矿产资源的产权残缺与租值耗散问题研究
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摘要
租值耗散（rent dissipation）是现代产权经济学中的重要理论之一，其内涵是，原本有价值的资源或财产，由于产权安排方面的缺陷，其租金(或价值)下降，乃至完全消失。矿产资源具有可耗竭性，相对于人类社会的无限需求，资源的有限供应能力引发了稀缺效应，产生了一种长期的超额利润或要素的超额收入。如果利用适度和管理得当，具有稳定供应量的矿产资源能够持续产生租值，反之，将导致租值的减少和浪费，即所谓的“租值耗散”问题。在我国，法律明确规定矿产资源属于国家所有，但现实中存在一定的产权残缺问题，包括国家的所有权权益没有充分实现，使用权缺乏严格规范和限制，转让权受到政府过度干预、收益权与控制权不对等等。产权残缺致使大量的矿产资源价值和资产收益被置于公共领域，转化为资源租值，导致相关利益主体的寻租行为和租值的耗散。租值耗散不仅降低了矿产资源的配置和利用效率，造成资源的浪费和枯竭，而且引发了寻租腐败和社会福利损失，导致了一系列区域发展障碍问题。
本文利用产权理论、公共选择等相关理论，搭建“产权残缺—公共领域—租值耗散”的理论范式，分析矿产资源产权残缺的根源、公共域的构成以及资源开发不同环节的租值耗散问题，提出矿产资源产权与收益分配制度创新与改革的路径和策略，力图破解资源型地区的产权制度瓶颈和收益分配难题。
本文主要研究结论有：
（1）在矿产资源开发环节，由于存在排他性产权残缺和委托代理失效问题，矿产资源产权主体对具体产权的权能难以单独享有，资源开采者竞相涌入、过度开采、粗放掠夺，产生了所谓的“公地悲剧”和外部性问题，使得矿产资源应有的租值下降，生态环境负外部性损失严重，最终导致租值耗散。资源开发环节的租值耗散是一种自然财富的减少。
（2）在矿产资源出让和转让环节，由于市场体系不完善、价格传导机制不健全以及政府管制不当，资源市场客观上存在大量的“租”，以至于官员设租、企业寻租的活动时有发生。这种设租和寻租活动所耗费的成本导致非专有收入的租值耗散。资源转让环节的租值耗散是一种社会福利水平的降低。
（3）山西是煤炭大省，在多年来大规模、高强度、粗放式开发煤炭资源的过程中，不仅产生了严重的资源损耗与生态环境破坏，而且也存在寻租与腐败问题，租值耗散现象十分突出。通过资源价值损耗、外部性损失、社会福利净损失、寻租成本等指标，测度出山西煤炭资源开发过程中租值耗散较为严重，占到GDP的9%以上。
（4）针对矿产资源产权排他性残缺、转让性残缺以及收益性残缺的问题，提出优化矿产资源产权制度安排、推进矿业权交易制度改革、重构矿产资源有偿使用和权利金制度体系等制度创新路径，以协调矿业领域不同主体间的收益分配关系，降低租值耗散，实现资源开发中的总交易费用最低和资源配置最优。
本文的创新点包括：
1.在选题方面，从租值耗散的独特视角出发，将该理论创新性地应用于资源经济学的研究中，对矿产资源开发中存在的公地悲剧、外部性、寻租、垄断等问题进行理论透视、机理研究和对策探讨，属于选题创新。
2.在理论分析方面，应用产权理论与公共选择理论，研究矿产资源产权残缺的类型、公共域的构成以及租值耗散的形成机制，搭建“产权残缺—公共领域—租值耗散”的理论分析框架，并以此框架分析矿产资源开发环节与转让环节的租值耗散问题，认为在排他性产权残缺和转让性产权残缺的前提下，这两个过程中都存在巨大的租值耗散，且产权残缺的程度越强，公共领域的范围就越大，租值耗散便越严重。在一定程度上拓展了租值耗散理论研究的广度和深度，属于理论创新。
3.在研究方法与测度工具方面，通过资源价值损耗、外部性损失、社会福利损失、寻租成本等指标，测度山西煤炭资源开发转让中租值耗散的程度，从不同层面刻画矿业发展的边际收益下降和社会福利损失情况，探究资源产权安排与资源配置效率的关系，属于方法创新。
Rent dissipation, which means that the rent (or value) of the resource is reducedand even completely disappeared owing to the problem of property right arrangement,is one of important theories in current property economics. Mineral resources areexhaustible. Compared to infinite demand of human, finite supply capability of theresource initiates scare effect, which causes an abnormal profit or abnormal incomefor a long term. The Mineral resource with stable supply capacity would continuouslyproduce rent value if it was mined in measure and managed properly.Whereas it willcause reduction and waste of rent value, i.e. called “rent dissipation” issue. Eventhough it is clearly specified that mineral resource is owned by the country in China,property right attenuation issue is serious in actuality, which include ownershipbenefit of the country not be fully embodied, use right be strictly ruled and limited,cession right be controled by the government, benefit right not be equivalent to thecontrol right etc. Property right attenuation makes a large amount of mineralresources revenue and property benefit be placed into public field, which areconverted into resource rent and further cause rent seeking activity of relevant benefitbody and rent dissipation. Rent dissipation not only reduces allocation efficiency ofthe mineral resources and causes waste and depletion of resource, but also causes rentseeking, corruption and social welfare loss during resource property management,which finally causes loss of mining revenue.
This paper takes advantage of property theory, public choice theory and otherrelevant theories to set up “property rights attenuation–public field–rentdissipation” theory mode, analyze type of property attenuation of the mineralresource, constitution of public field and rent dissipation issue, and then provideinnovative way and policy of mineral resource property right and benefit allocationsystem, so as to try one’s best to solve system bottleneck and benefit allocationpuzzle in resource-based regions.
Main research conclusions in the paper include:
(1) Because of exclusive property right attenuation and invalid agencyagreement during mineral resource development, main body of the property rightcan’t fully restrain the excessive, disorder, illegal behavior of other stakeholders, andthe resource developer only considers private cost and doesn’t consider social cost,which causes called “tragedy of commons” and externalities, leading to the mineralresources rent is reduced and rent dissipation.
(2) During the course of mineral resources acquisition and transaction, themarket entrants must obtain or maintain monopolistic position throughnon-productive rent seeking activity as a result of imperfect market system andgovernment regulation. The costs which spend in the rent creation and rent seekingactivities are also one rent dissipation of non-exclusive income.
(3) Shanxi Province is rich of coal. Not only serious resource loss and ecologyenvironment destruction is produced but also there exists rent-seeking and corruptionissue during high strength, extensive and large scale coal resource development formany years, rent dissipation phenomenon is extremely outstanding. This paper judgesthat rent dissipation is very serious in Shanxi through fore indexes including resourcevalue loss, external loss, social welfare net loss, and rent seeking cost, which weremore than9%of Shanxi GDP.
(4) Property right system of mineral resources will be optimized throughdeepening property right reform of resource-based enterprises, innovating minemanagement system of the government and improving the mining right tradingmarket and so on. And on this basis we will re-constitute the paid use system, royaltysystem, and comprehensive compensation system of mineral resources, so as tocoordinate benefit allocation relationship between different bodies, reduce rentdissipation and realize total trading cost lowest and resource allocation optimum ofmining industry.
Innovation points in this paper include:
(1) There is an innovation in selecting this topic。Based on a unique viewpoint of rent dissipation, this paper have an in-depth study on many problem ofresource-based economy, including the tragedy of Commons, externality,rent-seeking and monopoly etc., and trying to seek innovation in topic selection andtheme positioning.
（2）There is a theory innovation points in the paper. Based on the study on theproperty rights attenuation, the public domain constitution and the rent dissipationconnotation of mineral resources, the paper set up inventively the theoretical analysisframework of“property attenuation–public domain–rent dissipation”. Theframework was used to study the rent dissipation problem of the mineral resourcesdevelopment links and transfer links. Because of exclusive property right attenuationand transferable property rights attenuation, there is huge rent dissipation in the twolinks. The more serious the property right attenuation, the greater the scope of publicdomain and the more serious the rent dissipation. On the other hand, the mineralresource property right reform will prompt property right more completly, step bystep to define clearly the rights of public domain, and ultimately solving the rentdissipation problems of mining industry.
（3）There is an innovation of research method. This paper measure the rentdissipation degree of shanxi coal resources development according to the fourindexes, including resources value loss, externality loss, social welfare loss, andrent-seeking cost. This paper detailed the marginal benefit descends of miningindustry and social welfare loss, and puts forward a new idea for studying theproperty right system arrangement and resources allocation.
本文利用产权理论、公共选择等相关理论，搭建“产权残缺—公共领域—租值耗散”的理论范式，分析矿产资源产权残缺的根源、公共域的构成以及资源开发不同环节的租值耗散问题，提出矿产资源产权与收益分配制度创新与改革的路径和策略，力图破解资源型地区的产权制度瓶颈和收益分配难题。
本文主要研究结论有：
（1）在矿产资源开发环节，由于存在排他性产权残缺和委托代理失效问题，矿产资源产权主体对具体产权的权能难以单独享有，资源开采者竞相涌入、过度开采、粗放掠夺，产生了所谓的“公地悲剧”和外部性问题，使得矿产资源应有的租值下降，生态环境负外部性损失严重，最终导致租值耗散。资源开发环节的租值耗散是一种自然财富的减少。
（2）在矿产资源出让和转让环节，由于市场体系不完善、价格传导机制不健全以及政府管制不当，资源市场客观上存在大量的“租”，以至于官员设租、企业寻租的活动时有发生。这种设租和寻租活动所耗费的成本导致非专有收入的租值耗散。资源转让环节的租值耗散是一种社会福利水平的降低。
（3）山西是煤炭大省，在多年来大规模、高强度、粗放式开发煤炭资源的过程中，不仅产生了严重的资源损耗与生态环境破坏，而且也存在寻租与腐败问题，租值耗散现象十分突出。通过资源价值损耗、外部性损失、社会福利净损失、寻租成本等指标，测度出山西煤炭资源开发过程中租值耗散较为严重，占到GDP的9%以上。
（4）针对矿产资源产权排他性残缺、转让性残缺以及收益性残缺的问题，提出优化矿产资源产权制度安排、推进矿业权交易制度改革、重构矿产资源有偿使用和权利金制度体系等制度创新路径，以协调矿业领域不同主体间的收益分配关系，降低租值耗散，实现资源开发中的总交易费用最低和资源配置最优。
本文的创新点包括：
1.在选题方面，从租值耗散的独特视角出发，将该理论创新性地应用于资源经济学的研究中，对矿产资源开发中存在的公地悲剧、外部性、寻租、垄断等问题进行理论透视、机理研究和对策探讨，属于选题创新。
2.在理论分析方面，应用产权理论与公共选择理论，研究矿产资源产权残缺的类型、公共域的构成以及租值耗散的形成机制，搭建“产权残缺—公共领域—租值耗散”的理论分析框架，并以此框架分析矿产资源开发环节与转让环节的租值耗散问题，认为在排他性产权残缺和转让性产权残缺的前提下，这两个过程中都存在巨大的租值耗散，且产权残缺的程度越强，公共领域的范围就越大，租值耗散便越严重。在一定程度上拓展了租值耗散理论研究的广度和深度，属于理论创新。
3.在研究方法与测度工具方面，通过资源价值损耗、外部性损失、社会福利损失、寻租成本等指标，测度山西煤炭资源开发转让中租值耗散的程度，从不同层面刻画矿业发展的边际收益下降和社会福利损失情况，探究资源产权安排与资源配置效率的关系，属于方法创新。
Rent dissipation, which means that the rent (or value) of the resource is reducedand even completely disappeared owing to the problem of property right arrangement,is one of important theories in current property economics. Mineral resources areexhaustible. Compared to infinite demand of human, finite supply capability of theresource initiates scare effect, which causes an abnormal profit or abnormal incomefor a long term. The Mineral resource with stable supply capacity would continuouslyproduce rent value if it was mined in measure and managed properly.Whereas it willcause reduction and waste of rent value, i.e. called “rent dissipation” issue. Eventhough it is clearly specified that mineral resource is owned by the country in China,property right attenuation issue is serious in actuality, which include ownershipbenefit of the country not be fully embodied, use right be strictly ruled and limited,cession right be controled by the government, benefit right not be equivalent to thecontrol right etc. Property right attenuation makes a large amount of mineralresources revenue and property benefit be placed into public field, which areconverted into resource rent and further cause rent seeking activity of relevant benefitbody and rent dissipation. Rent dissipation not only reduces allocation efficiency ofthe mineral resources and causes waste and depletion of resource, but also causes rentseeking, corruption and social welfare loss during resource property management,which finally causes loss of mining revenue.
This paper takes advantage of property theory, public choice theory and otherrelevant theories to set up “property rights attenuation–public field–rentdissipation” theory mode, analyze type of property attenuation of the mineralresource, constitution of public field and rent dissipation issue, and then provideinnovative way and policy of mineral resource property right and benefit allocationsystem, so as to try one’s best to solve system bottleneck and benefit allocationpuzzle in resource-based regions.
Main research conclusions in the paper include:
(1) Because of exclusive property right attenuation and invalid agencyagreement during mineral resource development, main body of the property rightcan’t fully restrain the excessive, disorder, illegal behavior of other stakeholders, andthe resource developer only considers private cost and doesn’t consider social cost,which causes called “tragedy of commons” and externalities, leading to the mineralresources rent is reduced and rent dissipation.
(2) During the course of mineral resources acquisition and transaction, themarket entrants must obtain or maintain monopolistic position throughnon-productive rent seeking activity as a result of imperfect market system andgovernment regulation. The costs which spend in the rent creation and rent seekingactivities are also one rent dissipation of non-exclusive income.
(3) Shanxi Province is rich of coal. Not only serious resource loss and ecologyenvironment destruction is produced but also there exists rent-seeking and corruptionissue during high strength, extensive and large scale coal resource development formany years, rent dissipation phenomenon is extremely outstanding. This paper judgesthat rent dissipation is very serious in Shanxi through fore indexes including resourcevalue loss, external loss, social welfare net loss, and rent seeking cost, which weremore than9%of Shanxi GDP.
(4) Property right system of mineral resources will be optimized throughdeepening property right reform of resource-based enterprises, innovating minemanagement system of the government and improving the mining right tradingmarket and so on. And on this basis we will re-constitute the paid use system, royaltysystem, and comprehensive compensation system of mineral resources, so as tocoordinate benefit allocation relationship between different bodies, reduce rentdissipation and realize total trading cost lowest and resource allocation optimum ofmining industry.
Innovation points in this paper include:
(1) There is an innovation in selecting this topic。Based on a unique viewpoint of rent dissipation, this paper have an in-depth study on many problem ofresource-based economy, including the tragedy of Commons, externality,rent-seeking and monopoly etc., and trying to seek innovation in topic selection andtheme positioning.
（2）There is a theory innovation points in the paper. Based on the study on theproperty rights attenuation, the public domain constitution and the rent dissipationconnotation of mineral resources, the paper set up inventively the theoretical analysisframework of“property attenuation–public domain–rent dissipation”. Theframework was used to study the rent dissipation problem of the mineral resourcesdevelopment links and transfer links. Because of exclusive property right attenuationand transferable property rights attenuation, there is huge rent dissipation in the twolinks. The more serious the property right attenuation, the greater the scope of publicdomain and the more serious the rent dissipation. On the other hand, the mineralresource property right reform will prompt property right more completly, step bystep to define clearly the rights of public domain, and ultimately solving the rentdissipation problems of mining industry.
（3）There is an innovation of research method. This paper measure the rentdissipation degree of shanxi coal resources development according to the fourindexes, including resources value loss, externality loss, social welfare loss, andrent-seeking cost. This paper detailed the marginal benefit descends of miningindustry and social welfare loss, and puts forward a new idea for studying theproperty right system arrangement and resources allocation.
引文
1袁怀雨,刘保顺,李克庆.理顺矿产资源有偿使用制度《中国地质矿产经济学会资源管理专业委员会2006年学术交流论文汇编》2006-12-01
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