我国农业巨灾风险管理有效性评价与机制设计
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摘要
本研究以提高农业巨灾风险管理有效性为目标,以农业巨灾风险的属性界定为切入点,展开对农业巨灾风险成灾机理和经济社会效应的研究。同时,重点抓住农业巨灾风险主体——农户的行为选择和风险态度这一核心,描绘相关风险主体行为的进化博弈过程和优化路径,研究农业巨灾风险主体行为选择的影响因素。在此基础上,结合我国农业巨灾风险管理的变迁轨迹和思想演变过程,构建我国农业巨灾风险管理有效性的评价标准和体系,测定目前我国农业巨灾风险管理的水平和层次,剖析存在的主要问题和障碍因素。最后通过对先进国家农业巨灾风险管理经验的比较和借鉴,对我国农业巨灾风险管理的长效机制进行设计,并从战略和政策层面提出操作性的对策建议。
一、研究主要内容
1、农业巨灾风险属性及效应分析。将研究农业巨灾风险特征及与普通自然灾害风险的属性差异,分析农业巨灾风险孕灾环境、致灾因子和承灾体的特征及释放的经济和社会效应；
2、农业巨灾风险主体行为选择及优化。本部分研究是为提高农业巨灾风险管理有效性和机制设计提供现实依据和理论支撑。借鉴预期效应理论、风险偏好理论、进化博弈模型等理论模型,通过建立具有微观基础、论证规范的分析框架,在对全国五省一市调查问卷统计分析的基础上,对农业巨灾风险主体行为特征和风险偏好做出规范意义上的推理和论证；
3、农业巨灾风险管理的国际比较和借鉴。研究以描述统计分析和必要的数理推导为主,并引入案例分析手段,对各国农业巨灾风险管理的现状进行考察、分析和比较,从中总结出各自的共性和差异、经验和教训。
4、我国农业巨灾风险管理有效性评价。研究从经济学、社会学、伦理学等角度来设计分析框架,围绕减灾激励、公平和效率目标,构建了农业巨灾抗灾能力的建设、预防与减灾体系的构建、巨灾应急管理方法的完善、损失分担机制的完善和社会认同感的增强五个方面,共计37个指标的评价体系。通过专家打分法和AHP法相结合的分析范式,对指标权重和现阶段我国农业巨灾风险管理的绩效进行全面测评。
5、我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制设计。管理机制设计首先是建立在对风险主体行为选择和优化的基础上,同时也是对农业巨灾风险管理有效性提高这一最终目标的体现和保证。研究重点围绕了农业巨灾风险管理的运行机制、激励机制、应急机制和损失分担补偿机制来展开。
二、研究主要结论
1、农业巨灾风险严重削弱经济社会可持续发展的基础。农业巨灾风险具有共生性、群发性和伴生性的自然属性,同时还具有厚尾统计属性和准公共产品经济属性。多重属性的农业巨灾风险表现出了不同于普通自然灾害的特性,进一步增强了农业巨灾风险管理的难度和强度。通过对农业巨灾风险的成灾机理分析发现,由于致灾因子多重性、承灾体易损性和孕灾环境脆弱性,农业巨灾损失会呈现叠加扩大效应,并会通过风险载体的价值量进行传递,对经济社会的可持续发展产生重要影响。
2、农业巨灾风险影响下的农户风险偏好具有不稳定性。通过构建行为经济学前景理论分析框架,研究发现农业巨灾风险影响下的农户风险偏好具有不稳定性,该结论通过实践调查数据进行了印证。即面对农业巨灾风险,农民有限理性实现程度较低,受非贝叶斯法则、代表性法则、锚定效应、从众行为、框架效应等的外界偏差性行为显著干扰的情况下,农民非理性选择很大程度上会主导个体的行为,农户风险偏好发生变化,由风险厌恶转向风险喜好。进一步的研究还发现,在现有政府全能救灾模式的影响下,农户会继续采取面向农业巨灾风险的无有效作为的态度,这在一定程度上与政府原本的农业巨灾风险管理意图相悖,这也是导致目前农业巨灾风险管理低效率的重要原因之一。
3、农业巨灾风险管理市场主体的进化博弈轨迹不存在稳定策略。通过借鉴进化博弈理论,构建了假定市场仅存在农户群落和保险公司群落的分析框架。研究发现,保险公司与农户的博弈轨迹不存在使博弈双方共同稳定的进化稳定策略,只能实现农业巨灾管理市场上平均意义的较优策略。农户是否购买农业巨灾保险的关键取决于个体比较预期收益和其所要承担的选择成本的大小。同时,由于农业巨灾风险的特殊属性,仅凭保险公司群体来提高农业巨灾风险的保障范围和深度也是不现实的,而政府的有效参与能优化农民群体和保险公司群体的选择策略。
4、农户的特征差异显著影响其对农业巨灾风险管理的满意度评价。在统计调查数据提炼和分析的基础上,运用因子分析和Logistic模型对农户的农业巨灾风险管理满意度及其影响因素进行分析。结果表明,农民年龄、文化程度、家庭人口规模、家庭总收入、农业收入占家庭总收入比重以及农户的行为选择倾向等因素对农业巨灾风险管理满意度的变化具有显著影响。通过降维处理,将农户农业巨灾风险管理的行为倾向可分解为自主积极型、政府依赖型和社会关系型。发现自主积极型倾向越明显的农户,对农业巨灾风险管理的主动性和有效性越强,对满意度的正面影响程度也越大。其次则是政府依赖型和社会关系型的农户。
5、我国现阶段农业巨灾风险管理整体有效性水平偏低。通过构建我国农业巨灾风险管理有效性指标评价体系,结合专家打分法和AHP法的分析范式,对指标权重和现阶段我国农业巨灾风险管理的绩效进行全面测评。结果显示,我国农业巨灾风险管理有效性得分仅为58.7分,处于划分的五个等级中的“一般”等级水平,这说明我国当前农业巨灾风险管理效率还有待于提升。农业巨灾风险管理的五个组成部分中仅有巨灾应急管理和社会认同感两个方面处于“较好”水平,巨灾损失分担方面,得分明显低于其他几个方面,说明我国农业巨灾造成的损失无法进行有效分担。
6、长效机制设计是农业巨灾风险管理有效性提高的关键。我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制包括运行机制、激励约束机制、应急机制和巨灾损失分担补偿机制。从农业巨灾风险管理运行机制来看,处理好政府和市场的角色定位问题是运行机制的核心。但是分析发现政府在农业巨灾风险管理的责任边界往往受多种因素制约,如政府财政的实力,预算安排、区域经济发达的程度,应急反映能力等。因此,建立政府和市场共同参与的农业巨灾风险综合管理运行机制是必然选择。同时,农业巨灾风险管理的激励机制、应急机制和损失分担补偿机制作为综合管理运行机制的体现和细分,共同组成了我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制。应该说,农业巨灾风险管理机制的设计和运行是增强巨灾风险管理有效性的重要保证。
三、可能的创新点
1、基于多重理论视角研究农业巨灾风险主体的行为选择和博弈轨迹。与以往农业巨灾风险管理的研究视角和基点不同,本文的研究更注重农业巨灾风险主体的行为选择和风险偏好。因为农业巨灾风险管理最重要的对象和参与者是农户,农户实际行为的选择和如何认识看待农业巨灾风险,无疑对提高农业巨灾风险管理的有效性具有至关重要的作用。本文通过统计调查,基于行为经济学、博弈理论等研究视角对农业巨灾风险主体的特征表现、风险偏好、行为选择影响因素、进化博弈轨迹等内容进行了深入分析。
2、尝试构建农业巨灾风险管理有效性指标评价体系。农业巨灾风险管理首先要解决衡量标准问题。就是说要对农业巨灾风险进行管理,那么管理的目标和价值标准是什么?本文在综合现有文献研究的基础上,创新性的提出了基于公平、效率和减灾激励三原则,从农业巨灾抗灾能力评价、预防与减灾体系评价、巨灾应急管理评价、损失分担评价和社会认同感评价五个方面构建了我国农业巨灾管理有效性评价指标体系,并通过专家打分法,层析分析法等对我国目前的农业巨灾风险管理水平进行了测定。
3、对我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制进行综合设计。在明确农业巨灾风险管理有效性目标的前提下,结合农业巨灾风险主体的行为特征,构建了我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制。在机制设计的过程中,注重了农业巨灾风险管理的社会性和自然性的统一,强调了政府和市场的双重能动性。不仅体现了传统灾害研究视角下工程法管理机制的设计,更注重人文社会科学元素的融入。从现有文献的掌握来看,本文设计的农业巨灾风险管理长效机制具有较为显著的创新性。
In order to improve the effectiveness of agricultural catastrophe risk management, this research feigned to discuss the Inundated mechanism and economical social effect of agricultural catastrophe risk with the property of agriculture catastrophe risk,which was defined as an entry point.Meanwhile, which catch the main point of agricultural catastrophe risk -with the behaviors choice and risk attitude of farmers as the core, depicting evolutionary game process and optimization path of the related risk subject behavior, as well as analyzing effect factor which would affect the main factors of agricultural catastrophe risk.On this basis, combined with evolution locus and thought evolved in agriculture catastrophe risk management in China, we tried to construct effective evaluation standards and systems of China's agricultural catastrophe risk management, and to evaluate China's agriculture determination catastrophe risk management level, In additional to analyze the main problems and obstacles. Finally, through the comparison and reference of agricultural catastrophe risk management in advanced countries, designing a long-effect mechanism of china's agriculture catastrophe risk management, and putting forward countermeasures and suggestions in a strategic and operational point of view
The main contents
1、The attribute and effect analysis of Agricultural catastrophe risk
The research discussed the characteristics of Agricultural catastrophe risk,and the differences in companion with common natural disaster risk.And then it analyzed the conforming circumstance, the factors and the features of victims, as well as the economic and social effect.
2、The main body's behavior selection and optimization of Agricultural Catastrophe Risk
The research provided practical basis and theoretical support for improving the management effectiveness and mechanism designing of Agricultural Catastrophe Risk. The author used the empirical models such as expected effect theory and risk preference theory for rreference. And through the establishment of the micro-foundation and argument specification's analysis framework, meanwhile,on the basis of statistical analysis to the 351 questionnaires in the five provinces and one city of the country,the author made normative sense reasoning for Catastrophic risk on the main behavioral characteristics of agricultural and risk preferences.
3、Agricultural Catastrophe Risk Management International comparison and reference
The Research was based on the describe of the statistical analysis and mathematical deduction mainly. And the author introduced the ways of case studies. The author summarized the similarities and differences, as well as the experience and lessons learned, which through the investigation, analysis and comparison of catastrophe risk management from different countries.
4、Domestic agriculture catastrophe risk evaluation
The model of this study was constructed base on the theory of economics, society, and moral scene, which have goal of fairness, effectiveness, encourage and make a reduction of risk. The study construct the foundation for the ability reduce the risk against agriculture disaster, the system of protecting and reducing the cost caused by the disaster, the emergency management procedures, lost recovery system and moral issue. The evaluation system included five different areas, and 37 indexes. Through the combination of professor evaluation and the method of AHP to analysis case, in additional to weight index and evaluate domestic agriculture catastrophe risk management.
5、Domestic agriculture catastrophe risk management long-term system design
The management system was majorly based on the selection of risk body and optimization. Additionally, at the same time it was also a reflection of an improvement of effectiveness for the agriculture catastrophe risk management. The study emphasized and surrounded by the topic of agriculture catastrophe risk management system, encouragement system, emergency backup system and loss recovery system.
Conclusion
1、Agricultural catastrophe risk seriously weakened the foundation of economic and social sustainable development. Agricultural catastrophe risk has the natural attribute of Symbiosis, group-occur and concomitants, also the economic attribute and heavy-tailed statistic attribute. A multi-attribute agricultural catastrophe risk showed difference from characteristics of common natural disasters, which further enhanced the difficulty and intensity in agricultural catastrophe risk management.By the analysis of disaster mechanism of Agricultural catastrophe risk we finded that agriculture catastrophe losses would be superimposed expanded, since the Multiplex of hazard -formative factors, vulnerability of Hazard-affected body,as well as the vulnerability of conforming environment. And have an important impact on the sustainable development of society and economy by the value of risk carrier.
2、The peasants'risk preference was unstable under the influence of agricultural catastrophe risk.By constructing a behavior economics prospect theory analysis frame,the researchers thought that under the influence of agricultural catastrophe risk,the peasants risk preference is unstable. The conclusion was based on practical investigation data. Indeed, owing to the fact that peasants were ignorant when they confronted the problems of agricultural catastrophe risk, peasants'limited rational realization degree was inferior. Under the significant interference of non-Bayesian rules, rules of representativeness, anchoring effect, herd behavior. peasants' rrational choices had often contributed to the individual behaviour.Thus risk aversion changed for risk appetite. Noticeably, further study also helps us to crystallize pieces of thoughts. In the existing government which under the influence of all-around relief mode, farmers would continue to think that the catastrophe risk facing agriculture is ineffective, which was somewhat inconsistent with the agricultural catastrophe risk management intentions that government had before. Additionally, it was also important reason for the low efficiency of the current agricultural catastrophe risk management.
3、Game trajectory in market subjects evolutionary of Agricultural catastrophe risk didn't have stable strategy. Through using evolution game theory, it constructed the analysis framework,assuming that the market only existed farmer's communities and insurance companies' community. Insurance companies and farmer's game trajectory did not exist the evolutionary stable strategy which makes game mutual stable. There was only a better strategy which could make average agricultural catastrophe management market come true. Whether the Farmers would buy agricultural catastrophe insurance was decided by an individual comparison and the expected benefits,as well as the size of the choice cost it will assume. Due to the fact that agricultural catastrophe risk was a special properties object, to increase the safeguard scope and depth of agricultural catastrophe risk only with the insurance company group was not realistic. Indisputably, the government can optimize effective participation of peasants' groups and the selection strategy of insurance company groups.
4、The difference between farmers had a substantial influence on their satisfaction of the Agricultural Catastrophe Risk Management. Base on the refine and analysis of the survey data, the research analyzed the farmers'satisfaction of the agricultural catastrophe risk management and the factors influenced on it with the factor analysis and logistic model. The results indicated that the age and cultural level, family and the family income, the proportion of households in agricultural earnings and the tendency of farmers' behavior choose had a dramatically influence on the satisfaction of the agricultural catastrophe risk management. By reducing the dimension, the farmers of agricultural catastrophe risk management actions can be decomposed into self-aggressive tendencies, the government and the social relational dependent. First of all,the more obvious tendency of self-active type of farmers, agricultural catastrophe risk management and effectiveness of the initiative was stronger, meanwhile,positive impact on the degree of satisfaction was also greater. The second was that government-dependent type of household and social relations.
5、Current Agriculture Risk Management appeared the low level of overall effectiveness in China. By building the effectiveness of Agricultural Risk Management Evaluation System, combined with expert scoring method and the method of AHP paradigm, we conducted comprehensive evaluations of the index weight,as well as the performance of current agricultural catastrophe risk management. The results showed the effectiveness of agricultural catastrophe risk management scoring only 58.7 points, is divided into five grades in the "general" grade level, which showed that our current agricultural catastrophe risk management to enhance efficiency had yet to be. In five components of agricultural Catastrophe Risk Management, only emergency management and social identity catastrophe were both in the "good" level, especially,sharing aspects of catastrophe losses scored significantly lower than other areas.Which indicated that China's agricultural Catastrophe Disaster losses can not be effectively shared.朗读
6、To improve the effectiveness of the agricultural catastrophe risk management, designing of the Long-term Mechanism always comes first. The long-term mechanism of catastrophe risk management in China includeed the operation mechanism, incentive & constraint mechanism, emergency mechanism as well as the loss allocation & compensation Mechanism. In terms of management operating mechanism, the key point was to do good deal with the role orientation between the government and the market. But, analysis showed that governments' responsibility boundary of the agricultural catastrophe risk management is constantly restricted by many factors, for example, the financial strength、budget layout, developed degree of the regional economy and the emergency reflecting ability,etc.Consequently, an establishment of comprehensive management operating mechanism which involves both the government and the market is an inevitable choice. Meanwhile, as the embodiment and subdivision of the comprehensive management operating mechanism, the incentive & constraint mechanism、emergency mechanism and the loss allocation & compensation mechanism constituted the long-term mechanism of agricultural catastrophe risk management in China. We should say that the design and operation of the management operating mechanism were important guarantees and basic premises to enhance the efficiency of catastrophe risk management.
Innovation
1.This research is based on statistical survey to study the subjects' behaviour choice and risk preference of the agricultural catastrophe risk. This paper emphasized the subjects' behaviour choice and risk preference rather than other research angles and basic points. Because peasants were the most important objects and participants in the agricultural catastrophe risk management, whose choices and views on this risk played a vital role in boosting it's effectiveness. Meanwhile, the implementation of scientific and rational institution and policy of the agricultural catastrophe risk management were in desperate need of positive cooperation and understanding from relative subjects. To depict and describe accurately the subjects'behavioral characteristic had a profound impact on the improvement of the level and effectiveness of the agricultural catastrophe risk management.
2.Attempting to construct an effectiveness evaluation index system of agricultural catastrophic risk management. First of all, agricultural catastrophic risk management should solve the problem of measure standard. That is, we can manage the agricultural catastrophic risk. And then, what is the goal and value standard of the management? On the basis of the study of existing literatures, this paper proposed three principles based on fairness、efficiency and incentive of disaster reduction innovatively. Meanwhile it constructed the effectiveness evaluation index system of domestic agricultural catastrophic risk management from five aspects, including the evaluation of capacity of resilience to agricultural catastrophe、system of prevention and reduction to catastrophe、catastrophe emergency management、loss sharing and social identity, and determined the current level of the agricultural catastrophic risk management through expert scoring method、chromatography analysis and so on.
3.Comprehensively design the long-term mechanism of domestic agricultural catastrophic risk management. In the premise that the effective goal of the agricultural catastrophic risk management has been made clear, this paper constructed the long-effect mechanism of our country's agricultural catastrophic risk management in the combination with the behaviour characteristics of the agricultural catastrophic risk's subject. In the process of the mechanism design, it paid attention to the sociality and naturalness unity of agricultural catastrophic risk management and focused on the government and market's liquidity, which not only embodied the engineering methods for the management mechanism design from the perspective of traditional disaster research, but also put more emphasis on the blend of the humanities and social science elements. Judging from the existing literatures, the long-term mechanism of agricultural catastrophic risk management this paper had designed has more significant innovation.
一、研究主要内容
1、农业巨灾风险属性及效应分析。将研究农业巨灾风险特征及与普通自然灾害风险的属性差异,分析农业巨灾风险孕灾环境、致灾因子和承灾体的特征及释放的经济和社会效应；
2、农业巨灾风险主体行为选择及优化。本部分研究是为提高农业巨灾风险管理有效性和机制设计提供现实依据和理论支撑。借鉴预期效应理论、风险偏好理论、进化博弈模型等理论模型,通过建立具有微观基础、论证规范的分析框架,在对全国五省一市调查问卷统计分析的基础上,对农业巨灾风险主体行为特征和风险偏好做出规范意义上的推理和论证；
3、农业巨灾风险管理的国际比较和借鉴。研究以描述统计分析和必要的数理推导为主,并引入案例分析手段,对各国农业巨灾风险管理的现状进行考察、分析和比较,从中总结出各自的共性和差异、经验和教训。
4、我国农业巨灾风险管理有效性评价。研究从经济学、社会学、伦理学等角度来设计分析框架,围绕减灾激励、公平和效率目标,构建了农业巨灾抗灾能力的建设、预防与减灾体系的构建、巨灾应急管理方法的完善、损失分担机制的完善和社会认同感的增强五个方面,共计37个指标的评价体系。通过专家打分法和AHP法相结合的分析范式,对指标权重和现阶段我国农业巨灾风险管理的绩效进行全面测评。
5、我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制设计。管理机制设计首先是建立在对风险主体行为选择和优化的基础上,同时也是对农业巨灾风险管理有效性提高这一最终目标的体现和保证。研究重点围绕了农业巨灾风险管理的运行机制、激励机制、应急机制和损失分担补偿机制来展开。
二、研究主要结论
1、农业巨灾风险严重削弱经济社会可持续发展的基础。农业巨灾风险具有共生性、群发性和伴生性的自然属性,同时还具有厚尾统计属性和准公共产品经济属性。多重属性的农业巨灾风险表现出了不同于普通自然灾害的特性,进一步增强了农业巨灾风险管理的难度和强度。通过对农业巨灾风险的成灾机理分析发现,由于致灾因子多重性、承灾体易损性和孕灾环境脆弱性,农业巨灾损失会呈现叠加扩大效应,并会通过风险载体的价值量进行传递,对经济社会的可持续发展产生重要影响。
2、农业巨灾风险影响下的农户风险偏好具有不稳定性。通过构建行为经济学前景理论分析框架,研究发现农业巨灾风险影响下的农户风险偏好具有不稳定性,该结论通过实践调查数据进行了印证。即面对农业巨灾风险,农民有限理性实现程度较低,受非贝叶斯法则、代表性法则、锚定效应、从众行为、框架效应等的外界偏差性行为显著干扰的情况下,农民非理性选择很大程度上会主导个体的行为,农户风险偏好发生变化,由风险厌恶转向风险喜好。进一步的研究还发现,在现有政府全能救灾模式的影响下,农户会继续采取面向农业巨灾风险的无有效作为的态度,这在一定程度上与政府原本的农业巨灾风险管理意图相悖,这也是导致目前农业巨灾风险管理低效率的重要原因之一。
3、农业巨灾风险管理市场主体的进化博弈轨迹不存在稳定策略。通过借鉴进化博弈理论,构建了假定市场仅存在农户群落和保险公司群落的分析框架。研究发现,保险公司与农户的博弈轨迹不存在使博弈双方共同稳定的进化稳定策略,只能实现农业巨灾管理市场上平均意义的较优策略。农户是否购买农业巨灾保险的关键取决于个体比较预期收益和其所要承担的选择成本的大小。同时,由于农业巨灾风险的特殊属性,仅凭保险公司群体来提高农业巨灾风险的保障范围和深度也是不现实的,而政府的有效参与能优化农民群体和保险公司群体的选择策略。
4、农户的特征差异显著影响其对农业巨灾风险管理的满意度评价。在统计调查数据提炼和分析的基础上,运用因子分析和Logistic模型对农户的农业巨灾风险管理满意度及其影响因素进行分析。结果表明,农民年龄、文化程度、家庭人口规模、家庭总收入、农业收入占家庭总收入比重以及农户的行为选择倾向等因素对农业巨灾风险管理满意度的变化具有显著影响。通过降维处理,将农户农业巨灾风险管理的行为倾向可分解为自主积极型、政府依赖型和社会关系型。发现自主积极型倾向越明显的农户,对农业巨灾风险管理的主动性和有效性越强,对满意度的正面影响程度也越大。其次则是政府依赖型和社会关系型的农户。
5、我国现阶段农业巨灾风险管理整体有效性水平偏低。通过构建我国农业巨灾风险管理有效性指标评价体系,结合专家打分法和AHP法的分析范式,对指标权重和现阶段我国农业巨灾风险管理的绩效进行全面测评。结果显示,我国农业巨灾风险管理有效性得分仅为58.7分,处于划分的五个等级中的“一般”等级水平,这说明我国当前农业巨灾风险管理效率还有待于提升。农业巨灾风险管理的五个组成部分中仅有巨灾应急管理和社会认同感两个方面处于“较好”水平,巨灾损失分担方面,得分明显低于其他几个方面,说明我国农业巨灾造成的损失无法进行有效分担。
6、长效机制设计是农业巨灾风险管理有效性提高的关键。我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制包括运行机制、激励约束机制、应急机制和巨灾损失分担补偿机制。从农业巨灾风险管理运行机制来看,处理好政府和市场的角色定位问题是运行机制的核心。但是分析发现政府在农业巨灾风险管理的责任边界往往受多种因素制约,如政府财政的实力,预算安排、区域经济发达的程度,应急反映能力等。因此,建立政府和市场共同参与的农业巨灾风险综合管理运行机制是必然选择。同时,农业巨灾风险管理的激励机制、应急机制和损失分担补偿机制作为综合管理运行机制的体现和细分,共同组成了我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制。应该说,农业巨灾风险管理机制的设计和运行是增强巨灾风险管理有效性的重要保证。
三、可能的创新点
1、基于多重理论视角研究农业巨灾风险主体的行为选择和博弈轨迹。与以往农业巨灾风险管理的研究视角和基点不同,本文的研究更注重农业巨灾风险主体的行为选择和风险偏好。因为农业巨灾风险管理最重要的对象和参与者是农户,农户实际行为的选择和如何认识看待农业巨灾风险,无疑对提高农业巨灾风险管理的有效性具有至关重要的作用。本文通过统计调查,基于行为经济学、博弈理论等研究视角对农业巨灾风险主体的特征表现、风险偏好、行为选择影响因素、进化博弈轨迹等内容进行了深入分析。
2、尝试构建农业巨灾风险管理有效性指标评价体系。农业巨灾风险管理首先要解决衡量标准问题。就是说要对农业巨灾风险进行管理,那么管理的目标和价值标准是什么?本文在综合现有文献研究的基础上,创新性的提出了基于公平、效率和减灾激励三原则,从农业巨灾抗灾能力评价、预防与减灾体系评价、巨灾应急管理评价、损失分担评价和社会认同感评价五个方面构建了我国农业巨灾管理有效性评价指标体系,并通过专家打分法,层析分析法等对我国目前的农业巨灾风险管理水平进行了测定。
3、对我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制进行综合设计。在明确农业巨灾风险管理有效性目标的前提下,结合农业巨灾风险主体的行为特征,构建了我国农业巨灾风险管理长效机制。在机制设计的过程中,注重了农业巨灾风险管理的社会性和自然性的统一,强调了政府和市场的双重能动性。不仅体现了传统灾害研究视角下工程法管理机制的设计,更注重人文社会科学元素的融入。从现有文献的掌握来看,本文设计的农业巨灾风险管理长效机制具有较为显著的创新性。
In order to improve the effectiveness of agricultural catastrophe risk management, this research feigned to discuss the Inundated mechanism and economical social effect of agricultural catastrophe risk with the property of agriculture catastrophe risk,which was defined as an entry point.Meanwhile, which catch the main point of agricultural catastrophe risk -with the behaviors choice and risk attitude of farmers as the core, depicting evolutionary game process and optimization path of the related risk subject behavior, as well as analyzing effect factor which would affect the main factors of agricultural catastrophe risk.On this basis, combined with evolution locus and thought evolved in agriculture catastrophe risk management in China, we tried to construct effective evaluation standards and systems of China's agricultural catastrophe risk management, and to evaluate China's agriculture determination catastrophe risk management level, In additional to analyze the main problems and obstacles. Finally, through the comparison and reference of agricultural catastrophe risk management in advanced countries, designing a long-effect mechanism of china's agriculture catastrophe risk management, and putting forward countermeasures and suggestions in a strategic and operational point of view
The main contents
1、The attribute and effect analysis of Agricultural catastrophe risk
The research discussed the characteristics of Agricultural catastrophe risk,and the differences in companion with common natural disaster risk.And then it analyzed the conforming circumstance, the factors and the features of victims, as well as the economic and social effect.
2、The main body's behavior selection and optimization of Agricultural Catastrophe Risk
The research provided practical basis and theoretical support for improving the management effectiveness and mechanism designing of Agricultural Catastrophe Risk. The author used the empirical models such as expected effect theory and risk preference theory for rreference. And through the establishment of the micro-foundation and argument specification's analysis framework, meanwhile,on the basis of statistical analysis to the 351 questionnaires in the five provinces and one city of the country,the author made normative sense reasoning for Catastrophic risk on the main behavioral characteristics of agricultural and risk preferences.
3、Agricultural Catastrophe Risk Management International comparison and reference
The Research was based on the describe of the statistical analysis and mathematical deduction mainly. And the author introduced the ways of case studies. The author summarized the similarities and differences, as well as the experience and lessons learned, which through the investigation, analysis and comparison of catastrophe risk management from different countries.
4、Domestic agriculture catastrophe risk evaluation
The model of this study was constructed base on the theory of economics, society, and moral scene, which have goal of fairness, effectiveness, encourage and make a reduction of risk. The study construct the foundation for the ability reduce the risk against agriculture disaster, the system of protecting and reducing the cost caused by the disaster, the emergency management procedures, lost recovery system and moral issue. The evaluation system included five different areas, and 37 indexes. Through the combination of professor evaluation and the method of AHP to analysis case, in additional to weight index and evaluate domestic agriculture catastrophe risk management.
5、Domestic agriculture catastrophe risk management long-term system design
The management system was majorly based on the selection of risk body and optimization. Additionally, at the same time it was also a reflection of an improvement of effectiveness for the agriculture catastrophe risk management. The study emphasized and surrounded by the topic of agriculture catastrophe risk management system, encouragement system, emergency backup system and loss recovery system.
Conclusion
1、Agricultural catastrophe risk seriously weakened the foundation of economic and social sustainable development. Agricultural catastrophe risk has the natural attribute of Symbiosis, group-occur and concomitants, also the economic attribute and heavy-tailed statistic attribute. A multi-attribute agricultural catastrophe risk showed difference from characteristics of common natural disasters, which further enhanced the difficulty and intensity in agricultural catastrophe risk management.By the analysis of disaster mechanism of Agricultural catastrophe risk we finded that agriculture catastrophe losses would be superimposed expanded, since the Multiplex of hazard -formative factors, vulnerability of Hazard-affected body,as well as the vulnerability of conforming environment. And have an important impact on the sustainable development of society and economy by the value of risk carrier.
2、The peasants'risk preference was unstable under the influence of agricultural catastrophe risk.By constructing a behavior economics prospect theory analysis frame,the researchers thought that under the influence of agricultural catastrophe risk,the peasants risk preference is unstable. The conclusion was based on practical investigation data. Indeed, owing to the fact that peasants were ignorant when they confronted the problems of agricultural catastrophe risk, peasants'limited rational realization degree was inferior. Under the significant interference of non-Bayesian rules, rules of representativeness, anchoring effect, herd behavior. peasants' rrational choices had often contributed to the individual behaviour.Thus risk aversion changed for risk appetite. Noticeably, further study also helps us to crystallize pieces of thoughts. In the existing government which under the influence of all-around relief mode, farmers would continue to think that the catastrophe risk facing agriculture is ineffective, which was somewhat inconsistent with the agricultural catastrophe risk management intentions that government had before. Additionally, it was also important reason for the low efficiency of the current agricultural catastrophe risk management.
3、Game trajectory in market subjects evolutionary of Agricultural catastrophe risk didn't have stable strategy. Through using evolution game theory, it constructed the analysis framework,assuming that the market only existed farmer's communities and insurance companies' community. Insurance companies and farmer's game trajectory did not exist the evolutionary stable strategy which makes game mutual stable. There was only a better strategy which could make average agricultural catastrophe management market come true. Whether the Farmers would buy agricultural catastrophe insurance was decided by an individual comparison and the expected benefits,as well as the size of the choice cost it will assume. Due to the fact that agricultural catastrophe risk was a special properties object, to increase the safeguard scope and depth of agricultural catastrophe risk only with the insurance company group was not realistic. Indisputably, the government can optimize effective participation of peasants' groups and the selection strategy of insurance company groups.
4、The difference between farmers had a substantial influence on their satisfaction of the Agricultural Catastrophe Risk Management. Base on the refine and analysis of the survey data, the research analyzed the farmers'satisfaction of the agricultural catastrophe risk management and the factors influenced on it with the factor analysis and logistic model. The results indicated that the age and cultural level, family and the family income, the proportion of households in agricultural earnings and the tendency of farmers' behavior choose had a dramatically influence on the satisfaction of the agricultural catastrophe risk management. By reducing the dimension, the farmers of agricultural catastrophe risk management actions can be decomposed into self-aggressive tendencies, the government and the social relational dependent. First of all,the more obvious tendency of self-active type of farmers, agricultural catastrophe risk management and effectiveness of the initiative was stronger, meanwhile,positive impact on the degree of satisfaction was also greater. The second was that government-dependent type of household and social relations.
5、Current Agriculture Risk Management appeared the low level of overall effectiveness in China. By building the effectiveness of Agricultural Risk Management Evaluation System, combined with expert scoring method and the method of AHP paradigm, we conducted comprehensive evaluations of the index weight,as well as the performance of current agricultural catastrophe risk management. The results showed the effectiveness of agricultural catastrophe risk management scoring only 58.7 points, is divided into five grades in the "general" grade level, which showed that our current agricultural catastrophe risk management to enhance efficiency had yet to be. In five components of agricultural Catastrophe Risk Management, only emergency management and social identity catastrophe were both in the "good" level, especially,sharing aspects of catastrophe losses scored significantly lower than other areas.Which indicated that China's agricultural Catastrophe Disaster losses can not be effectively shared.朗读
6、To improve the effectiveness of the agricultural catastrophe risk management, designing of the Long-term Mechanism always comes first. The long-term mechanism of catastrophe risk management in China includeed the operation mechanism, incentive & constraint mechanism, emergency mechanism as well as the loss allocation & compensation Mechanism. In terms of management operating mechanism, the key point was to do good deal with the role orientation between the government and the market. But, analysis showed that governments' responsibility boundary of the agricultural catastrophe risk management is constantly restricted by many factors, for example, the financial strength、budget layout, developed degree of the regional economy and the emergency reflecting ability,etc.Consequently, an establishment of comprehensive management operating mechanism which involves both the government and the market is an inevitable choice. Meanwhile, as the embodiment and subdivision of the comprehensive management operating mechanism, the incentive & constraint mechanism、emergency mechanism and the loss allocation & compensation mechanism constituted the long-term mechanism of agricultural catastrophe risk management in China. We should say that the design and operation of the management operating mechanism were important guarantees and basic premises to enhance the efficiency of catastrophe risk management.
Innovation
1.This research is based on statistical survey to study the subjects' behaviour choice and risk preference of the agricultural catastrophe risk. This paper emphasized the subjects' behaviour choice and risk preference rather than other research angles and basic points. Because peasants were the most important objects and participants in the agricultural catastrophe risk management, whose choices and views on this risk played a vital role in boosting it's effectiveness. Meanwhile, the implementation of scientific and rational institution and policy of the agricultural catastrophe risk management were in desperate need of positive cooperation and understanding from relative subjects. To depict and describe accurately the subjects'behavioral characteristic had a profound impact on the improvement of the level and effectiveness of the agricultural catastrophe risk management.
2.Attempting to construct an effectiveness evaluation index system of agricultural catastrophic risk management. First of all, agricultural catastrophic risk management should solve the problem of measure standard. That is, we can manage the agricultural catastrophic risk. And then, what is the goal and value standard of the management? On the basis of the study of existing literatures, this paper proposed three principles based on fairness、efficiency and incentive of disaster reduction innovatively. Meanwhile it constructed the effectiveness evaluation index system of domestic agricultural catastrophic risk management from five aspects, including the evaluation of capacity of resilience to agricultural catastrophe、system of prevention and reduction to catastrophe、catastrophe emergency management、loss sharing and social identity, and determined the current level of the agricultural catastrophic risk management through expert scoring method、chromatography analysis and so on.
3.Comprehensively design the long-term mechanism of domestic agricultural catastrophic risk management. In the premise that the effective goal of the agricultural catastrophic risk management has been made clear, this paper constructed the long-effect mechanism of our country's agricultural catastrophic risk management in the combination with the behaviour characteristics of the agricultural catastrophic risk's subject. In the process of the mechanism design, it paid attention to the sociality and naturalness unity of agricultural catastrophic risk management and focused on the government and market's liquidity, which not only embodied the engineering methods for the management mechanism design from the perspective of traditional disaster research, but also put more emphasis on the blend of the humanities and social science elements. Judging from the existing literatures, the long-term mechanism of agricultural catastrophic risk management this paper had designed has more significant innovation.
引文
①详见矫梅燕，“健全农业气象服务和农村气象灾害防御体系”[J]．《求是》，2010．6；
①对于这种“强依赖”行为,陈雨露,马勇2009年曾撰文分析：内生于中国特殊整合和社会结构的农户弱势心理,使农户总是希望借助或等待“外力”的输入来改变现状,使其在任何时候都希望政府施以援手,并认为是一种理所当然的等待。这种强依赖心理也一定程度上妨碍了市场化和商业化的运作,因为任何通过政府运作的事情都会勾起农户对政府援助的习惯性“遐想”,并最终形成一种特殊的预期。详见陈雨露,马小勇,关于农户信用和风险偏好的几个注释,财贸经济,2009(1)。
①根据张维等(2008)对山东省400农户针对农业保险的调查,保险公司的信誉不高及保险业务程序过于复杂是农户参保比重低的重要影响因素。农户因“保险费太高”、“买保险的程序及保险条款太复杂”、“索赔困难”、“信不过农业保险”这些原因而没有购买农业保险出现的频率分别是11.28%、12.16%、12.28%和10.65%。详见张维,胡继连,农户参与农业保险的意愿与需求：山东的调查,改革,2008(3)。
①王敏俊.影响小规模农民参加政策性农业保险的因素分析,中国农村经济,2009(3)：38-44.；
①友于：《<管子·度地篇>探微》,《农史研究丛刊》第1册,1959年。
②暨南大学,陈高镛编。
①谯珊.近代中国自然灾害与城市衰落[J].四川师范大学学报,2007(7).
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①根据张维等(2008)对山东省400农户针对农业保险的调查,保险公司的信誉不高及保险业务程序过于复杂是农户参保比重低的重要影响因素。农户因“保险费太高”、“买保险的程序及保险条款太复杂”、“索赔困难”、“信不过农业保险”这些原因而没有购买农业保险出现的频率分别是11.28%、12.16%、12.28%和10.65%。详见张维,胡继连,农户参与农业保险的意愿与需求：山东的调查,改革,2008(3)。
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①友于：《<管子·度地篇>探微》,《农史研究丛刊》第1册,1959年。
②暨南大学,陈高镛编。
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