中国银行业监管目标实现问题研究
|
摘要
近年来,随着银行业监管理论与实践的发展要求,银行业监管目标实现问题研究成为银行业监管领域的重要课题,但是国内外关于该课题的研究仍停滞于概念界定和初步理论分析的阶段,缺乏全面深入的理论分析和实证分析。本文在理论分析和实证分析的基础上,得出了我国银行业监管目标存在着理论与现实矛盾的初步判断,并通过进一步对银行业监管目标实现程度分析,发现监管者存有维护银行业利益的倾向,以及导致监管者存有该倾向的深层原因。本文突破了国内关于该课题的研究思路,在理论研究和实证分析方面进行了有益探索,论文共分为四个部分:
第一部分对我国银行业监管效果进行初步判断。通过对银行业监管理论推本溯源,认为银行业监管者应当实现社会福利最大化为根本目标,本文据此对我国银行业监管目标的实现效果进行分析,发现监管者在实践中偏离了最大化全社会福利的监管目标,进而求证出银行业监管目标存在着理论与现实的矛盾。
第二部分银行业监管目标理论分析。首先对世界主要发达国家和我国银行业监管目标的制度设计及监管目标定位进行了分析,发现各国在银行业监管目标设计中都没有均等地体现各监管目标,而是存在不同程度的侧重。分析认为尽管发达国家对个别监管目标设计侧重相对较轻,但其凭借发达的经济发展水平、健全的法律制度体系及金融监管机制作为有效补充,在实质上已体现了银行业各监管目标的核心思想。在对现有文献综述和各国银行业监管法规分析归纳的基础上,本文认为监管者的根本动机应是实现全社会福利最大化,这是监管者力图实现的最终理想状态,本文将其定义为银行业监管的总体目标;为在银行业监管实践中有效地实现总体目标,将其细化分解为稳定、发展、效率和公平四个核心方面,本文将此定义为银行业监管的具体目标。具体目标在执行过程中必须要服从于总体目标,监管者必须确保在银行业监管具体目标的执行中不能偏离总体目标。
第三部分我国银行业监管目标实现程度评价体系的构建及实证分析。根据稳定、发展、效率和公平性四个具体目标的分解要素设计了基础指标,构建了我国银行业监管目标实现程度的指标体系。使用专家打分法对该指标体系的准则层进行主观赋权,运用因子分析方法对前三个监管目标进行客观赋权,由于在个别年份数据缺失,公平性目标使用了标准差赋权法进行客观赋权。最后,综合各监管目标的赋权结果形成了该考察期间的我国银行业监管目标实现程度变化趋势。根据监管目标实现程度分析结果,审视银行业监管目标存在的理论与现实的矛盾,发现我国银行业监管者在实践中为保障银行业国有资产保值增值的目的而产生维护银行业利益的监管倾向,这导致银行业监管实践与总体目标发生偏离,成为导致银行业监管目标存在理论与现实矛盾的根本原因。
第四部分改进和提升我国银行业监管目标实现的对策建议。结合各监管目标实现程度的分析结果,提出监管者应矫正目前存在的监管倾向,着重加强公平性目标和发展性目标的监管,继续加强对稳定和效率性目标的监管,按照维护和增进公共利益的总体目标推进银行业监管目标有效实现。
本文创新之处在于:第一,从社会福利角度深层次分析银行业监管实践对监管目标的实现效果,发现银行业监管者未能按照既定监管目标维护和增进公共利益,而是偏离了最大化社会福利的目标,银行业监管目标存在着理论与现实的矛盾。第二,构建了我国银行业监管目标实现程度评价体系,实证分析了银行业监管目标实现程度,得到近年来银行业监管目标实现程度的改进趋势:1998-1999年期间实现程度略有下降,1999-2004年期间呈快速提升的趋势,2004-2006年期间逐渐降低,2006-2007年期间呈逐步提升的趋势。第三,对银行业监管目标实现效果进行深度分析,发现监管者在实践中出于保障银行业国有资产保值增值的动机而产生维护银行业利益的监管倾向,这导致银行业监管实践与总体目标发生偏离,成为导致银行业监管目标存在理论与现实矛盾的根本原因。
本文属于将规制经济学与银行业监管相结合的一篇理论探索性论文,在银行业监管目标实现问题研究方面做出了有益的探索和实践,但其中仍不免存有不足之处,主要是:第一,对银行业监管目标实现程度指标体系有待进一步丰富和完善。受数据可得性的制约,银行业监管目标实现程度指标体系未能涵盖所有应纳入评价体系的指标,这需要在下一步研究中进一步改进和完善。第二,本文实证研究目的是要得到1998-2007年期间我国银行业监管目标实现程度的改进趋势,所构建的银行业监管目标指标体系定位于定量研究,由于定性指标取值主要依靠主观判断、客观性较低,因此本评价体系未纳入定性指标,这有待于将来进一步完善分析方法,将定性指标也纳入指标体系更全面地反映银行业监管目标实现效果。
第三,银行业监管实践对社会福利的影响分析有待进一步完善并改进社会福利的测算方法。本文创新之处就在于从社会福利角度深层次分析银行业监管实践对监管目标的实现效果,验证银行业监管实践是否遵循最大化全社会福利的总体目标。但是在现有理论和分析技术的局限下,本文关于银行业监管实践导致社会福利损失的测算仅是近似的估计,仍有待进一步精确和完善。
With the development requirements of banking supervision theory and practice, the objective of banking supervision has become a significant subject in recent years. However, this subject still stagnates in the stage of concept definition and basic theory analysis as well as it is lack of the roundly and profoundly theory analysis and empirical analysis. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis even or the analysis for banking supervision objective implementation degree, it is found that the regulators have the tendency of safeguarding the interests of banking, so that it is become the main reason for regulators also having this tendency. This paper breaks through the previous research thinking in China as well as introduces the regulation theory into the research of banking supervision objective, and then it is made the beneficial exploration at the aspects of theoretical research and empirical analysis. This paper includes four parts:
The first part is the preliminary judge for Chinese banking supervision effect. Though the basic source of banking supervision theory, it is believed that the banking regulators should make the achievement of social welfare maximization as the fundamental goal. So this article makes the analysis of Chinese banking supervision objective effect and it is found that the regulators have deviated from the supervision objective of whole social maximization welfare in the practice. Accordingly, it is proved that the banking supervision objective existing the contradiction between theory and reality.
The second part is the theoretical analysis of the banking supervision objective. Firstly, it is analyzed the banking supervision objective regulation design and supervision objective location of China and other major developed countries of the world. As a result, it is found that all the countries do not reflect the supervision objective equally in their banking supervision objective design, but make the emphasis at different degrees. According to analysis, it is considered that the developed countries make less emphasis on some supervision objective design, though these counties has already essentially embodied the core idea of banking supervision objective by the effective supplementary of their advanced level of economic development, a sound legal system and financial system. On the basis of analyzing existing literature and banking supervision regulations, this article considered that the fundamental motive of regulators should be to achieve social welfare maximizing which is the ultimate ideal of regulators, so this article will define it as the overall objective of banking supervision. In order to make the effective implementation of overall objective in the banking supervision practice, it is divided into four core factors which are refinement, development, efficiency and fairness these are the specific objectives of banking supervision. Specific objectives must be subject to the overall goal in the implementation process and regulators need to ensure that the implementation of specific objectives should not deviate from the overall objective.
The third part is the construction and empirical study for Chinese banking supervision objective realization and evaluation system. According to the specific objectives decomposition elements of stability, development, efficiency and fairness, it is designed the basic indexes and the index system of Chinese banking supervision objectives realization degree. It is made the subjective empowerment on the criteria layer of this index system by experts scoring and made the objective empowerment on other three supervision objectives by factor analysis method. Because of the lack of data in individual years, fairness objective is made the objective empowerment by the method of standard deviation. Finally, it is formed the trends of realization degree of banking supervision objective during this study period. Examining the theoretical and practical contradictions existed in banking supervision objectives by the analysis of supervision objectives realization degree, it is concluded that Chinese banking supervision regulators have the tendency of protecting banking benefits in order to ensure the preserving and increasing the value of state-owned banking sector assets. As a result, it is led to the practice of banking supervision deviated from the overall objective and this is become the root reason of causing the contradictions between theory and practice in banking supervision objectives.
The fourth part is reflection and policy recommendations for Chinese banking supervision objective. It is made that the regulators should be to correct the existing regulatory orientation, especially make the emphasis on the regulation objectives of development and fairness. At the same time, it is continually strengthen the regulation objectives of stability and efficiency. Also, it is promoted the effective implementation of banking supervision objectives according to the overall objective of protecting and enhancing public interest.
The innovative points of this paper are those that, firstly, it is deeply analyzed the realization of banking supervision practice for banking supervision objectives from the perspective of social welfare, so it is found that the banking regulators do not according to the provided objectives to protect and promote the public interest. As a result, it is deviated from the objective of maximizing the social welfare and the banking regulation objectives are existed the contradictions between theory and reality. Secondly, this paper established the system of banking supervision objective realization which is made the empirical analysis and it is found that the changing trends of banking supervision objective realization degree in performances of those: It was decreased slightly during the period 1998 to 1999. The period the trend of 1999 to 2004 was increasing rapidly. The realization degree of 2004 to 2006 was reducing gradually. During 2006 to 2007 it is increasing continuously. Thirdly, with deep analysis of banking supervision objectives realization results, it is concluded that Chinese banking supervision regulators have the tendency of protecting banking benefits in order to ensure the preserving and increasing the value of state-owned banking sector assets. As a result, it is led to the practice of banking supervision deviated from the overall objective and this is become the root reason of causing the contradictions between theory and practice in banking supervision objectives.
This dissertation belongs to theoretical explorative research which combines regulation economics with industrial economics and banking regulation. It makes a beneficial exploration and practice in the studying of banking regulation efficiency. However, it still has some disadvantages which are that: Firstly, remaining to further improve and refine the evaluation system of banking regulation objective realization degree which can not put the entire evaluation index into empirical research due to the objective difficulties in obtaining data. So to a certain extent, defectiveness has been brought to the entire empirical research. Secondly, this dissertation mainly makes the evaluation of banking supervision objective realization as quantitative study rather than qualitative study. Because the qualitative index obtained in the time series is so difficult to show the changes in trend of supervision objective realization degree that it can not be put into empirical research. All of these will remain to be improved in the future. Thirdly, the impact analysis of Banking Supervision to the social welfare is to be further enriched the theoretical basis for improving and perfecting the evaluation technical methods of social welfare loss. With the limitations of existed theories and technologies, this article has chosen to approximately estimate the impact of social welfare losses led by banking supervision in the use of social welfare losses caused by economic price regulation. This is the most reasonable research method under the objective limited conditions though it has one-sidedness. In this paper, it is considered that there are more comprehensive and effective methods of measuring social welfare losses indicators and making empirical analysis with the deep development of banking regulation theory and technology.
第一部分对我国银行业监管效果进行初步判断。通过对银行业监管理论推本溯源,认为银行业监管者应当实现社会福利最大化为根本目标,本文据此对我国银行业监管目标的实现效果进行分析,发现监管者在实践中偏离了最大化全社会福利的监管目标,进而求证出银行业监管目标存在着理论与现实的矛盾。
第二部分银行业监管目标理论分析。首先对世界主要发达国家和我国银行业监管目标的制度设计及监管目标定位进行了分析,发现各国在银行业监管目标设计中都没有均等地体现各监管目标,而是存在不同程度的侧重。分析认为尽管发达国家对个别监管目标设计侧重相对较轻,但其凭借发达的经济发展水平、健全的法律制度体系及金融监管机制作为有效补充,在实质上已体现了银行业各监管目标的核心思想。在对现有文献综述和各国银行业监管法规分析归纳的基础上,本文认为监管者的根本动机应是实现全社会福利最大化,这是监管者力图实现的最终理想状态,本文将其定义为银行业监管的总体目标;为在银行业监管实践中有效地实现总体目标,将其细化分解为稳定、发展、效率和公平四个核心方面,本文将此定义为银行业监管的具体目标。具体目标在执行过程中必须要服从于总体目标,监管者必须确保在银行业监管具体目标的执行中不能偏离总体目标。
第三部分我国银行业监管目标实现程度评价体系的构建及实证分析。根据稳定、发展、效率和公平性四个具体目标的分解要素设计了基础指标,构建了我国银行业监管目标实现程度的指标体系。使用专家打分法对该指标体系的准则层进行主观赋权,运用因子分析方法对前三个监管目标进行客观赋权,由于在个别年份数据缺失,公平性目标使用了标准差赋权法进行客观赋权。最后,综合各监管目标的赋权结果形成了该考察期间的我国银行业监管目标实现程度变化趋势。根据监管目标实现程度分析结果,审视银行业监管目标存在的理论与现实的矛盾,发现我国银行业监管者在实践中为保障银行业国有资产保值增值的目的而产生维护银行业利益的监管倾向,这导致银行业监管实践与总体目标发生偏离,成为导致银行业监管目标存在理论与现实矛盾的根本原因。
第四部分改进和提升我国银行业监管目标实现的对策建议。结合各监管目标实现程度的分析结果,提出监管者应矫正目前存在的监管倾向,着重加强公平性目标和发展性目标的监管,继续加强对稳定和效率性目标的监管,按照维护和增进公共利益的总体目标推进银行业监管目标有效实现。
本文创新之处在于:第一,从社会福利角度深层次分析银行业监管实践对监管目标的实现效果,发现银行业监管者未能按照既定监管目标维护和增进公共利益,而是偏离了最大化社会福利的目标,银行业监管目标存在着理论与现实的矛盾。第二,构建了我国银行业监管目标实现程度评价体系,实证分析了银行业监管目标实现程度,得到近年来银行业监管目标实现程度的改进趋势:1998-1999年期间实现程度略有下降,1999-2004年期间呈快速提升的趋势,2004-2006年期间逐渐降低,2006-2007年期间呈逐步提升的趋势。第三,对银行业监管目标实现效果进行深度分析,发现监管者在实践中出于保障银行业国有资产保值增值的动机而产生维护银行业利益的监管倾向,这导致银行业监管实践与总体目标发生偏离,成为导致银行业监管目标存在理论与现实矛盾的根本原因。
本文属于将规制经济学与银行业监管相结合的一篇理论探索性论文,在银行业监管目标实现问题研究方面做出了有益的探索和实践,但其中仍不免存有不足之处,主要是:第一,对银行业监管目标实现程度指标体系有待进一步丰富和完善。受数据可得性的制约,银行业监管目标实现程度指标体系未能涵盖所有应纳入评价体系的指标,这需要在下一步研究中进一步改进和完善。第二,本文实证研究目的是要得到1998-2007年期间我国银行业监管目标实现程度的改进趋势,所构建的银行业监管目标指标体系定位于定量研究,由于定性指标取值主要依靠主观判断、客观性较低,因此本评价体系未纳入定性指标,这有待于将来进一步完善分析方法,将定性指标也纳入指标体系更全面地反映银行业监管目标实现效果。
第三,银行业监管实践对社会福利的影响分析有待进一步完善并改进社会福利的测算方法。本文创新之处就在于从社会福利角度深层次分析银行业监管实践对监管目标的实现效果,验证银行业监管实践是否遵循最大化全社会福利的总体目标。但是在现有理论和分析技术的局限下,本文关于银行业监管实践导致社会福利损失的测算仅是近似的估计,仍有待进一步精确和完善。
With the development requirements of banking supervision theory and practice, the objective of banking supervision has become a significant subject in recent years. However, this subject still stagnates in the stage of concept definition and basic theory analysis as well as it is lack of the roundly and profoundly theory analysis and empirical analysis. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis even or the analysis for banking supervision objective implementation degree, it is found that the regulators have the tendency of safeguarding the interests of banking, so that it is become the main reason for regulators also having this tendency. This paper breaks through the previous research thinking in China as well as introduces the regulation theory into the research of banking supervision objective, and then it is made the beneficial exploration at the aspects of theoretical research and empirical analysis. This paper includes four parts:
The first part is the preliminary judge for Chinese banking supervision effect. Though the basic source of banking supervision theory, it is believed that the banking regulators should make the achievement of social welfare maximization as the fundamental goal. So this article makes the analysis of Chinese banking supervision objective effect and it is found that the regulators have deviated from the supervision objective of whole social maximization welfare in the practice. Accordingly, it is proved that the banking supervision objective existing the contradiction between theory and reality.
The second part is the theoretical analysis of the banking supervision objective. Firstly, it is analyzed the banking supervision objective regulation design and supervision objective location of China and other major developed countries of the world. As a result, it is found that all the countries do not reflect the supervision objective equally in their banking supervision objective design, but make the emphasis at different degrees. According to analysis, it is considered that the developed countries make less emphasis on some supervision objective design, though these counties has already essentially embodied the core idea of banking supervision objective by the effective supplementary of their advanced level of economic development, a sound legal system and financial system. On the basis of analyzing existing literature and banking supervision regulations, this article considered that the fundamental motive of regulators should be to achieve social welfare maximizing which is the ultimate ideal of regulators, so this article will define it as the overall objective of banking supervision. In order to make the effective implementation of overall objective in the banking supervision practice, it is divided into four core factors which are refinement, development, efficiency and fairness these are the specific objectives of banking supervision. Specific objectives must be subject to the overall goal in the implementation process and regulators need to ensure that the implementation of specific objectives should not deviate from the overall objective.
The third part is the construction and empirical study for Chinese banking supervision objective realization and evaluation system. According to the specific objectives decomposition elements of stability, development, efficiency and fairness, it is designed the basic indexes and the index system of Chinese banking supervision objectives realization degree. It is made the subjective empowerment on the criteria layer of this index system by experts scoring and made the objective empowerment on other three supervision objectives by factor analysis method. Because of the lack of data in individual years, fairness objective is made the objective empowerment by the method of standard deviation. Finally, it is formed the trends of realization degree of banking supervision objective during this study period. Examining the theoretical and practical contradictions existed in banking supervision objectives by the analysis of supervision objectives realization degree, it is concluded that Chinese banking supervision regulators have the tendency of protecting banking benefits in order to ensure the preserving and increasing the value of state-owned banking sector assets. As a result, it is led to the practice of banking supervision deviated from the overall objective and this is become the root reason of causing the contradictions between theory and practice in banking supervision objectives.
The fourth part is reflection and policy recommendations for Chinese banking supervision objective. It is made that the regulators should be to correct the existing regulatory orientation, especially make the emphasis on the regulation objectives of development and fairness. At the same time, it is continually strengthen the regulation objectives of stability and efficiency. Also, it is promoted the effective implementation of banking supervision objectives according to the overall objective of protecting and enhancing public interest.
The innovative points of this paper are those that, firstly, it is deeply analyzed the realization of banking supervision practice for banking supervision objectives from the perspective of social welfare, so it is found that the banking regulators do not according to the provided objectives to protect and promote the public interest. As a result, it is deviated from the objective of maximizing the social welfare and the banking regulation objectives are existed the contradictions between theory and reality. Secondly, this paper established the system of banking supervision objective realization which is made the empirical analysis and it is found that the changing trends of banking supervision objective realization degree in performances of those: It was decreased slightly during the period 1998 to 1999. The period the trend of 1999 to 2004 was increasing rapidly. The realization degree of 2004 to 2006 was reducing gradually. During 2006 to 2007 it is increasing continuously. Thirdly, with deep analysis of banking supervision objectives realization results, it is concluded that Chinese banking supervision regulators have the tendency of protecting banking benefits in order to ensure the preserving and increasing the value of state-owned banking sector assets. As a result, it is led to the practice of banking supervision deviated from the overall objective and this is become the root reason of causing the contradictions between theory and practice in banking supervision objectives.
This dissertation belongs to theoretical explorative research which combines regulation economics with industrial economics and banking regulation. It makes a beneficial exploration and practice in the studying of banking regulation efficiency. However, it still has some disadvantages which are that: Firstly, remaining to further improve and refine the evaluation system of banking regulation objective realization degree which can not put the entire evaluation index into empirical research due to the objective difficulties in obtaining data. So to a certain extent, defectiveness has been brought to the entire empirical research. Secondly, this dissertation mainly makes the evaluation of banking supervision objective realization as quantitative study rather than qualitative study. Because the qualitative index obtained in the time series is so difficult to show the changes in trend of supervision objective realization degree that it can not be put into empirical research. All of these will remain to be improved in the future. Thirdly, the impact analysis of Banking Supervision to the social welfare is to be further enriched the theoretical basis for improving and perfecting the evaluation technical methods of social welfare loss. With the limitations of existed theories and technologies, this article has chosen to approximately estimate the impact of social welfare losses led by banking supervision in the use of social welfare losses caused by economic price regulation. This is the most reasonable research method under the objective limited conditions though it has one-sidedness. In this paper, it is considered that there are more comprehensive and effective methods of measuring social welfare losses indicators and making empirical analysis with the deep development of banking regulation theory and technology.
引文
1.A.E Bentley.The Process of Government,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,1967.
2.Anne O.Krueger.The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,The American Economic Review,1974,No.3,pp.64.
3.Ann Orr,Krishnan Sharma.Microfinance for Development,Building Inclusive Financial Sectors for Development,G-24 Policy Brief,United Nations,New York:2006,No.31.
4.Archie K.Davis.Banking Regulation Today:A Banker's View.Law and Contemporary Problems,1966,Vol.31,No.4,pp.639-647.
5.Aronld C.Harberger.Monopoly and Resource Allocation,American Economic Review,1954,No.5.
6.Arnoud W.A.Boot,Silva Dezelan and Todd.T.Milbourn.Challenges for Central Banking.A.M.Santomero,S.Viotti,A.Vredin,Kluwer,Massachussetts,2001,pp.39-58.
7.Barth.J.R.,G.Caprio.Jr.and R.Levine.Financial Regulation and Performance:Cross-country Evidence,OCC Economics Working Paper,1998.
8.Becker,Gary S.A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,Quarterly Journal of Economics,1983,Vol.98,No.3,pp.371-400.
9.Becker,G.and G.Stigler.Law Enforcement,Malfeasance,and the Compensation of Enforcers,Journal of Legal Studies 1974,No.3,pp.1-18.
10.Bilin Neyapti,Nergiz Dincer.Measuring the Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision,with an Application to Transition Economics,Turkish Economic Association Discussion Paper,http://www.tek.org.tr/,2004,No.2.
11.Bemstein.M.H.Regulation Business by Independent Commission,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1955.
12.Beston.G.The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking,New York,McMillan:1990.
13.Boot,Arnoud W.A.,Stuart I.Greenbaum and Anjan V.Thankor.Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting,The American Economic Review,1993,No.83,pp.1165-1183.
14.Campbell,Tim S.,Chan,Yuk-Shee,Marino,Anthony M.An incentive-based theory of bank regulation,Journal of Financial Intermediation,Elsevier,1992,Vol.2,No.3,pp.255-276.
15.Cowling,Keith,Dennis C.,Mueller.The Social Cost of Monopoly Power,Economic Journal,1978,No.12,pp.245-280.
16.Crew.M.A.,P.R.Kleindorfer.The Economics of Public Utility Regulation,the Macmillan Press,1986.
17.C.Wolf..Market or Govemments:Choosing between Imperfect Alternatives,Cambridge:The MIT Press,1997.
18.David B.Truman.The Government Process:Political Interests and Public Opinion,New York:Alfred A.Knopf Press,1951.
19.Mathias Dewatripont,Jean Tirole.The prudential regulation of banks.Cambridge,Mass:MIT Press,c1994.
20.Diamond.D.W.,P.H.Dybvig.Bank Runs,Deposit Insurance and Liquidity,Journal of Political Economy,1983,Vol.91,No.3,pp.401-419.
21.Douglas Ginsburg.A New Economic Theory of Regulation:Rent Extraction Rather than Rent Creation,Michigan Law Review,1999,Vol.97,No.6,pp.1771-1779.
22.Flannery.M.,Rangan.K.Market Forces at Work in the Banking Industry:Evidence from the Capital Building of the 1990s,Social Science Research Network Electronic Library:2002.
23.Franklin Allen,Richard Herring.Banking Regulation Versus Securities Market Regulation.Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions,University of Pennsylvania,Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers,2001.
24.Furman,Jason and Joseph E.Stiglitz.Economic Crises:Evidence and Insights from East Asia,Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1998,Vol.No.2,pp.1-135.
25.Garcia,G,C.J.Lindgren 和 M.I.Saal.Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy.Washington:International Monetary Fund,1996.
26.Gary S.Beeker.A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,Quarterly Journal of Ecnomics,1983,No.98,pp.371-400.
27.George J.Stigler,Claire Friedland.What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity.Journal of Law and Economics,1962,No.5,pp.1-16.
28.George J.Stigler.The Theory of Economic Regulation,Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,Vol.2,No.1,pp.3-21.
29.Giorgio Di Giorgio,Carmine Di Noia.Financial Regulation and Supervision in the Euro Area:A Four-Peak Proposal.Financial Institutions Center,the Wharton School,University of Pennsylvania,2001.
30.Goodhart,C.A.E and D.Schonemaker.Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies,The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation,Goodhart ed.Central Banking Publications Ltd,London,1998.
31.Gordon Tullock.The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,Monopolies and Thefts,Western Economic Journal,1967,No.5,pp.224-320.
32.Gray.H.M.The Passing of Public Utility Concept,Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics,1940,Vol.16,No.1,pp.8-20.
33.Hantke-Domas.M.The Public Interest Theory of Regulation:Non-Existence or Misinterpretation,European Journal of Law and Economics,2003,Vol.15,No.2,pp.165-194.
34.Horace M.Gray.The Passing of Public Utility Concept,Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics,1940,Vol.16,No.1.pp.8-20.
35.Howard Davies.Financial Regulation & Consumer Protection,Erfaringer og utfordringer Kredittilsynet,2006,No.3,pp.127-132.
36.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Jr.Ross Levine.Banking System Around the Globe:Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?.World Bank working papers,2000,No.2325.
37.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Jr.Ross Levine.The regulation and supervision of banks around the world:a new database.World Bank working papers,2001,No.2588.
38.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Jr.Ross Levine.Bank Regulation and Supervision:What Works Best.NBER working paper,2002,No.9323.
39.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Jr.Ross Levine.Bank supervision and regulation:what works best,Journal of Financial Intermediation,2003.
40.James R.Barth,Daniel E.Nolle,Triphon Phurniwasana and Glenn Yago.A.Cross-Country Analysis of the Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance,Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Economic and Policy Analysis working paper,2002,No.2.
41.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Ross Levine.Rethinking Bank Regulation:Till Angels Govern,Cambridge University Press:Har/Cdr edition,2005.
42.Jin-Guk Kim,Tae-Yun Kim and Junsok Yang.Regulatory Transparency:What We Learned in Korea,Working paper prepared by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy for the Conference for the APEC-OECD Cooperative Initiative on Regulatory Reform,2002.
43.Johan den Hertog.General Theories of Regulation,Encyclopedia of Law and Economics,Utrecht University,Netherlands:2000,No.3,pp.223-270.
44.John H Kareken,Neil Wallace.Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation:A PartialEquilibrium Exposition,1978,Vol.51,No.3,pp413-38.
45.Joskow.P.L.,Noll.R.G.Regulation in Theory and Practice:An Overview,Gary Fromm(ed.),Studies in Public Regulation,Cambridge:MIT Press,1981.
46.Joskow.P.L.,Rose.N.L.The Effects of Economic Regulation,In Handbook of Industrial Organization by Richard Schmalensee,Robert Willig,Amsterdam,North Holland:1989,No.2,pp.1449-1506.
47.Kane,E.J.Principal-Agent Problemin S&L Salvage.Journal of Finacnce,1990,Vol.45,pp.755-764.
48.Kaufman.G.G.The U.S.Banking Debacle of the 1980s:An Overview and Lessons,the Financier,1995.
49.Kenneth Spong,Banking Regulation—Its Purpose,Implementations and Effects,1th edition,Public Affairs Department,Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,Kansas City,Missouri:1983.
50.Kenneth Spong.Banking Regulation—Its Purpose,Implementations and Effects 5th edition., Public Affairs Department,Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,Kansas City,Missouri:2000.
51.Kregel.J.A.Margins of Safety and Weight of the Argument in Generating Financial Fragility,Journal of Economics Issues,1997,No.31.
52.Krueger,A.The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,American Economic Review,1974,Vol.64,No.3,pp.291-303.
53.Lawrence J.Lau,Kwoh-Ting.The Efficient Regulation and Supervision of Banks in the Information Technology Era,Working paper,2002,pp.7-9.
54.Long,Millard and Dimitri Vittas.Financial Regulation:Changing the Rules of the Game,World Bank,WPS803,1991.
55.Luis Serven,Norman V.Loayza.Regulation and macroeconomic performance,The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series,2005,pp.3469.
56.Martin Summer.Banking Regulation and Systemticrisk,Oesterreichische National Bank (Austrian Central Bank) Working Papers,2002,No.57,pp.26.
57.Marver H.Bernstein.Regulating Business Independent Commission,Princeton:Princeton University:1955.
58.M.A.Utton.The Economics of Regulation Industry,Basil Blackwell,1986.
59.Meade J.E.The Theory of Economic Externalities.Geneve,1973,pp.15.
60.Meltzer A.H.Margins in the Regulation of Financial Institutions,the Journal of Political Economy,1967,No.75,pp.482-511.
61.Merton,R.C.The financial system and economic performance,Journal of Financial Services Research,1990,No.4,pp.263-300.
62.Mercuro,Nicholas,Ryan and Timothy P.Law,economics,and public policy,Greenwich:Jai Press,1984,pp.7-15.
63.Michael Hantke-Domas.The Public Interest Theory of Rgegulation:Non-Existence or Misinterestation,European Journal of Law and Economics,2003,Vol.15,No.2,pp.166.
64.Michael A.Crew,Paul R.Kleindorfer.The Economics of Public Utility Regulation,the Macmillian Press,1986.
65.Michael E.Collins.Efficient,Effective Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions,Insights,Second Quarter 2006.
66.Minsky.H.The Financial Instability Hyphthesis:Capital Process and the Behavior of the Economy,Cambridge University Press,1982.
67.Minsky,H.The Financial Instability Hyphthesis:a restatement.In P.Arestis and T.Skouras eds,Post Keynesian Economic Theory,Wheat sheaf Books,Sussex,1982.
68.Nobusuke Tamaki.Banking Regulation in Japan,CESifo DICE Report,2008,Vol.3.
69.Peltzman.S.Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,Journal of Law and Economics,1976,Vol.19,No.2,pp.211-241.
70.Rajan,R.and L.Zingales.Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists,New York,NY:Random House,2003.
71.Richard A.Posner.Theofies of Economic Regulation,Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1974,Vol.5,No.2,pp.335-358.
72.Richard A.Posner.The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,Journal of Political Economy,1975,Vol.83,No.4,pp.807-27.
73.Rio Hondo,San Angel.Efficiency in Financial Regulation and Reform of Supervision Authorities:A Survey in the APEC Region.ITAM Working Paper,2002.
74.Richard J.Herring,Anthony M.Santomero.What is Optimal Financial Regulation,Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions,University of Pennsylvania in its series Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers,2000,No.00-34.
75.Schwartz,Anna.Financial Stability and the Federal Safety Net.In William S.Haraf and Rose Marie Kushneider,eds.,Restructuring Banking and Financial Service in America.Washington.D.C,American Enterprise Institute,1988,pp.34-62.
76.Spiering.R.Reflection on the Regulation of Financial Intermediaries,Kyklos,1990,Vol.43,pp.91-109.
77.Stephen Martin.Industrial Economics Economic Analysis and Public Policy,New York,Macmillan Publishing Company:2003,No.2.
78.Stigler.G J.The Theory of Economic Regulation,Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,Vol.2,No.1,pp.3-21.
79.Stigler,G.The Citizen and the State:Essays on Regulation,University of Chicago Press,1975.
80.Stiglitz J.E.,Andrew Weiss.Credit Rationing in Market with Imperfect Information.American Economic Review,1981,Vol.73,No.3,pp.393-410.
81.Stiglitz,Weiss.A Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,American Economics Review,1982,pp.125-138.
82.Sudipto Bhattacharya,Amoud Wa Boot and Anjan V.Thakor.The Economics of Bank Regulation,Journal of Monetary Economics,1998,Vol.141,No.1,pp.745-770.
83.Taylor.M.Twin Peaks:A Regulatory Structure for the New Century.Center for the Study of Financial Innovation,London:1995.
84.T.Beck,A.Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine.Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance,NBER Working Paper,2003,No.9620.
85.Tim S.Campbell & Yuk-Shee Chan & Anthony M.Marino.An incentive-based theory of bank regulation,Journal of Financial Intermediation,Elsevier,1992,Vol.2,No.3,pp.255-276.
86.艾伦·加特.管制、放松与重新管制[M].第2版.经济科学出版社,1999年9月.
87.巴瑞·易臣格瑞.金融危机的防范与管理[M].刘士余等译.科学出版社,2003年10月1日.
88.毕马威会计事务所.2006年中国银行业调查报告[R].中国毕马威(KPMG)会计事务所,2007年.
89.卡尔·约翰·林捷瑞恩,吉连·加西亚,马修·I·萨尔.银行稳健经营与宏观经济政策[M].潘康等译.中国金融出版社,1997年.
90.曹啸,计小青.从公共利益理论到比较制度分析[J].管制经济学的新发展:上海财经大学金融学院货币银行系工作论文,2005年.
91.陈建华.金融监管有效性研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2002年.
92.陈学彬,邹平座.金融监管的外部控制系统研究[J].2002年第10期.
93.陈颖.商业银行市场准入与退出问题研究[M].中国人民大学出版社,2007年.
94.陈忠阳.让银行资本发挥它的作用[J].货币金融评论,2004年第5期.
95.德沃特里庞·泰勒尔.银行监管[M].石磊,王永钦,译.复旦大学出版社,2002年6月.
96.董红蕾.最优银行规制制度研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2004年4月.
97.高来.从银行风险管理角度看监管效率的提高[J].上海金融,2004年第8期.
98.顾自安.国外金融规制的比较分析[J].经济学家,2006年10月.
99.郭永刚.央行官员:优惠利率涉农贷款被有门路人获得[N].中国青年报,2006年11月27日.
100.过勇,胡鞍钢.不可低估行政垄断造成的经济损失[N].中国经济时报,2002年7月16日.
101.黄达.金融学[M].中国人民大学出版社,2004年.
102.胡怀邦.银行监管的目标定位理论分析与中国选择[N].金融时报,2003年11月24日.
103.胡鞍钢.中国挑战腐败[M].浙江人民出版社,2001年.
104.纪琼骁.中国金融监管制度的变迁[D].武汉:武汉大学,2005年3月.
105.姜付秀,余晖.我国行政性垄断的危害—市场势力效应和收入分配效应的实证研究[A].反行政性垄断与促进竞争政策前沿问题研究[M].经济科学出版社,2008年5月.
106.姜付秀,余晖.对行政性垄断导致福利损失和收入分配扭曲实证研究[J].中国经济时报,2007年11月6日.
107.类承曜.国有商银行改革的逻辑——个政治经济学的视角[J].货币金融评论,2006年第12期.
108.李宏瑾.金融监管的一般经济学解释[J].吉林金融研究,2002年第6期.
109.李峰,李华民.稳定与竞争:中国金融监管的目标聚合[J].南方金融,2003年第10期。
110.李富英,藏慧萍.银行监管的理论研究[J].理论与经济,2005年第1期.
111.李晗.金融监管法的经济学分析[J].法学杂志,2006年第5期.
112.李晗.法经济学视野下的金融监管法正义性分析[J].法制与社会发展(双月刊),2006年第5期.
113.李念斋,万喜乔.中央银行金融监管绩效分析[J].银行与企业,1999年第1期.
114.李成.金融监管学[M].科学出版社,2006年9月.
115.李洪江.国有商业银行不良资产状况研究[J].问题研究,2002第10期.
116.李宏瑾.金融监管的一般经济学解释[J].吉林金融研究,2002年第6期.
117.李建军.国有商业银行绩效评价—理论、方法与实证[M].第1版.中国金融出版社,2004年6月.
118.李文泓.国际金融监管理念与监管方式的转变及其对我国的启示[J].国际金融研究,2001年第6期.
119.林志远.中国金融监察与监管体系—现状、问题和对策[M].中国青年出版社,1997.
120.刘毅.金融监管问题研究[M].经济科学出版社,2006年5月.
121.刘萍萍,封斌.论公平与效益价值目标对金融监管法的影响[J].金融管理,2005年第6期.
122.刘有鹏,晏宗新,周闽军.中国银行业管制效率:评价原则与检验[J].财贸研究,2005年第2期.
123.刘小星,何建敏.对我国金融监管运行机制的博弈分析[J].数理统计与管理,2004年第6期.
124.刘明志.银行管制的收益和成本[M].中国金融出版社,2003年4月.
125.刘明康.银行监管实务[M].中国银监会干部教育培训编审委员会,2006年9月.
126.刘仁伍.国际金融监管前沿问题[M].吴竞择编译.第1版.中国金融出版社,2002年5月.
127.刘晓勇.银行监管有效性研究[M].社会科学文献出版社,2007年10月.
128.刘宇飞.国际金融监管的新发展[M].经济科学出版社,1999年.
129.卢先明.公共物品与政府职能[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2005年第1期.
130.陆磊.信息结构、利益集团与公共政策:当前金融监管制度选择中的理论问题[J].经济研究,2000年第12期.
131.罗春华.开放经济条件下我国银行监管效率研究[D].湖南:湖南师范学院, 2004年4月.
132.孟艳.我国银行监管的有效性问题研究[M].经济科学出版社,2007年9月.
133.宓丹.银行监管的目标体系分析[J].财经科学,2005年第5期.
134.宓丹.论银行监管的目标[J].电子科技大学学报社科版,2005年第4期.
135.江春,许立成.金融监管与金融发展:理论框架与实证检验[J].金融研究,2005年第4期.
136.蒋海.论弹性监管与金融效率[J].重庆金融,2002年第2期.
137.庞华玲.论金融监管体制目标与金融安全[J].法学杂志,2003年第24期.
138.平狄克,鲁宾费尔德.微观经济学[M].第3版.中国人民大学出版社,1998年.
139.祁敬宇.金融监管学[M].西安交通大学出版社,2007年9月.
140.钱沈钢.论我国银行监管的目标模式选择[J].广西财政高等专科学校学报,2005年第18期.
141.钱婵娟.中国改革开放进程中的银行监管制度思想研究(1979-2004)[M].第1版.上海财经大学出版社,2007年9月。
142.钱小安.金融监管体制、效率与变革[M].第1版.中国金融出版社,2006年10月.
143.邱东,杨仲山等.当代国民经济统计学主流[M].第1版.东北财经大学出版社,2004年5月.
144.曲振涛,杨恺钧.规制经济学[M].复旦大学,2006年3月.
145.屈芸.对农村信用社贷款定价问题的思考[J].当代经济,2007年第3期.
146.尚静.金融可持续发展角度的银行监管研究[J].商业研究,2005年第10期.
147.尚金峰.开放条件下的金融监管[M].中国商业出版社,2006年.
148.施其武.谈银行监管的边界和效率[J].银行家,2007年7月.
149.托马斯·赫尔曼,凯文·穆尔多克,约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨.金融约束:一个新的分析框架.政府在东亚经济发展中的作用[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1998年.
150.夏博辉.论商业银行信息披露的经济学法学基础[J].会计研究,2004年第8 期.
151.谢朝华.我国金融监管制度的目标框架选择[J].商业研究,2005年第18期.
152.王进诚.社会主义新农村建设中的农村金融缺失与破解[J].中国金融,2006年第2期.
153.王明华.银行稳定成本研究[M].第1版.中国经济出版社,2007年5月.
154.王曙光.金融自由化与经济发展[M].北京大学出版社,2003年3月.
155.王学龙.全面开放条件下我国银行监管的目标定位[J].2007年第5期.
156.王召.中国货币政策传导机制[D].北京大学中国经济研究中心,2002年4月.
157.王朝弟,肖龙沧.中国货币政策框架研究[M].中国方正出版社,2003年8月。
158.王健.世界银行称农信社贷款利率上限应该取消[N].第一财经日报,2007年2月15日.
159.王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论—基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用[M].商务印书馆,2004年9月.
160.王松奇(组长),欧明刚,刘熠辉(副组长).2004-2005年中国商业银行竞争力报告[R].《银行家》研究中心,2005年.
161.王松奇(组长),欧明刚,刘熠辉(副组长).2005-2006年中国商业银行竞争力报告[R].《银行家》研究中心,2006年.
162.王振山.金融效率论—金融资源优化配置的理论与实践[M].第1版.经济管理出版社,2000年7月.
163.韦宝毅.中国商业银行监管效率研究[D].2006年5月.
164.肖兴志.规制经济理论的产生与发展[J].经济评论,2002年第3期.
165.邢莹莹、宫晓冬.银行监管的动因及目标选择[J].西安金融,2005年第6期.
166.阎庆民.中国银行业监管效率分析[J].金融研究,2002年第8期.
167.阎庆民.当代银行监管理论的发展[N].金融时报,2006年2月13日.
168.晏宗新.金融业管制与竞争理论研究—兼论中国金融业的管制问题[M].中国科学技术大学出版社,2007年8月.
169.杨春林.商业银行有效监管论[M].人民法院出版社,2005年.
170.杨家才,阙方平,秦汉锋.银行监管通论[M].华中科技大学出版社,2006年7月.
171.易宪容.利率市场化下的金融生态[N].中国经济时报,2003年6月19日.
172.于立,肖兴志.规制理论发展综述[J].财经问题研究,2001年第1期.
173.于良春.反行政性垄断与促进竞争政策前沿问题研究[M].经济科学出版社,2008年5月.
174.中国人民银行.中国货币政策执行报告[R/OL].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/,2003-2006年.
175.藏慧萍.美国金融监管制度的历史演进[M].第1版.经济管理出版社,2007年9月.
176.曾少清,赵想林.银行监管的效率原理初探[J].武汉金融,2006年第3期.
177.张红凤.西方规制经济学的变迁[M].经济科学出版社,2005年10月.
178.张贵乐,姜学军.试论金融监管的目标[J].财贸经济,1997年第11期.
179.张荔.发达国家金融监管比较研究[M].第1版.中国金融出版社,2003年4月.
180.张强,佘桂荣.银行监管的市场约束理论进展[J].2006年第10期.
181.张亦春.金融市场学[M].高等教育出版社.1999年.
182.植草益.微观经济学[M].中国发展出版社,1992年.
183.中国人民银行货币政策执行小组.稳步推进利率市场化报告[R].中国货币政策执行报告增刊,2005年1月.
184.周道许.现代金融监管体制研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2000年.
185.周海林.金融监管法的价值:自由竞争与金融安全[J].福建金融管理干部学院学报,2007年第4期.
186.周泉恭,王志军.欧盟国家金融监管结构发展分析[J].当代财经,2006年第4期.
187.朱新蓉.中国金融监管制度创新研究[J].上海金融,2003年第8期.
2.Anne O.Krueger.The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,The American Economic Review,1974,No.3,pp.64.
3.Ann Orr,Krishnan Sharma.Microfinance for Development,Building Inclusive Financial Sectors for Development,G-24 Policy Brief,United Nations,New York:2006,No.31.
4.Archie K.Davis.Banking Regulation Today:A Banker's View.Law and Contemporary Problems,1966,Vol.31,No.4,pp.639-647.
5.Aronld C.Harberger.Monopoly and Resource Allocation,American Economic Review,1954,No.5.
6.Arnoud W.A.Boot,Silva Dezelan and Todd.T.Milbourn.Challenges for Central Banking.A.M.Santomero,S.Viotti,A.Vredin,Kluwer,Massachussetts,2001,pp.39-58.
7.Barth.J.R.,G.Caprio.Jr.and R.Levine.Financial Regulation and Performance:Cross-country Evidence,OCC Economics Working Paper,1998.
8.Becker,Gary S.A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,Quarterly Journal of Economics,1983,Vol.98,No.3,pp.371-400.
9.Becker,G.and G.Stigler.Law Enforcement,Malfeasance,and the Compensation of Enforcers,Journal of Legal Studies 1974,No.3,pp.1-18.
10.Bilin Neyapti,Nergiz Dincer.Measuring the Quality of Bank Regulation and Supervision,with an Application to Transition Economics,Turkish Economic Association Discussion Paper,http://www.tek.org.tr/,2004,No.2.
11.Bemstein.M.H.Regulation Business by Independent Commission,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1955.
12.Beston.G.The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking,New York,McMillan:1990.
13.Boot,Arnoud W.A.,Stuart I.Greenbaum and Anjan V.Thankor.Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting,The American Economic Review,1993,No.83,pp.1165-1183.
14.Campbell,Tim S.,Chan,Yuk-Shee,Marino,Anthony M.An incentive-based theory of bank regulation,Journal of Financial Intermediation,Elsevier,1992,Vol.2,No.3,pp.255-276.
15.Cowling,Keith,Dennis C.,Mueller.The Social Cost of Monopoly Power,Economic Journal,1978,No.12,pp.245-280.
16.Crew.M.A.,P.R.Kleindorfer.The Economics of Public Utility Regulation,the Macmillan Press,1986.
17.C.Wolf..Market or Govemments:Choosing between Imperfect Alternatives,Cambridge:The MIT Press,1997.
18.David B.Truman.The Government Process:Political Interests and Public Opinion,New York:Alfred A.Knopf Press,1951.
19.Mathias Dewatripont,Jean Tirole.The prudential regulation of banks.Cambridge,Mass:MIT Press,c1994.
20.Diamond.D.W.,P.H.Dybvig.Bank Runs,Deposit Insurance and Liquidity,Journal of Political Economy,1983,Vol.91,No.3,pp.401-419.
21.Douglas Ginsburg.A New Economic Theory of Regulation:Rent Extraction Rather than Rent Creation,Michigan Law Review,1999,Vol.97,No.6,pp.1771-1779.
22.Flannery.M.,Rangan.K.Market Forces at Work in the Banking Industry:Evidence from the Capital Building of the 1990s,Social Science Research Network Electronic Library:2002.
23.Franklin Allen,Richard Herring.Banking Regulation Versus Securities Market Regulation.Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions,University of Pennsylvania,Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers,2001.
24.Furman,Jason and Joseph E.Stiglitz.Economic Crises:Evidence and Insights from East Asia,Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1998,Vol.No.2,pp.1-135.
25.Garcia,G,C.J.Lindgren 和 M.I.Saal.Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy.Washington:International Monetary Fund,1996.
26.Gary S.Beeker.A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence,Quarterly Journal of Ecnomics,1983,No.98,pp.371-400.
27.George J.Stigler,Claire Friedland.What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity.Journal of Law and Economics,1962,No.5,pp.1-16.
28.George J.Stigler.The Theory of Economic Regulation,Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,Vol.2,No.1,pp.3-21.
29.Giorgio Di Giorgio,Carmine Di Noia.Financial Regulation and Supervision in the Euro Area:A Four-Peak Proposal.Financial Institutions Center,the Wharton School,University of Pennsylvania,2001.
30.Goodhart,C.A.E and D.Schonemaker.Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies,The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation,Goodhart ed.Central Banking Publications Ltd,London,1998.
31.Gordon Tullock.The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,Monopolies and Thefts,Western Economic Journal,1967,No.5,pp.224-320.
32.Gray.H.M.The Passing of Public Utility Concept,Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics,1940,Vol.16,No.1,pp.8-20.
33.Hantke-Domas.M.The Public Interest Theory of Regulation:Non-Existence or Misinterpretation,European Journal of Law and Economics,2003,Vol.15,No.2,pp.165-194.
34.Horace M.Gray.The Passing of Public Utility Concept,Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics,1940,Vol.16,No.1.pp.8-20.
35.Howard Davies.Financial Regulation & Consumer Protection,Erfaringer og utfordringer Kredittilsynet,2006,No.3,pp.127-132.
36.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Jr.Ross Levine.Banking System Around the Globe:Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?.World Bank working papers,2000,No.2325.
37.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Jr.Ross Levine.The regulation and supervision of banks around the world:a new database.World Bank working papers,2001,No.2588.
38.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Jr.Ross Levine.Bank Regulation and Supervision:What Works Best.NBER working paper,2002,No.9323.
39.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Jr.Ross Levine.Bank supervision and regulation:what works best,Journal of Financial Intermediation,2003.
40.James R.Barth,Daniel E.Nolle,Triphon Phurniwasana and Glenn Yago.A.Cross-Country Analysis of the Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance,Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Economic and Policy Analysis working paper,2002,No.2.
41.James R.Barth,Gerard Caprio and Ross Levine.Rethinking Bank Regulation:Till Angels Govern,Cambridge University Press:Har/Cdr edition,2005.
42.Jin-Guk Kim,Tae-Yun Kim and Junsok Yang.Regulatory Transparency:What We Learned in Korea,Working paper prepared by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy for the Conference for the APEC-OECD Cooperative Initiative on Regulatory Reform,2002.
43.Johan den Hertog.General Theories of Regulation,Encyclopedia of Law and Economics,Utrecht University,Netherlands:2000,No.3,pp.223-270.
44.John H Kareken,Neil Wallace.Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation:A PartialEquilibrium Exposition,1978,Vol.51,No.3,pp413-38.
45.Joskow.P.L.,Noll.R.G.Regulation in Theory and Practice:An Overview,Gary Fromm(ed.),Studies in Public Regulation,Cambridge:MIT Press,1981.
46.Joskow.P.L.,Rose.N.L.The Effects of Economic Regulation,In Handbook of Industrial Organization by Richard Schmalensee,Robert Willig,Amsterdam,North Holland:1989,No.2,pp.1449-1506.
47.Kane,E.J.Principal-Agent Problemin S&L Salvage.Journal of Finacnce,1990,Vol.45,pp.755-764.
48.Kaufman.G.G.The U.S.Banking Debacle of the 1980s:An Overview and Lessons,the Financier,1995.
49.Kenneth Spong,Banking Regulation—Its Purpose,Implementations and Effects,1th edition,Public Affairs Department,Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,Kansas City,Missouri:1983.
50.Kenneth Spong.Banking Regulation—Its Purpose,Implementations and Effects 5th edition., Public Affairs Department,Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City,Kansas City,Missouri:2000.
51.Kregel.J.A.Margins of Safety and Weight of the Argument in Generating Financial Fragility,Journal of Economics Issues,1997,No.31.
52.Krueger,A.The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,American Economic Review,1974,Vol.64,No.3,pp.291-303.
53.Lawrence J.Lau,Kwoh-Ting.The Efficient Regulation and Supervision of Banks in the Information Technology Era,Working paper,2002,pp.7-9.
54.Long,Millard and Dimitri Vittas.Financial Regulation:Changing the Rules of the Game,World Bank,WPS803,1991.
55.Luis Serven,Norman V.Loayza.Regulation and macroeconomic performance,The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series,2005,pp.3469.
56.Martin Summer.Banking Regulation and Systemticrisk,Oesterreichische National Bank (Austrian Central Bank) Working Papers,2002,No.57,pp.26.
57.Marver H.Bernstein.Regulating Business Independent Commission,Princeton:Princeton University:1955.
58.M.A.Utton.The Economics of Regulation Industry,Basil Blackwell,1986.
59.Meade J.E.The Theory of Economic Externalities.Geneve,1973,pp.15.
60.Meltzer A.H.Margins in the Regulation of Financial Institutions,the Journal of Political Economy,1967,No.75,pp.482-511.
61.Merton,R.C.The financial system and economic performance,Journal of Financial Services Research,1990,No.4,pp.263-300.
62.Mercuro,Nicholas,Ryan and Timothy P.Law,economics,and public policy,Greenwich:Jai Press,1984,pp.7-15.
63.Michael Hantke-Domas.The Public Interest Theory of Rgegulation:Non-Existence or Misinterestation,European Journal of Law and Economics,2003,Vol.15,No.2,pp.166.
64.Michael A.Crew,Paul R.Kleindorfer.The Economics of Public Utility Regulation,the Macmillian Press,1986.
65.Michael E.Collins.Efficient,Effective Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions,Insights,Second Quarter 2006.
66.Minsky.H.The Financial Instability Hyphthesis:Capital Process and the Behavior of the Economy,Cambridge University Press,1982.
67.Minsky,H.The Financial Instability Hyphthesis:a restatement.In P.Arestis and T.Skouras eds,Post Keynesian Economic Theory,Wheat sheaf Books,Sussex,1982.
68.Nobusuke Tamaki.Banking Regulation in Japan,CESifo DICE Report,2008,Vol.3.
69.Peltzman.S.Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,Journal of Law and Economics,1976,Vol.19,No.2,pp.211-241.
70.Rajan,R.and L.Zingales.Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists,New York,NY:Random House,2003.
71.Richard A.Posner.Theofies of Economic Regulation,Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science,1974,Vol.5,No.2,pp.335-358.
72.Richard A.Posner.The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,Journal of Political Economy,1975,Vol.83,No.4,pp.807-27.
73.Rio Hondo,San Angel.Efficiency in Financial Regulation and Reform of Supervision Authorities:A Survey in the APEC Region.ITAM Working Paper,2002.
74.Richard J.Herring,Anthony M.Santomero.What is Optimal Financial Regulation,Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions,University of Pennsylvania in its series Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers,2000,No.00-34.
75.Schwartz,Anna.Financial Stability and the Federal Safety Net.In William S.Haraf and Rose Marie Kushneider,eds.,Restructuring Banking and Financial Service in America.Washington.D.C,American Enterprise Institute,1988,pp.34-62.
76.Spiering.R.Reflection on the Regulation of Financial Intermediaries,Kyklos,1990,Vol.43,pp.91-109.
77.Stephen Martin.Industrial Economics Economic Analysis and Public Policy,New York,Macmillan Publishing Company:2003,No.2.
78.Stigler.G J.The Theory of Economic Regulation,Journal of Economics and Management Science,1971,Vol.2,No.1,pp.3-21.
79.Stigler,G.The Citizen and the State:Essays on Regulation,University of Chicago Press,1975.
80.Stiglitz J.E.,Andrew Weiss.Credit Rationing in Market with Imperfect Information.American Economic Review,1981,Vol.73,No.3,pp.393-410.
81.Stiglitz,Weiss.A Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,American Economics Review,1982,pp.125-138.
82.Sudipto Bhattacharya,Amoud Wa Boot and Anjan V.Thakor.The Economics of Bank Regulation,Journal of Monetary Economics,1998,Vol.141,No.1,pp.745-770.
83.Taylor.M.Twin Peaks:A Regulatory Structure for the New Century.Center for the Study of Financial Innovation,London:1995.
84.T.Beck,A.Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine.Bank Supervision and Corporate Finance,NBER Working Paper,2003,No.9620.
85.Tim S.Campbell & Yuk-Shee Chan & Anthony M.Marino.An incentive-based theory of bank regulation,Journal of Financial Intermediation,Elsevier,1992,Vol.2,No.3,pp.255-276.
86.艾伦·加特.管制、放松与重新管制[M].第2版.经济科学出版社,1999年9月.
87.巴瑞·易臣格瑞.金融危机的防范与管理[M].刘士余等译.科学出版社,2003年10月1日.
88.毕马威会计事务所.2006年中国银行业调查报告[R].中国毕马威(KPMG)会计事务所,2007年.
89.卡尔·约翰·林捷瑞恩,吉连·加西亚,马修·I·萨尔.银行稳健经营与宏观经济政策[M].潘康等译.中国金融出版社,1997年.
90.曹啸,计小青.从公共利益理论到比较制度分析[J].管制经济学的新发展:上海财经大学金融学院货币银行系工作论文,2005年.
91.陈建华.金融监管有效性研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2002年.
92.陈学彬,邹平座.金融监管的外部控制系统研究[J].2002年第10期.
93.陈颖.商业银行市场准入与退出问题研究[M].中国人民大学出版社,2007年.
94.陈忠阳.让银行资本发挥它的作用[J].货币金融评论,2004年第5期.
95.德沃特里庞·泰勒尔.银行监管[M].石磊,王永钦,译.复旦大学出版社,2002年6月.
96.董红蕾.最优银行规制制度研究[D].上海:复旦大学,2004年4月.
97.高来.从银行风险管理角度看监管效率的提高[J].上海金融,2004年第8期.
98.顾自安.国外金融规制的比较分析[J].经济学家,2006年10月.
99.郭永刚.央行官员:优惠利率涉农贷款被有门路人获得[N].中国青年报,2006年11月27日.
100.过勇,胡鞍钢.不可低估行政垄断造成的经济损失[N].中国经济时报,2002年7月16日.
101.黄达.金融学[M].中国人民大学出版社,2004年.
102.胡怀邦.银行监管的目标定位理论分析与中国选择[N].金融时报,2003年11月24日.
103.胡鞍钢.中国挑战腐败[M].浙江人民出版社,2001年.
104.纪琼骁.中国金融监管制度的变迁[D].武汉:武汉大学,2005年3月.
105.姜付秀,余晖.我国行政性垄断的危害—市场势力效应和收入分配效应的实证研究[A].反行政性垄断与促进竞争政策前沿问题研究[M].经济科学出版社,2008年5月.
106.姜付秀,余晖.对行政性垄断导致福利损失和收入分配扭曲实证研究[J].中国经济时报,2007年11月6日.
107.类承曜.国有商银行改革的逻辑——个政治经济学的视角[J].货币金融评论,2006年第12期.
108.李宏瑾.金融监管的一般经济学解释[J].吉林金融研究,2002年第6期.
109.李峰,李华民.稳定与竞争:中国金融监管的目标聚合[J].南方金融,2003年第10期。
110.李富英,藏慧萍.银行监管的理论研究[J].理论与经济,2005年第1期.
111.李晗.金融监管法的经济学分析[J].法学杂志,2006年第5期.
112.李晗.法经济学视野下的金融监管法正义性分析[J].法制与社会发展(双月刊),2006年第5期.
113.李念斋,万喜乔.中央银行金融监管绩效分析[J].银行与企业,1999年第1期.
114.李成.金融监管学[M].科学出版社,2006年9月.
115.李洪江.国有商业银行不良资产状况研究[J].问题研究,2002第10期.
116.李宏瑾.金融监管的一般经济学解释[J].吉林金融研究,2002年第6期.
117.李建军.国有商业银行绩效评价—理论、方法与实证[M].第1版.中国金融出版社,2004年6月.
118.李文泓.国际金融监管理念与监管方式的转变及其对我国的启示[J].国际金融研究,2001年第6期.
119.林志远.中国金融监察与监管体系—现状、问题和对策[M].中国青年出版社,1997.
120.刘毅.金融监管问题研究[M].经济科学出版社,2006年5月.
121.刘萍萍,封斌.论公平与效益价值目标对金融监管法的影响[J].金融管理,2005年第6期.
122.刘有鹏,晏宗新,周闽军.中国银行业管制效率:评价原则与检验[J].财贸研究,2005年第2期.
123.刘小星,何建敏.对我国金融监管运行机制的博弈分析[J].数理统计与管理,2004年第6期.
124.刘明志.银行管制的收益和成本[M].中国金融出版社,2003年4月.
125.刘明康.银行监管实务[M].中国银监会干部教育培训编审委员会,2006年9月.
126.刘仁伍.国际金融监管前沿问题[M].吴竞择编译.第1版.中国金融出版社,2002年5月.
127.刘晓勇.银行监管有效性研究[M].社会科学文献出版社,2007年10月.
128.刘宇飞.国际金融监管的新发展[M].经济科学出版社,1999年.
129.卢先明.公共物品与政府职能[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2005年第1期.
130.陆磊.信息结构、利益集团与公共政策:当前金融监管制度选择中的理论问题[J].经济研究,2000年第12期.
131.罗春华.开放经济条件下我国银行监管效率研究[D].湖南:湖南师范学院, 2004年4月.
132.孟艳.我国银行监管的有效性问题研究[M].经济科学出版社,2007年9月.
133.宓丹.银行监管的目标体系分析[J].财经科学,2005年第5期.
134.宓丹.论银行监管的目标[J].电子科技大学学报社科版,2005年第4期.
135.江春,许立成.金融监管与金融发展:理论框架与实证检验[J].金融研究,2005年第4期.
136.蒋海.论弹性监管与金融效率[J].重庆金融,2002年第2期.
137.庞华玲.论金融监管体制目标与金融安全[J].法学杂志,2003年第24期.
138.平狄克,鲁宾费尔德.微观经济学[M].第3版.中国人民大学出版社,1998年.
139.祁敬宇.金融监管学[M].西安交通大学出版社,2007年9月.
140.钱沈钢.论我国银行监管的目标模式选择[J].广西财政高等专科学校学报,2005年第18期.
141.钱婵娟.中国改革开放进程中的银行监管制度思想研究(1979-2004)[M].第1版.上海财经大学出版社,2007年9月。
142.钱小安.金融监管体制、效率与变革[M].第1版.中国金融出版社,2006年10月.
143.邱东,杨仲山等.当代国民经济统计学主流[M].第1版.东北财经大学出版社,2004年5月.
144.曲振涛,杨恺钧.规制经济学[M].复旦大学,2006年3月.
145.屈芸.对农村信用社贷款定价问题的思考[J].当代经济,2007年第3期.
146.尚静.金融可持续发展角度的银行监管研究[J].商业研究,2005年第10期.
147.尚金峰.开放条件下的金融监管[M].中国商业出版社,2006年.
148.施其武.谈银行监管的边界和效率[J].银行家,2007年7月.
149.托马斯·赫尔曼,凯文·穆尔多克,约瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨.金融约束:一个新的分析框架.政府在东亚经济发展中的作用[M].北京:中国经济出版社,1998年.
150.夏博辉.论商业银行信息披露的经济学法学基础[J].会计研究,2004年第8 期.
151.谢朝华.我国金融监管制度的目标框架选择[J].商业研究,2005年第18期.
152.王进诚.社会主义新农村建设中的农村金融缺失与破解[J].中国金融,2006年第2期.
153.王明华.银行稳定成本研究[M].第1版.中国经济出版社,2007年5月.
154.王曙光.金融自由化与经济发展[M].北京大学出版社,2003年3月.
155.王学龙.全面开放条件下我国银行监管的目标定位[J].2007年第5期.
156.王召.中国货币政策传导机制[D].北京大学中国经济研究中心,2002年4月.
157.王朝弟,肖龙沧.中国货币政策框架研究[M].中国方正出版社,2003年8月。
158.王健.世界银行称农信社贷款利率上限应该取消[N].第一财经日报,2007年2月15日.
159.王俊豪.政府管制经济学导论—基本理论及其在政府管制实践中的应用[M].商务印书馆,2004年9月.
160.王松奇(组长),欧明刚,刘熠辉(副组长).2004-2005年中国商业银行竞争力报告[R].《银行家》研究中心,2005年.
161.王松奇(组长),欧明刚,刘熠辉(副组长).2005-2006年中国商业银行竞争力报告[R].《银行家》研究中心,2006年.
162.王振山.金融效率论—金融资源优化配置的理论与实践[M].第1版.经济管理出版社,2000年7月.
163.韦宝毅.中国商业银行监管效率研究[D].2006年5月.
164.肖兴志.规制经济理论的产生与发展[J].经济评论,2002年第3期.
165.邢莹莹、宫晓冬.银行监管的动因及目标选择[J].西安金融,2005年第6期.
166.阎庆民.中国银行业监管效率分析[J].金融研究,2002年第8期.
167.阎庆民.当代银行监管理论的发展[N].金融时报,2006年2月13日.
168.晏宗新.金融业管制与竞争理论研究—兼论中国金融业的管制问题[M].中国科学技术大学出版社,2007年8月.
169.杨春林.商业银行有效监管论[M].人民法院出版社,2005年.
170.杨家才,阙方平,秦汉锋.银行监管通论[M].华中科技大学出版社,2006年7月.
171.易宪容.利率市场化下的金融生态[N].中国经济时报,2003年6月19日.
172.于立,肖兴志.规制理论发展综述[J].财经问题研究,2001年第1期.
173.于良春.反行政性垄断与促进竞争政策前沿问题研究[M].经济科学出版社,2008年5月.
174.中国人民银行.中国货币政策执行报告[R/OL].http://www.pbc.gov.cn/,2003-2006年.
175.藏慧萍.美国金融监管制度的历史演进[M].第1版.经济管理出版社,2007年9月.
176.曾少清,赵想林.银行监管的效率原理初探[J].武汉金融,2006年第3期.
177.张红凤.西方规制经济学的变迁[M].经济科学出版社,2005年10月.
178.张贵乐,姜学军.试论金融监管的目标[J].财贸经济,1997年第11期.
179.张荔.发达国家金融监管比较研究[M].第1版.中国金融出版社,2003年4月.
180.张强,佘桂荣.银行监管的市场约束理论进展[J].2006年第10期.
181.张亦春.金融市场学[M].高等教育出版社.1999年.
182.植草益.微观经济学[M].中国发展出版社,1992年.
183.中国人民银行货币政策执行小组.稳步推进利率市场化报告[R].中国货币政策执行报告增刊,2005年1月.
184.周道许.现代金融监管体制研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2000年.
185.周海林.金融监管法的价值:自由竞争与金融安全[J].福建金融管理干部学院学报,2007年第4期.
186.周泉恭,王志军.欧盟国家金融监管结构发展分析[J].当代财经,2006年第4期.
187.朱新蓉.中国金融监管制度创新研究[J].上海金融,2003年第8期.