国有控股、高管权力与薪酬激励
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摘要
近年来国有控股上市公司高管薪酬迅速增加,高管薪酬与业绩的倒挂现象频现,使国企高管薪酬成为大众关注的焦点。解释高管薪酬的主流理论为最优契约理论,认为有效的薪酬契约安排可以使高管按股东利益行事,然而现实与经验研究并没有很好证实这一点,对于此,管理权力理论认为高管有能力影响董事会,从而影响自己的薪酬契约,高管权力越大其操纵自身薪酬的能力就越强。国有控股公司特殊的制度背景赋予了高管极大的权力,国企高管薪酬乱象是否与高管权力相关呢?基于此,本文以国有控股上市公司为样本,在对高管权力界定的基础上,运用实证研究的方法,研究高管权力对高管薪酬的影响。
一、研究内容
研究主要内容包括：(1)确立研究的逻辑起点。通过对高管薪酬激励的“最优契约理论”与“管理权力理论”的回顾,明确了高管可能通过其权力影响针对自己的薪酬契约,从而使薪酬契约成为代理问题的一部分,确立了研究的逻辑起点。(2)制度背景与理论分析。在对国有企业高管薪酬激励制度背景考察基础上,探讨了国企高管权力的形成,并分析了国企高管权力对薪酬激励的影响,为后续研究提供依据。(3)高管权力对货币薪酬的影响。界定高管权力的基础上,运用实证研究方法,分析了高管权力对货币薪酬、薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,并对高管权力对业绩影响进行探讨。(4)高管权力对在职消费的影响。回顾在职消费相关理论基础上,实证检验高管权力对在职消费的影响,进一步分析了在职消费对业绩的影响,以判断在职消费为激励效应还是权力寻租。(5)高管权力对股权激励的影响。在分析股权激励理论的基础上,首先对股权激励进行描述统计,然后深入股权激励条款,运用logistic回归模型,实证检验高管权力对股权激励方案选择的影响。
二、主要结论
(1)现行的制度环境赋予国有控股公司高管极大的权力。我国国有企业改革的过程,实际上就是控制权不断下放给企业高管的过程。国有控股上市公司存在“一股独大”的现象,这种制度安排使股东大会功能弱化,董事会掌控在大股东手中,作为股东代言人的高管具有极大的权力,加之国有产权的虚拟化以及信息的不对称,对公司高管的监督形同虚设,此外,上市公司治理结构不合理、资本市场的不完善等因素,使得高管权力不受约束。
(2)国有控股公司高管利用权力获取高额的货币薪酬,降低了薪酬-业绩敏感性,削弱了薪酬激励的有效性。高管权力对薪酬影响的实证结果表明：高管权力与高管薪酬正相关,权力越大的高管其货币薪酬也就越高；高管利用管理权力降低薪酬业绩的相关性,权力大的高管薪酬对业绩不敏感；高管权力大的企业,高管薪酬对盈利业绩的敏感性高于对亏损业绩的敏感性；权力大的企业,高管薪酬对上升业绩的敏感性高于对下降业绩的敏感性。薪酬激励的有效性受到了考验,扭曲了激励效果。研究结果还表明国有控股公司的高管可能利用权力自定薪酬,通过对不同权力企业的业绩比较,却并不能证明权力大的企业具有更好的业绩,说明高管薪酬没能有效的解决代理问题,反而成为了代理问题的一部分。
(3)国有控股公司高管利用权力获取过度在职消费,在职消费与货币薪酬无替代关系。高管权力对在职消费影响的实证结果表明：高管权力对在职消费具有显著正的影响,说明高管权力越大,在职消费越高；高管货币薪酬与在职消费正相关,没能证明在职消费与货币薪酬之间的替代关系。进一步研究表明,在职消费与企业业绩负相关,说明在职消费对高管不是一种控制权的补偿激励,而是高管利用权力侵害股东利益的一种方式。
(4)国有控股公司股权激励的激励性不足,高管利用权力通过股权激励谋利。通过国有控股上市公司2006-2010年通过股权激励方案的分析表明：股权激励方案总体上激励期限较短、行权条件不高,更多体现为福利性质而不是激励性质；权力大的高管更可能让公司通过一个福利性的股权激励方案,说明高管利用自身权力通过股权激励为自己谋取私利。
(5)国有控股公司高管权力使薪酬契约不仅没有有效的解决代理问题,反而成为代理问题的一部分。实证结果表明高管权力越大,其货币薪酬与在职消费越高,更易获得福利性的股权激励,薪酬对业绩越不敏感,说明高管利用权力为自己谋取私利并扭曲了薪酬激励效果。另一方面,虽然业绩与薪酬具有正相关性,但在职消费与业绩负相关,且没有发现高管权力大的企业具有更好的业绩,说明高管权力使薪酬没能有效的解决代理问题,反而成为了代理问题的一部分。
为了能有效激励国有控股公司高管,应当重构激励相容的薪酬激励契约,完善公司治理制度,健全市场约束机制。
三、创新之处
(1)结合国有控股上市公司这个特殊群体,基于管理权力的研究视角,较为系统探讨了国企高管薪酬激励问题。管理权力理论不再认为董事会完全受托于股东,认为高管有能力也有动机影响董事会,进而影响高管薪酬契约。国有企业特殊的制度背景,使国企高管具有极大的权力,这给管理权力理论检验提供了良好的条件。基于此,较为系统地经验检验了高管权力对货币薪酬、薪酬业绩敏感性、在职消费与股权激励的影响。
(2)把公司董事长作为高管团队代表,并引入个人特征来反映高管权力,研究高管权力对薪酬的影响。国有控股上市中,领薪董事长相当于国外公司的CEO,以董事长作为高管团队代表,能更准确反映高管权力对薪酬的影响。此外,手工收集任职年限等指标来衡量管理权力。
(3)基于国有控股上市公司特殊制度背景,不仅考察高管权力对薪酬激励的影响,还探讨了高管权力以及薪酬激励对绩效的影响,进而提出国企高管薪酬契约没能有效的解决代理问题,薪酬契约本身反成为代理问题的一部分,经验检验了高管权力是导致薪酬契约本身成为代理问题的原因。
In recent years, executive compensation is increased rapidly in the state-owned listed companies, which becomes a controversial topic in the public. The contractual arrangements could make executives act in the interests of shareholders as optional contracting approach, while the reality and empirical studies don't confirm it. Managerial power approach suggests that executives have ability to influence the board, thus executives could affect the pay contract. Power executives could manipulate their pay contract. Executives are powerful in chinese stated-owned listed companies as the special system, is the Phenomenon that paying for worse performance associated with it? Basing on managerial power approach, using the date of the state-owned listed companies in china, this paper examines empirically the impact of executive power on compensation.
1. Research contents
The main contents of this paper as follows:(1) Establishing the logical starting point of this study. By reviewing the optional contracting approach and managerial power approach, we suggest that executives could influence the compensation contract by their power, which act as the logical starting point of this study.(2) The analysis of institution and theory. Based on the analysis of compensation institution and resources of managerial power, we study the impacts of executive power on compensation contract, which provides the basis for following study.(3) The impact of executive power to the monetary compensation. Using regression analysis, we study the impacts of executive power on executive compensation, pay-performance sensitivity and company performance.(4) The impact of executive power on perks. Based on reviewing the theory of perks, this paper examines empirically the impacts of executive power to perks and the impacts of perks to company performance.(5) The impact of executive power on stock option. Based on the analysis of stock option, firstly we make descriptive statistical analysis to stock option, and then examine empirically the impacts of executive power to the stock option by the logistic regression model.
2. Important conclusions
(1) Executives are powerful in chinese stated-owned listed companies under the institutional environment. The reform of state-owned enterprises delegates the control to executives. There is a dominant shareholder in the state-owned listed companies, which reduces the utility of the general meeting of shareholders. So the board is controlled by the major shareholder, executives who are the agent of the major shareholder have great power. In addition, the worse corporate governance in the state-owned listed companies and the capital market being not perfect makes the executives unconstrained.
(2) Executives get high monetary compensation and reduce pay-performance sensitivity by their power in stated-owned listed companies. Study the impacts of executive power on executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity, this paper suggests the following conclusions:executive power has a significant positive impact on compensation, the higher salaries are associated with powerful executives; executive power reduces pay-performance sensitivity, the salaries aren't sensitivity to companies' performance in which executives have more power; in the companies that executives have more power, executive salaries are more sensitivity to the profit than the loss, and are more sensitivity to the creasing performance than the reducing performance. The results show that executives in state-owned companies have power to affect the compensation contract. Comparing the performance of companies which executives have different power, there aren't evidences that suggest more power leading to better performance. That indicates executive pay be not the way to solve the agency problem between executives and shareholders, become the part of the agency problem.
(3) Executives in the state-owned listed companies take excessive perks. Perks are positive relation to the Executive compensation. This paper examines empirically the impact of executive power to perks, our findings suggest that executive power has a significant positive impact on perks, and there aren't evidences suggesting perks substitute to salary. Further study suggests that perks has a significant negative impact on corporate performance. That indicates perks aren't effective incentives to executive, and perks are the symbolize that power executives taking interests of shareholders.
(4) Stock option isn't incentive to the executives in the state-owned listed companies. Powerful executives take interests of shareholders by stock option. Using the date2006to2010of the state-owned listed companies in china, this paper examines empirically the affect of stock option. Our findings suggest that stock option affecting to executive is welfare rather than incentive. By the logistic regression analysis, our findings suggest power executive may receive a welfare stock option contract. That indicates that executives take interests of shareholder by their power.
(5)Executive compensation contract doesn't effectively solve the agency problem, instead becomes the part of the agency problem. The empirical results show that powerful executives have higher compensation, more perks, welfare stock option, and less sensitivity of pay-performance. On the other hand, although executive compensation is positively related to company performance, perks are negatively related to company performance, executive power isn't relevant to company performance. This suggests that executives affect the incentive contracts by their power, which makes incentive contracts not solve the agency problem between executives and shareholders, while incentive contracts become the part of the agency problem.
In order to effectively incentive executives, we should reconstruct incentive mechanism between executives and shareholders, improve corporate governance, and improve the market discipline mechanism.
3. Innovations
(1) Based on managerial power approach, we study systematically the executive compensation contract of the chinese state-owned listed companies. Managerial power approach suggests that the board is no longer on behalf of shareholders completely, and executives have ability and motive to influence directors, and executives could affect the compensation contract. The special institutional environments of state-owned enterprises give executives great power, which provides good conditions to test managerial power approach.
(2) Taking chairman of the board t as CEO, we study the impacts of executive power on compensation by introduction of personal characteristics. The chairman who gets salaries is equivalent to CEO, and chairman of the board should be the representative of executive team. By the way, the conclusion of study is creditably.
(3) Based on the special institutional background of state-owned enterprises in China, this paper not only examines the impacts of executive power to compensation contract, but also studies the effects on company performance of executive power and compensation incentive contract. This study suggests that executives affect the incentive contracts by their power, which makes incentive contracts not solve the agency problem between executives and shareholders, while incentive contracts become the part of the agency problem. So the paper empirically examines managerial power approach.
一、研究内容
研究主要内容包括：(1)确立研究的逻辑起点。通过对高管薪酬激励的“最优契约理论”与“管理权力理论”的回顾,明确了高管可能通过其权力影响针对自己的薪酬契约,从而使薪酬契约成为代理问题的一部分,确立了研究的逻辑起点。(2)制度背景与理论分析。在对国有企业高管薪酬激励制度背景考察基础上,探讨了国企高管权力的形成,并分析了国企高管权力对薪酬激励的影响,为后续研究提供依据。(3)高管权力对货币薪酬的影响。界定高管权力的基础上,运用实证研究方法,分析了高管权力对货币薪酬、薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,并对高管权力对业绩影响进行探讨。(4)高管权力对在职消费的影响。回顾在职消费相关理论基础上,实证检验高管权力对在职消费的影响,进一步分析了在职消费对业绩的影响,以判断在职消费为激励效应还是权力寻租。(5)高管权力对股权激励的影响。在分析股权激励理论的基础上,首先对股权激励进行描述统计,然后深入股权激励条款,运用logistic回归模型,实证检验高管权力对股权激励方案选择的影响。
二、主要结论
(1)现行的制度环境赋予国有控股公司高管极大的权力。我国国有企业改革的过程,实际上就是控制权不断下放给企业高管的过程。国有控股上市公司存在“一股独大”的现象,这种制度安排使股东大会功能弱化,董事会掌控在大股东手中,作为股东代言人的高管具有极大的权力,加之国有产权的虚拟化以及信息的不对称,对公司高管的监督形同虚设,此外,上市公司治理结构不合理、资本市场的不完善等因素,使得高管权力不受约束。
(2)国有控股公司高管利用权力获取高额的货币薪酬,降低了薪酬-业绩敏感性,削弱了薪酬激励的有效性。高管权力对薪酬影响的实证结果表明：高管权力与高管薪酬正相关,权力越大的高管其货币薪酬也就越高；高管利用管理权力降低薪酬业绩的相关性,权力大的高管薪酬对业绩不敏感；高管权力大的企业,高管薪酬对盈利业绩的敏感性高于对亏损业绩的敏感性；权力大的企业,高管薪酬对上升业绩的敏感性高于对下降业绩的敏感性。薪酬激励的有效性受到了考验,扭曲了激励效果。研究结果还表明国有控股公司的高管可能利用权力自定薪酬,通过对不同权力企业的业绩比较,却并不能证明权力大的企业具有更好的业绩,说明高管薪酬没能有效的解决代理问题,反而成为了代理问题的一部分。
(3)国有控股公司高管利用权力获取过度在职消费,在职消费与货币薪酬无替代关系。高管权力对在职消费影响的实证结果表明：高管权力对在职消费具有显著正的影响,说明高管权力越大,在职消费越高；高管货币薪酬与在职消费正相关,没能证明在职消费与货币薪酬之间的替代关系。进一步研究表明,在职消费与企业业绩负相关,说明在职消费对高管不是一种控制权的补偿激励,而是高管利用权力侵害股东利益的一种方式。
(4)国有控股公司股权激励的激励性不足,高管利用权力通过股权激励谋利。通过国有控股上市公司2006-2010年通过股权激励方案的分析表明：股权激励方案总体上激励期限较短、行权条件不高,更多体现为福利性质而不是激励性质；权力大的高管更可能让公司通过一个福利性的股权激励方案,说明高管利用自身权力通过股权激励为自己谋取私利。
(5)国有控股公司高管权力使薪酬契约不仅没有有效的解决代理问题,反而成为代理问题的一部分。实证结果表明高管权力越大,其货币薪酬与在职消费越高,更易获得福利性的股权激励,薪酬对业绩越不敏感,说明高管利用权力为自己谋取私利并扭曲了薪酬激励效果。另一方面,虽然业绩与薪酬具有正相关性,但在职消费与业绩负相关,且没有发现高管权力大的企业具有更好的业绩,说明高管权力使薪酬没能有效的解决代理问题,反而成为了代理问题的一部分。
为了能有效激励国有控股公司高管,应当重构激励相容的薪酬激励契约,完善公司治理制度,健全市场约束机制。
三、创新之处
(1)结合国有控股上市公司这个特殊群体,基于管理权力的研究视角,较为系统探讨了国企高管薪酬激励问题。管理权力理论不再认为董事会完全受托于股东,认为高管有能力也有动机影响董事会,进而影响高管薪酬契约。国有企业特殊的制度背景,使国企高管具有极大的权力,这给管理权力理论检验提供了良好的条件。基于此,较为系统地经验检验了高管权力对货币薪酬、薪酬业绩敏感性、在职消费与股权激励的影响。
(2)把公司董事长作为高管团队代表,并引入个人特征来反映高管权力,研究高管权力对薪酬的影响。国有控股上市中,领薪董事长相当于国外公司的CEO,以董事长作为高管团队代表,能更准确反映高管权力对薪酬的影响。此外,手工收集任职年限等指标来衡量管理权力。
(3)基于国有控股上市公司特殊制度背景,不仅考察高管权力对薪酬激励的影响,还探讨了高管权力以及薪酬激励对绩效的影响,进而提出国企高管薪酬契约没能有效的解决代理问题,薪酬契约本身反成为代理问题的一部分,经验检验了高管权力是导致薪酬契约本身成为代理问题的原因。
In recent years, executive compensation is increased rapidly in the state-owned listed companies, which becomes a controversial topic in the public. The contractual arrangements could make executives act in the interests of shareholders as optional contracting approach, while the reality and empirical studies don't confirm it. Managerial power approach suggests that executives have ability to influence the board, thus executives could affect the pay contract. Power executives could manipulate their pay contract. Executives are powerful in chinese stated-owned listed companies as the special system, is the Phenomenon that paying for worse performance associated with it? Basing on managerial power approach, using the date of the state-owned listed companies in china, this paper examines empirically the impact of executive power on compensation.
1. Research contents
The main contents of this paper as follows:(1) Establishing the logical starting point of this study. By reviewing the optional contracting approach and managerial power approach, we suggest that executives could influence the compensation contract by their power, which act as the logical starting point of this study.(2) The analysis of institution and theory. Based on the analysis of compensation institution and resources of managerial power, we study the impacts of executive power on compensation contract, which provides the basis for following study.(3) The impact of executive power to the monetary compensation. Using regression analysis, we study the impacts of executive power on executive compensation, pay-performance sensitivity and company performance.(4) The impact of executive power on perks. Based on reviewing the theory of perks, this paper examines empirically the impacts of executive power to perks and the impacts of perks to company performance.(5) The impact of executive power on stock option. Based on the analysis of stock option, firstly we make descriptive statistical analysis to stock option, and then examine empirically the impacts of executive power to the stock option by the logistic regression model.
2. Important conclusions
(1) Executives are powerful in chinese stated-owned listed companies under the institutional environment. The reform of state-owned enterprises delegates the control to executives. There is a dominant shareholder in the state-owned listed companies, which reduces the utility of the general meeting of shareholders. So the board is controlled by the major shareholder, executives who are the agent of the major shareholder have great power. In addition, the worse corporate governance in the state-owned listed companies and the capital market being not perfect makes the executives unconstrained.
(2) Executives get high monetary compensation and reduce pay-performance sensitivity by their power in stated-owned listed companies. Study the impacts of executive power on executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity, this paper suggests the following conclusions:executive power has a significant positive impact on compensation, the higher salaries are associated with powerful executives; executive power reduces pay-performance sensitivity, the salaries aren't sensitivity to companies' performance in which executives have more power; in the companies that executives have more power, executive salaries are more sensitivity to the profit than the loss, and are more sensitivity to the creasing performance than the reducing performance. The results show that executives in state-owned companies have power to affect the compensation contract. Comparing the performance of companies which executives have different power, there aren't evidences that suggest more power leading to better performance. That indicates executive pay be not the way to solve the agency problem between executives and shareholders, become the part of the agency problem.
(3) Executives in the state-owned listed companies take excessive perks. Perks are positive relation to the Executive compensation. This paper examines empirically the impact of executive power to perks, our findings suggest that executive power has a significant positive impact on perks, and there aren't evidences suggesting perks substitute to salary. Further study suggests that perks has a significant negative impact on corporate performance. That indicates perks aren't effective incentives to executive, and perks are the symbolize that power executives taking interests of shareholders.
(4) Stock option isn't incentive to the executives in the state-owned listed companies. Powerful executives take interests of shareholders by stock option. Using the date2006to2010of the state-owned listed companies in china, this paper examines empirically the affect of stock option. Our findings suggest that stock option affecting to executive is welfare rather than incentive. By the logistic regression analysis, our findings suggest power executive may receive a welfare stock option contract. That indicates that executives take interests of shareholder by their power.
(5)Executive compensation contract doesn't effectively solve the agency problem, instead becomes the part of the agency problem. The empirical results show that powerful executives have higher compensation, more perks, welfare stock option, and less sensitivity of pay-performance. On the other hand, although executive compensation is positively related to company performance, perks are negatively related to company performance, executive power isn't relevant to company performance. This suggests that executives affect the incentive contracts by their power, which makes incentive contracts not solve the agency problem between executives and shareholders, while incentive contracts become the part of the agency problem.
In order to effectively incentive executives, we should reconstruct incentive mechanism between executives and shareholders, improve corporate governance, and improve the market discipline mechanism.
3. Innovations
(1) Based on managerial power approach, we study systematically the executive compensation contract of the chinese state-owned listed companies. Managerial power approach suggests that the board is no longer on behalf of shareholders completely, and executives have ability and motive to influence directors, and executives could affect the compensation contract. The special institutional environments of state-owned enterprises give executives great power, which provides good conditions to test managerial power approach.
(2) Taking chairman of the board t as CEO, we study the impacts of executive power on compensation by introduction of personal characteristics. The chairman who gets salaries is equivalent to CEO, and chairman of the board should be the representative of executive team. By the way, the conclusion of study is creditably.
(3) Based on the special institutional background of state-owned enterprises in China, this paper not only examines the impacts of executive power to compensation contract, but also studies the effects on company performance of executive power and compensation incentive contract. This study suggests that executives affect the incentive contracts by their power, which makes incentive contracts not solve the agency problem between executives and shareholders, while incentive contracts become the part of the agency problem. So the paper empirically examines managerial power approach.
引文
①宁向东：《公司治理理论》,中国发展出版社,2005,34-36。
②威廉姆森：《公司治理》,现代制度经济学上北京大学出版社,2003,242-265。
①Fama,1980,Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm；Jensen,1983,Seperation of Ownership and Control.
①主要参考迈克尔.詹森,《企业理论—治理、剩余索取权和组织形式》,上海财经大学出版社,2008.3.
①张维迎,《产权·激励与公司治理》,经济科学出版社,2005.7
①Murphy, K J et., Managerial capital and the market foe CEOs, working paper, university of southern California,2003.
②Bebchuk, L, Jesen F, and David W. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation. University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
①吕长江、赵宇恒,国有企业管理者激励效应研究—基于管理者权力的解释,管理世界,2008,11.
①主要参考姜爱林,国有企业高管薪酬管理若干问题研究,当代经济管理,2008.05
①参见沈艺峰、沈洪涛,《公司财务理论主流》,东北财经大学出版社,2004.08,P190-200.
①本部分内容主要参考：宁向东,《公司治理理论》,中国发展出版社,2005,P115-127
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①吕长江、赵宇恒,国有企业管理者激励效应研究—基于管理者权力的解释,管理世界,2008,11.
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