. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1992, 21(5): 483-508.
[41] Moldovanu .B, Sela A. Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2003(21):1-13.
[42] Schmitz P. W.On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 106(1):177-189.
[43] Jehiel P., B. Moldovanu and E. Stacchetti. How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons[J]. American Economic Review, 1996, 86 (4): 814-829.
[44] Jehiel P. , B. Moldovanu.Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2000, 31(4):768-791.
[45] Jehiel P., B. Moldovanu. Efficient Sesign with Interdependent Valuations[J]. Econometrica, 2001, 69 (5): 1237-1259.
[46] Das Varma G. Bidding for A Process Innovation under Alternate Modes of Competition[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization 2003, 21(1):15-37.
[47] Goeree J. K.Bidding for The Future: Signalling in Auctions with An Aftermarket[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003, 108: 345-364.
[48] Gallini N. Deterrence by Market Sharing:A Strategic Incentive for Licensing[J]. American Economic Review, 1984,74: 931-941.
[49] Gallini N, Winter R. Licensing in The Theory of Innovation[J].Rand Journal of Economics, 1985 (16): 237-252.
[50] Youn T. The Role of Licensing in a Vertically Differentiated Product Market. Working Paper, 1998.
[51] Yi S. Entry, Licensing and Research Joint Venture[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1999, 17:1-24.
[52] 张元鹏. 科技创新与最优专利转让方式的选择问题[J]. 经济科学,2005(2):109-118.
[53] 岳贤平,顾海英. 国外企业专利许可行为及其机理研究[J]. 中国软科学,2005(5):98-94.
[54] 张凤香,黄瑞华. 企业间专利技术交易中的道德风险博弈分析[J]. 科学管理研究,2004,22(2):36-40.
[55] 朱桂龙,李卫民. 国际技术在中国技术转移影响因素分析[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理,2004(6):31-35.
[56] 谭红平,石建民. 浅论跨国公司与国际技术转移[J]. 经济评论,1997(3):14-17.
[57] 穆荣平. 国际技术转移影响因素分析[J]. 科学学研究,1997(4):68-73.
[58] 季学猷. 清华大学的技术转移——合同模式和衍生模式研究[D]. 清华大学硕士论文,2005.
[59] Wilson R. The Structure of Incentives for Decentralization under Uncertainty[M]. La Decision, 1969.
[60] Spence M. Job Market Signaling[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1973, 87:355 -374.
[61] Mirrlees J. Note on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty. In Essays on Economic Behavior under Uncertainty, Balch, McFadden and Wu, eds. Amsterdam: North Holland,1974.
[62] Ross S. The Economic Theory of Agency: the Principal’s Problem[J]. American Economic Review, 1973, 63:134-139.
[63] 张维迎. 企业的企业家——契约理论[M]. 上海:上海三联出版社,1995.
[64] Myerson R. Mechanism Design By an Informed Principal[J]. Econometrica, 1983, 51(6): 1767-1769.
[65] Maskin E., J. Tirole. The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal:The Case of Private Values[J]. Econometrica, 1990(58):379-409.
[66] 张维迎. 博弈论与信息经济学[M]. 上海:上海三联书店,1996.
[67] Myerson R. Optimal Auction Design[M]. Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981 (6):58-73.
[68] Riley J. G., W. F. Samuelson. Optimal Auctions[J]. American Economic Review 1981,71: 381- 392.
[69] Matthews S. A. Comparing Auctions for Risk-Averse Buyers: A Buyers’s Point of View[J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55:633-646.
[70] Milgrom P. R., Weber R. J. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding[J]. Econometrica, 1982, 50(5): 1089-1122.
[71] McAfee R. P., J.McMillan. Auctions and Bidding[J]. Journal of Economic Literature,1987,25: 699-738.
[72] Robinson M.S. Collusion and the Choice of Auction[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1985(16): 141-145.
[73] 许永国. 拍卖经济理论综述[J]. 经济研究,2002(9):84-95.
[74] Kamien M., Schwartz N. Market Structure and Innovation[M]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1982.
[75] 李仁耀,黄金树. 专利权人在非对称信息下的技术授权策略选择[J]. 经济研究,2006(10):44-51.
[76] Sen D. On The Coexistence of Different Licensing Schemes[J]. International Review of Economics and Finance, 2005(14):393-413.
[77] 董正英. 技术交易、中介与中国技术市场的发展. 复旦大学博士论文[D]. 2003:46-58.
[78] 方世建,史春茂. 信息非对称中的技术中介效率[J]. 研究与发展管理,2003,15(3):44-49.
[79] 和金生,姜秀莲,汪晓华. 技术中介机构运行模式探讨[J]. 天津大学学报(社会科学版),2001,3(4):351-355.
[80] Friedman B M. The Future of Monetary Policy: The Central Bank as An Army with only A Signal corps[ J ]. International Finance, 1999,2 : 321-338.
[81] Hoppe and Ozdenoren. Intermediation in Innovation. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4891, 2005.
[82] 王建华. 大学中介性组织研究[D]. 厦门大学硕士论文,2002.
[83] 叶桂林. 大学技术转移中心运行模式研究[J]. 经济问题探索,2002(4):92-95.
[84] Kamien M.I. Patent Licensing[M]. In: R.J. Aumann and S. Hart eds., Handbook of Game Theory, Elsevier Science Publishers,1992.
[85] Cohen W. M, Levinthal D.A. Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D[J]. Economic Journal, 1989, 99: 569-596.
[86] Teece D. Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of Transferring Technological Know-How[J]. The Economic Journal, 1977, 346 (87): 242-261.
[87] 江南 . 重论文轻专利 75% 高校专利申请近于零 [EB/OL]. http://learning.sohu.com/, 2005-6-17.
[88] 高校技术转移的机理、过程和政策分析课题组. 提高高等学校科技成果转化动态过程的实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,1997,9 (1):23-28.
[89] 王之梓. 高校专利实施的实证分析及其对策[J].东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2002,2(9): 12-17.
[90] 梅 元 红 , 郑 永 平 , 嵇 世 山 . 高 校 专 利 实 施 的 制 约 因 素 及 对 策 [EB/OL]. http://www.paper.edu.cn/,2006-03-16.
[91] Jensen R., Thursby M. Proofs of Prototypes for Sale: The Tales of University Licensing[J]. American Economic Review, 2001, 9(1): 240-259.
[92] 原长弘,贾一伟. 高校技术转移:从营销视角考察[J]. 研究与发展管理,2002,14(5):55-59.
[93] Teece D.J. Managing Intellectual Capital: Managing Intellectual Capital: Organizational, Strategic and Policy Dimensions[M]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000:93.
[94] 翁君奕. 美日中高校技术转移激励政策比较[J]. 高等教育研究,2000(4):98-102.
[95] 中国科技信息研究所.大学知识商业化的机制[EB/OL]. http://www.softscience.gov.cn,2004-07-21.
[96] 2006中国移动通信产业高峰论坛[EB/OL]. http://www.c114.net/zhuanti_simple/Read_board,2006-04-13.
[97] Greenwald B.C. Adverse Selection in The Labour Market[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1986,53: 325-347.
[98] Haile P.A Auctions with Private Uncertainty and Resale Opportunities[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2003,108 (1): 72-110.
[99] Katzman B., M. Rhodes-Kropf. The Consequences of Information Revealed in Auctions. Working paper, 2002, Columbia University.
[100] Hongjun Zhong. License Auctions with Post-bid Market Competition. 第五界经济学年会.
[101] 张璞,张学东.科技成果转化不畅问题的制度创新[J].科学学研究,2001,19(1):40-44.
[102] 徐棣枫,厉宁. 专利领域中的反垄断问题研究——试论滥用专利权[J]. 南京大学学报(哲学、 人文、社会科学),1998 (4):146-154.
[103] 武长海 . 知 识产权摩 擦, 我国 如 何 转 守 为 攻 [EB/OL]. http://www.xinhuanet.com/, 2006-08-02.
[104] 傅家骥. 技术创新学[M]. 北京:清华大学出版社,1999.
[105] 让-雅克?拉丰,大卫?马赫蒂摩. 激励理论(第一卷)委托-代理模型. 北京:中国人民大学出版社,2002.