搜索引擎中若干问题的研究与应用
摘要
本文首先从总体上对搜索领域的研究内容进行了描述,然后对信息抽取、词项评重、反作弊三个方面进行了深入的研究,并开发了实际的应用项目。信息抽取包vHead主要针对英文文本,目标是提取出文本中最核心的中心产品词,采用改进的逆向最大匹配算法,查询不同种类的trie词典,时间性能良好,抽取结果准确率高。词项评重包采用目前流行的排序学习模型,从用户的点击日志中挖掘信息,定义统计、语义、语法特征,给输入文本的每个单词打分。本文反作弊技术的应用主要是去除电子商务平台上发布的重复的商品信息。商品信息是结构化的多个字段数据,利用title、brief等主要字段进行聚类,采用了线上线下两种方案。最后,本文对付费搜索拍卖模型进行了理论分析,提出了一种减少策略性竞价的方法,并对多关键字拍卖进行了研究。
The main contents of search engines arc described as a whole firstly. And then It focalizes three aspects:Information Extraction, Term marking, Antispam. In the last, the sponsored search auction is analysized from the angle of algorithmic game theory. For limiting vindictive bidding in GSP and "sawtooth" bidding in GFP,I introduce a new pricing strategy and analyse its equilibrium and properties. Meanwhile, the model of multiple keywords auction in the foundation of the generalized second price (GSP) auction is researched.
The main contents of search engines arc described as a whole firstly. And then It focalizes three aspects:Information Extraction, Term marking, Antispam. In the last, the sponsored search auction is analysized from the angle of algorithmic game theory. For limiting vindictive bidding in GSP and "sawtooth" bidding in GFP,I introduce a new pricing strategy and analyse its equilibrium and properties. Meanwhile, the model of multiple keywords auction in the foundation of the generalized second price (GSP) auction is researched.
引文
[1]涂志勇.博弈论.北京大学出版社.2009.
[2]Christopher Meek, David Mxwell Chickering, David Bruce Wilson. Stochastic and Contingent-Payment Auctions. Paper presented at the First Workshop on Sponsored Search Auction, Vancouver, BC,2005.
[3]Michael T.Goodrich, Roberto Tamassia. Algorithm Design:Foundations, Analysis, and Internet Examples. Wiley Publishing.2002.
[4]W.Bruce Croft, Donald Metzler, Trevor Strohman. Search Engines:Informa-tion Retrieval in Practice. Pearson Education.2010.
[5]Pang-Ning Tan, Michael Steinbach, Vipin Kumar. Introduction to Data Min-ing. Pearson Education.2006.
[6]刘树林,戎文晋.搜索引擎广告的机制设计理论与实践—关键词拍卖.科学出版社.2010.
[7]Yan Li, Songtao Liang, Tao Zhang. Pricing Scheme for Limiting Strategic Bidding on Sponsored Search Auction. WICOM,2011.
[8]Yan Li, Songtao Liang, Tao Zhang. Multiple Keywords Model on Sponsored Search Auction. WICOM,2011.
[9]Jia Yuan. Comparing Different Yahoo Sponsored Search Auctions:A Regres-sion Discontinuity Design Approach.2009.
[10]Tianming Bu, Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi. Forward looking nash equilibrium for keyword auction. Information Processing Letters 105(2),41-46(2008).
[11]Yunhong Zhou, Rajan Lukose. Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions. Sec-ond Workshop on Sponsored Search Auction, in conjunction with the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce(EC 2006), Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 11(2006).
[12]Gagan Aggarwal, Ashish Goel. Rajeev Motwani. Truthful auctions for pricing search keyword.J.Feigenbaum, J.C.-I.Chuang. D.M.Pennock (Eds.). Proceed-ings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-06). Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA,11-15, ACM,2006, pp.1-7.
[13]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham. Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auction. In Proceeding of the 7th Workshop on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents(GTDT),2005.
[14]Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky. Strategic bidder behaviour in spon-sored in search auctions. Decision Support Systems 43(2007)192-198.
[15]Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz. Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction:Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review 97(1),242-259(2007).
[16]Hal R. Varian. Position auction. International Journal of Industrial Organi-zation 25(6),1163-1178(2007).
[2]Christopher Meek, David Mxwell Chickering, David Bruce Wilson. Stochastic and Contingent-Payment Auctions. Paper presented at the First Workshop on Sponsored Search Auction, Vancouver, BC,2005.
[3]Michael T.Goodrich, Roberto Tamassia. Algorithm Design:Foundations, Analysis, and Internet Examples. Wiley Publishing.2002.
[4]W.Bruce Croft, Donald Metzler, Trevor Strohman. Search Engines:Informa-tion Retrieval in Practice. Pearson Education.2010.
[5]Pang-Ning Tan, Michael Steinbach, Vipin Kumar. Introduction to Data Min-ing. Pearson Education.2006.
[6]刘树林,戎文晋.搜索引擎广告的机制设计理论与实践—关键词拍卖.科学出版社.2010.
[7]Yan Li, Songtao Liang, Tao Zhang. Pricing Scheme for Limiting Strategic Bidding on Sponsored Search Auction. WICOM,2011.
[8]Yan Li, Songtao Liang, Tao Zhang. Multiple Keywords Model on Sponsored Search Auction. WICOM,2011.
[9]Jia Yuan. Comparing Different Yahoo Sponsored Search Auctions:A Regres-sion Discontinuity Design Approach.2009.
[10]Tianming Bu, Xiaotie Deng, Qi Qi. Forward looking nash equilibrium for keyword auction. Information Processing Letters 105(2),41-46(2008).
[11]Yunhong Zhou, Rajan Lukose. Vindictive bidding in keyword auctions. Sec-ond Workshop on Sponsored Search Auction, in conjunction with the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce(EC 2006), Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 11(2006).
[12]Gagan Aggarwal, Ashish Goel. Rajeev Motwani. Truthful auctions for pricing search keyword.J.Feigenbaum, J.C.-I.Chuang. D.M.Pennock (Eds.). Proceed-ings 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-06). Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA,11-15, ACM,2006, pp.1-7.
[13]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham. Spiteful bidding in sealed-bid auction. In Proceeding of the 7th Workshop on Game Theoretic and Decision Theoretic Agents(GTDT),2005.
[14]Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky. Strategic bidder behaviour in spon-sored in search auctions. Decision Support Systems 43(2007)192-198.
[15]Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz. Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction:Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review 97(1),242-259(2007).
[16]Hal R. Varian. Position auction. International Journal of Industrial Organi-zation 25(6),1163-1178(2007).