我国证券监管的效率改进研究
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摘要
我国是一个新兴加转轨的证券市场,尽管已经建立起了集中统一的监管结构模式,但监管效率低下是一个比较突出的现实问题。分析导致我国证券监管低效率的成因,继而设计改进和提高其效率的模式,具有理论与现实的双重意义。本文按照经济学关于制度配置效率和运行效率的分析框架,运用新制度经济学法律不完备理论、公共强制理论关于证券监管原因和监管权配置的理论,信息经济学的激励理论,构建了一个基于监管权配置和监管者激励双因子影响下的监管效率提高模式,并对如何实现这一模式提出了政策建议。
论文共分七章。第一章是导论,交代了选题的背景、研究意义、基本构思和框架；第二章是文献综述,对国内外有关证券监管效率的文献进行了简单回顾和评价。论文第三章,对我国证券监管的现状及面临的问题进行了基本描述,分析了导致证券监管效率低下的原因。论文第四章是理论分析,分析了证券监管有效性检验,对证券监管进行了成本收益分析。借鉴制度经济学“配置效率”与“运行效率”的分析框架,构建了证券监管效率的双因子分析模型,运用法律不完备理论,讨论监管结构优化下的效率改进；运用契约理论的委托——代理分析工具,分析监管者激励对证券监管运行效率的影响。论文的第五章,是实证分析部分。对证券监管进行了国际比较,从发行(IPO)监管和监管执法两个方面,分析了我国证券监管的低效率。论文的第六章,是关于改进我国证券监管效率的模式设计。构建我国新型的集中统一与自律监管相结合的证券监管结构模式,设计了备择的对监管者激励与约束机制,进一步讨论了我国证券监管效率改进机制的实现问题。论文的第七章,是论文的结论和待研究问题。
初步结论是,监管权配置不平衡性,是影响监管效率的实现的制度结构性原因；监管者激励机制的缺乏,也影响监管效率的制度运行性原因。因此,应当通过重构证券监管结构模式,建立对监管者的激励约束机制,改进和提高我国的证券监管效率。给出的对策和建议包括：改变监管理念,摆正政府与监管的关系,监管权力去行政化；引入第三方监管以及完善司法对监管的介入与制衡机制。
China is a new-emerging securities market. Although a kind of centralized regulatory structure model was set up in our country, the low efficiency of regulation is still a serious issue at present. It is of significance in both theory and reality to analyze the cause formation of low efficiency in our country's securities market, and devise a model to reform and increase its efficiency. This dissertation, based on the analytical framework of economics concerning the system allotment efficiency of and operation efficiency, and by applying the incomplete theory of law under the new instrument economics, public enforcement theory concerning the theory of causes of securities regulation and the theory of allotment of regulation power, and the incentive theory of information economics, tries to construct a new model to increase regulation efficiency under the influence of allotment of regulation power and incentive of regulators and put forward some suggestions on how to implement this model.
This paper is made up of 8 chapters. Chapter 1, as an introductory part, deals with the thesis-chosen background, research significance, basic mode of thought and structure. Chapter 2 gives a general review and appraisal of the literature about the securities regulation efficiency at home and abroad. Chapter 3 gives a general description of the status of our country's securities regulation and some issues that we are facing, and make an analysis of the reason causing securities regulation low efficiency. Chapter 4, as a theoretic part, analyses the effectiveness test of the securities regulation and its cost profits. With the analytical framework of "allotment efficiency" and "operation efficiency" of instrument economics as a reference, tries to construct an double-factor analytical model of securities regulation efficiency, by applying the incomplete theory of law, discusses the efficiency improvement under the optimized regulation structure, and with the help of analytical tool-trust agency in the contract theory, analyses the influences that the encouragement measures to the regulators exerted on the securities regulation efficiency. Chapter 5, as a positive analysis part, first gives a comparison securities regulation between countries, and makes a analysis of the low efficiency from the aspect of regulation to IPO and regulation enforcement. Chapter 6 is about the devising of the model on how to improve the regulation efficiency, which is a new regulation structure model combined our country's new-type centralization with self-discipline. It works out a mechanism as a selection on how to encourage and constrain the regulators. further the more,it discusses how to realize this model to improve the low efficiency. From the viewpoint of the idea of changing securities regulation, building a correct relationship between the government and the regulation, de-administration of regulation power, it raises the advice on how to ensure the independence of regulation power. And from the aspect of regulation competition, judicial involvement, media supervising, devises some measures to encourage regulators. Chapter 7 is about the thesis conclusion and problems for future research.
The thesis conclusion is that the imbalance of the allotment of regulation power is the instrument reason which effects the low regulation efficiency. Besides, the lack of encouragement mechanism is another reason which effects the operation of regulation efficiency. Therefore, by rebuilding a new model of securities regulation structure and encouragement mechanism to the regulators, it aims to improve and increase our country's securities regulation efficiency. The countermeasures and suggestions are embodies in:change regulation idea, establish a smooth relationship between the government and regulation, de-administrate the regulation power, and introduce the third party regulation and perfect the engagement of judiciary to the regulation and counterbalance mechanism.
论文共分七章。第一章是导论,交代了选题的背景、研究意义、基本构思和框架；第二章是文献综述,对国内外有关证券监管效率的文献进行了简单回顾和评价。论文第三章,对我国证券监管的现状及面临的问题进行了基本描述,分析了导致证券监管效率低下的原因。论文第四章是理论分析,分析了证券监管有效性检验,对证券监管进行了成本收益分析。借鉴制度经济学“配置效率”与“运行效率”的分析框架,构建了证券监管效率的双因子分析模型,运用法律不完备理论,讨论监管结构优化下的效率改进；运用契约理论的委托——代理分析工具,分析监管者激励对证券监管运行效率的影响。论文的第五章,是实证分析部分。对证券监管进行了国际比较,从发行(IPO)监管和监管执法两个方面,分析了我国证券监管的低效率。论文的第六章,是关于改进我国证券监管效率的模式设计。构建我国新型的集中统一与自律监管相结合的证券监管结构模式,设计了备择的对监管者激励与约束机制,进一步讨论了我国证券监管效率改进机制的实现问题。论文的第七章,是论文的结论和待研究问题。
初步结论是,监管权配置不平衡性,是影响监管效率的实现的制度结构性原因；监管者激励机制的缺乏,也影响监管效率的制度运行性原因。因此,应当通过重构证券监管结构模式,建立对监管者的激励约束机制,改进和提高我国的证券监管效率。给出的对策和建议包括：改变监管理念,摆正政府与监管的关系,监管权力去行政化；引入第三方监管以及完善司法对监管的介入与制衡机制。
China is a new-emerging securities market. Although a kind of centralized regulatory structure model was set up in our country, the low efficiency of regulation is still a serious issue at present. It is of significance in both theory and reality to analyze the cause formation of low efficiency in our country's securities market, and devise a model to reform and increase its efficiency. This dissertation, based on the analytical framework of economics concerning the system allotment efficiency of and operation efficiency, and by applying the incomplete theory of law under the new instrument economics, public enforcement theory concerning the theory of causes of securities regulation and the theory of allotment of regulation power, and the incentive theory of information economics, tries to construct a new model to increase regulation efficiency under the influence of allotment of regulation power and incentive of regulators and put forward some suggestions on how to implement this model.
This paper is made up of 8 chapters. Chapter 1, as an introductory part, deals with the thesis-chosen background, research significance, basic mode of thought and structure. Chapter 2 gives a general review and appraisal of the literature about the securities regulation efficiency at home and abroad. Chapter 3 gives a general description of the status of our country's securities regulation and some issues that we are facing, and make an analysis of the reason causing securities regulation low efficiency. Chapter 4, as a theoretic part, analyses the effectiveness test of the securities regulation and its cost profits. With the analytical framework of "allotment efficiency" and "operation efficiency" of instrument economics as a reference, tries to construct an double-factor analytical model of securities regulation efficiency, by applying the incomplete theory of law, discusses the efficiency improvement under the optimized regulation structure, and with the help of analytical tool-trust agency in the contract theory, analyses the influences that the encouragement measures to the regulators exerted on the securities regulation efficiency. Chapter 5, as a positive analysis part, first gives a comparison securities regulation between countries, and makes a analysis of the low efficiency from the aspect of regulation to IPO and regulation enforcement. Chapter 6 is about the devising of the model on how to improve the regulation efficiency, which is a new regulation structure model combined our country's new-type centralization with self-discipline. It works out a mechanism as a selection on how to encourage and constrain the regulators. further the more,it discusses how to realize this model to improve the low efficiency. From the viewpoint of the idea of changing securities regulation, building a correct relationship between the government and the regulation, de-administration of regulation power, it raises the advice on how to ensure the independence of regulation power. And from the aspect of regulation competition, judicial involvement, media supervising, devises some measures to encourage regulators. Chapter 7 is about the thesis conclusion and problems for future research.
The thesis conclusion is that the imbalance of the allotment of regulation power is the instrument reason which effects the low regulation efficiency. Besides, the lack of encouragement mechanism is another reason which effects the operation of regulation efficiency. Therefore, by rebuilding a new model of securities regulation structure and encouragement mechanism to the regulators, it aims to improve and increase our country's securities regulation efficiency. The countermeasures and suggestions are embodies in:change regulation idea, establish a smooth relationship between the government and regulation, de-administrate the regulation power, and introduce the third party regulation and perfect the engagement of judiciary to the regulation and counterbalance mechanism.
引文
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