CoPS创新用户与系统集成商的利益博弈：招标和激励模型模拟分析
摘要
复杂产品系统(Complex Products and Systems, CoPS)是指那些关系到国计民生、技术含量高、单件或小批量定制的产品、系统或基础设施,比如大型计算机、航空航天系统和智能交通系统等,日益成为现代经济的“技术资产骨架”,复杂产品系统的技术能力成为国家经济实力的象征。与大规模研发制造产品不同,复杂产品系统研制过程中涉及更多更复杂的利益相关者,这使得复杂产品系统项目的研制与运营难度更大,如何有效地协调各利益相关者(特别是CoPS用户和系统集成商)之间的利益博弈是复杂产品系统项目成功的关键。在此背景下,本文运用博弈论相关思想,构建模型并对模型进行模拟的方式,试图分析CoPS创新用户和系统集成商之间的利益博弈,探求消除由于信息不对称而产生的逆向选择和道德风险等现象的方法。
本文在分析相关问题研究现状的基础上,主要研究了以下几个方面的问题：
第一、对项目招标和激励进行了理论分析,探讨了项目招投标机制中涉及的博弈经济学,激励中涉及的委托代理理论,并结合招投标现实情况以及相关激励原理,提出了构建CoPS项目创新招投标模型和激励模型的相关思路。
第二、运用博弈论构建了CoPS创新项目的招投标博弈模型,该模型能很好地解决招投标人之间由于信息不对称而产生的逆向选择或者串通抬高标价而追逐超额利润的围标现象发生,通过对模型的模拟,分析了CoPS创新用户和系统集成商之间的博弈过程,参与投标的系统集成商之间的博弈过程,并探讨了相关博弈策略。
第三、运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论构建了CoPS创新用户对系统集成商的激励模型,并利用Lingo10数学软件和Excel.2003对非线性最优化问题进行定量模拟,探讨了系统集成商的创新风险规避度和创新产出方差对系统集成商的最优努力水平、CoPS创新用户的激励成本和总代理成本以及他们各自创新增加收益的影响等,并提出了相关管理建议。
本文主要研究发现有：CoPS项目招投标市场属于双头寡头竞争招标市场；CoPS创新用户选择系统集成商时不应只关注报价,而应综合考察系统集成商各方面的能力,选择使CoPS创新用户未来收益最大的系统集成商中标；系统集成商在投标时可以通过调整成本或报价等策略来赢得标的；在CoPS项目创新过程中,为激励系统集成商努力工作,需要设计合适的激励机制,同时,由于CoPS项目创新的复杂性等特点,CoPS创新用户在设计激励机制时,一定要考查系统集成商的创新风险规避度以及创新产出成果方差对激励效果的影响,CoPS项目创新用户和系统集成商共同推动CoPS项目创新的成功。
Complex Products and Systems (CoPS) is one of the typical representative of the importance of emerged. The so-called complex systems products are those related to the high technology, single or small quantities of customized products, systems or infrastructure, such as large-scale computer, aerospace systems, intelligent transport systems and other capital goods. CoPS are increasingly becoming a modern economy "technology backbone" and the technological complexity of products is to become the symbol of the country's economic strength. In addition, large-scale R & D and manufacturing products with different and complex product development process involved in more complex stakeholders, which makes complex products system project more difficult, how to effectively coordinate the benefit game among the stakeholders (especially between CoPS user and system integrator) is the key to core of the success of the CoPS project. In this context, based on the idea of the game theory, the paper attempted to explore the benefit game between CoPS user and system integrator.
The research work done by the author was illustrated as below:
1. The project bidding and incentives is analyzed theoretically, the paper explores the game economics which involved in the project bidding game mechanism, the principal-agent theory which involved in the project incentives, and combines with the realities of bidding and tendering and related incentive principle, offers some ideas how to build CoPS project innovation bidding and incentives models, explores such methods to eliminate the phenomena which arises from adverse selection and moral hazard.
2. This paper builds the CoPS innovation project bidding game model with the game theory which can solve the phenomenon of adverse selection or pursuing excess profit by colluding to raise the price which posed by information asymmetry, analyzes the game process between CoPS user and system integrator and among the system integrators by simulating the model, and explore some related game strategy.
3. This paper builds the incentives model of CoPS User to System Integrator with the principal-agent theory of information economics, and makes use of Lingo 10 mathematical software and Excel.2003 to simulate the nonlinear optimization problem by quantitative approach, explores the innovation risk reliability of the system integrators and innovation output variance how to influence the optimal effort level of the system integrator、the incentive costs and agent costs of CoPS innovation user, and innovation increase revenue, and put forward relevant management recommendations.
The main finds of this paper:the bidding market of CoPS project is the two-headed competitive bidding oligopoly market; the CoPS innovative user should not only concerned about pricing when you select the system integrator, but study all aspects of system integrators comprehensively, chooses the system integrator who enables the CoPS user to obtain the maximum benefit; in order to encourage system integrator to work hard in the process of CoPS project innovation, the CoPS user need to design an appropriate incentive mechanism, at the same time, due to the complexity characteristic of CoPS innovation, the CoPS user should examine the effect between innovation risk aversion or variance of system integrator and the incentive outputs, Both CoPS project innovation user and system integrator promote CoPS project innovation to success jointly.
本文在分析相关问题研究现状的基础上,主要研究了以下几个方面的问题：
第一、对项目招标和激励进行了理论分析,探讨了项目招投标机制中涉及的博弈经济学,激励中涉及的委托代理理论,并结合招投标现实情况以及相关激励原理,提出了构建CoPS项目创新招投标模型和激励模型的相关思路。
第二、运用博弈论构建了CoPS创新项目的招投标博弈模型,该模型能很好地解决招投标人之间由于信息不对称而产生的逆向选择或者串通抬高标价而追逐超额利润的围标现象发生,通过对模型的模拟,分析了CoPS创新用户和系统集成商之间的博弈过程,参与投标的系统集成商之间的博弈过程,并探讨了相关博弈策略。
第三、运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论构建了CoPS创新用户对系统集成商的激励模型,并利用Lingo10数学软件和Excel.2003对非线性最优化问题进行定量模拟,探讨了系统集成商的创新风险规避度和创新产出方差对系统集成商的最优努力水平、CoPS创新用户的激励成本和总代理成本以及他们各自创新增加收益的影响等,并提出了相关管理建议。
本文主要研究发现有：CoPS项目招投标市场属于双头寡头竞争招标市场；CoPS创新用户选择系统集成商时不应只关注报价,而应综合考察系统集成商各方面的能力,选择使CoPS创新用户未来收益最大的系统集成商中标；系统集成商在投标时可以通过调整成本或报价等策略来赢得标的；在CoPS项目创新过程中,为激励系统集成商努力工作,需要设计合适的激励机制,同时,由于CoPS项目创新的复杂性等特点,CoPS创新用户在设计激励机制时,一定要考查系统集成商的创新风险规避度以及创新产出成果方差对激励效果的影响,CoPS项目创新用户和系统集成商共同推动CoPS项目创新的成功。
Complex Products and Systems (CoPS) is one of the typical representative of the importance of emerged. The so-called complex systems products are those related to the high technology, single or small quantities of customized products, systems or infrastructure, such as large-scale computer, aerospace systems, intelligent transport systems and other capital goods. CoPS are increasingly becoming a modern economy "technology backbone" and the technological complexity of products is to become the symbol of the country's economic strength. In addition, large-scale R & D and manufacturing products with different and complex product development process involved in more complex stakeholders, which makes complex products system project more difficult, how to effectively coordinate the benefit game among the stakeholders (especially between CoPS user and system integrator) is the key to core of the success of the CoPS project. In this context, based on the idea of the game theory, the paper attempted to explore the benefit game between CoPS user and system integrator.
The research work done by the author was illustrated as below:
1. The project bidding and incentives is analyzed theoretically, the paper explores the game economics which involved in the project bidding game mechanism, the principal-agent theory which involved in the project incentives, and combines with the realities of bidding and tendering and related incentive principle, offers some ideas how to build CoPS project innovation bidding and incentives models, explores such methods to eliminate the phenomena which arises from adverse selection and moral hazard.
2. This paper builds the CoPS innovation project bidding game model with the game theory which can solve the phenomenon of adverse selection or pursuing excess profit by colluding to raise the price which posed by information asymmetry, analyzes the game process between CoPS user and system integrator and among the system integrators by simulating the model, and explore some related game strategy.
3. This paper builds the incentives model of CoPS User to System Integrator with the principal-agent theory of information economics, and makes use of Lingo 10 mathematical software and Excel.2003 to simulate the nonlinear optimization problem by quantitative approach, explores the innovation risk reliability of the system integrators and innovation output variance how to influence the optimal effort level of the system integrator、the incentive costs and agent costs of CoPS innovation user, and innovation increase revenue, and put forward relevant management recommendations.
The main finds of this paper:the bidding market of CoPS project is the two-headed competitive bidding oligopoly market; the CoPS innovative user should not only concerned about pricing when you select the system integrator, but study all aspects of system integrators comprehensively, chooses the system integrator who enables the CoPS user to obtain the maximum benefit; in order to encourage system integrator to work hard in the process of CoPS project innovation, the CoPS user need to design an appropriate incentive mechanism, at the same time, due to the complexity characteristic of CoPS innovation, the CoPS user should examine the effect between innovation risk aversion or variance of system integrator and the incentive outputs, Both CoPS project innovation user and system integrator promote CoPS project innovation to success jointly.
引文
③MBA必修核心课程编译组,人力资源：组织和人事,中国国际广播出版社,1997年8月,P332
④维克.弗罗姆,《工作与激励》,1964年
[1]R.爱德华.弗里曼.战略管理：利益相关者方法[M].上海：上海译文出版社,1984/2006.
[2]贝尔纳.萨拉尼耶著,费方域等译.合同经济学[M].上海财经大学出版社,2008,7.
[3]陈劲,童亮.集知创新——企业复杂产品系统创新之路[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2004.
[4]陈劲,童亮等.复杂产品系统创新的知识管理：以GX公司为例[J].科研管理,2005,9.
[5]高鸿业.西方经济学(微观部分)[M].中国人民大学出版社,2005,8.
[6]冯根福.双重委托代理理论：上市公司治理的另一种分析框架[J].经济研究,2004,12.
[7]桂彬旺.基于模块化的复杂产品系统创新因素与作用路径研究[D].浙江大学,2006.
[8]韩伯棠,艾凤义.不对称条件下双寡头横向R&D合作[J].现代管理科学,2004,(2)：3-4.
[9]何军耀等.努力水平：基金管理人内因核心行为分析[J].系统工程,2005,23(5)：89-93.
[10]洪远朋等.经济利益关系通论[M].复旦大学出版社,1999.
[11]侯光明等.管理博弈论[M].北京理工大学,2005.
[12]Edwin Mansfield著,黄险峰等译.微观经济学(第九版)[M].中国人民大学,1997/2003.
[13]胡婉丽等.合作创新三阶段博弈模型[J].2004,13(5)：71-75.
[14]胡文发.工程招投标与案例[M].化学工业出版社,2008,3.
[15]江伟.工程项目管理中信息不对称的对策研究[D].华北电力大学,2003.
[16]李洪波等.垄断产品链中革新合作机制的研究[J].系统工程学报,2005,20(1)：98-103.
[17]李军.权力与利益—权力学研究中的重要课题[J].北京市政法管理干部学院学报,2003.
[18]刘德铭.对策论及其应用[M].国防科技大学出版社,1994.
[19]刘兵等.企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2000,6：50-53.
[20]卢纪华等.基于技术开发项目的虚拟企业利益分配机制研究[J].中国管理科学.2003.10.
[21]罗炜,唐元虎.国内外合作创新研究述评[J].科学管理研究,2000,18(4)
[22]尼科斯·波朗查斯.政治权力与社会阶级[M].中国社会科学出版社,1982,11.
[23]秦旋.招投标机制及最低价中标法的经济学分析[J].武汉理工大学学报,2007,6.
[24]盛亚等.利益相关者与企业技术创新绩效关系[J].科研管理,2008,11.
[25]盛亚.企业技术创新管理——利益相关者方法[M].光明日报出版社,2009.
[26]盛亚,单航英,陶锐.基于利益相关者的企业创新管理模式[J].科学学研究,2007.
[27]陶锐CoPS创新项目系统集成商的利益相关者影响机制[D].浙江工商大学,2007.
[28]童亮.基于跨组织合作联结的复杂产品系统创新知识管理机制研究[D].浙江大学,2006.
[29]徐臻,王理平.技术溢出对创新模式选择的影响[J].上海管理科学.2005.1.
[30]徐新等.委托-代理问题中信息对称情况下自然状态对最优契约的影响研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2000,11：62-66.
[31]杨东升等.校企合作创新方式选择的博弈分析[J].科研管理,2008,10.
[32]杨志刚,吴贵生.复杂产品技术能力成长的路径依赖——以我国通信设备制造业为例[J].科研管理,2003(6)：13-20.
[33]尹宝兴.复杂产品系统创新的利益相关者分析[D].浙江工商大学,2008.
[34]尹碧涛,赵付民.基于价值链的RJV合作创新经济分析[J].技术经济与管理研究.2006.2.
[35]俞冠军等.政府投资工程中的项目文化建设探讨[J].基建优化,2005,8.
[36]于维生等.博弈论及其在经济管理中的应用[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2005.
[37]原毅军等.技术关联下生产性服务业与制造业研发博弈[J].中国工业经济,2007,11.
[38]约瑟夫.阿.熊彼特.经济发展理论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1990.
[39]詹美求等.校企合作创新利益分配问题的博弈分析[J].科研管理,2008,1.
[40]张迪.论公共权力与利益的关系[J].云南社会科学,2003.
[41]张波.横向Bertrand垄断竞争下的供应链需求信息纵向共享博弈[J].上海交通大学学报,2008,9.
[42]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联出版社,1996.
[43]张屹山,金成晓.真实的经济过程：利益竞争与权力博弈[J].社会科学战线,2004.
[44]赵黎明等.改进的双目标Friedman竞标模型[J].北京理工大学学报,2007,4.
[45]赵小惠等.制造商-供应商协同产品创新合作机制研究[J].工业工程,2005,8.
[46]钟胜.供应链合作投资上游企业R&D研究[J].商业经济与管理,2006,17 8(8)：52-56.
[47]Brod A, Shivakumar R.Advantageous semi-collusion[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1999,47(2):22 1-230.
[48]Chatterjee, K. and W. Samuelson. Bargaining under Incomplete Information [J]. Operations Research,1983,31:835-851.
[49]D. Aspremont, C. Jacquemm, A. Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in duopoly with
spillovers[J]. American Economic Review,1988,78(5):1133-1137.
[50]Elias, A. A. R. Y. Cavana and L. S Jackson. Stakeholder analysis for innovation project management [J]. Innovation Management.2002,32 (4):301-310.
[51]Friedman L. A Competitive bidding strategy [J]. Operations Research,1956,4(1):104-112.
[52]Freeman, C. The Economics of Industrial Innovation,2nd ed. [M].Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1982.
[53]Gann, D.& Salter, A. Innovation in project - based, service - enhanced firms:the construction of comlex products and systems [J]. Research Policy.2000,29:955-972.
[54]Gann, D., A. Salter. Learning and innovation management in project-based, service-enhanced firms [J].International Journal of Innovation Management,1998.2(4):431-454.
[55]Gates M.Bidding strategies and probabilities [J].Journal of the Construction Division, American Society of Civil Engineering,1967,67(1).
[56]Harsanvi. J. Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players Part III and III[J]. Management Science.1967(14):159-182,320-334,486-502.
[57]Hart, O. and B. Holmstrom, "Theory of Contracts", in Advances in Economic Theory:Fifth World Congress [M]. edited by T. Bewley, Cambridge University Press,1987.
[58]Hinloopen, J. Subsidizing R&D Cooperatives[J]. De Economist,2001,149(3):313-345.
[59]Hobday, M. Product complexity, innovation and industrial organization[J]. Research Policy, 1998,26:698-710.
[60]Hobday, M.& Rush H. Technology Management in Complex Product Systems (CoPS):Ten Questions Answered [J].International Journal of Technology Management.1999,17:618-638.
[61]Hobday M. Complex System vs. Mass Production Industries:A New Innovation Research Agenda. Paper prepared for CENTRIM/SPRU/OU Project on Complex Product Systems. EPSRC Technology Management Initiative, GR/k/31756,1996.
[62]Hobday, M. The project-based organization:an ideal form for managing complex products and systems [J].Research Policy,2000.29:871-893.
[63]Holmstrom, B. Moral Hazard and Observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economics 1979, 10:74-91.
[64]Kamien, Morton, Muller, Eitan, Zang, Israel. Research joint ventures and R&D cartels [J]. American Economic Review,1992,82(5):1293-1307.
[65]Kash, D.E.& Rycroft, R, W. Emerging patterns of complex technological innovation [J].Technological Forecasting and Social Change,2002,69(6):581-606.
[66]Miller R, Hobday M, Leroux-Demers T., and Olleros X., "Innovation in Complex Systems Industries:the Case of Flight Simulation"[J]. Industrial and Corporate Change,1995, Vol.4 No.2pp:363-400.
[67]Miller, W. L... A broader mission of R&D [J]. Research Technology Management.1995,38 (6):24-36.
[68]Mirrlees, J. Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty. Amsterdam: North-Holland.1974:p12-pl23.
[69]Mitchell R, Agle B. and Wood D... Towards a theory of stakeholder identification and salience:Defining the Principle of who and what really counts [J]. Academy of Management Review.1997.22 (4):853-886.
[70]Myerson, R. and M. Satterthwaite:Efficient Mechanisms of Bilateral Trading [J].Journal of Economic Theory,1983,28:265-281.
[71]Nash, J. Equilibrium Points in n-Person games[J]. Proceedings of the national Academy of Sciences,1950(36):48-49.
[72]Petit Maria Luisa, Tolwinski Boleslaw. R&D cooperation or competition [J]. European Economic Review,1998,43:185-208.
[73]Petit M L, Sanna-Randaccio F.Endogenous R&D and foreign direct investment in international oligopolies[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000, 18(2):339-367.
[74]Phillip G Bradford, Sunju Park, Michael H. Rothkopf. protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic vickrey auctions[J]. rutcor research report.2004,3:1-12..
[75]Powell, W. Hybrid organizational arrangements:new form or transitional development [J].California Management Review.1987,30:67-87.
[76]Romer, P M. Endogenous Technological Change [J]. Journal of Political Economy, Part H, 1990:71-102.
[77]Ross, S., The Economic Theory of Agency:The Principal's Problem[J], American Economic Review,1973,63:134-139.
[78]Schelling, T. The strategy of Conflict[M]. Boston:Harvard University Press,1960:p3.
[79]Selten, R. The Chain-Store Paradox[J]. Theory and Decision.1978(9):127-129.
[80]Shapley L S, Shubik. A method for evaluating the distribution of power in committee system[J]. The American Political Science Review,1954(48),787-792..
[81]Sobrero, M.& Roberts E.B. Strategic management of supplier-manufacturer relations in new product development [J]. Research Policy.2002,31:159-182..
[82]Spence, M. and R. Zechhauser, Insurance, Information and Individual Action [J]. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings),1971,61:380-387.
[83]Spence, A. Job Market Signaling[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1974(87):355-374.
[84]William J. Baumol. Pareto Optimal Size of Innovation Spillovers [J]. Princeton University Discussion paper,1999.
④维克.弗罗姆,《工作与激励》,1964年
[1]R.爱德华.弗里曼.战略管理：利益相关者方法[M].上海：上海译文出版社,1984/2006.
[2]贝尔纳.萨拉尼耶著,费方域等译.合同经济学[M].上海财经大学出版社,2008,7.
[3]陈劲,童亮.集知创新——企业复杂产品系统创新之路[M].北京：知识产权出版社,2004.
[4]陈劲,童亮等.复杂产品系统创新的知识管理：以GX公司为例[J].科研管理,2005,9.
[5]高鸿业.西方经济学(微观部分)[M].中国人民大学出版社,2005,8.
[6]冯根福.双重委托代理理论：上市公司治理的另一种分析框架[J].经济研究,2004,12.
[7]桂彬旺.基于模块化的复杂产品系统创新因素与作用路径研究[D].浙江大学,2006.
[8]韩伯棠,艾凤义.不对称条件下双寡头横向R&D合作[J].现代管理科学,2004,(2)：3-4.
[9]何军耀等.努力水平：基金管理人内因核心行为分析[J].系统工程,2005,23(5)：89-93.
[10]洪远朋等.经济利益关系通论[M].复旦大学出版社,1999.
[11]侯光明等.管理博弈论[M].北京理工大学,2005.
[12]Edwin Mansfield著,黄险峰等译.微观经济学(第九版)[M].中国人民大学,1997/2003.
[13]胡婉丽等.合作创新三阶段博弈模型[J].2004,13(5)：71-75.
[14]胡文发.工程招投标与案例[M].化学工业出版社,2008,3.
[15]江伟.工程项目管理中信息不对称的对策研究[D].华北电力大学,2003.
[16]李洪波等.垄断产品链中革新合作机制的研究[J].系统工程学报,2005,20(1)：98-103.
[17]李军.权力与利益—权力学研究中的重要课题[J].北京市政法管理干部学院学报,2003.
[18]刘德铭.对策论及其应用[M].国防科技大学出版社,1994.
[19]刘兵等.企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2000,6：50-53.
[20]卢纪华等.基于技术开发项目的虚拟企业利益分配机制研究[J].中国管理科学.2003.10.
[21]罗炜,唐元虎.国内外合作创新研究述评[J].科学管理研究,2000,18(4)
[22]尼科斯·波朗查斯.政治权力与社会阶级[M].中国社会科学出版社,1982,11.
[23]秦旋.招投标机制及最低价中标法的经济学分析[J].武汉理工大学学报,2007,6.
[24]盛亚等.利益相关者与企业技术创新绩效关系[J].科研管理,2008,11.
[25]盛亚.企业技术创新管理——利益相关者方法[M].光明日报出版社,2009.
[26]盛亚,单航英,陶锐.基于利益相关者的企业创新管理模式[J].科学学研究,2007.
[27]陶锐CoPS创新项目系统集成商的利益相关者影响机制[D].浙江工商大学,2007.
[28]童亮.基于跨组织合作联结的复杂产品系统创新知识管理机制研究[D].浙江大学,2006.
[29]徐臻,王理平.技术溢出对创新模式选择的影响[J].上海管理科学.2005.1.
[30]徐新等.委托-代理问题中信息对称情况下自然状态对最优契约的影响研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2000,11：62-66.
[31]杨东升等.校企合作创新方式选择的博弈分析[J].科研管理,2008,10.
[32]杨志刚,吴贵生.复杂产品技术能力成长的路径依赖——以我国通信设备制造业为例[J].科研管理,2003(6)：13-20.
[33]尹宝兴.复杂产品系统创新的利益相关者分析[D].浙江工商大学,2008.
[34]尹碧涛,赵付民.基于价值链的RJV合作创新经济分析[J].技术经济与管理研究.2006.2.
[35]俞冠军等.政府投资工程中的项目文化建设探讨[J].基建优化,2005,8.
[36]于维生等.博弈论及其在经济管理中的应用[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2005.
[37]原毅军等.技术关联下生产性服务业与制造业研发博弈[J].中国工业经济,2007,11.
[38]约瑟夫.阿.熊彼特.经济发展理论[M].北京：商务印书馆,1990.
[39]詹美求等.校企合作创新利益分配问题的博弈分析[J].科研管理,2008,1.
[40]张迪.论公共权力与利益的关系[J].云南社会科学,2003.
[41]张波.横向Bertrand垄断竞争下的供应链需求信息纵向共享博弈[J].上海交通大学学报,2008,9.
[42]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联出版社,1996.
[43]张屹山,金成晓.真实的经济过程：利益竞争与权力博弈[J].社会科学战线,2004.
[44]赵黎明等.改进的双目标Friedman竞标模型[J].北京理工大学学报,2007,4.
[45]赵小惠等.制造商-供应商协同产品创新合作机制研究[J].工业工程,2005,8.
[46]钟胜.供应链合作投资上游企业R&D研究[J].商业经济与管理,2006,17 8(8)：52-56.
[47]Brod A, Shivakumar R.Advantageous semi-collusion[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1999,47(2):22 1-230.
[48]Chatterjee, K. and W. Samuelson. Bargaining under Incomplete Information [J]. Operations Research,1983,31:835-851.
[49]D. Aspremont, C. Jacquemm, A. Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in duopoly with
spillovers[J]. American Economic Review,1988,78(5):1133-1137.
[50]Elias, A. A. R. Y. Cavana and L. S Jackson. Stakeholder analysis for innovation project management [J]. Innovation Management.2002,32 (4):301-310.
[51]Friedman L. A Competitive bidding strategy [J]. Operations Research,1956,4(1):104-112.
[52]Freeman, C. The Economics of Industrial Innovation,2nd ed. [M].Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1982.
[53]Gann, D.& Salter, A. Innovation in project - based, service - enhanced firms:the construction of comlex products and systems [J]. Research Policy.2000,29:955-972.
[54]Gann, D., A. Salter. Learning and innovation management in project-based, service-enhanced firms [J].International Journal of Innovation Management,1998.2(4):431-454.
[55]Gates M.Bidding strategies and probabilities [J].Journal of the Construction Division, American Society of Civil Engineering,1967,67(1).
[56]Harsanvi. J. Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players Part III and III[J]. Management Science.1967(14):159-182,320-334,486-502.
[57]Hart, O. and B. Holmstrom, "Theory of Contracts", in Advances in Economic Theory:Fifth World Congress [M]. edited by T. Bewley, Cambridge University Press,1987.
[58]Hinloopen, J. Subsidizing R&D Cooperatives[J]. De Economist,2001,149(3):313-345.
[59]Hobday, M. Product complexity, innovation and industrial organization[J]. Research Policy, 1998,26:698-710.
[60]Hobday, M.& Rush H. Technology Management in Complex Product Systems (CoPS):Ten Questions Answered [J].International Journal of Technology Management.1999,17:618-638.
[61]Hobday M. Complex System vs. Mass Production Industries:A New Innovation Research Agenda. Paper prepared for CENTRIM/SPRU/OU Project on Complex Product Systems. EPSRC Technology Management Initiative, GR/k/31756,1996.
[62]Hobday, M. The project-based organization:an ideal form for managing complex products and systems [J].Research Policy,2000.29:871-893.
[63]Holmstrom, B. Moral Hazard and Observability[J]. Bell Journal of Economics 1979, 10:74-91.
[64]Kamien, Morton, Muller, Eitan, Zang, Israel. Research joint ventures and R&D cartels [J]. American Economic Review,1992,82(5):1293-1307.
[65]Kash, D.E.& Rycroft, R, W. Emerging patterns of complex technological innovation [J].Technological Forecasting and Social Change,2002,69(6):581-606.
[66]Miller R, Hobday M, Leroux-Demers T., and Olleros X., "Innovation in Complex Systems Industries:the Case of Flight Simulation"[J]. Industrial and Corporate Change,1995, Vol.4 No.2pp:363-400.
[67]Miller, W. L... A broader mission of R&D [J]. Research Technology Management.1995,38 (6):24-36.
[68]Mirrlees, J. Notes on Welfare Economics, Information and Uncertainty. Amsterdam: North-Holland.1974:p12-pl23.
[69]Mitchell R, Agle B. and Wood D... Towards a theory of stakeholder identification and salience:Defining the Principle of who and what really counts [J]. Academy of Management Review.1997.22 (4):853-886.
[70]Myerson, R. and M. Satterthwaite:Efficient Mechanisms of Bilateral Trading [J].Journal of Economic Theory,1983,28:265-281.
[71]Nash, J. Equilibrium Points in n-Person games[J]. Proceedings of the national Academy of Sciences,1950(36):48-49.
[72]Petit Maria Luisa, Tolwinski Boleslaw. R&D cooperation or competition [J]. European Economic Review,1998,43:185-208.
[73]Petit M L, Sanna-Randaccio F.Endogenous R&D and foreign direct investment in international oligopolies[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000, 18(2):339-367.
[74]Phillip G Bradford, Sunju Park, Michael H. Rothkopf. protocol completion incentive problems in cryptographic vickrey auctions[J]. rutcor research report.2004,3:1-12..
[75]Powell, W. Hybrid organizational arrangements:new form or transitional development [J].California Management Review.1987,30:67-87.
[76]Romer, P M. Endogenous Technological Change [J]. Journal of Political Economy, Part H, 1990:71-102.
[77]Ross, S., The Economic Theory of Agency:The Principal's Problem[J], American Economic Review,1973,63:134-139.
[78]Schelling, T. The strategy of Conflict[M]. Boston:Harvard University Press,1960:p3.
[79]Selten, R. The Chain-Store Paradox[J]. Theory and Decision.1978(9):127-129.
[80]Shapley L S, Shubik. A method for evaluating the distribution of power in committee system[J]. The American Political Science Review,1954(48),787-792..
[81]Sobrero, M.& Roberts E.B. Strategic management of supplier-manufacturer relations in new product development [J]. Research Policy.2002,31:159-182..
[82]Spence, M. and R. Zechhauser, Insurance, Information and Individual Action [J]. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings),1971,61:380-387.
[83]Spence, A. Job Market Signaling[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1974(87):355-374.
[84]William J. Baumol. Pareto Optimal Size of Innovation Spillovers [J]. Princeton University Discussion paper,1999.