商业银行公司治理的法律制度研究
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摘要
改革开放以来,我国一直在努力探索推进金融体制改革。由于我国直接金融发展相对滞后,因此银行体制改革一直是金融改革的核心任务。经过多年的不断努力,我国已经初步建立现代商业银行制度。然而不可否认的是,我国建立现代商业银行制度的改革尚未完成,包括完善公司治理在内的现代商业银行制度建设,仍是今后较长一段时期金融体制改革的重要课题。本文主要采用规范分析、比较分析、案例分析等研究方法,系统研究商业银行公司治理的法律制度问题,以期为我国进一步推进与商业银行公司治理有关的法律制度建设提供一些有价值的观点。
从企业形态来讲,商业银行是从事信贷经营的一种现代企业组织形式,也就是说商业银行既是一种现代企业组织形式,同时又是从事特定金融业务的特殊企业组织形式。为此,全面分析商业银行的公司治理问题就需要从两个视角展开:一是清晰把握现代企业公司治理的一般原则和治理机制,因为商业银行与其他工商企业一样,在任何国家都要受到《公司法》、《证券法》等法律的约束,其公司治理与其他类型工商企业存在着多方面的共同点;二是准确把握商业银行的特殊性及其公司治理的特殊性,明确商业银行公司治理与其他类型工商企业公司治理的差异。
关于公司治理的概念,不同学者的界定还存在一定的差别,经济学学者和法学学者的看法也不完全一致。总体看来,经济学家更倾向于认为,公司治理是解决由所有权与经营权相分离而产生的各种问题的制度安排体系,包括股东和股东大会、董事和董事会、企业高管等之间权力分配以及相应的激励机制。而法学家则更倾向于从权力、责任、义务、利益相互平衡的原则出发,认为公司治理的核心内容是约束和激励代理人更好地履行其信托责任,全面保护委托人的信托权益。尽管公司治理理论的历史并不是很长,但是相关理论却发展非常迅速,并形成了委托—代理理论、利益相关者理论、古典和现代管家理论、产权理论和超产权理论等理论假说。
有效的公司治理需要一系列有效的运作机制为保障。从大的方面看,公司治理机制主要可以划分为公司内部监督与制约机制和外部约束机制两个方面。股东和股东大会、董事和董事会、监事和监事会等对公司经营管理的监督和制约,以及股东大会、董事会、监事会等组织结构内部的制衡机制,就是公司内部治理机制。债权人的相机治理、产品市场竞争的约束机制、资本市场竞争的约束机制、经理人市场竞争的约束机制、独立的审计评价的约束机制、法律约束与政府干预机制等,则构成了公司治理的外部约束机制。在新古典经济学看来,公司治理完全是企业自身能够解决的问题。因为金融合同都发生在老练的发行商与投资人之间,一旦投资人认识到被剥夺的风险,就会惩罚那些未按合同披露有关信息并约束自己行为以善待投资人的公司。因此,市场机制的有效运作可以有效地保护投资人的权益,因而对公司治理加以法律约束和政府干预是完全不必要的。然而,各国公司治理的实践表明,各种保护投资人的合同的签订和执行都非常需要法律法规的约束,并且建立于法律约束基础上的投资人保护合约,一般比没有法律约束的合约更容易得到执行。为此,世界上绝大多数国家和地区都建立起了较为系统的有关公司治理的法律制度体系。
关于公司治理的法律制度内容非常广泛,股东的知情权、股东重大事项决定、股东收益权、股东大会的多数原则和少数股东权利保护、维护股东权益的司法救济制度等股东权益方面的法律制度,董事会的法律地位、董事会构成及其内部制衡机制、董事会制衡与激励机制、董事的义务及其违反职责追究等方面的法律制度,以及监事会在公司监督中的地位与作用、公司高层管理人员的法律地位、股份公司信息披露与财务审计制度等,都是其重要组成部分。公司治理有效性较高的国家和地区都作出了严格的法律制度规定。
各个国家和地区的公司法、公司条例等法律法规均对商业银行具有约束力,因此商业银行的公司治理与其他工商企业存在着很大的共同之处。但值得注意的是,与其他工商企业相比,商业银行在资本结构、经营活动的透明性、系统性风险程度、政府监管程度等方面也存在其明显的特殊性,而这些特殊性直接影响着商业银行公司治理的有效性,即使得在一般工商企业公司治理中有效运作的内部监督制约机制和外部约束机制的有效性明显降低。为此,商业银行的公司治理就需要特殊的更有针对性的法律制度保护。在金融自由化以前,各国普遍通过法律制度和政府干预对商业银行管理层的自由裁量空间进行约束,避免其滥用自身权利,即对银行的各种经营活动加以严格管制。随着金融自由化的推进,许多金融监管措施逐步被废止,许多国家逐步调整了金融监管思路,更加注重针对造成商业银行公司治理机制失灵的原因,找到相应的应对措施,尽可能使各种治理机制都发挥作用,以此提高商业银行公司治理的有效性。具体说来,就是制定和实施一系列的法律制度,以加强商业银行信息披露,鼓励商业银行强化内部公司治理,促进存款保险制度与银行经营稳健性相协调,规范陷入经营困境商业银行的处理措施,促进银行业多元市场竞争。
对于许多银行制度转轨的国家来说,有关商业银行公司治理的法律制度建设面临的任务更为繁杂,其内容主要包括三个方面:一是规范商业银行产权制度改革的法律制度;二是规范商业银行内部监督制约机制的法律制度;三是规范商业信息披露等外部制约机制的法律制度。银行转轨国家建立完善商业银行公司治理,必须同步推进上述三个方面的法律制度建设。
完善商业银行公司治理一直是近年来我国商业银行制度建设的重要内容之一。目前,我国已经初步建立起现代商业银行所需要的公司治理框架:商业银行产权改革与引入战略投资者取得重大进展,公司内部治理机制得到初步确立,薪酬制度改革和激励机制建设不断取得新突破,竞争性的商业银行业的市场结构已具雏形,与商业银行公司治理有关法律制度体系也已经基本形成。当然,由于各种历史和现实原因,我国商业银行公司治理仍有许多问题需要进一步解决。国家对商业银行的隐形保险存在严重的消极影响,商业银行股权结构也存在着明显问题,商业银行内部约束与制衡机制运作效率还比较低,商业银行高层管理人员激励机制设计仍不够合理,外部治理机制对商业银行经营管理的约束还较小。为此,进一步推进商业银行公司治理改革和加快相关法律制度建设,仍是一项迫切需要解决的课题。
完善我国商业银行公司治理的法律制度建设需要解决的问题复杂多样,当前紧迫的工作包括七个方面:一是实现从隐形存款保险到明确存款保险法律制度的转变;二是调整关于股东大会地位和对股东权利保护方面的法律制度;三是调整有关董事会地位与董事会内部制衡机制方面的法律制度;四是调整有关监事会监督职能的法律制度;五是完善商业银行高层管理人员激励机制的法律制度;六是完善商业银行信息披露方面的法律制度;七是全面提高法律制度的实施效率。
Since reform and opening, China has been promoting the financial system reform. As the direct finance in our country developed in backward, the banking system reform has been the core task of financial reform. After years of continuous efforts, China has initially established a modern commercial banking system. However, it is undeniable that a modern commercial banking system reform has not been completed. Financial reform which including improvements in corporate governance and the construction of modern commercial banking system is still an important issue in a long period of time. In order to provide some valuable views, this paper used standard analysis, comparative analysis, case studies and other research methods to study on the legal system of corporate governance for commercial banks.
In essence, the commercial banks are engaged in a modern enterprise organization of credit management, which means that commercial banks in both a modern form of enterprise organization, and it is also engaged in special organization of financial services. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of corporate governance for commercial banks should start from two perspectives. Firstly, we should grasp the principles and mechanisms of modern corporate governance. Like the business enterprises, commercial banks in any country would be subject to the "Company Law","Securities Law "and other legal constraints, there are many aspects of corporate governance in common with other types of businesses. Secondly, we should grasp the specificities of commercial banks and corporate governance, and understand the corporate governance differences between commercial banks and other types of business enterprises.
The scholars have some differences in defining the concept of corporate governance, and economists andJurist are not exactly the same view. In general, economists tend to think that the purpose of corporate governance is to solve the problems by the separation of ownership and management, including distribution of power and the corresponding incentives by shareholders and general meeting of shareholders, directors and board of directors, corporate executives. The jurists are more inclined from the principles of the powers, duties, obligations, the balance between the interests, they think that the core of corporate governance is to constraint and incentive agents for better fulfilling the trust responsibility and protecting the client's interests. Although the theory history of corporate governance is not very long, it has developed rapidly and formed a series theories, such as principal - agent theory, stakeholder theory, classical and modern stewardship theory, property rights theory and super-hypothesis theory.
Effective corporate governance requires a range of operating mechanisms for the security. Overall, the main corporate governance mechanisms can be divided into internal and external of supervision and restriction mechanisms. Internal mechanisms include company management supervision and regulation mechanisms by shareholders and general meeting of shareholders, directors and board of directors, supervisors and board of supervisors, as well as internal balances system by shareholders, board of directors, supervisors. External mechanisms include creditors of the camera governance, product market competition, restraint mechanisms, capital market competition, the restraint mechanism, the manager constraint mechanism of market competition, independent auditing mechanism to evaluate the constraints, legal constraints and government intervention mechanism.
From the view of new classical economics, corporate governance is completely able to solve their own problems. Because of financial contracts between experienced issuers and investors, once investors realize that the risk of being deprived, they would punish those who fail to disclose relevant information and the contract their own behavior.Therefore, the effective market mechanisms can effectively protect the interests of investors and thus it is unnecessary to be legally binding and intervent on corporate governance. However, the practice of corporate governance has shown that a variety of contract signed and enforcement of protecting investor needs laws and regulations. For this reason, most countries and regions have established a more systematic legal system on corporate governance.
The content of the legal system of corporate governance is very wide, which includes the right of shareholders, the shareholders decisions on major issues, the right of shareholder returns, the majority shareholders principles and minority shareholder rights protection, the judicial relief system's for safeguard the interests of shareholders, the legal position of the board of directors, the board composition and internal checks and balances, the board of checks and balances and incentives, the obligations and breach of duties of directors and other legal system of accountability, the monitoring position of the company's supervisory board, the legal position of senior management, and shares information disclosure and financial audit system.The countries and regions who have effectiveness of corporate governance formulate strict provisions of the legal system.
The Companies Act, the Companies Ordinance and other laws and regulations in various countries are binding on the commercial banks. Corporate governance for commercial banks have many commons wih other business enterprises. Compared with other industrial and commercial enterprises, commercial banks have specificities in capital structure, transparency of business activities, systemic risk and the degree of government regulation, which directly affects the effectiveness of corporate governance. Therefore, corporate governance of commercial banks require special protection of the legal system. Before financial liberalization, each countries carry on legal system and government intervention to constrain the discretionary space and avoid the abuse of their rights on commercial banks. With the advance of financial liberalization, many financial regulation was gradually abolished, many countries gradually adjust the way of financial regulation. In order to improve the effectiveness of commercial banks, they pay more attention to the reasons of corporate governance failure and find appropriate measures. In detail, they develop and implement a series of legal system to strengthen the commercial bank information disclosure, encourage commercial banksto strengthen their internal corporate governance, promote deposit insurance system in coordinate with stability of banks, regulate treatment measures for banks into financial difficulties and promote diversified banking market competition.
For many transition countries, the task of legal system construction is more complex to the corporate governance of commercial banks. The content mainly includes three aspects. Firstly, they should standardize the legal system for property rights reform of commercial banks. Secondly, they should standardize the legal system for Internal supervision and control mechanism of commercial banks. Thirdly, they should standardize the legal system for information disclosure of commercial banks.
To Improve corporate governance is an important part of commercial banks system construction in recent years. At present, China has initially established a modern commercial bank corporate governance framework. Commercial banks reform and the introduction of strategic investors made significant progress in investment, internal governance mechanism has been initially established, pay system reform continue to make new incentive mechanism, competitive commercial banking market structure has taken shape, the legal system related to corporate governance system is basically formed. Of course, due to various historical and practical reasons, there are still many problems to be resolved. National invisible insurance has serious negative impact on commercial banks, and ownership structure also has obvious problems, such as the efficiency of internal constraints are relatively low, incentive mechanism for senior management is still not reasonable, constraints of external governance mechanism are also relatively low. So it is an important task to promote corporate governance reform and legal system construction.
There are many problems should be solved to improve corporate governance of commercial banks in the legal system. The current urgent work includes seven aspects: First, we should realize the transition from invisible deposit insurance to clear deposit insurance legal system. Second, we should adjust the legal system of the position of shareholders and protection of the rights of shareholders. Third, we should adjust the legal system of the position of the board of directors and board of internal checks and balances mechanism. Fourth, we should adjust the the legal system of the functions of the Board Supervisors. Fifth, we should improve incentives of senior management in commercial banks. Sixth, we should improve the legal system of information disclosure of commercial banks. Last, we should improve the implementation efficiency of legal system.
从企业形态来讲,商业银行是从事信贷经营的一种现代企业组织形式,也就是说商业银行既是一种现代企业组织形式,同时又是从事特定金融业务的特殊企业组织形式。为此,全面分析商业银行的公司治理问题就需要从两个视角展开:一是清晰把握现代企业公司治理的一般原则和治理机制,因为商业银行与其他工商企业一样,在任何国家都要受到《公司法》、《证券法》等法律的约束,其公司治理与其他类型工商企业存在着多方面的共同点;二是准确把握商业银行的特殊性及其公司治理的特殊性,明确商业银行公司治理与其他类型工商企业公司治理的差异。
关于公司治理的概念,不同学者的界定还存在一定的差别,经济学学者和法学学者的看法也不完全一致。总体看来,经济学家更倾向于认为,公司治理是解决由所有权与经营权相分离而产生的各种问题的制度安排体系,包括股东和股东大会、董事和董事会、企业高管等之间权力分配以及相应的激励机制。而法学家则更倾向于从权力、责任、义务、利益相互平衡的原则出发,认为公司治理的核心内容是约束和激励代理人更好地履行其信托责任,全面保护委托人的信托权益。尽管公司治理理论的历史并不是很长,但是相关理论却发展非常迅速,并形成了委托—代理理论、利益相关者理论、古典和现代管家理论、产权理论和超产权理论等理论假说。
有效的公司治理需要一系列有效的运作机制为保障。从大的方面看,公司治理机制主要可以划分为公司内部监督与制约机制和外部约束机制两个方面。股东和股东大会、董事和董事会、监事和监事会等对公司经营管理的监督和制约,以及股东大会、董事会、监事会等组织结构内部的制衡机制,就是公司内部治理机制。债权人的相机治理、产品市场竞争的约束机制、资本市场竞争的约束机制、经理人市场竞争的约束机制、独立的审计评价的约束机制、法律约束与政府干预机制等,则构成了公司治理的外部约束机制。在新古典经济学看来,公司治理完全是企业自身能够解决的问题。因为金融合同都发生在老练的发行商与投资人之间,一旦投资人认识到被剥夺的风险,就会惩罚那些未按合同披露有关信息并约束自己行为以善待投资人的公司。因此,市场机制的有效运作可以有效地保护投资人的权益,因而对公司治理加以法律约束和政府干预是完全不必要的。然而,各国公司治理的实践表明,各种保护投资人的合同的签订和执行都非常需要法律法规的约束,并且建立于法律约束基础上的投资人保护合约,一般比没有法律约束的合约更容易得到执行。为此,世界上绝大多数国家和地区都建立起了较为系统的有关公司治理的法律制度体系。
关于公司治理的法律制度内容非常广泛,股东的知情权、股东重大事项决定、股东收益权、股东大会的多数原则和少数股东权利保护、维护股东权益的司法救济制度等股东权益方面的法律制度,董事会的法律地位、董事会构成及其内部制衡机制、董事会制衡与激励机制、董事的义务及其违反职责追究等方面的法律制度,以及监事会在公司监督中的地位与作用、公司高层管理人员的法律地位、股份公司信息披露与财务审计制度等,都是其重要组成部分。公司治理有效性较高的国家和地区都作出了严格的法律制度规定。
各个国家和地区的公司法、公司条例等法律法规均对商业银行具有约束力,因此商业银行的公司治理与其他工商企业存在着很大的共同之处。但值得注意的是,与其他工商企业相比,商业银行在资本结构、经营活动的透明性、系统性风险程度、政府监管程度等方面也存在其明显的特殊性,而这些特殊性直接影响着商业银行公司治理的有效性,即使得在一般工商企业公司治理中有效运作的内部监督制约机制和外部约束机制的有效性明显降低。为此,商业银行的公司治理就需要特殊的更有针对性的法律制度保护。在金融自由化以前,各国普遍通过法律制度和政府干预对商业银行管理层的自由裁量空间进行约束,避免其滥用自身权利,即对银行的各种经营活动加以严格管制。随着金融自由化的推进,许多金融监管措施逐步被废止,许多国家逐步调整了金融监管思路,更加注重针对造成商业银行公司治理机制失灵的原因,找到相应的应对措施,尽可能使各种治理机制都发挥作用,以此提高商业银行公司治理的有效性。具体说来,就是制定和实施一系列的法律制度,以加强商业银行信息披露,鼓励商业银行强化内部公司治理,促进存款保险制度与银行经营稳健性相协调,规范陷入经营困境商业银行的处理措施,促进银行业多元市场竞争。
对于许多银行制度转轨的国家来说,有关商业银行公司治理的法律制度建设面临的任务更为繁杂,其内容主要包括三个方面:一是规范商业银行产权制度改革的法律制度;二是规范商业银行内部监督制约机制的法律制度;三是规范商业信息披露等外部制约机制的法律制度。银行转轨国家建立完善商业银行公司治理,必须同步推进上述三个方面的法律制度建设。
完善商业银行公司治理一直是近年来我国商业银行制度建设的重要内容之一。目前,我国已经初步建立起现代商业银行所需要的公司治理框架:商业银行产权改革与引入战略投资者取得重大进展,公司内部治理机制得到初步确立,薪酬制度改革和激励机制建设不断取得新突破,竞争性的商业银行业的市场结构已具雏形,与商业银行公司治理有关法律制度体系也已经基本形成。当然,由于各种历史和现实原因,我国商业银行公司治理仍有许多问题需要进一步解决。国家对商业银行的隐形保险存在严重的消极影响,商业银行股权结构也存在着明显问题,商业银行内部约束与制衡机制运作效率还比较低,商业银行高层管理人员激励机制设计仍不够合理,外部治理机制对商业银行经营管理的约束还较小。为此,进一步推进商业银行公司治理改革和加快相关法律制度建设,仍是一项迫切需要解决的课题。
完善我国商业银行公司治理的法律制度建设需要解决的问题复杂多样,当前紧迫的工作包括七个方面:一是实现从隐形存款保险到明确存款保险法律制度的转变;二是调整关于股东大会地位和对股东权利保护方面的法律制度;三是调整有关董事会地位与董事会内部制衡机制方面的法律制度;四是调整有关监事会监督职能的法律制度;五是完善商业银行高层管理人员激励机制的法律制度;六是完善商业银行信息披露方面的法律制度;七是全面提高法律制度的实施效率。
Since reform and opening, China has been promoting the financial system reform. As the direct finance in our country developed in backward, the banking system reform has been the core task of financial reform. After years of continuous efforts, China has initially established a modern commercial banking system. However, it is undeniable that a modern commercial banking system reform has not been completed. Financial reform which including improvements in corporate governance and the construction of modern commercial banking system is still an important issue in a long period of time. In order to provide some valuable views, this paper used standard analysis, comparative analysis, case studies and other research methods to study on the legal system of corporate governance for commercial banks.
In essence, the commercial banks are engaged in a modern enterprise organization of credit management, which means that commercial banks in both a modern form of enterprise organization, and it is also engaged in special organization of financial services. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis of corporate governance for commercial banks should start from two perspectives. Firstly, we should grasp the principles and mechanisms of modern corporate governance. Like the business enterprises, commercial banks in any country would be subject to the "Company Law","Securities Law "and other legal constraints, there are many aspects of corporate governance in common with other types of businesses. Secondly, we should grasp the specificities of commercial banks and corporate governance, and understand the corporate governance differences between commercial banks and other types of business enterprises.
The scholars have some differences in defining the concept of corporate governance, and economists andJurist are not exactly the same view. In general, economists tend to think that the purpose of corporate governance is to solve the problems by the separation of ownership and management, including distribution of power and the corresponding incentives by shareholders and general meeting of shareholders, directors and board of directors, corporate executives. The jurists are more inclined from the principles of the powers, duties, obligations, the balance between the interests, they think that the core of corporate governance is to constraint and incentive agents for better fulfilling the trust responsibility and protecting the client's interests. Although the theory history of corporate governance is not very long, it has developed rapidly and formed a series theories, such as principal - agent theory, stakeholder theory, classical and modern stewardship theory, property rights theory and super-hypothesis theory.
Effective corporate governance requires a range of operating mechanisms for the security. Overall, the main corporate governance mechanisms can be divided into internal and external of supervision and restriction mechanisms. Internal mechanisms include company management supervision and regulation mechanisms by shareholders and general meeting of shareholders, directors and board of directors, supervisors and board of supervisors, as well as internal balances system by shareholders, board of directors, supervisors. External mechanisms include creditors of the camera governance, product market competition, restraint mechanisms, capital market competition, the restraint mechanism, the manager constraint mechanism of market competition, independent auditing mechanism to evaluate the constraints, legal constraints and government intervention mechanism.
From the view of new classical economics, corporate governance is completely able to solve their own problems. Because of financial contracts between experienced issuers and investors, once investors realize that the risk of being deprived, they would punish those who fail to disclose relevant information and the contract their own behavior.Therefore, the effective market mechanisms can effectively protect the interests of investors and thus it is unnecessary to be legally binding and intervent on corporate governance. However, the practice of corporate governance has shown that a variety of contract signed and enforcement of protecting investor needs laws and regulations. For this reason, most countries and regions have established a more systematic legal system on corporate governance.
The content of the legal system of corporate governance is very wide, which includes the right of shareholders, the shareholders decisions on major issues, the right of shareholder returns, the majority shareholders principles and minority shareholder rights protection, the judicial relief system's for safeguard the interests of shareholders, the legal position of the board of directors, the board composition and internal checks and balances, the board of checks and balances and incentives, the obligations and breach of duties of directors and other legal system of accountability, the monitoring position of the company's supervisory board, the legal position of senior management, and shares information disclosure and financial audit system.The countries and regions who have effectiveness of corporate governance formulate strict provisions of the legal system.
The Companies Act, the Companies Ordinance and other laws and regulations in various countries are binding on the commercial banks. Corporate governance for commercial banks have many commons wih other business enterprises. Compared with other industrial and commercial enterprises, commercial banks have specificities in capital structure, transparency of business activities, systemic risk and the degree of government regulation, which directly affects the effectiveness of corporate governance. Therefore, corporate governance of commercial banks require special protection of the legal system. Before financial liberalization, each countries carry on legal system and government intervention to constrain the discretionary space and avoid the abuse of their rights on commercial banks. With the advance of financial liberalization, many financial regulation was gradually abolished, many countries gradually adjust the way of financial regulation. In order to improve the effectiveness of commercial banks, they pay more attention to the reasons of corporate governance failure and find appropriate measures. In detail, they develop and implement a series of legal system to strengthen the commercial bank information disclosure, encourage commercial banksto strengthen their internal corporate governance, promote deposit insurance system in coordinate with stability of banks, regulate treatment measures for banks into financial difficulties and promote diversified banking market competition.
For many transition countries, the task of legal system construction is more complex to the corporate governance of commercial banks. The content mainly includes three aspects. Firstly, they should standardize the legal system for property rights reform of commercial banks. Secondly, they should standardize the legal system for Internal supervision and control mechanism of commercial banks. Thirdly, they should standardize the legal system for information disclosure of commercial banks.
To Improve corporate governance is an important part of commercial banks system construction in recent years. At present, China has initially established a modern commercial bank corporate governance framework. Commercial banks reform and the introduction of strategic investors made significant progress in investment, internal governance mechanism has been initially established, pay system reform continue to make new incentive mechanism, competitive commercial banking market structure has taken shape, the legal system related to corporate governance system is basically formed. Of course, due to various historical and practical reasons, there are still many problems to be resolved. National invisible insurance has serious negative impact on commercial banks, and ownership structure also has obvious problems, such as the efficiency of internal constraints are relatively low, incentive mechanism for senior management is still not reasonable, constraints of external governance mechanism are also relatively low. So it is an important task to promote corporate governance reform and legal system construction.
There are many problems should be solved to improve corporate governance of commercial banks in the legal system. The current urgent work includes seven aspects: First, we should realize the transition from invisible deposit insurance to clear deposit insurance legal system. Second, we should adjust the legal system of the position of shareholders and protection of the rights of shareholders. Third, we should adjust the legal system of the position of the board of directors and board of internal checks and balances mechanism. Fourth, we should adjust the the legal system of the functions of the Board Supervisors. Fifth, we should improve incentives of senior management in commercial banks. Sixth, we should improve the legal system of information disclosure of commercial banks. Last, we should improve the implementation efficiency of legal system.
引文
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