肯德尔·沃尔顿“假扮游戏”美学思想研究
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摘要
“假扮游戏”美学是美国哲学家肯德尔·沃尔顿的美学理论。沃尔顿认为,几乎一切再现艺术作品的审美欣赏都是以作品为游戏道具而展开的“假扮游戏”。“假扮游戏”现象广泛地存在于原始巫舞仪式、白昼梦、儿童游戏、文艺欣赏、节庆狂欢以及主题园林等人类社会生活的多个领域。所谓“假扮游戏”,是指作为游戏者的欣赏者有意识地假装相信虚构世界及其虚构事实为真实的行为。“假扮游戏”是一种精神摹拟。欣赏者通过在精神上摹拟虚构情境并以自我置入虚构世界并置换虚构人物,而获取类似真实的情感体验。这是连通虚构世界与现实世界的心理渠道。再现艺术是精神摹拟中的再现,而非形式摹仿中的再现。对文学艺术创作而言,要成为对某物的再现,就是要在关于此物的“假扮游戏”中充当道具。因此,作为精神摹拟的“假扮游戏”是再现艺术的基础。假扮元素在文学艺术审美欣赏体验中的渗透是欣赏者获取审美愉悦的重要来源之一
“假扮游戏”以想象为心理基础,以特定规则为规约限制,以道具作为生发虚构事实的载体。想象、规则与道具是“假扮游戏”的三个要素。首先,作为“假扮游戏”的心理基础的想象分为自发想象与偶发想象、当前想象与后台想象、协同想象与个体想象。从想象者内心生发出的关于自我的想象是其参与到虚构情境之中进行“假扮游戏”的关键环节。其次,“假扮游戏”的规则是对一种支配性秩序的限定,它建立在协同想象的基础上,由全体参与者共同遵守始终。在儿童游戏、宗教仪式及其它假扮性的社会活动中,规则的制定常由权威者完成。而在文艺审美欣赏的“假扮游戏”中,游戏规则即欣赏规则,是由作家或艺术家的创作意图决定、由批评家与收藏家辅助阐释并监管执行的。欣赏者也在一定程度上参与着游戏规则的制定。再者,所谓道具,是指为“假扮游戏”生发了虚构事实的事物,作为想象的对象激发并助推想象的展开,有时也在游戏中担任一定的角色。道具分为既定道具与随机道具。既定道具所生发的虚构事实是由基于社会共识的习俗惯例产生并被约定俗成的；而随机道具所承载的虚构意义只在该“假扮游戏”语境下临时有效。一旦进入“假扮游戏”的语境,这类事物便暂时隐藏了真实身份,而被赋予了虚构的道具身份,其所指涉的意义只在“假扮游戏”语境下为真实。依据所使用道具的作用,“假扮游戏”可分为“内容导向的假扮”与“道具导向的假扮”。所谓内容导向的“假扮游戏”,是指游戏的展开以道具所生发的虚构事实的内容为重点；所谓道具导向的“假扮游戏”,是指游戏的展开以道具本身的物理特性和外观特征为重点。具体的“假扮游戏”往往是两种导向的叠加,二者在同一游戏的不同阶段发挥不同的作用。道具生发虚构事实的机制遵循现实原则与共识原则,这表明虚构事实在“假扮游戏”语境下的真实性一方面与整个社会范围内的认知习惯有关,另一方面也取决于欣赏者的自由意愿。在再现艺术的审美游戏中,作品通常充当道具,生发出其所再现的虚构世界与虚构实体的若干虚构事实。
沃尔顿指出,虚构世界与现实世界之间的距离不是一种可测量的物理距离,物理手段无法消除两个世界之间的隔膜。身处现实世界的欣赏者无法以实存的肉身闯入虚构世界中干预事件进程或改变人物命运,但常在心理层面与虚构世界产生关联,被人物的崇高行为感动、为人物的悲惨命运落泪、与陷入困境的人物一同恐慌,还会出现近乎真切的身体反应。他建构了亨利模型与查尔斯模型来说明这种审美心理现象。亨利模型的基本内容是,观众亨利在观看话剧表演时,冲上舞台试图拯救被缚在火车轨道上即将罹难的女主角。这一模型描述的是欣赏者试图打破现实世界与虚构世界的隔膜并介入虚构世界进行干预的现象。查尔斯模型的基本内容是,观众查尔斯在观看恐怖电影时,面对扑面而来似乎即将冲破荧幕的怪物,即便知晓自己并未身处危险之中,也会表现出极为真实的惧怕反应。这一模型描述的是欣赏者清醒地知晓现实与虚构的差别,但仍对虚构情境做出虚拟情感反应的现象。
沃尔顿以认知科学术语“精神摹拟”来阐释“假扮游戏”现象的心理根源。所谓精神摹拟,是指摹拟者在以自我为中心的第一人称想象中再现了某种虚构情境或者某位被摹拟对象所处的虚构情境,以自身置换虚构实体在此情境中的存在状态,假装相信这一虚构情境为真实,并对其作出虚拟情感反应的行为。沃尔顿指出,精神摹拟有别于物理摹仿。物理摹仿的对象往往是现实世界中实存的事物,而精神摹拟的内容除现实世界中实存的事物外,也可以是虚拟的过程或非实存的虚构实体。精神摹拟行为的目的不在于追求摹拟者与被摹拟内容的匹配一致。精神摹拟还不同于移情。移情是向对象灌注自我,从而体悟被移情对象感受或把握被移情对象形式特征的一种想象行为。而精神摹拟是以被摹拟的虚构情境作为自我所处的情境,以摹拟者自身置换被摹拟情境的原主角,以实现自我认知的想象行为。摹拟者由此所获得的情感反应不必与原主角的感受相匹配,自我认知才是精神摹拟的目的。
沃尔顿以戏剧艺术的审美欣赏为例,指出观众通过精神上摹拟虚构世界的途径而被人物与故事所触动,产生类情感的反应。所谓类情感,是指欣赏者在假装相信虚构事实为真实时作出的情感反应,它在效果上类似真实情感,却具有虚构性。类情感的产生发展历经“郁积冲动—假想渴望—化身虚构”三个阶段。卡塔西斯效用的三种译名所代表的内涵——“宣泄”、“净化”与“陶冶”是一次完整的戏剧审美体验在不同阶段所呈现的类情感状态。当观众介入虚构世界的冲动压倒了抑制冲动的清醒意识时,卡塔西斯呈现为宣泄；当观众介入虚构世界的冲动被清醒意志抑制时,卡塔西斯呈现为净化；观众反复观赏表演后,其介入虚构世界的冲动与抑制冲动的自觉达到平衡,此时卡塔西斯呈现为陶冶。卡塔西斯的呈现样态受制于作品的审美属性和欣赏者的审美素养。
“假扮游戏”的语境建构是一个复杂的过程。虚构事实对虚构世界的构筑而言至关重要。所谓虚构事实,是由作为游戏道具的再现艺术作品所生发的描述虚构实体在虚构世界中的存在状态的事实。虚构事实仅在虚构世界之中为真实,分为纯粹性虚构事实和依存性虚构事实。纯粹性虚构事实依照现实原则与共识原则叠加为依存性虚构事实,依存性虚构事实再按照现实原则与共识原则构筑起内在于作品的虚构世界。虚构世界不等同于笛卡尔所谓的可能世界,不是在现实中可能发生但尚未发生的潜在情形。可能世界是一种逻辑可能,在条件具备时便可转化为现实世界；而虚构世界是一种心理可能,有赖于自愿假装相信虚构世界为真实的“假扮游戏”心理。
虚构世界的自足性与虚构性是“假扮游戏”建构语境的前提。若干个小型虚构世界通过外部纵向嵌套、内部纵向嵌套、外部横向嵌套、内部横向嵌套、平行嵌套与同一嵌套等基本嵌套模式构建起宏大的作品世界,实现同一虚构实体或同一虚构事实在多个虚构世界之间的通达与跨界。当一个虚构世界嵌套另一个虚构世界时,后者的虚构事实化身为前者的虚构历史。沃尔顿区分了内在于作品文本的虚构世界与审美接受中的虚构世界。前者即作品世界,是指仅凭作品生发的虚构事实所构建的虚构世界；后者即游戏世界,是指不完全依存于作品而主要凭借欣赏者的想象所构筑的虚构世界。作品世界与游戏世界皆是虚构世界,于其中展开的审美欣赏活动皆是“假扮游戏”。
基于不同的再现手段,“假扮游戏”呈现不同的特征。以文字为媒介建构虚构世界的再现是叙述性再现,内含有关事件、人物和环境的若干虚构事实,并通过叙事人将虚构事实表述给读者。沃尔顿指出,叙事人作为连通虚构世界与现实世界的中介,是生发虚构事实的虚构人物。从创作的角度来看,叙事人是不现身于作品世界的执笔人要生发虚构事实所须依赖的关键角色；从接受的角度来看,叙事人为读者提供了观察虚构世界的视角与立场。因此,叙事人是叙述性再现作品生发虚构事实的具体执行者。在叙述性再现之外,以言语为依托的“假扮游戏”广泛存在于生活中。隐喻表达便是借助“假扮游戏”心理,使说话人与听话人在同一个虚构语境下更方便地描述所指的言说方式。说话人与听话人以言语方式参与游戏,双方的表达重点集中在喻体上,以对一个事物的想象来规定对另一个事物的想象。喻词的省略现象表明了“假扮游戏”的规则。喻体是隐喻表达经由“假扮游戏”拓展出的新的目标领域。喻体所建构的形象是隐喻“假扮游戏”中生发虚构事实的道具。因此,隐喻表达是道具导向的“假扮游戏”。听话人能够在理解说话人隐喻表达内容的基础上创造出新的隐喻,这便是在理解了说话人所设立的“假扮游戏”规则后,以言语为道具参与“假扮游戏”的行为。
以图像为媒介建构虚构世界的再现是描绘性再现。沃尔顿认为,观看绘画、雕像、电影、摄影作品的审美活动是一种视觉“假扮游戏”。要成为被描绘物的再现图像,就要在关于这一事物的视觉“假扮游戏”中充当道具,使观者能通过这一图像想象自己正在观看被描绘物。视觉“假扮游戏”为二维平面的图像打开了纵深空间,镜面、窗口、门框与帷幕等元素分隔了视觉“假扮游戏”中的虚构空间。画内世界多重空间的层次嵌套大致遵循正向嵌套、反向嵌套与反射嵌套的模式。摄影与绘画都可唤起视觉“假扮游戏”,但二者的差别在于,摄影具有“通透性”而绘画不具有这一性质。所谓通透性,是指观者通过照片能够在虚构意义上“直接”看到被拍摄物本身。照片作为视觉“假扮游戏”的道具,协助观者维持了与被拍摄物的感知关联,而其作为图像介质的物理性质反而常被视觉忽略。
“假扮游戏”美学的贡献在于,揭示了再现艺术审美欣赏的信疑心理矛盾,开辟了对介乎信疑之间的假装相信这一心理维度的研究；以精神摹拟的概念消解了传统再现论下作品与被摹仿物的匹配性关联,为后现代艺术的阐释提供了支撑；指出再现艺术作品作为虚构世界的模型和“假扮游戏”的平台,只提供生发作品意义的可能性,而非规定作品意义；充分认识到欣赏者的审美意识的自主性,并将之作为再现艺术的基础因素。这些观点补充了艾布拉姆斯艺术四要素图式以及审美接受理论和审美心理学的相关研究。“假扮游戏”美学的局限在于,沃尔顿对“假扮游戏”现象的分析性描述多过确定性界说,难免给人体系驳杂而概念模糊的印象；他对传统摹仿论与再现论的质疑是一种聚焦局限而忽略成就的批判,不是对其在特定社会历史语境下的功与过的辩证评价；从该理论的整体构架来看,图像性的再现艺术是主要研究对象,而同样作为“假扮游戏”的叙事文学审美欣赏未得到同等重视。
“假扮游戏”美学不仅对西方再现艺术及其相关审美问题的阐释适用,也是中国古代审美文化研究的一个具有创新性的切入点。对中国古代艺术及审美文化中“假扮游戏”现象的挖掘有益于沃尔顿“假扮游戏”美学的理论完善,也有助于将中国传统审美文化推广到西方,以“假扮游戏”为话题的中西美学对话的前景令人期待。
The concept of "make-believe" was first proposed by Kendall Walton in his "Pictures and Make-Believe" in1973. He has established the aesthetic theory system based on the core concept "game of make-believe" since then, and it has been more than fourty years till the present day. He claims, aesthetic appreciations towards almost all kinds of representational arts are playing in games of make-believe, in which the players take artworks as props that generate fictional truth. Appreciators as players in the game pretend to believe the fictional truth to be true in the fictional worlds constructed by the work. Since they intend to pretend in full awareness of the fictionality of the characters and the story, this game of make-believe is essentially a kind of mental simulation. Appreciators enter the fictional world inside the work and change the fictional entity with themselves, to mentally and psychologically experience the fictional environment, destiny and plots. The emotional reaction towards the work acquired by the appreciator also presents fictionality to some extent. The representation is therefore realized by simulation of the fictional environment instead of imitation of the objects. To be the representation of something, as a result, is to perform in the game of make-believe as the prop, to generate fictional truth about the represented thing. Thus, game of make-believe as mental simulation is the foundation of representational arts.
Focused on the motives of the aesthetics of make-believe, the preface introduces and analyzes three main reasons why Kendall Walton proposed the concept of make-believe. The construction of the make-believe theory is launched on the basis of the observation of representational arts. The theory concentrates on the attributes that qualify artworks to be representational arts. With those characteristics, novels, romances and stories are more representational than other genres such as the texts in bibliographies and schoolbooks. According to Walton, what those attributes have in common is'fictionality'. Consequently, the second motive to construct the theory of make-believe relies on the meditation of the standard that could differ fictions from non-fictions convincingly. It's nothing easier to solve this problem than the first one. However, to concern with the minimum range of objects would simplify the study and make it more efficient. Walton put forward the concept of'fictional representation' therefore, to make the goal more concentrated. Moreover, it's inevitable to elaborate the concept of'mimesis'when it's to be contemplated. The foundation of representational arts. Thus, the third motive of the make-believe theory is to disprove several traditional perspectives of mimesis, such as the theory of symbolism, the theory of resemblance, the theory of hallucination and the theory of substitutes, as well as the demonstration of'representation'and'mimesis'in terms of linguistic philosophy. By tranforming the term of'mental simulation'borrowed from the congnitive science to the realm of aesthetics and philosphy of art, Walton created a new psychological dimension to the understanding of mimesis and representation, who believed that the activities of make-believe in any circumstances are essentially mental simulation.
The first chapter draws an outline of the category'make-believe'and its related categories as a system, by analysis on five instances chosen from domains of religion, art, life and social culture, which can be defined as phenomena of make-believe. The phenomena of make-believe perform prevalently in human social life, as in the realm of religious ceremony, daydreams and dreams, children's game, gardens designed for the specific theme, play and performance in the theater, masquerade parade on festivals and carnivals.'Make-believe'can be defined as such kind of human behavior that people willingly pretend to believe fictional facts are true in the fictional worlds, thereby also pretend to react to the fictional truth, just like the way they respond to the real stimulations in the real circumstances. The psychological state of make-believe could be taken as one of the main sources from which appreciators are able to acquire aesthetic pleasure during appreciating representational artworks. According to the definition, three propositions are concluded. Imagination is the psychological basis of make-believe. The game of make-believe has to work under the control of specific stipulations that are previously made by players or the designer. Besides, props are primarily necessary for players to perform their fictional identities in the game of make-believe, since props are the basic tools that generate fictional truth. Thus, imagination, the stipulation and props are three dominant elements of the game of make-believe.
Firstly, the psychological activity of imagining is always in the manner that Walton mentioned as first-person manner, namely we are used to imagining certain scenario about ourselves from the deep inside. In the first-person manner imagination, one is usually the protagonist of one's own imaginings. There are six paradigms of imaginings, including spontaneous imaginings, deliberate imaginings, occurent imaginings, nonocurrent imaginings, social imaginings and solitary imaginings. Imagination about oneself plays a crucial role during the game of make-believe, helping players engage in the fictional conditions. Secondly, the stipulation of make-believe game is decided by players or the designer. It prescripts the basic roles of the game and the way to play these roles. On the one hand, with certain stipulation, the application of playing becomes possible and accessible. On the other hand, players have to obey the rules willingly and cooperatively, for the stipulation made by players is actually the joint fantasy, which combines wishes, demands and ideals of all the members. As a result, the stipulation has to be described on the foundation of social imaginings, and followed by all the participants from the very beginning to the end. The prescriptions in the game of make-believe are often constituted by authorities approbated by the majority of the society, especially in religious affairs, children's games and other daily life activities. Similarly, in the aesthetic appreciation of representational artworks, also as a kind of make-believe game, the stipulation namely the method to comprehend the intention, meaning and value of the work is decided by the artists and writers, and interpreted by the critics and collectors. Moreover, the so-called props are things that are able to carry meanings and generate fictional truth. As the prompter of imagining, a prop stimulates imagination about the given fictional worlds, guiding appreciators to imagine certain contents. Sometimes the props also have fictional identities in the game to play roles together with other fictional entities. As to the aesthetic appreciation of representational art, the artwork is the prop in the game of make-believe, which shows the appreciators as players what is going on in the fictional world.
There are two types of props, ad hoc props and given props. Once entering the fictional circumstances of make-believe game, the original and real identities of objects that are going to be used as props would be hid temporarily. The fictional prop identities of them would come forward to the front stage, which are the only admitted identities for them to exist in the fictional world, meaning that the fictional identity of the object is the only true identity that can be used by the players. According to the meaning signified by the prop and its role in the fictional world, games of make-believe appear as two different kinds of make-believe, including prop-oriented make-believe and content-oriented make-believe. In fact, there is no sharp line between prop-oriented make-believe and content-oriented make-believe. On the contrary, they cooperate with each other during playing from time to time. It is related to some aspects, such as the stipulation and stages of the game. The rules that props follow to generate fictional truth are the reality principle and the mutual belief principle. The two principles of generating fictional truth indicate that the mind state of make-believe not merely depends on social understandings of facts in the fictional world, but also on the free will of appreciators. On the one hand, people are likely to pretend to'believe'fictional truth, because those facts are to some extent correlated to reality. On the other hand, it's not hard for them to pretend, because to believe those facts or not is up to themselves.
To expound the question about how remote fictional worlds are from the real world, Walton explored further in the psychological foundation of the game of make-believe and put forward the theory of mental simulation and quasi-emotion. The septum between fictional worlds and the real world cannot be diminished by physical resolutions. It's impossile for the audience to interfere the process of fictional events, or change the destiny of the protagonist, since the audience is in the real world instead of being in the same fictional world with the fictitious entity. However, we are often touched by the fiction, feeling worried about the character, praying with him to hope things get better, and being eager to save him out of the tragedy. It seems that psychological connection is the only way for the audience to break through this septum and get into the world on the stage or in the movie. Walton described the phenomena prevalently exist in the aesthetic appreciation of representational artworks via constructing two representative modes that illustrate two audiences named Henry and Charles. Henry tries to step onto the stage to save the trapped heroine played by the actress, while Charles feels terrified when watching the horror movie about the green slime flowing towards the audience. By the reference of the term'mental simulation'borrowed from cognitive science, Walton studied the emotional state of the audience when appreciating fictions, and named it the'quasi-emotion', which is essentially distinct from the real emotion activated by the real stimulations in reality. Simulators always put themselves in the center of the imagination, which means all the events occurring in the fictional world of one's imagining are about oneself. People do not have to imitate the mental state of others, but to make their own decisions and options with clear consciousness in order to respond to fictional circumstances. That's the characteristic that mental simulation differs from empathy and hallucination. Thus, mental simulation centered on the imaginer per se is the psychological foundation of the make-believe behavior.
First of all, mental simulation does not equal to illusions caused by drugs. Imaginers respond to the fictional situation under the mind state of clear consciousness. The behavior of simulating fictional situations in mind probably takes place in daydreams, aesthetic appreciation and composition of literature and artworks. Secondly, mental simulation is not exactly the same with empathy. The subject of empathy transfers her own personality and emotional feelings to the object that she's empathetic with, via imagining it and getting familiar with it, aiming at understandings of the empathized thing or person. The subject and object of empathy would combine into one during the process. However, the subject of mental simulation takes fictional situations of others as her own, in which she's the protagonist and the center of all perceptions about the fictional world, aiming at acquaintance with herself, instead of adapting to emotions and feelings of others. As a result, simulators do not have to match themselves with the targets, to be the same with the given psychological state, who could gain more freedom than ones in the process of empathy. Moreover, mental simulation is not physical imitation. The objects of physical imitation are something that really exist, which are concrete and easy to be perceived by all the sensibilities, namely people can touch, smell, see, taste and hear them, whereas due to the imaginative quality, it's possible for the subject of mental simulation to observe fictional objects, which do not exist in the real world at all, in a fantastic way. As a consequence, the behavior of mental simulation does not require the subjects to match with the represented objects, neither to resemble nor keep accordance with them.
The aesthetic activities of representational artworks, especially the performance and appreciation of the theater, are full of elements related to mental simulation. When watching the performance, the audience play in the game of make-believe based on the work world and characters, whose experience engenders such kind of emotion like the real feelings but not so real. Charles did not leave the seat even if the green slime was running to him fictionally, which made him really nervous and terrified. The intense mental state of Charles is almost as real as the daily emotion stimulated in the true environment, yet not that kind of real emotion, for it's generated by fictional conditions. Walton preferred calling it the'quasi-emotion', in order to distinguish it from the real feelings with active responses. During the process of appreciating a drama performance, the quasi-emotion of the audience will go through three stages. In the first stage, the audience is immersed in the fictional situation, being stimulated with multiple intense feelings stuck inside himself, which cannot be released by any physical ways. In the next stage after that, the audience tries to figure out the channel to release his quasi-emotions. In the last period, the audience finally realizes that he can imagine himself to be one of the characters on stage, but to change the tragic destiny into the expected one in his own fantasy, which might be distinct from the performing one. In these stages of appreciating the drama, the quasi-emotion can be caused by the contradiction between being helpless stuck in the real world and being eager to interfere with the fictional world.
The generation and the relief of quasi-emotion could be sufficient to illustrate the catharsis effect proposed by Aristotle, namely to release, to purify and to nurture the daily emotion and sensibilities of the citizens in the aesthetic appreciation of the tragic drama performance. When the rational control to stay sitting in his seat is overwhelmed by the impulsion to save the heroine trapped by the villains, Henry rushes up onto the stage to carry her out of the danger. Henry does not save her though, since they are in two different worlds. The catharsis effect represented by Henry thereby remains in the primary relief of quasi-emotion. On the contrary, when the rational control that commands to stay seated overwhelms the implusion of escaping away from the green slime flowing to him, Charles still sits there instead of running out of the cinema, although he's sweating and shivering, terrified by the fictional situation represented on the screen. Since Charles will certainly not be harmed by the green slime, he not merely releases his terror of the monster but also gets it purified. After watching the movie or the play over and over again for many times, it's possible that Henry and Charles would react to the fictional situation more rationally and calmly, who have reached the final destination of catharsis effect as to promote oneself via practising and nurturing in the fictional world. It depends on the aesthetic properties and the faculties of understanding and psychological state of make-believe within different individuals that which aspects of catharsis effects appear in each appreciation experience. To participate more times in games of make-believe generated by the movies or the theaters would be helpful to exercise those faculties and make the nurture more efficient.
The fictional truth generated by artworks acting as props of the make-believe game ought to be about fictitious entities in question, which is true and merely true in fictional worlds, instead of in the real world. Fictional truth can be primary, namely directly generated by the work, or indirectly implied by the primary ones.'The primary fictional truth'being organized into groups in order to generate more complicated'implied fictional truth'is the first step to creat a fictional world. Thus, the construction of the fictional world relies on the connection and implication of fictional truth. The breeding process of fictional truth also presents characteristics in generating process of fictional truth, in accordance with the reality principle and the mutual belief principle.
The theory of possible worlds can be applied to elaborate this question, as the transition and medium between pure fictional worlds and the real world. A possible world is such kind of potential situation that can transform into reality once the conditions needed are fulfilled, whereas a fictional world is less connected with the real world than possible worlds, which might not always have counterparts in reality. Possible worlds cannot exist without the real world. On the contrary, fictional worlds can perform just as well even if not being related to reality, for fantasies and imaginings are as important as, or even more crucial than reality for the construction of fictional worlds. In case of that, the independence and fictionality of representational arts deserve respects, which even work for historical novels, epics, plays and movies with counterparts in accordance. Fictional worlds are not possible worlds in respect of relations with reality. However, as to the mind state of make-believe they may contain, there could be similarities between fictional worlds and possible worlds. The concept of possible worlds emphasizes logical possibilities, which can become reality when conditions are ready; whereas fictional worlds are based on psychological possibilities, which do not need any proof or permission from reality and logic to exist legitimately. The only source of legitimization for fictional worlds and fictional truth is up to the belief of appreciators, which means the mind state of make-believe could decide whether fictional worlds are believable (in the fictional sense) to the audience. The generation of fictional truth not only makes the construction of magnificent possible, but also builds up connections among solitary fictional worlds, nesting them into a huge system, during the process of which, the extent of'believe'has been deepened while the extent of'disbelieve'been diminished. since after being nested and proved by other fictional worlds, the fictional truth with similar contents becomes more convincing.
Based on the reflection of the psychological dimension of fictional worlds, Walton proposed the concepts of work worlds and game worlds. The work world is completely built up on the foundation of the artwork per se, which has close connection with all the fictional truth generated by the work. The game world does not absolutely rely on fictional truth generated by the work, which also absorbs imagined facts created by appreciators, as players in the game of make-believe. Both work worlds and game worlds are fictional worlds with elements of make-believe. With the help of imagination and make-believe, aesthetic pleasure that cannot be fulfilled in work worlds that lack of artistic acqierement would be fulfilled in game worlds. In the game of make-believe, multiple work worlds could be nested on each other to build a larger game world, without questioning about the legitimate identity of existence, which reveals a kind of aesthetic freedom provided by imagination. Walton applied the pair of concepts to explain the aesthetic appreciation of absolute music, aiming at whether it could be qualified as representational arts. According to Walton, absolute music is non-representational by itself in the realm of work worlds. However, it becomes representational after being appreciated by the listener in an aesthetic way, adding imagined fictional truth and vivid images to the work. As a consequence, non-representational absolute music become representational in the game world. Imaginings bring lifeless absolute music into the game of make-believe. The objects represented by the music are created by the listener, instead of being composed by the musician. Accordingly, the imagined fictional truth of the listener performs as the prop in the game of make-believe, generating fictitious facts about the interaction between the listener and the work, instead of the work per se.
There are multiple paradigms of representation, among which narrative representational works like novels, and depictive representational artworks like sketches are the most representative. The narrative representation like novels, epics and scripts of theaters is to represent events and circumstances with literary language, the linguistic nature of which always demands someone to narrate the development of the whole story, no matter whether this'someone'is implicit or explicit. Walton claims that narrators who tell the story are not authors, but characters as fictional as other figures in the work worlds, just like the fact that the apparent artists in depictive representation are not the artists who painted the work, but characters painted in the work as fictional as other images. Narrators live in the fictional worlds, who connect the real world with fictional worlds, namely to connect artists with appreciators as the medium. They act and speak of the fictional truth, in their own perspectives, for readers and the audience. Narrators speak for the author from time to time, filtering events taking place in the fictional worlds and describing them, to the readers, with special observation and position. Readers have to get to know the work worlds with the help of narrators, and observe events through perceptions of narrators, instead of understanding on their own. Therefore, it's the narrator who helps readers to find their fictional identities in the work and play as this fictitious entity in the game of make-believe generated by the work world.
Beyond literary works and other genres with narrative representational qualities, the narrative representation prevalently exists in daily life, especially linguistic communication like metaphors. Walton suggested that it would be more convenient for speakers and listeners to communicate by using metaphorical and make-believe methods to express the signified objects. Metaphors invent the game of make-believe about the implicated targets and the implicating tools, the relation between which generates fictional truth and sets up the fictional circumstance, inviting speakers and listeners to join the game in a linguistic way. Instead of the signified target, the emphasized point of the metaphor concentrates on the process of connecting with something that can imply it. The nature of metaphor is actually to stipulate one thing in frame of the imagination of the other thing. The objects signifying the targets have broadened the view of communicating into the more complicated new realm. The speaker intentionally omits copula in the expression, leaving merely the target and the symbolic medium. The omission of copula conceals the symbolic relation between the two, which indicates the stipulation that the speaker sets for her game of make-believe, to guide listeners to follow and imitate. The objects mentioned with symbolic meaning to signify the represented targets perform as props in the metaphor, which works as the game of make-believe. Consequently, metaphorical expression could be appropriately regarded as prop-oriented make-believe. It's natural for listeners to understand the prescription in the game of make-believe proposed by the metaphor of the speaker, and creat new metaphors according to their own imaginings. The creation of new metaphors qualifies the listener as one of the players in the game of make-believe.
Depictive representation and visual games of make-believe have been discussed in the fifth chapter. Depictions like oil paintings, sketches, etchings and watercolor paintings are such kind of representational artworks that represent objects with images and figures. Depictive representational artworks represent objects and events with two-dimensional and still images, which are more concrete and easier to be perceived directly by eyes than the linguistic representational method of narrative representations. However, the represented objects and events are three or four dimensional and dynamic in the real world. Some other objects to be represented in the paintings are even abstract or not existing, which thereby cannot be perceived in reality. It's believed that the reason why spectators could recognize the images painted in the work, and find the counterparts of them in reality relies on the resemblance between the represented object and its image. Some scholars advocated the reason to be hallucination of human sights. And others like Gombrich tried to explain this visual experience on the basis of the substitute theory. Yet those misunderstandings of the depictive representation have been disproved by Walton according to his theory of visual games of make-believe. The reason why appreciators are able to recognize the images of those represented objects can be explained in terms of the theory on visual games of make-believe. Walton brought forward this concept to adjust the concept of'seeing-in'(seeing X in Y) claimed by Richard Wollheim, who believed to recognize something represented in the depiction is a kind of special visual experience of seeing the represented thing in the depiction. Walton considered the visual experience of seeing-in as playing in the visual game of make-believe, with the depictive representation as the prop. To depict something, thereby, is to creat the prop that would prompt imaginings of the audience about the represented objects in the visual game of make-believe. In the visual game of make-believe about the painting, it's not two-dimensional of the fictional world inside. Spectators would imagine the world to be spatio-temporal, as dynamic as reality. Thus, appreciating the depictive representation is to see through the canvas into a broader fictional environment inside the work world, pretending to believe all that happens fictionally in the painting is true. Artists prefer applying mirrors, curtains, doorframes and windows to divide multiple layers of space for the world inside the painting, which successfully increase the depth of visual experience. There are several forms of organizing multiple layers of space inside the painting, including the obverse side-directed nesting, the reverse side-directed nesting, the reflection-directed nesting.
The first and the most common paradigm to nest space inside and outside the painting is to depict the space according to our visual habit, namely to look in the direction right ahead. To represent the space inside the fictional world in the right direction obverse to the spectator would join the two parts of space together into one in the same direction. Figures in the painting of the obverse side directed space nesting are moving farther away from the audience. Therefore, the space of this nesting paradigm is endless and frameless. It seems to the appreciators that the painting opens a window to somewhere else, inviting them to walk in. The second most common paradigm to nest space inside and outside the painting is to depict the space against our visual habit, namely to represent the space inside the fictional world in the opposite direction to the spectator, which would also join the two parts of space together, but in two contrary directions. Figures in the painting of the reverse side directed space nesting are breaking through the frame, walking out of the depiction and moving closer to the audience. It looks like the painting shows them another world in the reverse direction to the space of reality where they are standing in. According to the way of how scenography works, some parts of the roomspace cannot be seen, for it's blocked by other objects in front, which keep it out of the sight of the painter and the spectator. By drawing mirrors and the roomspace reflected in it, artists connect the scenery that can be seen with the one that cannot be seen. This kind of technique is the reflection-directed depictive nesting, which riches the arrangement of space in the limited scale of the canvas.
The works of depictive representation with the camera and films are transparent, Walton claimed. Transparency is such kind of quality that helps the audience see what actually exists in front of the camera directly. The objects captured in the film show up again in the photo, which can be perceived directly by spectators, just like the visual experience of seeing something face to face with the naked eyes. As the prop in the visual game of make-believe, these photographs maintain the perceptual connection between spectators and the objects shot by the camera.
Walton connected the foundation of representational arts with the behavior of make-believe to prove that all kinds of representational arts are basically games of make-believe, in which the artworks are props that generate fictional truth to establish fictional worlds and invite appreciators to come inside and play. Moreover, Walton proved the affirmations of the resemblance theory, the symbolic theory, the hallucination theory and the theory of substitutes, as well as perspectives on empathy limited and insufficient, via elaborating almost all of the representations are mental simulation in games of make-believe in the psychological dimension. Artists and appreciators mentally simulate the target objects to represent them in fictional worlds, and react to the fictional conditions with quasi-emotion, which differs from the actual emotion stimulated by the real affairs and physical environment elements. In conclusion, mimesis as make-believe is the foundation of representational arts and the aesthetic appreciation of the representational artworks.
Kendall Walton has made significant contribution to western aesthetic study today by proposing the aesthetics of game of make-believe. It reveals the special psychological structure between belief and disbelief in aesthetic appreciation of representational arts, and opens up the new dimension of make-believe to solve the willing suspension of disbelief question proposed by Coleridge. It disconnects the relation between representational artworks and the represented objects authorized by traditional perspectives on representation, providing theoretical support for the interpretation of post-modern arts. It also points out that representational artworks do not stipulate the meaning by themselves, but to present possibilities of generating the meaning, by constructing models of fictional worlds as the aesthetic field of game of make-believe. Walton has realized sufficiently the independency of the audience in aesthetic appreciation, and taken it as the foundamental factor of representational arts. These perspectives of aesthetics of game of make-believe supplements the structure of four elements drew by M.H. Abrams in details, and also broaden the view of studies on aesthetic reception and aesthetic psychology.
However, Walton has analyzed the phenomena of game of make-believe more than defining its concept. He concentrates on the limitations of the theories on representation and mimesis, without dialectically examing their achievements under certain historical and social circumstances. According to the whole structure of Walton's aesthetics, it takes representational arts, especially visual arts as the main subject, whereas paying less attention to the literary works and linguistic game of make-believe to some extent. Besides, the study on Walton's aesthetics of game of make-believe is also available for the interpretation of Chinese traditional aesthetic culture, which is probably helpful for the academic communication between western and China in the realm of aesthetics. Moreover, the reflections on the phenomena of game of make-believe in Chinese traditional aesthetic culture would definitely be enlightening for the study on game of make-believe in the whole world, via popularizing the aesthetic outlook of Chinese tr
“假扮游戏”以想象为心理基础,以特定规则为规约限制,以道具作为生发虚构事实的载体。想象、规则与道具是“假扮游戏”的三个要素。首先,作为“假扮游戏”的心理基础的想象分为自发想象与偶发想象、当前想象与后台想象、协同想象与个体想象。从想象者内心生发出的关于自我的想象是其参与到虚构情境之中进行“假扮游戏”的关键环节。其次,“假扮游戏”的规则是对一种支配性秩序的限定,它建立在协同想象的基础上,由全体参与者共同遵守始终。在儿童游戏、宗教仪式及其它假扮性的社会活动中,规则的制定常由权威者完成。而在文艺审美欣赏的“假扮游戏”中,游戏规则即欣赏规则,是由作家或艺术家的创作意图决定、由批评家与收藏家辅助阐释并监管执行的。欣赏者也在一定程度上参与着游戏规则的制定。再者,所谓道具,是指为“假扮游戏”生发了虚构事实的事物,作为想象的对象激发并助推想象的展开,有时也在游戏中担任一定的角色。道具分为既定道具与随机道具。既定道具所生发的虚构事实是由基于社会共识的习俗惯例产生并被约定俗成的；而随机道具所承载的虚构意义只在该“假扮游戏”语境下临时有效。一旦进入“假扮游戏”的语境,这类事物便暂时隐藏了真实身份,而被赋予了虚构的道具身份,其所指涉的意义只在“假扮游戏”语境下为真实。依据所使用道具的作用,“假扮游戏”可分为“内容导向的假扮”与“道具导向的假扮”。所谓内容导向的“假扮游戏”,是指游戏的展开以道具所生发的虚构事实的内容为重点；所谓道具导向的“假扮游戏”,是指游戏的展开以道具本身的物理特性和外观特征为重点。具体的“假扮游戏”往往是两种导向的叠加,二者在同一游戏的不同阶段发挥不同的作用。道具生发虚构事实的机制遵循现实原则与共识原则,这表明虚构事实在“假扮游戏”语境下的真实性一方面与整个社会范围内的认知习惯有关,另一方面也取决于欣赏者的自由意愿。在再现艺术的审美游戏中,作品通常充当道具,生发出其所再现的虚构世界与虚构实体的若干虚构事实。
沃尔顿指出,虚构世界与现实世界之间的距离不是一种可测量的物理距离,物理手段无法消除两个世界之间的隔膜。身处现实世界的欣赏者无法以实存的肉身闯入虚构世界中干预事件进程或改变人物命运,但常在心理层面与虚构世界产生关联,被人物的崇高行为感动、为人物的悲惨命运落泪、与陷入困境的人物一同恐慌,还会出现近乎真切的身体反应。他建构了亨利模型与查尔斯模型来说明这种审美心理现象。亨利模型的基本内容是,观众亨利在观看话剧表演时,冲上舞台试图拯救被缚在火车轨道上即将罹难的女主角。这一模型描述的是欣赏者试图打破现实世界与虚构世界的隔膜并介入虚构世界进行干预的现象。查尔斯模型的基本内容是,观众查尔斯在观看恐怖电影时,面对扑面而来似乎即将冲破荧幕的怪物,即便知晓自己并未身处危险之中,也会表现出极为真实的惧怕反应。这一模型描述的是欣赏者清醒地知晓现实与虚构的差别,但仍对虚构情境做出虚拟情感反应的现象。
沃尔顿以认知科学术语“精神摹拟”来阐释“假扮游戏”现象的心理根源。所谓精神摹拟,是指摹拟者在以自我为中心的第一人称想象中再现了某种虚构情境或者某位被摹拟对象所处的虚构情境,以自身置换虚构实体在此情境中的存在状态,假装相信这一虚构情境为真实,并对其作出虚拟情感反应的行为。沃尔顿指出,精神摹拟有别于物理摹仿。物理摹仿的对象往往是现实世界中实存的事物,而精神摹拟的内容除现实世界中实存的事物外,也可以是虚拟的过程或非实存的虚构实体。精神摹拟行为的目的不在于追求摹拟者与被摹拟内容的匹配一致。精神摹拟还不同于移情。移情是向对象灌注自我,从而体悟被移情对象感受或把握被移情对象形式特征的一种想象行为。而精神摹拟是以被摹拟的虚构情境作为自我所处的情境,以摹拟者自身置换被摹拟情境的原主角,以实现自我认知的想象行为。摹拟者由此所获得的情感反应不必与原主角的感受相匹配,自我认知才是精神摹拟的目的。
沃尔顿以戏剧艺术的审美欣赏为例,指出观众通过精神上摹拟虚构世界的途径而被人物与故事所触动,产生类情感的反应。所谓类情感,是指欣赏者在假装相信虚构事实为真实时作出的情感反应,它在效果上类似真实情感,却具有虚构性。类情感的产生发展历经“郁积冲动—假想渴望—化身虚构”三个阶段。卡塔西斯效用的三种译名所代表的内涵——“宣泄”、“净化”与“陶冶”是一次完整的戏剧审美体验在不同阶段所呈现的类情感状态。当观众介入虚构世界的冲动压倒了抑制冲动的清醒意识时,卡塔西斯呈现为宣泄；当观众介入虚构世界的冲动被清醒意志抑制时,卡塔西斯呈现为净化；观众反复观赏表演后,其介入虚构世界的冲动与抑制冲动的自觉达到平衡,此时卡塔西斯呈现为陶冶。卡塔西斯的呈现样态受制于作品的审美属性和欣赏者的审美素养。
“假扮游戏”的语境建构是一个复杂的过程。虚构事实对虚构世界的构筑而言至关重要。所谓虚构事实,是由作为游戏道具的再现艺术作品所生发的描述虚构实体在虚构世界中的存在状态的事实。虚构事实仅在虚构世界之中为真实,分为纯粹性虚构事实和依存性虚构事实。纯粹性虚构事实依照现实原则与共识原则叠加为依存性虚构事实,依存性虚构事实再按照现实原则与共识原则构筑起内在于作品的虚构世界。虚构世界不等同于笛卡尔所谓的可能世界,不是在现实中可能发生但尚未发生的潜在情形。可能世界是一种逻辑可能,在条件具备时便可转化为现实世界；而虚构世界是一种心理可能,有赖于自愿假装相信虚构世界为真实的“假扮游戏”心理。
虚构世界的自足性与虚构性是“假扮游戏”建构语境的前提。若干个小型虚构世界通过外部纵向嵌套、内部纵向嵌套、外部横向嵌套、内部横向嵌套、平行嵌套与同一嵌套等基本嵌套模式构建起宏大的作品世界,实现同一虚构实体或同一虚构事实在多个虚构世界之间的通达与跨界。当一个虚构世界嵌套另一个虚构世界时,后者的虚构事实化身为前者的虚构历史。沃尔顿区分了内在于作品文本的虚构世界与审美接受中的虚构世界。前者即作品世界,是指仅凭作品生发的虚构事实所构建的虚构世界；后者即游戏世界,是指不完全依存于作品而主要凭借欣赏者的想象所构筑的虚构世界。作品世界与游戏世界皆是虚构世界,于其中展开的审美欣赏活动皆是“假扮游戏”。
基于不同的再现手段,“假扮游戏”呈现不同的特征。以文字为媒介建构虚构世界的再现是叙述性再现,内含有关事件、人物和环境的若干虚构事实,并通过叙事人将虚构事实表述给读者。沃尔顿指出,叙事人作为连通虚构世界与现实世界的中介,是生发虚构事实的虚构人物。从创作的角度来看,叙事人是不现身于作品世界的执笔人要生发虚构事实所须依赖的关键角色；从接受的角度来看,叙事人为读者提供了观察虚构世界的视角与立场。因此,叙事人是叙述性再现作品生发虚构事实的具体执行者。在叙述性再现之外,以言语为依托的“假扮游戏”广泛存在于生活中。隐喻表达便是借助“假扮游戏”心理,使说话人与听话人在同一个虚构语境下更方便地描述所指的言说方式。说话人与听话人以言语方式参与游戏,双方的表达重点集中在喻体上,以对一个事物的想象来规定对另一个事物的想象。喻词的省略现象表明了“假扮游戏”的规则。喻体是隐喻表达经由“假扮游戏”拓展出的新的目标领域。喻体所建构的形象是隐喻“假扮游戏”中生发虚构事实的道具。因此,隐喻表达是道具导向的“假扮游戏”。听话人能够在理解说话人隐喻表达内容的基础上创造出新的隐喻,这便是在理解了说话人所设立的“假扮游戏”规则后,以言语为道具参与“假扮游戏”的行为。
以图像为媒介建构虚构世界的再现是描绘性再现。沃尔顿认为,观看绘画、雕像、电影、摄影作品的审美活动是一种视觉“假扮游戏”。要成为被描绘物的再现图像,就要在关于这一事物的视觉“假扮游戏”中充当道具,使观者能通过这一图像想象自己正在观看被描绘物。视觉“假扮游戏”为二维平面的图像打开了纵深空间,镜面、窗口、门框与帷幕等元素分隔了视觉“假扮游戏”中的虚构空间。画内世界多重空间的层次嵌套大致遵循正向嵌套、反向嵌套与反射嵌套的模式。摄影与绘画都可唤起视觉“假扮游戏”,但二者的差别在于,摄影具有“通透性”而绘画不具有这一性质。所谓通透性,是指观者通过照片能够在虚构意义上“直接”看到被拍摄物本身。照片作为视觉“假扮游戏”的道具,协助观者维持了与被拍摄物的感知关联,而其作为图像介质的物理性质反而常被视觉忽略。
“假扮游戏”美学的贡献在于,揭示了再现艺术审美欣赏的信疑心理矛盾,开辟了对介乎信疑之间的假装相信这一心理维度的研究；以精神摹拟的概念消解了传统再现论下作品与被摹仿物的匹配性关联,为后现代艺术的阐释提供了支撑；指出再现艺术作品作为虚构世界的模型和“假扮游戏”的平台,只提供生发作品意义的可能性,而非规定作品意义；充分认识到欣赏者的审美意识的自主性,并将之作为再现艺术的基础因素。这些观点补充了艾布拉姆斯艺术四要素图式以及审美接受理论和审美心理学的相关研究。“假扮游戏”美学的局限在于,沃尔顿对“假扮游戏”现象的分析性描述多过确定性界说,难免给人体系驳杂而概念模糊的印象；他对传统摹仿论与再现论的质疑是一种聚焦局限而忽略成就的批判,不是对其在特定社会历史语境下的功与过的辩证评价；从该理论的整体构架来看,图像性的再现艺术是主要研究对象,而同样作为“假扮游戏”的叙事文学审美欣赏未得到同等重视。
“假扮游戏”美学不仅对西方再现艺术及其相关审美问题的阐释适用,也是中国古代审美文化研究的一个具有创新性的切入点。对中国古代艺术及审美文化中“假扮游戏”现象的挖掘有益于沃尔顿“假扮游戏”美学的理论完善,也有助于将中国传统审美文化推广到西方,以“假扮游戏”为话题的中西美学对话的前景令人期待。
The concept of "make-believe" was first proposed by Kendall Walton in his "Pictures and Make-Believe" in1973. He has established the aesthetic theory system based on the core concept "game of make-believe" since then, and it has been more than fourty years till the present day. He claims, aesthetic appreciations towards almost all kinds of representational arts are playing in games of make-believe, in which the players take artworks as props that generate fictional truth. Appreciators as players in the game pretend to believe the fictional truth to be true in the fictional worlds constructed by the work. Since they intend to pretend in full awareness of the fictionality of the characters and the story, this game of make-believe is essentially a kind of mental simulation. Appreciators enter the fictional world inside the work and change the fictional entity with themselves, to mentally and psychologically experience the fictional environment, destiny and plots. The emotional reaction towards the work acquired by the appreciator also presents fictionality to some extent. The representation is therefore realized by simulation of the fictional environment instead of imitation of the objects. To be the representation of something, as a result, is to perform in the game of make-believe as the prop, to generate fictional truth about the represented thing. Thus, game of make-believe as mental simulation is the foundation of representational arts.
Focused on the motives of the aesthetics of make-believe, the preface introduces and analyzes three main reasons why Kendall Walton proposed the concept of make-believe. The construction of the make-believe theory is launched on the basis of the observation of representational arts. The theory concentrates on the attributes that qualify artworks to be representational arts. With those characteristics, novels, romances and stories are more representational than other genres such as the texts in bibliographies and schoolbooks. According to Walton, what those attributes have in common is'fictionality'. Consequently, the second motive to construct the theory of make-believe relies on the meditation of the standard that could differ fictions from non-fictions convincingly. It's nothing easier to solve this problem than the first one. However, to concern with the minimum range of objects would simplify the study and make it more efficient. Walton put forward the concept of'fictional representation' therefore, to make the goal more concentrated. Moreover, it's inevitable to elaborate the concept of'mimesis'when it's to be contemplated. The foundation of representational arts. Thus, the third motive of the make-believe theory is to disprove several traditional perspectives of mimesis, such as the theory of symbolism, the theory of resemblance, the theory of hallucination and the theory of substitutes, as well as the demonstration of'representation'and'mimesis'in terms of linguistic philosophy. By tranforming the term of'mental simulation'borrowed from the congnitive science to the realm of aesthetics and philosphy of art, Walton created a new psychological dimension to the understanding of mimesis and representation, who believed that the activities of make-believe in any circumstances are essentially mental simulation.
The first chapter draws an outline of the category'make-believe'and its related categories as a system, by analysis on five instances chosen from domains of religion, art, life and social culture, which can be defined as phenomena of make-believe. The phenomena of make-believe perform prevalently in human social life, as in the realm of religious ceremony, daydreams and dreams, children's game, gardens designed for the specific theme, play and performance in the theater, masquerade parade on festivals and carnivals.'Make-believe'can be defined as such kind of human behavior that people willingly pretend to believe fictional facts are true in the fictional worlds, thereby also pretend to react to the fictional truth, just like the way they respond to the real stimulations in the real circumstances. The psychological state of make-believe could be taken as one of the main sources from which appreciators are able to acquire aesthetic pleasure during appreciating representational artworks. According to the definition, three propositions are concluded. Imagination is the psychological basis of make-believe. The game of make-believe has to work under the control of specific stipulations that are previously made by players or the designer. Besides, props are primarily necessary for players to perform their fictional identities in the game of make-believe, since props are the basic tools that generate fictional truth. Thus, imagination, the stipulation and props are three dominant elements of the game of make-believe.
Firstly, the psychological activity of imagining is always in the manner that Walton mentioned as first-person manner, namely we are used to imagining certain scenario about ourselves from the deep inside. In the first-person manner imagination, one is usually the protagonist of one's own imaginings. There are six paradigms of imaginings, including spontaneous imaginings, deliberate imaginings, occurent imaginings, nonocurrent imaginings, social imaginings and solitary imaginings. Imagination about oneself plays a crucial role during the game of make-believe, helping players engage in the fictional conditions. Secondly, the stipulation of make-believe game is decided by players or the designer. It prescripts the basic roles of the game and the way to play these roles. On the one hand, with certain stipulation, the application of playing becomes possible and accessible. On the other hand, players have to obey the rules willingly and cooperatively, for the stipulation made by players is actually the joint fantasy, which combines wishes, demands and ideals of all the members. As a result, the stipulation has to be described on the foundation of social imaginings, and followed by all the participants from the very beginning to the end. The prescriptions in the game of make-believe are often constituted by authorities approbated by the majority of the society, especially in religious affairs, children's games and other daily life activities. Similarly, in the aesthetic appreciation of representational artworks, also as a kind of make-believe game, the stipulation namely the method to comprehend the intention, meaning and value of the work is decided by the artists and writers, and interpreted by the critics and collectors. Moreover, the so-called props are things that are able to carry meanings and generate fictional truth. As the prompter of imagining, a prop stimulates imagination about the given fictional worlds, guiding appreciators to imagine certain contents. Sometimes the props also have fictional identities in the game to play roles together with other fictional entities. As to the aesthetic appreciation of representational art, the artwork is the prop in the game of make-believe, which shows the appreciators as players what is going on in the fictional world.
There are two types of props, ad hoc props and given props. Once entering the fictional circumstances of make-believe game, the original and real identities of objects that are going to be used as props would be hid temporarily. The fictional prop identities of them would come forward to the front stage, which are the only admitted identities for them to exist in the fictional world, meaning that the fictional identity of the object is the only true identity that can be used by the players. According to the meaning signified by the prop and its role in the fictional world, games of make-believe appear as two different kinds of make-believe, including prop-oriented make-believe and content-oriented make-believe. In fact, there is no sharp line between prop-oriented make-believe and content-oriented make-believe. On the contrary, they cooperate with each other during playing from time to time. It is related to some aspects, such as the stipulation and stages of the game. The rules that props follow to generate fictional truth are the reality principle and the mutual belief principle. The two principles of generating fictional truth indicate that the mind state of make-believe not merely depends on social understandings of facts in the fictional world, but also on the free will of appreciators. On the one hand, people are likely to pretend to'believe'fictional truth, because those facts are to some extent correlated to reality. On the other hand, it's not hard for them to pretend, because to believe those facts or not is up to themselves.
To expound the question about how remote fictional worlds are from the real world, Walton explored further in the psychological foundation of the game of make-believe and put forward the theory of mental simulation and quasi-emotion. The septum between fictional worlds and the real world cannot be diminished by physical resolutions. It's impossile for the audience to interfere the process of fictional events, or change the destiny of the protagonist, since the audience is in the real world instead of being in the same fictional world with the fictitious entity. However, we are often touched by the fiction, feeling worried about the character, praying with him to hope things get better, and being eager to save him out of the tragedy. It seems that psychological connection is the only way for the audience to break through this septum and get into the world on the stage or in the movie. Walton described the phenomena prevalently exist in the aesthetic appreciation of representational artworks via constructing two representative modes that illustrate two audiences named Henry and Charles. Henry tries to step onto the stage to save the trapped heroine played by the actress, while Charles feels terrified when watching the horror movie about the green slime flowing towards the audience. By the reference of the term'mental simulation'borrowed from cognitive science, Walton studied the emotional state of the audience when appreciating fictions, and named it the'quasi-emotion', which is essentially distinct from the real emotion activated by the real stimulations in reality. Simulators always put themselves in the center of the imagination, which means all the events occurring in the fictional world of one's imagining are about oneself. People do not have to imitate the mental state of others, but to make their own decisions and options with clear consciousness in order to respond to fictional circumstances. That's the characteristic that mental simulation differs from empathy and hallucination. Thus, mental simulation centered on the imaginer per se is the psychological foundation of the make-believe behavior.
First of all, mental simulation does not equal to illusions caused by drugs. Imaginers respond to the fictional situation under the mind state of clear consciousness. The behavior of simulating fictional situations in mind probably takes place in daydreams, aesthetic appreciation and composition of literature and artworks. Secondly, mental simulation is not exactly the same with empathy. The subject of empathy transfers her own personality and emotional feelings to the object that she's empathetic with, via imagining it and getting familiar with it, aiming at understandings of the empathized thing or person. The subject and object of empathy would combine into one during the process. However, the subject of mental simulation takes fictional situations of others as her own, in which she's the protagonist and the center of all perceptions about the fictional world, aiming at acquaintance with herself, instead of adapting to emotions and feelings of others. As a result, simulators do not have to match themselves with the targets, to be the same with the given psychological state, who could gain more freedom than ones in the process of empathy. Moreover, mental simulation is not physical imitation. The objects of physical imitation are something that really exist, which are concrete and easy to be perceived by all the sensibilities, namely people can touch, smell, see, taste and hear them, whereas due to the imaginative quality, it's possible for the subject of mental simulation to observe fictional objects, which do not exist in the real world at all, in a fantastic way. As a consequence, the behavior of mental simulation does not require the subjects to match with the represented objects, neither to resemble nor keep accordance with them.
The aesthetic activities of representational artworks, especially the performance and appreciation of the theater, are full of elements related to mental simulation. When watching the performance, the audience play in the game of make-believe based on the work world and characters, whose experience engenders such kind of emotion like the real feelings but not so real. Charles did not leave the seat even if the green slime was running to him fictionally, which made him really nervous and terrified. The intense mental state of Charles is almost as real as the daily emotion stimulated in the true environment, yet not that kind of real emotion, for it's generated by fictional conditions. Walton preferred calling it the'quasi-emotion', in order to distinguish it from the real feelings with active responses. During the process of appreciating a drama performance, the quasi-emotion of the audience will go through three stages. In the first stage, the audience is immersed in the fictional situation, being stimulated with multiple intense feelings stuck inside himself, which cannot be released by any physical ways. In the next stage after that, the audience tries to figure out the channel to release his quasi-emotions. In the last period, the audience finally realizes that he can imagine himself to be one of the characters on stage, but to change the tragic destiny into the expected one in his own fantasy, which might be distinct from the performing one. In these stages of appreciating the drama, the quasi-emotion can be caused by the contradiction between being helpless stuck in the real world and being eager to interfere with the fictional world.
The generation and the relief of quasi-emotion could be sufficient to illustrate the catharsis effect proposed by Aristotle, namely to release, to purify and to nurture the daily emotion and sensibilities of the citizens in the aesthetic appreciation of the tragic drama performance. When the rational control to stay sitting in his seat is overwhelmed by the impulsion to save the heroine trapped by the villains, Henry rushes up onto the stage to carry her out of the danger. Henry does not save her though, since they are in two different worlds. The catharsis effect represented by Henry thereby remains in the primary relief of quasi-emotion. On the contrary, when the rational control that commands to stay seated overwhelms the implusion of escaping away from the green slime flowing to him, Charles still sits there instead of running out of the cinema, although he's sweating and shivering, terrified by the fictional situation represented on the screen. Since Charles will certainly not be harmed by the green slime, he not merely releases his terror of the monster but also gets it purified. After watching the movie or the play over and over again for many times, it's possible that Henry and Charles would react to the fictional situation more rationally and calmly, who have reached the final destination of catharsis effect as to promote oneself via practising and nurturing in the fictional world. It depends on the aesthetic properties and the faculties of understanding and psychological state of make-believe within different individuals that which aspects of catharsis effects appear in each appreciation experience. To participate more times in games of make-believe generated by the movies or the theaters would be helpful to exercise those faculties and make the nurture more efficient.
The fictional truth generated by artworks acting as props of the make-believe game ought to be about fictitious entities in question, which is true and merely true in fictional worlds, instead of in the real world. Fictional truth can be primary, namely directly generated by the work, or indirectly implied by the primary ones.'The primary fictional truth'being organized into groups in order to generate more complicated'implied fictional truth'is the first step to creat a fictional world. Thus, the construction of the fictional world relies on the connection and implication of fictional truth. The breeding process of fictional truth also presents characteristics in generating process of fictional truth, in accordance with the reality principle and the mutual belief principle.
The theory of possible worlds can be applied to elaborate this question, as the transition and medium between pure fictional worlds and the real world. A possible world is such kind of potential situation that can transform into reality once the conditions needed are fulfilled, whereas a fictional world is less connected with the real world than possible worlds, which might not always have counterparts in reality. Possible worlds cannot exist without the real world. On the contrary, fictional worlds can perform just as well even if not being related to reality, for fantasies and imaginings are as important as, or even more crucial than reality for the construction of fictional worlds. In case of that, the independence and fictionality of representational arts deserve respects, which even work for historical novels, epics, plays and movies with counterparts in accordance. Fictional worlds are not possible worlds in respect of relations with reality. However, as to the mind state of make-believe they may contain, there could be similarities between fictional worlds and possible worlds. The concept of possible worlds emphasizes logical possibilities, which can become reality when conditions are ready; whereas fictional worlds are based on psychological possibilities, which do not need any proof or permission from reality and logic to exist legitimately. The only source of legitimization for fictional worlds and fictional truth is up to the belief of appreciators, which means the mind state of make-believe could decide whether fictional worlds are believable (in the fictional sense) to the audience. The generation of fictional truth not only makes the construction of magnificent possible, but also builds up connections among solitary fictional worlds, nesting them into a huge system, during the process of which, the extent of'believe'has been deepened while the extent of'disbelieve'been diminished. since after being nested and proved by other fictional worlds, the fictional truth with similar contents becomes more convincing.
Based on the reflection of the psychological dimension of fictional worlds, Walton proposed the concepts of work worlds and game worlds. The work world is completely built up on the foundation of the artwork per se, which has close connection with all the fictional truth generated by the work. The game world does not absolutely rely on fictional truth generated by the work, which also absorbs imagined facts created by appreciators, as players in the game of make-believe. Both work worlds and game worlds are fictional worlds with elements of make-believe. With the help of imagination and make-believe, aesthetic pleasure that cannot be fulfilled in work worlds that lack of artistic acqierement would be fulfilled in game worlds. In the game of make-believe, multiple work worlds could be nested on each other to build a larger game world, without questioning about the legitimate identity of existence, which reveals a kind of aesthetic freedom provided by imagination. Walton applied the pair of concepts to explain the aesthetic appreciation of absolute music, aiming at whether it could be qualified as representational arts. According to Walton, absolute music is non-representational by itself in the realm of work worlds. However, it becomes representational after being appreciated by the listener in an aesthetic way, adding imagined fictional truth and vivid images to the work. As a consequence, non-representational absolute music become representational in the game world. Imaginings bring lifeless absolute music into the game of make-believe. The objects represented by the music are created by the listener, instead of being composed by the musician. Accordingly, the imagined fictional truth of the listener performs as the prop in the game of make-believe, generating fictitious facts about the interaction between the listener and the work, instead of the work per se.
There are multiple paradigms of representation, among which narrative representational works like novels, and depictive representational artworks like sketches are the most representative. The narrative representation like novels, epics and scripts of theaters is to represent events and circumstances with literary language, the linguistic nature of which always demands someone to narrate the development of the whole story, no matter whether this'someone'is implicit or explicit. Walton claims that narrators who tell the story are not authors, but characters as fictional as other figures in the work worlds, just like the fact that the apparent artists in depictive representation are not the artists who painted the work, but characters painted in the work as fictional as other images. Narrators live in the fictional worlds, who connect the real world with fictional worlds, namely to connect artists with appreciators as the medium. They act and speak of the fictional truth, in their own perspectives, for readers and the audience. Narrators speak for the author from time to time, filtering events taking place in the fictional worlds and describing them, to the readers, with special observation and position. Readers have to get to know the work worlds with the help of narrators, and observe events through perceptions of narrators, instead of understanding on their own. Therefore, it's the narrator who helps readers to find their fictional identities in the work and play as this fictitious entity in the game of make-believe generated by the work world.
Beyond literary works and other genres with narrative representational qualities, the narrative representation prevalently exists in daily life, especially linguistic communication like metaphors. Walton suggested that it would be more convenient for speakers and listeners to communicate by using metaphorical and make-believe methods to express the signified objects. Metaphors invent the game of make-believe about the implicated targets and the implicating tools, the relation between which generates fictional truth and sets up the fictional circumstance, inviting speakers and listeners to join the game in a linguistic way. Instead of the signified target, the emphasized point of the metaphor concentrates on the process of connecting with something that can imply it. The nature of metaphor is actually to stipulate one thing in frame of the imagination of the other thing. The objects signifying the targets have broadened the view of communicating into the more complicated new realm. The speaker intentionally omits copula in the expression, leaving merely the target and the symbolic medium. The omission of copula conceals the symbolic relation between the two, which indicates the stipulation that the speaker sets for her game of make-believe, to guide listeners to follow and imitate. The objects mentioned with symbolic meaning to signify the represented targets perform as props in the metaphor, which works as the game of make-believe. Consequently, metaphorical expression could be appropriately regarded as prop-oriented make-believe. It's natural for listeners to understand the prescription in the game of make-believe proposed by the metaphor of the speaker, and creat new metaphors according to their own imaginings. The creation of new metaphors qualifies the listener as one of the players in the game of make-believe.
Depictive representation and visual games of make-believe have been discussed in the fifth chapter. Depictions like oil paintings, sketches, etchings and watercolor paintings are such kind of representational artworks that represent objects with images and figures. Depictive representational artworks represent objects and events with two-dimensional and still images, which are more concrete and easier to be perceived directly by eyes than the linguistic representational method of narrative representations. However, the represented objects and events are three or four dimensional and dynamic in the real world. Some other objects to be represented in the paintings are even abstract or not existing, which thereby cannot be perceived in reality. It's believed that the reason why spectators could recognize the images painted in the work, and find the counterparts of them in reality relies on the resemblance between the represented object and its image. Some scholars advocated the reason to be hallucination of human sights. And others like Gombrich tried to explain this visual experience on the basis of the substitute theory. Yet those misunderstandings of the depictive representation have been disproved by Walton according to his theory of visual games of make-believe. The reason why appreciators are able to recognize the images of those represented objects can be explained in terms of the theory on visual games of make-believe. Walton brought forward this concept to adjust the concept of'seeing-in'(seeing X in Y) claimed by Richard Wollheim, who believed to recognize something represented in the depiction is a kind of special visual experience of seeing the represented thing in the depiction. Walton considered the visual experience of seeing-in as playing in the visual game of make-believe, with the depictive representation as the prop. To depict something, thereby, is to creat the prop that would prompt imaginings of the audience about the represented objects in the visual game of make-believe. In the visual game of make-believe about the painting, it's not two-dimensional of the fictional world inside. Spectators would imagine the world to be spatio-temporal, as dynamic as reality. Thus, appreciating the depictive representation is to see through the canvas into a broader fictional environment inside the work world, pretending to believe all that happens fictionally in the painting is true. Artists prefer applying mirrors, curtains, doorframes and windows to divide multiple layers of space for the world inside the painting, which successfully increase the depth of visual experience. There are several forms of organizing multiple layers of space inside the painting, including the obverse side-directed nesting, the reverse side-directed nesting, the reflection-directed nesting.
The first and the most common paradigm to nest space inside and outside the painting is to depict the space according to our visual habit, namely to look in the direction right ahead. To represent the space inside the fictional world in the right direction obverse to the spectator would join the two parts of space together into one in the same direction. Figures in the painting of the obverse side directed space nesting are moving farther away from the audience. Therefore, the space of this nesting paradigm is endless and frameless. It seems to the appreciators that the painting opens a window to somewhere else, inviting them to walk in. The second most common paradigm to nest space inside and outside the painting is to depict the space against our visual habit, namely to represent the space inside the fictional world in the opposite direction to the spectator, which would also join the two parts of space together, but in two contrary directions. Figures in the painting of the reverse side directed space nesting are breaking through the frame, walking out of the depiction and moving closer to the audience. It looks like the painting shows them another world in the reverse direction to the space of reality where they are standing in. According to the way of how scenography works, some parts of the roomspace cannot be seen, for it's blocked by other objects in front, which keep it out of the sight of the painter and the spectator. By drawing mirrors and the roomspace reflected in it, artists connect the scenery that can be seen with the one that cannot be seen. This kind of technique is the reflection-directed depictive nesting, which riches the arrangement of space in the limited scale of the canvas.
The works of depictive representation with the camera and films are transparent, Walton claimed. Transparency is such kind of quality that helps the audience see what actually exists in front of the camera directly. The objects captured in the film show up again in the photo, which can be perceived directly by spectators, just like the visual experience of seeing something face to face with the naked eyes. As the prop in the visual game of make-believe, these photographs maintain the perceptual connection between spectators and the objects shot by the camera.
Walton connected the foundation of representational arts with the behavior of make-believe to prove that all kinds of representational arts are basically games of make-believe, in which the artworks are props that generate fictional truth to establish fictional worlds and invite appreciators to come inside and play. Moreover, Walton proved the affirmations of the resemblance theory, the symbolic theory, the hallucination theory and the theory of substitutes, as well as perspectives on empathy limited and insufficient, via elaborating almost all of the representations are mental simulation in games of make-believe in the psychological dimension. Artists and appreciators mentally simulate the target objects to represent them in fictional worlds, and react to the fictional conditions with quasi-emotion, which differs from the actual emotion stimulated by the real affairs and physical environment elements. In conclusion, mimesis as make-believe is the foundation of representational arts and the aesthetic appreciation of the representational artworks.
Kendall Walton has made significant contribution to western aesthetic study today by proposing the aesthetics of game of make-believe. It reveals the special psychological structure between belief and disbelief in aesthetic appreciation of representational arts, and opens up the new dimension of make-believe to solve the willing suspension of disbelief question proposed by Coleridge. It disconnects the relation between representational artworks and the represented objects authorized by traditional perspectives on representation, providing theoretical support for the interpretation of post-modern arts. It also points out that representational artworks do not stipulate the meaning by themselves, but to present possibilities of generating the meaning, by constructing models of fictional worlds as the aesthetic field of game of make-believe. Walton has realized sufficiently the independency of the audience in aesthetic appreciation, and taken it as the foundamental factor of representational arts. These perspectives of aesthetics of game of make-believe supplements the structure of four elements drew by M.H. Abrams in details, and also broaden the view of studies on aesthetic reception and aesthetic psychology.
However, Walton has analyzed the phenomena of game of make-believe more than defining its concept. He concentrates on the limitations of the theories on representation and mimesis, without dialectically examing their achievements under certain historical and social circumstances. According to the whole structure of Walton's aesthetics, it takes representational arts, especially visual arts as the main subject, whereas paying less attention to the literary works and linguistic game of make-believe to some extent. Besides, the study on Walton's aesthetics of game of make-believe is also available for the interpretation of Chinese traditional aesthetic culture, which is probably helpful for the academic communication between western and China in the realm of aesthetics. Moreover, the reflections on the phenomena of game of make-believe in Chinese traditional aesthetic culture would definitely be enlightening for the study on game of make-believe in the whole world, via popularizing the aesthetic outlook of Chinese tr
引文
① Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art", The Philosophical Review, Vol.79, No.3 (July,1970), pp.334-367.
② Kendall Walton,"Categories and Intentions:A Reply", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.32, No. 2 (Winter,1973), pp.267-268.
① Kendall Walton, "Pictures and Make-Believe", The Philosophical Review, Vol.82, No.3 (July,1973), pp.283-319.
② Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monisl, Vol.58, No.2, Languages of Art (April,1974), pp.236-254.
③ Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. 1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
④ Kendall Walton, "The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns," in Theory Only:Journal of the Michigan Music Theory Society (February/March 1977), pp.3-16.
⑤ Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.75, No. I (January,1978), pp.5-27.
⑥ Kendall Walton, "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds from the Real World?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.37, No.1 (Autumn,1978), pp.11-23.
⑦ Kendall Walton, "Style and the Products and Processes of Art," in The Concept of Style, ed. by Berel Lang (University of Pennsylvania Press,1979), pp.45-66.
⑧ Kendall Walton, "Appreciating Fiction:Suspending Disbelief or Pretending Belief?" Dispositio, Vol.5. No. 13/14(1980), pp.1-18.
⑨ Kendall Walton, "Fiction, Fiction-Making, and Styles of Fictionality," Philosophy and Literature, Vol.7, No.1 (Spring,1983), pp.78-88.
⑩ Kendall Walton, "Transparent Pictures:On the Nature of Photographic Realism," Critical Inquiry, Voi.11, No.2 (December,1984), pp.246-277.
11 Kendall Walton, "Do We Need Fictional Entities?:Notes Toward a Theory," in Rudolf Haller, Aesthetics: Proceedings of the Eighth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Part Ⅰ (Vienna:Holder-Pichler-Tempsky,1984), 179-192.
12 Kendall Walton, "Fictional Entities", in The Reasons of Art:Artworks and the Transformations of Philosophy, edited by Peter McCorrnick (Ottawa:University of Ottawa Press,1985).
① Kendall Walton, "Looking at Pictures and Looking at Things", in Andrew Harrison, ed., Philosophy and the Visual Arts (Reidel,1987), pp.277-300.
② Kendall Walton, "What Is Abstract about the Art of Music?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 46, No.3 (Spring,1988), pp.351-364.
③ Kendall Walton, "Looking Again through Photographs:A Response to Edwin Martin", Critical Inquiry, Vol. 12, No.4 (Summer,1986), pp.801-808.
④ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990).
⑤ Kendall Walton, "Fiction," in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith, Vol.1 (Munich:Philosophia Verlag,1991), pp.274-275.
⑥ Kendall Walton, "Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally," in Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Art:Essays for Richard Wollheim, edited by James Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford:Blackwells,1992), pp.281-291.
⑦ Kendall Walton, "Make-Believe, and its Role in Pictorial Representation and the Acquisition of Knowledge,' Philosophic Exchange (1992), pp.81-95.
⑧ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1, April 1993, pp.39-57.
⑨ Kendall Walton, "On Pictures and Photographs:Objections Answered". In Richard Allen and Murray Smith, editors. Film Theory and Philosophy (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997), pp.60-75.
⑩ Kendall Walton, "Aesthetics, I. Introduction," in The Dictionary of Art, edited by Hugh Brigstocke (London: Macmillan,1994).
11 Kendall Walton, "Understanding Humour and Understanding Music," in The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays," Michael Krausz, ed. (Oxford,1993). Published also in the Journal of Musicology, Vol.11, No. I (1993).
12 Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol.52, No.1, The Philosophy of Music (Winter,1994), pp.47-61.
13 Kendall Walton, "Two Arts That Beat as One (Review of Edward Rothstein, Emblems of Mind:The Inner Life of Music and Mathematics)", The New York Times Book Review (June 16,1995).
14 Kendall Walton, "Projectivism, Empathy, and Musical Tension". In Philosophical Topics, Vol.26, No.l&2 (Spring & Fall,1999), pp.407-440.
① Kendall Walton, "Spelunking, Simulation and Slime:On Being Moved by Fiction". In Mette Hjort and Sue Laver, Emotion and the Arts (Oxford University Press,1997), pp.37-49.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008).
③ Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?" In Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of N on-Existence, edited by Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Center for the Study of Language and Information, (Stanford University press,2000), pp.69-94.
④ Kendall Walton, "Is 'What Is Art?'Really the Question?" (Review of Michael Kelly, editor, Encyclopedia of Aesthetics). Times Literary Supplement (September 29,2000), pp.8-9.
① Kendall Walton, "Depiction, Perception, and Imagination:Responses to Richard Wollheim", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.60, No.1,60th Anniversary Issue (Winter,2002), pp.27-35.
② Kendall Walton, "Restricted Quantification, Negative Existentials, and Fiction", Dialectica, Vol.57, No.2 (2003), pp.241-244.
Kendall Walton, "Landscape and Still Life:Static Representations of Static Scenes", Rivista di Estetica 25 (February,2005), pp.105-116.
④ Kendall Walton, "Aesthetics-What? Why? and Wherefore?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.65, No.2 (Spring,2007), pp.147-161.
① 参见刘心恬：《论沃尔顿美学三原则对文艺本质研究的启示》,载《山东大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),2012年第1期,第148-153页。
⑥ Kendall Walton, "Thoughtwriting-in Poetry and Music", New Literary History; Vol.42, No.3 (Summer, 2011), pp.455-476.
⑦ Kendall Walton, "Pictures, Titles, Depictive Content," In Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts, Volume I, Proceedings of the 33rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg,2010 (Frankfurt:Ontos Verlag,2011).
⑧ Kendall Walton. "Two Kinds of Physicality, in Electronic and Traditional Music", In Bodily Expression in Electronic Music:Perspectives on a Reclaimed Performativity, ed. by Deniz Peters, Gerhard Eckel, and Andreas Dorschel (Routledge,2011).
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① See URL:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation.
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④ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第144-145页。
⑤ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第144页。
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② [俄]巴赫金：《巴赫金全集》(第六卷),李兆林、夏忠宪译,石家庄：河北教育出版社,1998年版,第11页。
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① F. E. Sparshott, "Truth in Fiction", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.26, No.1 (Autumn,1967), pp.3-7.
② Peter J. Rabinowitz, "Truth in Fiction:A Reexamination of Audiences", Critical Inquiry, Vol.4, No.1 (Autumn, 1977), pp.121-141.
③ David Lewis, "Truth in Fiction", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.15, No.1 (January,1978), pp.37-46.
① Eva Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", The British Journal of Aesthetics (1978), pp.31-44.
② David Novitz, "Fiction, Imagination and Emotion", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.38, No.3 (Spring.1980), pp.279-288.
③ Peter McCormick, "Feelings and Fictions", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.43, No.4 (Summer, 1985), pp.375-383.
④ 此书译名参照赵新宇、陆扬、费小平译肯德尔·沃尔顿：《扮假作真的摹仿：再现艺术的基础》,北京：商务印书馆,2013年版。
① Alex Neill, "Fiction and the Emotions",American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.30, No.1 (January,1993), pp.1-13.
② John S. O'Connor, "Seeking Truth in Fiction:Teaching Unreliable Narrators", The English Journal, Vol.83, No. 2 (February,1994), pp.48-50.
③ John F. Phillips, "Truth and Inference in Fiction", Philosophical Studies:An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol.94, No.3 (June,1999), pp.273-293.
④ Thomas Pavel, "Fiction and Imitation", Poetics Today, Vol.21, No.3 (Autumn,2000), pp.521-541.
⑤ Jeanne Deslandes, "A Philosophy of Emoting", Journal of Narrative Theory, Vol.34, No.3, Narrative Emotion: Feeling, Form and Function (Fall,2004), pp.335-372.
⑥ Jerome McGann, "Beauty, the Irreal, and the Willing Assumption of Disbelief
", Critical Inquiry, Vol.30, No.4 (Summer,2004), pp.717-738.
⑦ Tracy C. Davis, "Do You Believe in Fairies?:The Hiss of Dramatic License", Theatre Journal, Vol.57, No.1 (Mar.,2005), pp.57-81.
⑧ Gregory Brazeal, "The Supreme Fiction:Fiction or Fact?", Journal of Modern Literature, Vol.31, No.1 (Fall, 2007), pp.80-100.
⑨ Stephen Davies, "Responding Emotionally to Fictions", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.67, No. 3 (Summer,2009), pp.269-284.
① See R. M. Sainsbury, Fiction and Fictionalism, (London and New York:Routledge,2010).
① Glenn A. Hartz, "How We Can Be Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony", Philosophy, Vol. 74, No.290 (Oct.,1999), pp.557-578.
② Ralph W. Clark, "Fictional Entities:Talking about Them and Having Feelings about Them", Philosophical Studies:An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol.38, No.4 (Nov.,1980), pp.341-349.
③ Alex Neill, "Fear, Fiction and Make-Believe", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.49, No.1 (Winter,1991), pp.47-56.
④ Robert Newsom, "Fear of Fictions", Narrative, Vol.2, No.2 (May,1994), pp.140-151.
⑤ Jerrold Levinson, The Pleasures of Aesthetics:Philosophical Essays (Cornell University Press,1996), pp.288-305.
⑥ Kendall L. Walton, "Empathy, Imagination and Phenomenal Concepts", first given in lecture at California State University (2006); the modified version as speech at 2012 Philosophy Spring Colloquium "The Aesthetic & The Ethical" at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and as seminar talk at Carleton College for Carleton and St. Olaf" Philosophy Department faculty (2012).
⑦ See Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim, "Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60. See also Richard Wollheim, "On Pictorial Representation", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.56, No.3 (Summer,1998), pp.217-226. See also Richard Wollheim, Robert Hopkins, "What Makes Representational Painting Truly Visual?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol.77 (2003), pp.131-147,149-167.
① Kendall L. Walton, "Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally," in Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Art:Essays for Richard Wollheim, edited by James Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford:Blackwells,1992), pp.281-291.
② Kendall Walton, "Depiction, Perception, and Imagination:Responses to Richard Wollheim", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.60, No.1,60th Anniversary Issue (Winter,2002), pp.27-35.
③ Richard Wollheim, "A Note on Mimesis as Make-Believe", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (Vol. 51, No.2, June 1991), pp.401-406.
④ Jerrold Levinson, "Wollheim on Pictorial Representation", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.56, No.3 (Summer,1998), pp.227-233.
⑤ Bence Nanay, "Taking Twofoldness Seriously:Walton on Imagination and Depiction", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.62, No.3 (Summer,2004), pp.285-289.
Dominic Lopes, "Pictures and the Representational Mind", The Monist, Vol.86, No.4, Art and the Mind (October,2003), pp.632-652.
⑦ Patrick Maynard, "Seeing Double", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, No.2 (Spring,1994), pp.155-167.
① Noel Carroll, "On Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.383-387.
② George M. Wilson, "Comments on Mimesis as Make-Believe", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.395-400.
③ Richard Wollheim, "A Note on Mimesis as Make-Believe'", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.401-406.
④ Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Artists in the Shadows:Review of Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe ", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.407-411.
① Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction, (Cambridge University Press,1990), p.xi.
② [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第55页。
③ [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第155页。
④ [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第174页。
⑤ [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第197-198页。
⑥ [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第228页。
① [美]Thomas E.Waternburg：《什么是艺术》,李奉栖等译,重庆：重庆大学出版社,第249页。
② See Jerrold Levinson, The Pleasures of Aesthetics:Philosophical Essays (Cornell University Press,1996), pp. 288-305.
③ Colin Lyas, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", Philosophy, Vol.66, No.258 (Oct.,1991), pp.527-529.
④ Malcolm Budd, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", Mind (New Series), Vol.101, No.401 (Jan.,1992), pp.195-198.
⑤ James Sloan Allen,''Review:Believing Make-Believe", The Sewanee Review. Vol.100, No.2 (Spring,1992), pp. xli-xliii.
⑥ Gregory Currie, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.90, No.7 (Jul.,1993), pp.367-370.
⑦ J. M. Moravcsik, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (Jul.,1993), pp.440-443.
⑧ Noel Carroll, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Quarterly Vol.45, No.178 (Jan.,1995), pp.93-99.
⑨ Robert Howell, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", Synthese, Vol.109, No.3 (Dec.,1996), pp.413-434.
⑨ Ian Ground, "Review (On Marvelous Images:On Values and the Arts by Kendall L. Walton)", Philosophy, Vol. 84, No.329 (Jul.,2009), pp.458-463.
① J. M. Moravcsik, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (July,1993), pp.440-443.
① [波兰]塔塔尔凯维奇：《西方六大美学观念史》,刘文潭译,上海：上海译文出版社,2013年版,第304-318页。
① See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.1-8.
① J. M. Moravcsik,"Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (July,1993), pp.440-443.
② Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics:Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York:Harcourt Brace,1958), pp. 31-32.
③ See William Wimsatt and Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy", The Sewanee Review, Vol.54, No.3 (July-September,1946), pp.468-488. See also George Dickie and W. Kent Wilson, "The Intentional Fallacy:Defending Beardsley", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.53, No.3 (Summer,1995), pp.233-250.
④ Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art", Philosophical Review, Vol.79, Issue 3(1970), pp.334-367.
② See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990). p.7.
③ See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990). p.7.
① [美]鲁晓鹏：《从史实性到虚构性：中国叙事诗学》,王玮译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版,第4页。
① [美]鲁晓鹏：《从史实性到虚构性：中国叙事诗学》,王玮译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版,第3页。
① [英]页布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版,第6贞。
② [美]古德曼：《构造世界的多种方式》,姬志闯译,上海：上海译文出版社,2008年版,第62页。
③ [德]加达默尔：《美的现实性——作为游戏、象征、节目的艺术》,张志扬等译,北京：三联书店,1991年版,第51页。
④ [德]黑格尔：《美学》(第二卷),朱光潜译,北京：商务印书馆,1981年版,第10页。
① Kendall Walton, " Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
① Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
② Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58. No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
③ Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
① [古希腊]业里士多德：《诗学》,陈中梅译注,北京：商务印书馆,2008年版,第113页。
② 参见[英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991 年版。
① See footnotes, Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.4.
② [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第24-25页。
① [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第24-27贞。
② Robert Ranulph Marett, The Threshold of Religion (Kessinger Publishing,1909), p.51.
② [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第27-28页。
④ [英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐一维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版,第8-9页。
① [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第13页。
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.14-15.
② [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第42页。
③ [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第49页。
① [英]琼斯：《剑桥艺术史——18世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第67页。
② [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第44-53页。
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.12.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.39.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.41.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.28.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.29-30.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.30-31.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.14.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.14.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.15.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.15.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.38-39.
① [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第10页。
② [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第42页。
③ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第130-131页。
④ [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第6-7页。
⑤ [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第20页。
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.39.
① 其一是在菲利普四世的王储菲利普诞生之前的版本,描绘的是玛格丽特公主准备受封王位继承人时的情景,其二是王储诞生之后,因玛格丽特公主作为王位继承人的身份丧失,画家不得不修改画作左半部分的内容,同时又因荣获圣地业哥红十字勋章,而将自己画在了涂改后的部位,才形成了今天世人所见的样貌。参见[法]阿拉斯：《我们什么也没看见——部别样的绘画描述集》,何蒨译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版,第130-157页。
① [英]伍德福德：《剑桥艺术史——古希腊岁马艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第40-42贞。
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.21.
Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.38.
① Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.39-40.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.41.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.146.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.144-150.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.145.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.150-160.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.38.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.54.
④ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.151.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.153-154.
② Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
③ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. I, No.l (April,1993), pp.39-57.
① [德]席勒：《审美教育书简》,张玉能译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第299页。
② [美]帕克：《悲剧悖论的解析》,载《开封教育学院学报》,1993年第2期,第13-18页。
① [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年,第17页。
② Kendall Walton,"How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (Fall,1978), pp.11-23.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.195.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.193.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.193.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.193.
② Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.75 (January 1978), pp.5-27.
① Samuel T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton,1983), p.6.
② Eva Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", The British Journal of Aesthetics (1978), pp.31-44.
① Eva Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", The British Journal of Aesthetics (1978), pp.31-44.
② Kendall Walton,"Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy (January,1978), pp.5-27.
① Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy (January,1978), pp.5-27.
② Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy (January,1978), pp.5-27.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.197.
④ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.198.
⑤ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.199.
① Peter Lamarque, "How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions?" The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol.21, No.4 (1981), pp.291-304.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.202.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.241.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.242.
① Kendall Walton, "Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime:On Being Moved by Fiction," in Emotion and the Arts, ed. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver. (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997) pp.37-49.
② Kendall Walton, "Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime:On Being Moved by Fiction," in Emotion and the Arts, ed. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver. (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997) pp.37-49.
③ [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第27页。
④ [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第19页。
① [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第51页。
② [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第51页。
③ 蒋孔阳、李醒尘：《十九世纪西方美学名著选》(德国卷),上海：复旦大学出版社,1990年版,第601页。
④ 蒋孔阳、李酲尘：《十九世纪西方美学名著选》(德国卷),上海：复旦大学出版社,1990年版,第606贞。
⑤ [德]沃林格：《抽象与移情：对艺术风格的心理学研究》,王才勇译,北京：金城出版社,2010年版,第4页。
① 李醒尘：《西方美学史教程》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第333页。
① Kendall Walton, "Empathy, Imagination and Phenomenal Concepts", first given in lecture at California State University (2006); the modified version as speech at 2012 Philosophy Spring Colloquium "The Aesthetic & The Ethical" at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and as seminar talk at Carleton College for Carleton and St. Olaf Philosophy Department faculty (2012).
② [英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐一维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版,第16页。
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.229.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.229-230.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.233.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.236-237.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.233.
① [古希腊]业里士多德：《诗学》,陈中·梅译注,北京：商务印书馆,2008年版,第9页。
② [古希腊]业里十多德：《诗学》,陈中梅译注,北京：商务印书馆,2008年版,第67贞。
③ 罗念生：《卡塔西斯笺释——业理斯多德论悲剧的作用》,载《剧本》,196l年第11期,第81-90页。
④ 朱光潜：《亚理斯多德的美学思想》,载《北京大学学报(人文科学)》,1961年第2期,第45-60页。
① 朱光潜：《业理斯多德的美学思想》,载《北京大学学报(人文科学)》,1961年第2期,第45-60页。
② 罗念生：《卡塔西斯笺释——业理斯多德论悲剧的作用》,载《剧本》,1961年第11期,第81-90贞。
① Wx指的是无法与wf通达的世界,在可与Wf通达的世界Wn……Wfn的情形详见第三节“跨界身份识别与嵌套世界”
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. I (March,1976), pp.49-61.
① J.R.R. Tolkien, "On Fairy-stories", The Tolkien Reader (New York:Ballantine Books,1966), p.38.
② [英]唐纳德·雷诺兹：《剑桥艺术史——19世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第12贞。
① Kendall Walton, "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (Fall,1978), pp.11-23.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008) pp.27-45.
② 冯棉：《“可能世界”概念的基本涵义》,载《华东师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),1995年第6期,第31-37页。
③ 李秀敏：《论可能世界理论中的两个问题》,载《江西教育学院学报》(社会科学),2004年第25卷第1期,第29-32页。
④ 冯棉：《“可能世界”概念的基本涵义》,载《华东师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),1995年第6期,第31-37页。
⑤ 冯棉：《“可能世界”概念的基本涵义》,载《华东师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),1995年第6期,第31-37页。
① 李秀敏：《论可能世界理论中的两个问题》,载《江西教育学院学报》(社会科学),2004年第25卷第1期,第29-32页。
① Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
① 张丽：《文学叙事中的可能性与真实性》,载《江西社会科学》,2012年第11期,第96-101页。
② [美]鲁晓鹏：《从史实性到虚构性：中国叙事诗学》,王玮译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版,第140页。
① 余英时：《红楼梦的两个世界》,上海：上海社会科学院出版社,2002年版,第36页。
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008) pp.27-45.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990) pp.154-155.
② [英]唐纳德·雷诺兹：《剑桥艺术史——19世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第12贞。
① Kendall Walton, "Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary (Volume 68,1994). pp.27-66.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), pp.27-45.
③ Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. I (March,1976), pp.49-61.
④ Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, (New York:Hungry Minds,2001), P18.
① [英]托尔金：《魔戒：魔戒再现》,丁棣译,南京：译林出版社,2001年版,第3页。
② [法]勒内·基拉尔：《浪漫的谎言与小说的真实》,罗芃译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版,第237页。
① 包括俄罗斯电影Portret Doryana Greya" (1915年)美国电影The Picture of Dorian Gray(1916年)德国电影Das Bildnis des Dorian Gray" (19174年)匈牙利电影Az elet kiralya" (1918年)美国电影"The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen" (2003年美国电影The Picture of Dorian Gray" (2006年)及英国电影Dorian Gray" (2009年)等。
① [英]托尔金：《魔戒：魔戒再现》,丁棣译,南京：译林出版社,2001年版,第4页。
① [英]托尔金：《魔戒：魔戒再现》,丁棣译,南京：译林出版社,2001年版,第14页。
① Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy (January,1978), pp.5-27.
① See George R. R. Martin, A Storm of Swords:Book Three of A Song of Ice and Fire (New York:Bantam Dell. 2000).
① Kendall Walton,"Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issuel (Winter,1994), pp.47-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge. Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.106.
① Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
② Kendall Walton,"Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
③ Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
④ Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
① [德]黑格尔：《美学》(第三卷上册),朱光潜译,北京：商务印书馆,1986年版,第344-345页。
② 朱光潜：《悲剧心理学》,北京：三联书店,1996年版,第29-30页。
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.35-37.
④ Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
③ Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. Ⅰ (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. Ⅰ (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
③Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
④ Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. 1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March. 1976), pp.49-61.
③ Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. I (March, 1976). pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles ofNonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
② Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles ofNonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
③ Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
① Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
② Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.Ⅰ, No.l (April,1993), pp.39-57.
③ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
④ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.l (April,1993), pp.39-57.
① 束定芳：《论隐喻的基本类型及句法和语义》,载《外国语》,2000年第l期,第20-28页。
① 束定芳：《论隐喻的本质及语义特征》,载《上海外国语大学学报》,1998年第6期,第10-19贞。
② Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthv Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
③ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
④ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57
⑤ See Richard Moran, "Seeing and Believing:Metaphor, Image, and Force," Critical Inquiry, Vol.16. No. 1 (1989), pp.87-112.
① Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
② 陈嘉映：《语言哲学》,北京：北京大学出版社,2003年版,第361页。
② Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
④ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.l (April,1993), pp.39-57.
⑤ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
① Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No. 1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
② Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
① Liane Lefaivre and Alexander Tzonis:The Emergency of Modern Architecture:A Doncumentary History from 1000 to 1800 (Routledge,2004), p.52.
② [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第5页。
① [德]维特根斯坦：《哲学研究》,陈嘉映译,上海：上海人民出版社,2005年版,第255页。
② [英]唐纳德·雷诺兹：《剑桥艺术史——19世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第32页。
③ Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art," The Philosophical Review Vol.79 (July,1970), pp.334-367.
① Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art," The Philosophical Review Vol.79 (July,1970), pp.334-367.
② Kendall Walton,"Categories of Art," The Philosophical Review Vol.79 (July,1970), pp.334-367.
① [德]席勒：《审美教育书简》,张玉能译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第142-143页。
① [德]席勒：《审美教育书简》,张玉能译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第143页。
① Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim:"Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60.
② Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim:"Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60.
① Richard Wollheim, "On Pictorial Representation", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.56, No.3 (Summer,1998), pp.217-226.
② Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim:"Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60.
① [德]维特根斯坦：《哲学研究》,陈嘉映译,上海：上海人民出版社,2005年版,第172页。
④ Bence Nanay,"Taking Twofoldness Seriously:Walton on Imagination and Depiction", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.62, No.3, (Summer,2004), pp.285-289.
⑤ Richard Wollheim, "Painting as an Art:The Andrew W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts", (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1987), pp.46-47.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.135.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
③ Kendall Walton,"Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
③ Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.245.
④ Kendall Walton,'"Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. I (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.63.
② Kendall Walton, "Pictures, Titles, Depictive Content," In Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts, Volume 1, Proceedings of the 33rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg,2010, edited by Heinrich, Rchard, et al (Frankfurt:Ontos Verlag,2011).
④ Kendall Walton,'"Pictures, Titles, Depictive Content," In Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts, Volume 1, Proceedings of the 33rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg,2010, edited by Heinrich, Rchard, et al (Frankfurt:Ontos Verlag,2011).
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), pp.66-67.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.68.
③ Kendall Walton, "Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally," in Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Art:Essays for Richard Wollheim, edited by James Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford:Blackwells,1992), pp.281-291.
① Kendall Walton, "Depiction, Perception, and Imagination:Responses to Richard Wollheim," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.60, No.1(Winter,2002), pp.27-35.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On l'alues and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.78.
① [英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版,第18页。
② [美]阿恩海姆：《艺术与视知觉》,滕守尧、朱疆源译,成都：四川人民出版社,1998年版,第305贞。
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.54-55.
③ [美]阿恩海姆：《艺术与视知觉》,滕守尧、朱疆源译,成都：四川人民出版社,1998年版,第293页。
⑤ Richard Wollheim, "Painting as an Art:The Andrew W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts", (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1987), pp.46-47.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.55.
① [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第31页。
② [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第36页。罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第31页。
③ [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第36页。
① [英]玛德琳和罗兰德·梅因斯通：《剑桥艺术史——17世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第22页。
① [英]苏珊·伍德福德：《剑桥艺术史——绘画观赏》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第61页。
② [英]罗萨·玛利亚·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第33页。
③ [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第34页。
① 此处“画家”指画作世界中作为虚构个体存在的委拉斯开兹的“形象”,而非现实世界中正在作画的委拉斯开兹。
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), pp.111-112.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.84.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008). p.88.
③ Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.89.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.92.
② [英]约翰·伯格：《另一种讲述的方式》,沈语冰译,桂林：广西帅范大学出版社,2007年版,第81页。
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press.2008), p.85。
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.86。
① 此处为与刘若愚表示“世界”的world相区分,采取universe的直译名“宇宙”。此外,艾布拉姆斯强调这一概念与“自然”的通用性,故在“自然”的近义上使用“宇宙”。但在《镜与灯》的中译本中,译者使用的是“世界”,而非“宇宙”
② [美]艾布拉姆斯：《镜与灯：浪漫主义文论及批评传统》,郦稚牛等译,北京：北京大学出版社,1989年版,第4页。
① James Liu, "Towards A Synthesis of Chinese and Western Theories of Literature", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol.4, Issue 1(1977), pp.1-24. ④ M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp:Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (Oxford University Press, 1953), p.6.
① [美]艾布拉姆斯：《镜与灯：浪漫主义文论及批评传统》,郦稚牛等译,北京：北京大学出版社,1989年版,第5页。
② 蒋孔阳、李醒尘：《十九世纪西方美学名著选》(德国卷),上海：复旦大学出版社,1990年版,第601页。
① Peter Lamarque, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.49, No.2 (Spring,1991), pp.161-166.
① J. M. Moravcsik, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (July.1993), pp.440-443.
② Gregory Currie. "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Journal of Philosphy, Vol.90, No.7 (July,1993), pp.367-370.
③ James Sloan Allen, "Believing Make-Believe", The Sewanee Review, Vol.100,No.2 (Spring,1992), pp. xli-xliii.
① 曾繁仁：《生态文明时代的美学探索与对话》,济南：山东大学出版社,2013年版,第157页。
② 张蓉、韩鹏杰、陆卫明：《中国文化的艺术精神》,西安：西安交通大学出版社,2001年版,第183页。
① 黄杨：《巫、舞、美三位休新证》,《北京舞蹈学院学报》,2009年第3期,第21-26页。
[1]Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art", The Philosophical Review, Vol.79, No.3 (July,1970), pp.334-367.
[2]Kendall Walton, "Categories and Intentions:A Reply", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.32, No.2 (Winter,1973), pp.267-268.
[3]Kendall Walton, "Pictures and Make-Believe", The Philosophical Review, Vol.82, No.3 (July,1973), pp.283-319.
[4]Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2, Languages of Art (April,1974), pp.236-254.
[5]Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation" Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March,1976), pp.49-61.
[6]Kendall Walton, "The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns," in Theory Only: Journal of the Michigan Music Theory Society (February/March 1977), pp.3-16.
[7]Kendall Walton, "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds from the Real World?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.37, No.1 (Autumn,1978),pp.11-23.
[8]Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions", The Journal of Philosophy Vol.75, No.1 (January,1978), pp.5-27.
[9]Kendall Walton, "Style and the Products and Processes of Art," in The Concept of Style, ed. by Berel Lang (University of Pennsylvania Press,1979), pp.45-66.
[10]Kendall Walton, "Appreciating Fiction:Suspending Disbelief or Pretending Belief?" Dispositio, Vol.5, No.13/14, Representation and Fictionality (Invierno-Primavera,1980), pp.1-18.
[11]Kendall Walton, "Fiction, Fiction-Making, and Styles of Fictionality,' Philosophy and Literature, Vol.7, No.1(Spring,1983), pp.78-88.
[12]Kendall Walton, "Transparent Pictures:On the Nature of Photographic Realism,' Critical Inquiry,11/2 (December,1984), pp.246-277.
[13]Kendall Walton, "Do We Need Fictional Entities?:Notes Toward a Theory," in Rudolf Haller, Aesthetics:Proceedings of the Eighth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Part I (Vienna:Holder-Pichler-Tempsky,1984), pp.179-192.
[14]Kendall Walton, "Fictional Entities", in The Reasons of Art:Artworks and the Transformations of Philosophy, edited by Peter McCormick (Ottawa:University of Ottawa Press,1985).
[15]Kendall Walton, "Looking Again through Photographs:A Response to Edwin Martin", Critical Inquiry, Vol.12, No.4 (Summer,1986), pp.801-808.
[16]Kendall Walton, "Looking at Pictures and Looking at Things", in Andrew Harrison, ed., Philosophy and the Visual Arts (Reidel,1987), pp.277-300.
[17]Kendall Walton, "What Is Abstract about the Art of Music?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.46, No.3 (Spring,1988), pp.351-364.
[18]Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990).
[19]Kendall Walton, "Fiction," in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith, Vol.1 (Munich:Philosophia Verlag,1991), pp. 274-275.
[20]Kendall Walton, "Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally," in Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Art:Essays for Richard Wollheim, edited by James Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford:Blackwells,1992), pp.281-291.
[21]Kendall Walton, "Make-Believe, and its Role in Pictorial Representation and the Acquisition of Knowledge," Philosophic Exchange (1992), pp.81-95.
[22]Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
[23]Kendall Walton, "Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary, Volume 68 (1994), pp.27-66.
[24]Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1 (Winter,1994), pp.47-61.
[25]Kendall Walton, "Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime:On Being Moved by Fiction", in Emotion and the Arts, ed. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1997) pp.37-49.
[26]Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000. pp.69-94.
[27]Kendall Walton, "Depiction, Perception, and Imagination:Responses to Richard Wollheim." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.60, No.1 (Winter,2002), pp.27-35.
[28]Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts, New York:Oxford University Press,2008.
[29]Kendall Walton, "Pictures, Titles, Depictive Content," In Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts, Volume 1, Proceedings of the 33rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg,2010, edited by Heinrich, Rchard, etal, Frankfurt:Ontos Verlag,2011.
[30]J.R.R. Tolkien, "On Fairy-stories", The Tolkien Reader, New York:Ballantine Books,1966.
[31]Robert Ranulph Marett, The Threshold of Religion, Kessinger Publishing,1909.
[32]Noel Carroll, "On Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.383-387.
[33]George M. Wilson, "Comments on Mimesis as Make-Believe", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.395-400.
[34]Richard Wollheim, "A Note on Mimesis as Make-Believe", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.401-406.
[35]Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Artists in the Shadows:Review of Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe ", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.407-411.
[36]J. M. Moravcsik, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (July,1993), pp.440-443.
[37]Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics:Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, New York:Harcourt Brace,1958.
[38]William Wimsatt and Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy", The Sewanee Review Vol.54, No.3 (July-September,1946), pp.468-488.
[39]George Dickie and W. Kent Wilson, "The Intentional Fallacy:Defending Beardsley", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.53, No.3 (Summer, 1995), pp.233-250.
[40]Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, (New York:Hungry Minds,2001)
[41]George R. R. Martin, A Storm of Swords:Book Three of A Song of Ice and Fire, New York:Bantam Dell,2000.
[42]Richard Moran, "Seeing and Believing:Metaphor, Image, and Force," Critical Inquiry, Vol.16,No.1 (1989), pp.87-112.
[43]Liane Lefaivre and Alexander Tzonis:The Emergency of Modern Architecture:A Doncumentary History from 1000 to 1800, Routledge,2004.
[44]Brian Laetz, "Kendall Walton's'Categories of Art':A Critical Commentary" British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol.50, No.3 (July,2010), pp.287-306.
[45]Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim:"Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60.
[46]Richard Wollheim, "On Pictorial Representation", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.56, No.3 (Summer,1998), pp.217-226.
[47]Bence Nanay, "Taking Twofoldness Seriously:Walton on Imagination and Depiction",The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.62, No.3 (Summer, 2004), pp.285-289.
[48]Richard Wollheim, "Painting as an Art:The Andrew W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts", Princeton:Princeton University Press,1987, pp.46-47.
[49]Samuel T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton University press,1983).
[50]Eva Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol.18, No.1 (1978), pp.31-44.
[51]Peter Lamarque, "How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions?" British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol.21, No.4 (1981), pp.291-304.
[52]Jerrold Levinson, The Pleasures of Aesthetics:Philosophical Essays, Cornell University Press,1996.
[53]Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction, Cambridge University Press,1990.
[54]Stephen Davies, Definitions of Art, Cornell University Press,1991.
[55]R. M. Sainsbury, Fiction and Fictionalism, Routledge,2010.
[1]罗念生：《卡塔西斯笺释——亚理斯多德论悲剧的作用》,载《剧本》,1961年第11期,第81-90页。
[2]朱光潜：《亚理斯多德的美学思想》,载《北京大学学报(人文科学)》,1961年第2期,第45-60页。
[3]束定芳：《论隐喻的基本类型及句法和语义》,载《外国语》,2000年第1期,第20-28页。
[4]束定芳：《论隐喻的本质及语义特征》,载《上海外国语大学学报》,1998 年第6期,第10-19页。
[5]冯棉：《“可能世界”概念的基本涵义》,载《华东师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),1995年第6期,第31-37页。
[6]李秀敏：《论可能世界理论中的两个问题》,载《江西教育学院学报》(社会科学),2004年第25卷第1期,第29-32页。
[7]张丽：《文学叙事中的可能性与真实性》,载《江西社会科学》,2012年第11期,第96—101页。
[8]黄杨：《巫、舞、美三位一体新证》,《北京舞蹈学院学报》,2009年第3期,第21-26页。
[1][美]沃尔顿：《扮假作真的摹仿：再现艺术的基础》,赵新宇、陆扬、费小平译,北京：商务印书馆,2013年版。
[2][美]鲁晓鹏：《从史实性到虚构性：中国叙事诗学》,王玮译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版。
[3][英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐一维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版。
[4][美]纳尔逊·古德曼：《构造世界的多种方式》,姬志闯译,上海：上海译文出版社,2008年版,第62页。
[5][德]加达默尔：《美的现实性——作为游戏、象征、节日的艺术》,张志扬等译,北京：三联书店,1991年版。
[6][德]黑格尔：《美学》(第二卷上册),朱光潜译,北京：商务印书馆,1981年版。
[7][古希腊]亚里士多德：《诗学》,陈中梅译注,北京：商务印书馆,2008年版。
[8][德]席勒：《审美教育书简》,张玉能译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[9][荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版。
[10][奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版。
[11][英]琼斯：《剑桥艺术史——18世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[12][德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版。
[13][德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版。
[14][法]阿拉斯：《我们什么也没看见——一部别样的绘画描述集》,何蒨译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版。
[15][英]伍德福德：《剑桥艺术史——古希腊罗马艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[16][英]唐纳德·雷诺兹：《剑桥艺术史——19世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[17]余英时：《红楼梦的两个世界》,上海：上海社会科学院出版社,2002年版。
[18][英]托尔金：《魔戒：魔戒再现》,丁棣译,南京：译林出版社,2001年版。
[19][法]勒内·基拉尔：《浪漫的谎言与小说的真实》,罗芃译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版。
[20][德]黑格尔：《美学》(第三卷上册),朱光潜译,北京：商务印书馆,1986年版。
[21]朱光潜：《悲剧心理学》,北京：三联书店,1996年版。
[22]陈嘉映：《语言哲学》,北京：北京大学出版社,2003年版。
[23][英]罗萨·玛利亚·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[24][德]维特根斯坦：《哲学研究》,陈嘉映译,上海：上海人民出版社,2005年版。
[25][美]阿恩海姆：《艺术与视知觉》,滕守尧、朱疆源译,成都：四川人民出版社,1998年版。
[26][英]玛德琳·梅因斯通、罗兰德·梅因斯通：《剑桥艺术史——17世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[27][英]苏珊·伍德福德：《剑桥艺术史——绘画观赏》,钱承旦译,南 京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[28][英]约翰·伯格：《另一种讲述的方式》,沈语冰译,桂林：广西师范大学出版社,2007年版。
[29]蒋孔阳、李醒尘：《十九世纪西方美学名著选》(德国卷),上海：复旦大学出版社,1990年版。
[30][德]沃林格：《抽象与移情：对艺术风格的心理学研究》,王才勇译,北京：金城出版社,2010年版。
[31]李醒尘：《西方美学史教程》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版。
[32][波兰]塔塔尔凯维奇：《西方六大美学观念史》,刘文潭译,上海：上海译文出版社,2013年版
[33][美]彼得·基维：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版。
[34][英]伯特兰·罗素：《心的分析》,北京：商务印书馆,2012年版。
[35][美]托马斯·沃滕伯格：《什么是艺术》,李奉栖等译,重庆：重庆大学出版社,2011年版。
[36][德]沃尔夫冈·伊瑟尔：《虚构与想象——文学人类学疆界》,陈定家、汪正龙等译,长春：吉林人民出版社,2001年版。
[37][美]纳尔逊·古德曼：《事实、虚构和预测》,刘华杰译,北京：商务印书馆,2007年版。
[38][英]吉尔伯特·赖尔：《心的概念》,徐大建译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版。
[39]朱立元主编：《西方美学范畴史》(第三卷),太原：山西教育出版社,2006年版。
[40]王杰：《审美幻象研究：现代美学导论》,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版。
[41]曾繁仁：《生态文明时代的美学探索与对话》,济南：山东大学出版社,2013年版。
② Kendall Walton,"Categories and Intentions:A Reply", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.32, No. 2 (Winter,1973), pp.267-268.
① Kendall Walton, "Pictures and Make-Believe", The Philosophical Review, Vol.82, No.3 (July,1973), pp.283-319.
② Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monisl, Vol.58, No.2, Languages of Art (April,1974), pp.236-254.
③ Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. 1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
④ Kendall Walton, "The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns," in Theory Only:Journal of the Michigan Music Theory Society (February/March 1977), pp.3-16.
⑤ Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.75, No. I (January,1978), pp.5-27.
⑥ Kendall Walton, "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds from the Real World?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.37, No.1 (Autumn,1978), pp.11-23.
⑦ Kendall Walton, "Style and the Products and Processes of Art," in The Concept of Style, ed. by Berel Lang (University of Pennsylvania Press,1979), pp.45-66.
⑧ Kendall Walton, "Appreciating Fiction:Suspending Disbelief or Pretending Belief?" Dispositio, Vol.5. No. 13/14(1980), pp.1-18.
⑨ Kendall Walton, "Fiction, Fiction-Making, and Styles of Fictionality," Philosophy and Literature, Vol.7, No.1 (Spring,1983), pp.78-88.
⑩ Kendall Walton, "Transparent Pictures:On the Nature of Photographic Realism," Critical Inquiry, Voi.11, No.2 (December,1984), pp.246-277.
11 Kendall Walton, "Do We Need Fictional Entities?:Notes Toward a Theory," in Rudolf Haller, Aesthetics: Proceedings of the Eighth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Part Ⅰ (Vienna:Holder-Pichler-Tempsky,1984), 179-192.
12 Kendall Walton, "Fictional Entities", in The Reasons of Art:Artworks and the Transformations of Philosophy, edited by Peter McCorrnick (Ottawa:University of Ottawa Press,1985).
① Kendall Walton, "Looking at Pictures and Looking at Things", in Andrew Harrison, ed., Philosophy and the Visual Arts (Reidel,1987), pp.277-300.
② Kendall Walton, "What Is Abstract about the Art of Music?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 46, No.3 (Spring,1988), pp.351-364.
③ Kendall Walton, "Looking Again through Photographs:A Response to Edwin Martin", Critical Inquiry, Vol. 12, No.4 (Summer,1986), pp.801-808.
④ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990).
⑤ Kendall Walton, "Fiction," in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith, Vol.1 (Munich:Philosophia Verlag,1991), pp.274-275.
⑥ Kendall Walton, "Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally," in Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Art:Essays for Richard Wollheim, edited by James Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford:Blackwells,1992), pp.281-291.
⑦ Kendall Walton, "Make-Believe, and its Role in Pictorial Representation and the Acquisition of Knowledge,' Philosophic Exchange (1992), pp.81-95.
⑧ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1, April 1993, pp.39-57.
⑨ Kendall Walton, "On Pictures and Photographs:Objections Answered". In Richard Allen and Murray Smith, editors. Film Theory and Philosophy (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997), pp.60-75.
⑩ Kendall Walton, "Aesthetics, I. Introduction," in The Dictionary of Art, edited by Hugh Brigstocke (London: Macmillan,1994).
11 Kendall Walton, "Understanding Humour and Understanding Music," in The Interpretation of Music: Philosophical Essays," Michael Krausz, ed. (Oxford,1993). Published also in the Journal of Musicology, Vol.11, No. I (1993).
12 Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol.52, No.1, The Philosophy of Music (Winter,1994), pp.47-61.
13 Kendall Walton, "Two Arts That Beat as One (Review of Edward Rothstein, Emblems of Mind:The Inner Life of Music and Mathematics)", The New York Times Book Review (June 16,1995).
14 Kendall Walton, "Projectivism, Empathy, and Musical Tension". In Philosophical Topics, Vol.26, No.l&2 (Spring & Fall,1999), pp.407-440.
① Kendall Walton, "Spelunking, Simulation and Slime:On Being Moved by Fiction". In Mette Hjort and Sue Laver, Emotion and the Arts (Oxford University Press,1997), pp.37-49.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008).
③ Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?" In Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of N on-Existence, edited by Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Center for the Study of Language and Information, (Stanford University press,2000), pp.69-94.
④ Kendall Walton, "Is 'What Is Art?'Really the Question?" (Review of Michael Kelly, editor, Encyclopedia of Aesthetics). Times Literary Supplement (September 29,2000), pp.8-9.
① Kendall Walton, "Depiction, Perception, and Imagination:Responses to Richard Wollheim", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.60, No.1,60th Anniversary Issue (Winter,2002), pp.27-35.
② Kendall Walton, "Restricted Quantification, Negative Existentials, and Fiction", Dialectica, Vol.57, No.2 (2003), pp.241-244.
Kendall Walton, "Landscape and Still Life:Static Representations of Static Scenes", Rivista di Estetica 25 (February,2005), pp.105-116.
④ Kendall Walton, "Aesthetics-What? Why? and Wherefore?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.65, No.2 (Spring,2007), pp.147-161.
① 参见刘心恬：《论沃尔顿美学三原则对文艺本质研究的启示》,载《山东大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),2012年第1期,第148-153页。
⑥ Kendall Walton, "Thoughtwriting-in Poetry and Music", New Literary History; Vol.42, No.3 (Summer, 2011), pp.455-476.
⑦ Kendall Walton, "Pictures, Titles, Depictive Content," In Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts, Volume I, Proceedings of the 33rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg,2010 (Frankfurt:Ontos Verlag,2011).
⑧ Kendall Walton. "Two Kinds of Physicality, in Electronic and Traditional Music", In Bodily Expression in Electronic Music:Perspectives on a Reclaimed Performativity, ed. by Deniz Peters, Gerhard Eckel, and Andreas Dorschel (Routledge,2011).
① [波兰]塔塔尔凯维奇：《西方六大美学观念史》,刘文潭译,上海：上海译文出版社,2013年版,第304-314页。
② [波兰]塔塔尔凯维奇：《西方六大美学观念史》,刘文潭译,上海：上海译文出版社,2013年版,第308页。
③ [波兰]塔塔尔凯维奇：《西方六大美学观念史》,刘文潭译,上海：上海译文出版社,2013年版,第312页。
④ [波兰]塔塔尔凯维奇：《西方六大美学观念史》,刘文潭译,上海：上海译文出版社,2013年版,第312页。⑤ See URL:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation.
① See URL:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation.
① [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第42页。
② [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第43页。
③ [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第44页。
④ [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第49页。
⑤ [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第50页。
① [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第9页。
② [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第10页。
③ [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第20页。
④ [英]吉尔伯特·赖尔：《心的概念》,徐大建译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第323页。
⑤ [英]吉尔伯特·赖尔：《心的概念》,徐大建译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第322页。
⑥ [英]吉尔伯特·赖尔：《心的概念》,徐大建译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第322页。
① [英]吉尔伯特·赖尔：《心的概念》,徐大建译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版,第323页。
② [美]阿恩海姆：《艺术与视知觉》,滕守尧、朱疆源译,成都：四川人民出版社,1998年版,第163页。
③ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第147页。
④ [德]伽达默尔：《美的现实性——作为游戏、象征、节目的艺术》,张志扬等译,北京：三联书店,1991年版,第57-58页。
⑤ [德]伽达默尔：《美的现实性——作为游戏、象征、节目的艺术》,张志扬等译,北京：三联书店,1991年版,第56-57页。
⑥ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第144页。
① [德]伽达默尔：《美的现实性——作为游戏、象征、节目的艺术》,张志扬等译,北京：三联书店,1991年版,第64贞。
② [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第143-144页。
③ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第142页。
④ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第144-145页。
⑤ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第144页。
⑥ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第137页。
① 英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版,第2-16页。.
② [俄]巴赫金：《巴赫金全集》(第六卷),李兆林、夏忠宪译,石家庄：河北教育出版社,1998年版,第11页。
③ [俄]巴赫金：《巴赫金全集》(第六卷),李兆林、夏忠宪译,石家庄：河北教育出版社,1998年版,第6贞。
④ [俄]巴赫金：《巴赫金全集》(第六卷),李兆林、夏忠宪译,石家庄：河北教育出版社,1998年版,第1l页。
⑤ [俄]巴赫金：《巴赫金全集》(第六卷),李兆林、夏忠宪译,石家庄：河北教育出版社,1998年版,第8页。
⑥ [俄]巴赫金：《巴赫金全集》(第六卷),李兆林、夏忠宪译,石家庄：河北教育出版社,1998年版,第8页。
⑦ [俄]巴赫金：《巴赫金全集》(第六卷),李兆林、夏忠宪译,石家庄：河北教育出版社,1998年版,第15页。
① F. E. Sparshott, "Truth in Fiction", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.26, No.1 (Autumn,1967), pp.3-7.
② Peter J. Rabinowitz, "Truth in Fiction:A Reexamination of Audiences", Critical Inquiry, Vol.4, No.1 (Autumn, 1977), pp.121-141.
③ David Lewis, "Truth in Fiction", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.15, No.1 (January,1978), pp.37-46.
① Eva Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", The British Journal of Aesthetics (1978), pp.31-44.
② David Novitz, "Fiction, Imagination and Emotion", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.38, No.3 (Spring.1980), pp.279-288.
③ Peter McCormick, "Feelings and Fictions", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.43, No.4 (Summer, 1985), pp.375-383.
④ 此书译名参照赵新宇、陆扬、费小平译肯德尔·沃尔顿：《扮假作真的摹仿：再现艺术的基础》,北京：商务印书馆,2013年版。
① Alex Neill, "Fiction and the Emotions",American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.30, No.1 (January,1993), pp.1-13.
② John S. O'Connor, "Seeking Truth in Fiction:Teaching Unreliable Narrators", The English Journal, Vol.83, No. 2 (February,1994), pp.48-50.
③ John F. Phillips, "Truth and Inference in Fiction", Philosophical Studies:An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol.94, No.3 (June,1999), pp.273-293.
④ Thomas Pavel, "Fiction and Imitation", Poetics Today, Vol.21, No.3 (Autumn,2000), pp.521-541.
⑤ Jeanne Deslandes, "A Philosophy of Emoting", Journal of Narrative Theory, Vol.34, No.3, Narrative Emotion: Feeling, Form and Function (Fall,2004), pp.335-372.
⑥ Jerome McGann, "Beauty, the Irreal, and the Willing Assumption of Disbelief
", Critical Inquiry, Vol.30, No.4 (Summer,2004), pp.717-738.
⑦ Tracy C. Davis, "Do You Believe in Fairies?:The Hiss of Dramatic License", Theatre Journal, Vol.57, No.1 (Mar.,2005), pp.57-81.
⑧ Gregory Brazeal, "The Supreme Fiction:Fiction or Fact?", Journal of Modern Literature, Vol.31, No.1 (Fall, 2007), pp.80-100.
⑨ Stephen Davies, "Responding Emotionally to Fictions", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.67, No. 3 (Summer,2009), pp.269-284.
① See R. M. Sainsbury, Fiction and Fictionalism, (London and New York:Routledge,2010).
① Glenn A. Hartz, "How We Can Be Moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony", Philosophy, Vol. 74, No.290 (Oct.,1999), pp.557-578.
② Ralph W. Clark, "Fictional Entities:Talking about Them and Having Feelings about Them", Philosophical Studies:An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol.38, No.4 (Nov.,1980), pp.341-349.
③ Alex Neill, "Fear, Fiction and Make-Believe", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.49, No.1 (Winter,1991), pp.47-56.
④ Robert Newsom, "Fear of Fictions", Narrative, Vol.2, No.2 (May,1994), pp.140-151.
⑤ Jerrold Levinson, The Pleasures of Aesthetics:Philosophical Essays (Cornell University Press,1996), pp.288-305.
⑥ Kendall L. Walton, "Empathy, Imagination and Phenomenal Concepts", first given in lecture at California State University (2006); the modified version as speech at 2012 Philosophy Spring Colloquium "The Aesthetic & The Ethical" at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and as seminar talk at Carleton College for Carleton and St. Olaf" Philosophy Department faculty (2012).
⑦ See Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim, "Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60. See also Richard Wollheim, "On Pictorial Representation", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.56, No.3 (Summer,1998), pp.217-226. See also Richard Wollheim, Robert Hopkins, "What Makes Representational Painting Truly Visual?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol.77 (2003), pp.131-147,149-167.
① Kendall L. Walton, "Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally," in Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Art:Essays for Richard Wollheim, edited by James Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford:Blackwells,1992), pp.281-291.
② Kendall Walton, "Depiction, Perception, and Imagination:Responses to Richard Wollheim", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.60, No.1,60th Anniversary Issue (Winter,2002), pp.27-35.
③ Richard Wollheim, "A Note on Mimesis as Make-Believe", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (Vol. 51, No.2, June 1991), pp.401-406.
④ Jerrold Levinson, "Wollheim on Pictorial Representation", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.56, No.3 (Summer,1998), pp.227-233.
⑤ Bence Nanay, "Taking Twofoldness Seriously:Walton on Imagination and Depiction", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.62, No.3 (Summer,2004), pp.285-289.
Dominic Lopes, "Pictures and the Representational Mind", The Monist, Vol.86, No.4, Art and the Mind (October,2003), pp.632-652.
⑦ Patrick Maynard, "Seeing Double", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, No.2 (Spring,1994), pp.155-167.
① Noel Carroll, "On Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.383-387.
② George M. Wilson, "Comments on Mimesis as Make-Believe", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.395-400.
③ Richard Wollheim, "A Note on Mimesis as Make-Believe'", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.401-406.
④ Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Artists in the Shadows:Review of Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe ", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol.51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.407-411.
① Gregory Currie, The Nature of Fiction, (Cambridge University Press,1990), p.xi.
② [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第55页。
③ [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第155页。
④ [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第174页。
⑤ [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第197-198页。
⑥ [美]彼得·基维主编：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版,第228页。
① [美]Thomas E.Waternburg：《什么是艺术》,李奉栖等译,重庆：重庆大学出版社,第249页。
② See Jerrold Levinson, The Pleasures of Aesthetics:Philosophical Essays (Cornell University Press,1996), pp. 288-305.
③ Colin Lyas, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", Philosophy, Vol.66, No.258 (Oct.,1991), pp.527-529.
④ Malcolm Budd, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", Mind (New Series), Vol.101, No.401 (Jan.,1992), pp.195-198.
⑤ James Sloan Allen,''Review:Believing Make-Believe", The Sewanee Review. Vol.100, No.2 (Spring,1992), pp. xli-xliii.
⑥ Gregory Currie, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.90, No.7 (Jul.,1993), pp.367-370.
⑦ J. M. Moravcsik, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (Jul.,1993), pp.440-443.
⑧ Noel Carroll, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Quarterly Vol.45, No.178 (Jan.,1995), pp.93-99.
⑨ Robert Howell, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", Synthese, Vol.109, No.3 (Dec.,1996), pp.413-434.
⑨ Ian Ground, "Review (On Marvelous Images:On Values and the Arts by Kendall L. Walton)", Philosophy, Vol. 84, No.329 (Jul.,2009), pp.458-463.
① J. M. Moravcsik, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the Representational Arts by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (July,1993), pp.440-443.
① [波兰]塔塔尔凯维奇：《西方六大美学观念史》,刘文潭译,上海：上海译文出版社,2013年版,第304-318页。
① See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.1-8.
① J. M. Moravcsik,"Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (July,1993), pp.440-443.
② Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics:Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York:Harcourt Brace,1958), pp. 31-32.
③ See William Wimsatt and Beardsley, "The Intentional Fallacy", The Sewanee Review, Vol.54, No.3 (July-September,1946), pp.468-488. See also George Dickie and W. Kent Wilson, "The Intentional Fallacy:Defending Beardsley", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.53, No.3 (Summer,1995), pp.233-250.
④ Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art", Philosophical Review, Vol.79, Issue 3(1970), pp.334-367.
② See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990). p.7.
③ See Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990). p.7.
① [美]鲁晓鹏：《从史实性到虚构性：中国叙事诗学》,王玮译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版,第4页。
① [美]鲁晓鹏：《从史实性到虚构性：中国叙事诗学》,王玮译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版,第3页。
① [英]页布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版,第6贞。
② [美]古德曼：《构造世界的多种方式》,姬志闯译,上海：上海译文出版社,2008年版,第62页。
③ [德]加达默尔：《美的现实性——作为游戏、象征、节目的艺术》,张志扬等译,北京：三联书店,1991年版,第51页。
④ [德]黑格尔：《美学》(第二卷),朱光潜译,北京：商务印书馆,1981年版,第10页。
① Kendall Walton, " Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
① Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
② Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58. No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
③ Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
① [古希腊]业里士多德：《诗学》,陈中梅译注,北京：商务印书馆,2008年版,第113页。
② 参见[英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991 年版。
① See footnotes, Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.4.
② [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第24-25页。
① [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第24-27贞。
② Robert Ranulph Marett, The Threshold of Religion (Kessinger Publishing,1909), p.51.
② [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第27-28页。
④ [英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐一维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版,第8-9页。
① [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第13页。
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.14-15.
② [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第42页。
③ [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第49页。
① [英]琼斯：《剑桥艺术史——18世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第67页。
② [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第44-53页。
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.12.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.39.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.41.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.28.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.29-30.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.30-31.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.14.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.14.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.15.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.15.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.38-39.
① [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第10页。
② [奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版,第42页。
③ [德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版,第130-131页。
④ [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第6-7页。
⑤ [荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版,第20页。
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.39.
① 其一是在菲利普四世的王储菲利普诞生之前的版本,描绘的是玛格丽特公主准备受封王位继承人时的情景,其二是王储诞生之后,因玛格丽特公主作为王位继承人的身份丧失,画家不得不修改画作左半部分的内容,同时又因荣获圣地业哥红十字勋章,而将自己画在了涂改后的部位,才形成了今天世人所见的样貌。参见[法]阿拉斯：《我们什么也没看见——部别样的绘画描述集》,何蒨译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版,第130-157页。
① [英]伍德福德：《剑桥艺术史——古希腊岁马艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第40-42贞。
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.21.
Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.38.
① Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.39-40.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.41.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.146.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.144-150.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.145.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.150-160.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.38.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.54.
④ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.151.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.153-154.
② Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
③ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. I, No.l (April,1993), pp.39-57.
① [德]席勒：《审美教育书简》,张玉能译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第299页。
② [美]帕克：《悲剧悖论的解析》,载《开封教育学院学报》,1993年第2期,第13-18页。
① [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年,第17页。
② Kendall Walton,"How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (Fall,1978), pp.11-23.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.195.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.193.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.193.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.193.
② Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.75 (January 1978), pp.5-27.
① Samuel T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton,1983), p.6.
② Eva Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", The British Journal of Aesthetics (1978), pp.31-44.
① Eva Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", The British Journal of Aesthetics (1978), pp.31-44.
② Kendall Walton,"Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy (January,1978), pp.5-27.
① Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy (January,1978), pp.5-27.
② Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy (January,1978), pp.5-27.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.197.
④ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.198.
⑤ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.199.
① Peter Lamarque, "How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions?" The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol.21, No.4 (1981), pp.291-304.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.202.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.241.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.242.
① Kendall Walton, "Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime:On Being Moved by Fiction," in Emotion and the Arts, ed. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver. (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997) pp.37-49.
② Kendall Walton, "Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime:On Being Moved by Fiction," in Emotion and the Arts, ed. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver. (Oxford:Oxford University Press,1997) pp.37-49.
③ [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第27页。
④ [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第19页。
① [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第51页。
② [德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版,第51页。
③ 蒋孔阳、李醒尘：《十九世纪西方美学名著选》(德国卷),上海：复旦大学出版社,1990年版,第601页。
④ 蒋孔阳、李酲尘：《十九世纪西方美学名著选》(德国卷),上海：复旦大学出版社,1990年版,第606贞。
⑤ [德]沃林格：《抽象与移情：对艺术风格的心理学研究》,王才勇译,北京：金城出版社,2010年版,第4页。
① 李醒尘：《西方美学史教程》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版,第333页。
① Kendall Walton, "Empathy, Imagination and Phenomenal Concepts", first given in lecture at California State University (2006); the modified version as speech at 2012 Philosophy Spring Colloquium "The Aesthetic & The Ethical" at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; and as seminar talk at Carleton College for Carleton and St. Olaf Philosophy Department faculty (2012).
② [英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐一维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版,第16页。
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.229.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.229-230.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.233.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.236-237.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.233.
① [古希腊]业里士多德：《诗学》,陈中·梅译注,北京：商务印书馆,2008年版,第9页。
② [古希腊]业里十多德：《诗学》,陈中梅译注,北京：商务印书馆,2008年版,第67贞。
③ 罗念生：《卡塔西斯笺释——业理斯多德论悲剧的作用》,载《剧本》,196l年第11期,第81-90页。
④ 朱光潜：《亚理斯多德的美学思想》,载《北京大学学报(人文科学)》,1961年第2期,第45-60页。
① 朱光潜：《业理斯多德的美学思想》,载《北京大学学报(人文科学)》,1961年第2期,第45-60页。
② 罗念生：《卡塔西斯笺释——业理斯多德论悲剧的作用》,载《剧本》,1961年第11期,第81-90贞。
① Wx指的是无法与wf通达的世界,在可与Wf通达的世界Wn……Wfn的情形详见第三节“跨界身份识别与嵌套世界”
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. I (March,1976), pp.49-61.
① J.R.R. Tolkien, "On Fairy-stories", The Tolkien Reader (New York:Ballantine Books,1966), p.38.
② [英]唐纳德·雷诺兹：《剑桥艺术史——19世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第12贞。
① Kendall Walton, "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds From the Real World?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (Fall,1978), pp.11-23.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008) pp.27-45.
② 冯棉：《“可能世界”概念的基本涵义》,载《华东师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),1995年第6期,第31-37页。
③ 李秀敏：《论可能世界理论中的两个问题》,载《江西教育学院学报》(社会科学),2004年第25卷第1期,第29-32页。
④ 冯棉：《“可能世界”概念的基本涵义》,载《华东师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),1995年第6期,第31-37页。
⑤ 冯棉：《“可能世界”概念的基本涵义》,载《华东师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),1995年第6期,第31-37页。
① 李秀敏：《论可能世界理论中的两个问题》,载《江西教育学院学报》(社会科学),2004年第25卷第1期,第29-32页。
① Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2 (April,1974), pp.236-254.
① 张丽：《文学叙事中的可能性与真实性》,载《江西社会科学》,2012年第11期,第96-101页。
② [美]鲁晓鹏：《从史实性到虚构性：中国叙事诗学》,王玮译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版,第140页。
① 余英时：《红楼梦的两个世界》,上海：上海社会科学院出版社,2002年版,第36页。
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008) pp.27-45.
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990) pp.154-155.
② [英]唐纳德·雷诺兹：《剑桥艺术史——19世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第12贞。
① Kendall Walton, "Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary (Volume 68,1994). pp.27-66.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), pp.27-45.
③ Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. I (March,1976), pp.49-61.
④ Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, (New York:Hungry Minds,2001), P18.
① [英]托尔金：《魔戒：魔戒再现》,丁棣译,南京：译林出版社,2001年版,第3页。
② [法]勒内·基拉尔：《浪漫的谎言与小说的真实》,罗芃译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版,第237页。
① 包括俄罗斯电影Portret Doryana Greya" (1915年)美国电影The Picture of Dorian Gray(1916年)德国电影Das Bildnis des Dorian Gray" (19174年)匈牙利电影Az elet kiralya" (1918年)美国电影"The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen" (2003年美国电影The Picture of Dorian Gray" (2006年)及英国电影Dorian Gray" (2009年)等。
① [英]托尔金：《魔戒：魔戒再现》,丁棣译,南京：译林出版社,2001年版,第4页。
① [英]托尔金：《魔戒：魔戒再现》,丁棣译,南京：译林出版社,2001年版,第14页。
① Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions," The Journal of Philosophy (January,1978), pp.5-27.
① See George R. R. Martin, A Storm of Swords:Book Three of A Song of Ice and Fire (New York:Bantam Dell. 2000).
① Kendall Walton,"Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issuel (Winter,1994), pp.47-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
② Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge. Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.106.
① Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
② Kendall Walton,"Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
③ Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
④ Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
① [德]黑格尔：《美学》(第三卷上册),朱光潜译,北京：商务印书馆,1986年版,第344-345页。
② 朱光潜：《悲剧心理学》,北京：三联书店,1996年版,第29-30页。
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.35-37.
④ Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
③ Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1(1994), pp.47-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. Ⅰ (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. Ⅰ (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
③Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
④ Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. 1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March. 1976), pp.49-61.
③ Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. I (March, 1976). pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles ofNonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
② Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles ofNonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
③ Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
① Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
② Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.Ⅰ, No.l (April,1993), pp.39-57.
③ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
④ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.l (April,1993), pp.39-57.
① 束定芳：《论隐喻的基本类型及句法和语义》,载《外国语》,2000年第l期,第20-28页。
① 束定芳：《论隐喻的本质及语义特征》,载《上海外国语大学学报》,1998年第6期,第10-19贞。
② Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthv Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence (Stanford:Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000), pp.69-94.
③ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
④ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57
⑤ See Richard Moran, "Seeing and Believing:Metaphor, Image, and Force," Critical Inquiry, Vol.16. No. 1 (1989), pp.87-112.
① Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
② 陈嘉映：《语言哲学》,北京：北京大学出版社,2003年版,第361页。
② Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
④ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.l (April,1993), pp.39-57.
⑤ Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
① Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No. 1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
② Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
① Liane Lefaivre and Alexander Tzonis:The Emergency of Modern Architecture:A Doncumentary History from 1000 to 1800 (Routledge,2004), p.52.
② [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第5页。
① [德]维特根斯坦：《哲学研究》,陈嘉映译,上海：上海人民出版社,2005年版,第255页。
② [英]唐纳德·雷诺兹：《剑桥艺术史——19世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第32页。
③ Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art," The Philosophical Review Vol.79 (July,1970), pp.334-367.
① Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art," The Philosophical Review Vol.79 (July,1970), pp.334-367.
② Kendall Walton,"Categories of Art," The Philosophical Review Vol.79 (July,1970), pp.334-367.
① [德]席勒：《审美教育书简》,张玉能译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第142-143页。
① [德]席勒：《审美教育书简》,张玉能译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第143页。
① Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim:"Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60.
② Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim:"Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60.
① Richard Wollheim, "On Pictorial Representation", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.56, No.3 (Summer,1998), pp.217-226.
② Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim:"Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60.
① [德]维特根斯坦：《哲学研究》,陈嘉映译,上海：上海人民出版社,2005年版,第172页。
④ Bence Nanay,"Taking Twofoldness Seriously:Walton on Imagination and Depiction", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.62, No.3, (Summer,2004), pp.285-289.
⑤ Richard Wollheim, "Painting as an Art:The Andrew W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts", (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1987), pp.46-47.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.135.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
③ Kendall Walton,"Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
② Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
③ Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.245.
④ Kendall Walton,'"Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation", Nous, Vol.10, No. I (March, 1976), pp.49-61.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.63.
② Kendall Walton, "Pictures, Titles, Depictive Content," In Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts, Volume 1, Proceedings of the 33rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg,2010, edited by Heinrich, Rchard, et al (Frankfurt:Ontos Verlag,2011).
④ Kendall Walton,'"Pictures, Titles, Depictive Content," In Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts, Volume 1, Proceedings of the 33rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg,2010, edited by Heinrich, Rchard, et al (Frankfurt:Ontos Verlag,2011).
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), pp.66-67.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.68.
③ Kendall Walton, "Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally," in Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Art:Essays for Richard Wollheim, edited by James Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford:Blackwells,1992), pp.281-291.
① Kendall Walton, "Depiction, Perception, and Imagination:Responses to Richard Wollheim," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.60, No.1(Winter,2002), pp.27-35.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On l'alues and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.78.
① [英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版,第18页。
② [美]阿恩海姆：《艺术与视知觉》,滕守尧、朱疆源译,成都：四川人民出版社,1998年版,第305贞。
③ Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), pp.54-55.
③ [美]阿恩海姆：《艺术与视知觉》,滕守尧、朱疆源译,成都：四川人民出版社,1998年版,第293页。
⑤ Richard Wollheim, "Painting as an Art:The Andrew W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts", (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1987), pp.46-47.
① Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990), p.55.
① [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第31页。
② [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第36页。罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第31页。
③ [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第36页。
① [英]玛德琳和罗兰德·梅因斯通：《剑桥艺术史——17世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第22页。
① [英]苏珊·伍德福德：《剑桥艺术史——绘画观赏》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第61页。
② [英]罗萨·玛利亚·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第33页。
③ [英]罗萨·玛利业·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版,第34页。
① 此处“画家”指画作世界中作为虚构个体存在的委拉斯开兹的“形象”,而非现实世界中正在作画的委拉斯开兹。
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), pp.111-112.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.84.
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008). p.88.
③ Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.89.
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.92.
② [英]约翰·伯格：《另一种讲述的方式》,沈语冰译,桂林：广西帅范大学出版社,2007年版,第81页。
① Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press.2008), p.85。
② Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts (New York:Oxford University Press,2008), p.86。
① 此处为与刘若愚表示“世界”的world相区分,采取universe的直译名“宇宙”。此外,艾布拉姆斯强调这一概念与“自然”的通用性,故在“自然”的近义上使用“宇宙”。但在《镜与灯》的中译本中,译者使用的是“世界”,而非“宇宙”
② [美]艾布拉姆斯：《镜与灯：浪漫主义文论及批评传统》,郦稚牛等译,北京：北京大学出版社,1989年版,第4页。
① James Liu, "Towards A Synthesis of Chinese and Western Theories of Literature", Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol.4, Issue 1(1977), pp.1-24. ④ M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp:Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (Oxford University Press, 1953), p.6.
① [美]艾布拉姆斯：《镜与灯：浪漫主义文论及批评传统》,郦稚牛等译,北京：北京大学出版社,1989年版,第5页。
② 蒋孔阳、李醒尘：《十九世纪西方美学名著选》(德国卷),上海：复旦大学出版社,1990年版,第601页。
① Peter Lamarque, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.49, No.2 (Spring,1991), pp.161-166.
① J. M. Moravcsik, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (July.1993), pp.440-443.
② Gregory Currie. "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Journal of Philosphy, Vol.90, No.7 (July,1993), pp.367-370.
③ James Sloan Allen, "Believing Make-Believe", The Sewanee Review, Vol.100,No.2 (Spring,1992), pp. xli-xliii.
① 曾繁仁：《生态文明时代的美学探索与对话》,济南：山东大学出版社,2013年版,第157页。
② 张蓉、韩鹏杰、陆卫明：《中国文化的艺术精神》,西安：西安交通大学出版社,2001年版,第183页。
① 黄杨：《巫、舞、美三位休新证》,《北京舞蹈学院学报》,2009年第3期,第21-26页。
[1]Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art", The Philosophical Review, Vol.79, No.3 (July,1970), pp.334-367.
[2]Kendall Walton, "Categories and Intentions:A Reply", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.32, No.2 (Winter,1973), pp.267-268.
[3]Kendall Walton, "Pictures and Make-Believe", The Philosophical Review, Vol.82, No.3 (July,1973), pp.283-319.
[4]Kendall Walton, "Are Representations Symbols?", The Monist, Vol.58, No.2, Languages of Art (April,1974), pp.236-254.
[5]Kendall Walton, "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive Representation" Nous, Vol.10, No.1 (March,1976), pp.49-61.
[6]Kendall Walton, "The Presentation and Portrayal of Sound Patterns," in Theory Only: Journal of the Michigan Music Theory Society (February/March 1977), pp.3-16.
[7]Kendall Walton, "How Remote Are Fictional Worlds from the Real World?", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.37, No.1 (Autumn,1978),pp.11-23.
[8]Kendall Walton, "Fearing Fictions", The Journal of Philosophy Vol.75, No.1 (January,1978), pp.5-27.
[9]Kendall Walton, "Style and the Products and Processes of Art," in The Concept of Style, ed. by Berel Lang (University of Pennsylvania Press,1979), pp.45-66.
[10]Kendall Walton, "Appreciating Fiction:Suspending Disbelief or Pretending Belief?" Dispositio, Vol.5, No.13/14, Representation and Fictionality (Invierno-Primavera,1980), pp.1-18.
[11]Kendall Walton, "Fiction, Fiction-Making, and Styles of Fictionality,' Philosophy and Literature, Vol.7, No.1(Spring,1983), pp.78-88.
[12]Kendall Walton, "Transparent Pictures:On the Nature of Photographic Realism,' Critical Inquiry,11/2 (December,1984), pp.246-277.
[13]Kendall Walton, "Do We Need Fictional Entities?:Notes Toward a Theory," in Rudolf Haller, Aesthetics:Proceedings of the Eighth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Part I (Vienna:Holder-Pichler-Tempsky,1984), pp.179-192.
[14]Kendall Walton, "Fictional Entities", in The Reasons of Art:Artworks and the Transformations of Philosophy, edited by Peter McCormick (Ottawa:University of Ottawa Press,1985).
[15]Kendall Walton, "Looking Again through Photographs:A Response to Edwin Martin", Critical Inquiry, Vol.12, No.4 (Summer,1986), pp.801-808.
[16]Kendall Walton, "Looking at Pictures and Looking at Things", in Andrew Harrison, ed., Philosophy and the Visual Arts (Reidel,1987), pp.277-300.
[17]Kendall Walton, "What Is Abstract about the Art of Music?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.46, No.3 (Spring,1988), pp.351-364.
[18]Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundation of Representational Arts (Cambridge, Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990).
[19]Kendall Walton, "Fiction," in Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, edited by Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith, Vol.1 (Munich:Philosophia Verlag,1991), pp. 274-275.
[20]Kendall Walton, "Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally," in Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Art:Essays for Richard Wollheim, edited by James Hopkins and Anthony Savile (Oxford:Blackwells,1992), pp.281-291.
[21]Kendall Walton, "Make-Believe, and its Role in Pictorial Representation and the Acquisition of Knowledge," Philosophic Exchange (1992), pp.81-95.
[22]Kendall Walton, "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," The European Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1 (April,1993), pp.39-57.
[23]Kendall Walton, "Morals in Fiction and Fictional Morality," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary, Volume 68 (1994), pp.27-66.
[24]Kendall Walton, "Listening with Imagination:Is Music Representational?" The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.52, Issue 1 (Winter,1994), pp.47-61.
[25]Kendall Walton, "Spelunking, Simulation, and Slime:On Being Moved by Fiction", in Emotion and the Arts, ed. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1997) pp.37-49.
[26]Kendall Walton, "Existence as Metaphor?", in Anthony Everett and Thomas Hofweber, Empthy Names:Fiction and the Puzzles of Nonexistence, Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Inf,2000. pp.69-94.
[27]Kendall Walton, "Depiction, Perception, and Imagination:Responses to Richard Wollheim." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.60, No.1 (Winter,2002), pp.27-35.
[28]Kendall Walton, Marvelous Image:On Values and the Arts, New York:Oxford University Press,2008.
[29]Kendall Walton, "Pictures, Titles, Depictive Content," In Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science and the Arts, Volume 1, Proceedings of the 33rd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg,2010, edited by Heinrich, Rchard, etal, Frankfurt:Ontos Verlag,2011.
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[31]Robert Ranulph Marett, The Threshold of Religion, Kessinger Publishing,1909.
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[35]Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Artists in the Shadows:Review of Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe ", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No.2 (June,1991), pp.407-411.
[36]J. M. Moravcsik, "Review (On Mimesis as Make-Believe by Kendall Walton)", The Philosophical Review, Vol.102, No.3 (July,1993), pp.440-443.
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[39]George Dickie and W. Kent Wilson, "The Intentional Fallacy:Defending Beardsley", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.53, No.3 (Summer, 1995), pp.233-250.
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[43]Liane Lefaivre and Alexander Tzonis:The Emergency of Modern Architecture:A Doncumentary History from 1000 to 1800, Routledge,2004.
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[45]Anthony Savile, Richard Wollheim:"Imagination and Pictorial Understanding", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary volumes, Vol.60 (1986), pp.19-60.
[46]Richard Wollheim, "On Pictorial Representation", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.56, No.3 (Summer,1998), pp.217-226.
[47]Bence Nanay, "Taking Twofoldness Seriously:Walton on Imagination and Depiction",The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol.62, No.3 (Summer, 2004), pp.285-289.
[48]Richard Wollheim, "Painting as an Art:The Andrew W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts", Princeton:Princeton University Press,1987, pp.46-47.
[49]Samuel T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate (Princeton University press,1983).
[50]Eva Schaper, "Fiction and the Suspension of Disbelief", The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol.18, No.1 (1978), pp.31-44.
[51]Peter Lamarque, "How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions?" British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol.21, No.4 (1981), pp.291-304.
[52]Jerrold Levinson, The Pleasures of Aesthetics:Philosophical Essays, Cornell University Press,1996.
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[54]Stephen Davies, Definitions of Art, Cornell University Press,1991.
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[1]罗念生：《卡塔西斯笺释——亚理斯多德论悲剧的作用》,载《剧本》,1961年第11期,第81-90页。
[2]朱光潜：《亚理斯多德的美学思想》,载《北京大学学报(人文科学)》,1961年第2期,第45-60页。
[3]束定芳：《论隐喻的基本类型及句法和语义》,载《外国语》,2000年第1期,第20-28页。
[4]束定芳：《论隐喻的本质及语义特征》,载《上海外国语大学学报》,1998 年第6期,第10-19页。
[5]冯棉：《“可能世界”概念的基本涵义》,载《华东师范大学学报》(哲学社会科学版),1995年第6期,第31-37页。
[6]李秀敏：《论可能世界理论中的两个问题》,载《江西教育学院学报》(社会科学),2004年第25卷第1期,第29-32页。
[7]张丽：《文学叙事中的可能性与真实性》,载《江西社会科学》,2012年第11期,第96—101页。
[8]黄杨：《巫、舞、美三位一体新证》,《北京舞蹈学院学报》,2009年第3期,第21-26页。
[1][美]沃尔顿：《扮假作真的摹仿：再现艺术的基础》,赵新宇、陆扬、费小平译,北京：商务印书馆,2013年版。
[2][美]鲁晓鹏：《从史实性到虚构性：中国叙事诗学》,王玮译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版。
[3][英]贡布里希：《木马沉思录：论艺术形式的根源》,徐一维译,北京：北京大学出版社,1991年版。
[4][美]纳尔逊·古德曼：《构造世界的多种方式》,姬志闯译,上海：上海译文出版社,2008年版,第62页。
[5][德]加达默尔：《美的现实性——作为游戏、象征、节日的艺术》,张志扬等译,北京：三联书店,1991年版。
[6][德]黑格尔：《美学》(第二卷上册),朱光潜译,北京：商务印书馆,1981年版。
[7][古希腊]亚里士多德：《诗学》,陈中梅译注,北京：商务印书馆,2008年版。
[8][德]席勒：《审美教育书简》,张玉能译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[9][荷兰]赫伊津哈：《游戏的人——关于文化的游戏成分的研究》,多人合译,杭州：中国美术学院出版社,1996年版。
[10][奥地利]弗洛伊德：《论创造力与无意识》,孙恺祥译,北京：中国展望出版社,1986年版。
[11][英]琼斯：《剑桥艺术史——18世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[12][德]尼采：《悲剧的诞生》,杨恒达译,南京：译林出版社,2012年版。
[13][德]加达默尔：《真理与方法》(上卷),洪汉鼎译,上海：译文出版社,1999年版。
[14][法]阿拉斯：《我们什么也没看见——一部别样的绘画描述集》,何蒨译,北京：北京大学出版社,2007年版。
[15][英]伍德福德：《剑桥艺术史——古希腊罗马艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[16][英]唐纳德·雷诺兹：《剑桥艺术史——19世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[17]余英时：《红楼梦的两个世界》,上海：上海社会科学院出版社,2002年版。
[18][英]托尔金：《魔戒：魔戒再现》,丁棣译,南京：译林出版社,2001年版。
[19][法]勒内·基拉尔：《浪漫的谎言与小说的真实》,罗芃译,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版。
[20][德]黑格尔：《美学》(第三卷上册),朱光潜译,北京：商务印书馆,1986年版。
[21]朱光潜：《悲剧心理学》,北京：三联书店,1996年版。
[22]陈嘉映：《语言哲学》,北京：北京大学出版社,2003年版。
[23][英]罗萨·玛利亚·莱茨：《剑桥艺术史——文艺复兴艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[24][德]维特根斯坦：《哲学研究》,陈嘉映译,上海：上海人民出版社,2005年版。
[25][美]阿恩海姆：《艺术与视知觉》,滕守尧、朱疆源译,成都：四川人民出版社,1998年版。
[26][英]玛德琳·梅因斯通、罗兰德·梅因斯通：《剑桥艺术史——17世纪艺术》,钱承旦译,南京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[27][英]苏珊·伍德福德：《剑桥艺术史——绘画观赏》,钱承旦译,南 京：译林出版社,2009年版。
[28][英]约翰·伯格：《另一种讲述的方式》,沈语冰译,桂林：广西师范大学出版社,2007年版。
[29]蒋孔阳、李醒尘：《十九世纪西方美学名著选》(德国卷),上海：复旦大学出版社,1990年版。
[30][德]沃林格：《抽象与移情：对艺术风格的心理学研究》,王才勇译,北京：金城出版社,2010年版。
[31]李醒尘：《西方美学史教程》,北京：北京大学出版社,2005年版。
[32][波兰]塔塔尔凯维奇：《西方六大美学观念史》,刘文潭译,上海：上海译文出版社,2013年版
[33][美]彼得·基维：《美学指南》,彭锋等译,南京：南京大学出版社,2008年版。
[34][英]伯特兰·罗素：《心的分析》,北京：商务印书馆,2012年版。
[35][美]托马斯·沃滕伯格：《什么是艺术》,李奉栖等译,重庆：重庆大学出版社,2011年版。
[36][德]沃尔夫冈·伊瑟尔：《虚构与想象——文学人类学疆界》,陈定家、汪正龙等译,长春：吉林人民出版社,2001年版。
[37][美]纳尔逊·古德曼：《事实、虚构和预测》,刘华杰译,北京：商务印书馆,2007年版。
[38][英]吉尔伯特·赖尔：《心的概念》,徐大建译,北京：商务印书馆,2010年版。
[39]朱立元主编：《西方美学范畴史》(第三卷),太原：山西教育出版社,2006年版。
[40]王杰：《审美幻象研究：现代美学导论》,北京：北京大学出版社,2012年版。
[41]曾繁仁：《生态文明时代的美学探索与对话》,济南：山东大学出版社,2013年版。