制度制约下的上市公司高管变更的研究
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摘要
公司的高管是拥有独特的、具有竞争力的人力资本。高管变更是完善公司治理结构的重要力量源泉之一。公司的内外部治理机制都会影响到高管的变更。高管自身的经营管理能力的优劣会直接影响到企业未来的可持续经营。自从21世纪中国加入WTO以来,中国的经济形势和制度环境发生了翻天覆地的变化。上市公司高管作为公司治理的主要参与者,发挥着重要的作用,而高管变更会直接影响公司治理的效果,进而影响公司所处行业的发展。因此,高管在公司治理中具有举足轻重的地位,高管的变更就更加值得我们关注。中国的经济与制度环境发生了很大的变化,会对高管变更产生一定的影响。公司的外部制度环境的变化如何影响高管的变更?公司的业绩在受到外部制度环境的影响时,与高管变更存在什么样的关系?这些问题值得我们去仔细研究。
本文从公司治理理论、委托代理理论和制度变迁理论出发,结合中国上市公司特有的经济和制度环境,以规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,选取1999年12月31日以前上市的公司为样本,观测高管变更的区间是2003年——2007年,从制度环境因素即市场竞争度、要素市场发育程度、市场化程度、政府干预企业的程度、商品市场的地方保护程度等五个方面分析对于高管变更影响的研究,以发现不同的制度环境因素对公司业绩的影响,进而影响高管的变更。本文结合高管变更的研究特征,运用logit回归方法,对制度环境因素变量和高管变更的关系进行了实证检验。本文为了能够进一步剖析高管变更的深层原因,在实证分析时将样本分为三种情况展开研究：全样本分析；董事长变更、总经理变更和两者同时变更的对比分析；第一大股东为国有股股东和第一大股东为非国有股股东的对比分析。研究结果发现,第一大股东为国有股股东时市场化进程、政府对于企业的干预程度、商品市场的地方保护程度对于高管变更的影响不明显。除此之外本文还发现以下重要的研究结论：第一,本文发现市场竞争度越强的企业,企业竞争能力就越强,高管变更的可能性就越低,即市场竞争度与高管变更之间的关系是负相关。第二,在市场发育较好的地区,高管人员变更的难度会越小,从而增大高管人员变更的可能性,高管变更与公司业绩之间的关系是负相关。第三,市场化程度越高,公司的外部制度环境对股东权益保护就会越好,从而提高了公司治理的效率,公司业绩与高管变更之间的关系是负相关。第四,政府对于企业的干预力度越大,高管变更的可能性就越大,人才的流动更加频繁,高管变更与公司绩效之间的关系是负相关。第五,当地政府对于商品市场的保护力度越大,高管变更的可能性就越大,高管变更与公司绩效之间的关系是负相关。
Company executives are unique, competitive human capital. Executive change which is to improve the corporate governance structure is one important source of strength. The company's internal and external governance mechanisms will affect the executive changes. Executive management capacity of their own strengths and weaknesses will directly affect the future of sustainable business enterprises. Since the 21st century, China's accession to WTO, China's economic situation and institutional environment has undergone enormous changes. Listed Companies Corporate Governance as a key player, to play an important role, but executives of corporate governance changes will directly affect the results, thereby affecting the company in which development of the industry. Thus, executives in corporate governance plays a decisive role, executives of the change is even more worthy of our attention. China's economic and institutional environment has undergone great changes, executive changes will have some impact. Company changes in the external institutional environment changes how they affect executives? The company's performance in the external system by the impact of the environment, and executives there is any kind of relationship change? These issues deserve our careful study.
From the corporate governance theory, principal agent theory and the theory of institutional change, combined with China's listed companies unique economic and institutional environment, to regulate the research and empirical research methods combined, selected on Dec.31,1999 the company marketed before the sample observed range of executive changes in 2003 and 2007, from a system that is market competition, environmental factors, degree, elements of market development, market level, the degree of government intervention in business, commodity market where the level of protection of the five areas The impact of the change of executives to find a different system of environmental factors on company performance, which in turn affect the executive changes. This paper studies characteristics of executive changes, using logit regression method, the system environmental variables and the relationship between the executive change an empirical test. This executive order to further analyze the underlying causes of changes in the empirical analysis to a study sample is divided into three cases:the full sample analysis; chairman of the board changes, general manager of change and comparative analysis of both changes; the first major shareholders state-owned shareholders and non-largest shareholder of comparative analysis of state-owned shareholders. The results showed that the largest shareholder is state-owned shareholders when the process of marketization, the government intervention in business, the degree of commodity market where the level of protection for the executive change was not obvious, In addition this study also found that the following important conclusions:First, we find that the stronger the degree of competition in the enterprise, the more powerful enterprise competitiveness, the lower the possibility of executive changes, that degree of market competition and executive change the relationship between a negative correlation. Second, good growth in the market area, executives will change the difficulty of the smaller, thereby increasing the possibility of changes to senior management, senior management changes and the relationship between company performance is negative. Third, the higher the level of the market, the company's external institutional environment will better protect the rights of shareholders, thereby increasing the efficiency of corporate governance, company performance and executives to change the relationship between the negative. Fourth, the government intervention in business, the greater the intensity, the greater the likelihood of executive changes, more frequent movement of personnel, executive changes and the relationship between corporate performance is negative. Fifth, the local government for greater efforts to protect the commodity market, the greater the likelihood of executive changes, executive changes and the relationship between corporate performance is negative.
本文从公司治理理论、委托代理理论和制度变迁理论出发,结合中国上市公司特有的经济和制度环境,以规范研究与实证研究相结合的方法,选取1999年12月31日以前上市的公司为样本,观测高管变更的区间是2003年——2007年,从制度环境因素即市场竞争度、要素市场发育程度、市场化程度、政府干预企业的程度、商品市场的地方保护程度等五个方面分析对于高管变更影响的研究,以发现不同的制度环境因素对公司业绩的影响,进而影响高管的变更。本文结合高管变更的研究特征,运用logit回归方法,对制度环境因素变量和高管变更的关系进行了实证检验。本文为了能够进一步剖析高管变更的深层原因,在实证分析时将样本分为三种情况展开研究：全样本分析；董事长变更、总经理变更和两者同时变更的对比分析；第一大股东为国有股股东和第一大股东为非国有股股东的对比分析。研究结果发现,第一大股东为国有股股东时市场化进程、政府对于企业的干预程度、商品市场的地方保护程度对于高管变更的影响不明显。除此之外本文还发现以下重要的研究结论：第一,本文发现市场竞争度越强的企业,企业竞争能力就越强,高管变更的可能性就越低,即市场竞争度与高管变更之间的关系是负相关。第二,在市场发育较好的地区,高管人员变更的难度会越小,从而增大高管人员变更的可能性,高管变更与公司业绩之间的关系是负相关。第三,市场化程度越高,公司的外部制度环境对股东权益保护就会越好,从而提高了公司治理的效率,公司业绩与高管变更之间的关系是负相关。第四,政府对于企业的干预力度越大,高管变更的可能性就越大,人才的流动更加频繁,高管变更与公司绩效之间的关系是负相关。第五,当地政府对于商品市场的保护力度越大,高管变更的可能性就越大,高管变更与公司绩效之间的关系是负相关。
Company executives are unique, competitive human capital. Executive change which is to improve the corporate governance structure is one important source of strength. The company's internal and external governance mechanisms will affect the executive changes. Executive management capacity of their own strengths and weaknesses will directly affect the future of sustainable business enterprises. Since the 21st century, China's accession to WTO, China's economic situation and institutional environment has undergone enormous changes. Listed Companies Corporate Governance as a key player, to play an important role, but executives of corporate governance changes will directly affect the results, thereby affecting the company in which development of the industry. Thus, executives in corporate governance plays a decisive role, executives of the change is even more worthy of our attention. China's economic and institutional environment has undergone great changes, executive changes will have some impact. Company changes in the external institutional environment changes how they affect executives? The company's performance in the external system by the impact of the environment, and executives there is any kind of relationship change? These issues deserve our careful study.
From the corporate governance theory, principal agent theory and the theory of institutional change, combined with China's listed companies unique economic and institutional environment, to regulate the research and empirical research methods combined, selected on Dec.31,1999 the company marketed before the sample observed range of executive changes in 2003 and 2007, from a system that is market competition, environmental factors, degree, elements of market development, market level, the degree of government intervention in business, commodity market where the level of protection of the five areas The impact of the change of executives to find a different system of environmental factors on company performance, which in turn affect the executive changes. This paper studies characteristics of executive changes, using logit regression method, the system environmental variables and the relationship between the executive change an empirical test. This executive order to further analyze the underlying causes of changes in the empirical analysis to a study sample is divided into three cases:the full sample analysis; chairman of the board changes, general manager of change and comparative analysis of both changes; the first major shareholders state-owned shareholders and non-largest shareholder of comparative analysis of state-owned shareholders. The results showed that the largest shareholder is state-owned shareholders when the process of marketization, the government intervention in business, the degree of commodity market where the level of protection for the executive change was not obvious, In addition this study also found that the following important conclusions:First, we find that the stronger the degree of competition in the enterprise, the more powerful enterprise competitiveness, the lower the possibility of executive changes, that degree of market competition and executive change the relationship between a negative correlation. Second, good growth in the market area, executives will change the difficulty of the smaller, thereby increasing the possibility of changes to senior management, senior management changes and the relationship between company performance is negative. Third, the higher the level of the market, the company's external institutional environment will better protect the rights of shareholders, thereby increasing the efficiency of corporate governance, company performance and executives to change the relationship between the negative. Fourth, the government intervention in business, the greater the intensity, the greater the likelihood of executive changes, more frequent movement of personnel, executive changes and the relationship between corporate performance is negative. Fifth, the local government for greater efforts to protect the commodity market, the greater the likelihood of executive changes, executive changes and the relationship between corporate performance is negative.
引文
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