中国政策性农业保险有效需求研究
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摘要
随着农业产业化的深度推进，农业生产经营的不确定性因素日益增多，农业风险愈来愈呈现复杂多样的特征，威胁着我国农村经济稳定和国家粮食安全。农业保险作为现代农业风险管理的重要工具，具有提升农业综合生产能力、稳定农户收入和提高农户福利水平的经济补偿功能。但农业保险的准公共品属性，决定了它在政府缺位的条件下，必会出现市场失灵。2004～2012年，连续9年的中央一号文件和政府工作报告均提出加强农业保险发展进程。2007年，财政部启动了农业保险财政补贴试点试验，使我国政策性农业保险发展步入良性循环。但与我国几乎全球最高的政府补贴比率极不相称的是，农业保险有效需求水平持续低迷。因此，进行政策性农业保险有效需求问题的研究，对促进我国政策性农业保险有效需求提升，完善农业保险政府补贴运作模式，实现政策性农业保险可持续发展具有一定的理论和现实意义。
国内外学者对农业保险需求问题进行了不懈的探索，推动了这一领域研究的蓬勃发展。但从研究侧重来看，大多研究囿于微观农户层面，缺乏与宏观政府层面相融合的研究成果，尤其是我国现行补贴模式对政策性农业保险有效需求的激励绩效，更高保障水平的补贴模式在我国农业保险实践中的可行性等问题缺乏深入研究和论证。基于此，本文应用现代保险需求理论、福利经济学理论和公共财政理论，结合已有国内外农业保险需求研究成果和农业保险有效需求机理的理论分析，首先，界定了政策性农业保险和农业保险有效需求的内涵，并构建了政策性农业保险有效需求分析逻辑框架，确定了研究视角；其次，采用实地调研和统计学定量分析相结合的方法，对政策性农业保险有效需求现状、问题及成因进行了解读；再次，采用规范分析和统计学定量分析方法，从微观农户层面和宏观政府层面对政策性农业保险有效需求的提升进行了机理解析；最后，采用统计学定量分析和数值模拟的方法，对差异化补贴模式下政策性农业保险有效需求的变化和可行性进行分析，因地制宜地进行补贴模式选择。基于以上理论分析和实证研究，提出了我国政策性农业保险有效需求提升的政策建议和实施保障。全文研究内容主要分为5大部分：
第一部分是问题的提出和研究视角的确定。通过界定研究背景、研究意义、研究方法、研究内容等，明确提出本文研究问题。在此基础上，提出了可能的创新和不足之处；在对已有文献研究内容和研究方法进行梳理的基础上，对农业保险、政策性农业保险、有效需求和农业保险有效需求等概念进行了界定。通过系统地对农业保险有效需求理论进行分析，明确了本文微观农户层面和宏观政府层面相融合的研究视角，并进一步就政府补贴对农业保险有效需求激励理论进行分析，构建了由微观机理、宏观机理和模式选择组成的政策性农业保险有效需求分析逻辑框架。
第二部分是政策性农业保险有效需求现状解读。我国农业保险实施政策性补贴以来，尽管其有效需求被大大激励，政府保费补贴资金的杠杆效应显著，赔付率有所下降，农业保险经营得到一定程度的改善。但渗透度仍很低，表明政府补贴对有效需求激励不足。突出的矛盾是补贴效率不高、低收入农户支付能力不足、其他传统风险分散方式的替代效应、激励制度不完善等。
第三部分是微观农户层面和宏观政府层面政策性农业保险有效需求机理解析。基于微观农户层面政策性农业保险有效需求的影响因素及作用机理实证分析发现，随着农户收入水平提高，农户购买农业保险的支付能力增强。农户的受教育程度、接受政府救济、资产、种植面积、保险认知和满意度等因素对政策性农业保险有效需求具有正效应。但在预算约束条件下，农户医疗保险和养老保险消费优先于农业保险消费，从事非农可能降低农户对农业保险的购买意愿；基于宏观政府层面政策性农业保险有效需求激励实证分析发现，政策性农业保险收入效应的力度大于替代效应的力度，但政策性农业保险和其替代品农户储蓄之间并未形成替代效应。替代效应不改变农户的福利，收入效应使农户福利增加，二者效用方向相同且产生的总效应使政策性农业保险有效需求提高。由于农业保险有效需求和有效供给之间存在动态内生性，政府补贴能促使均衡水平提高。我国农业保险市场有效需求和有效供给存在长期稳定的均衡关系，但2004年为突变点。农业保险有效需求具有更强的自我发展和完善能力，是农业保险有效需求和有效供给实现更高均衡点的源动力。
第四部分是政策性农业保险补贴模式的选择。通过对差异化补贴模式下政策性农业保险有效需求分析，发现我国实施的保成本补贴模式对政策性农业保险有效需求的提高具有正效应，但绩效较低。适时推出政府补贴比例动态变化下多保障水平的产值保险具有可行性，但我国尚不具备广泛开展保收入模式的基础。对于低收入农户，无论哪一种补贴模式下的政策性农业保险，其均不具有支付能力。因此，如何提高低收入农户的纯收入水平，是提升政策性农业保险有效需求的关键所在。
第五部分是结论和政策建议。政策性农业保险有效需求低下，是农户收入和经济状况、风险管理方式采用、其他消费束约束和保险认知等的复合效应，归根结底是农户基于效用最大化的理性选择。通过提高农户政策性农业保险支付能力，培育农户政策性农业保险购买意愿，创新政策性农业保险产品和技术以及提高政策性农业保险服务水平，是解决政策性农业保险有效需求不足的根本途径。进一步强化政府主导地位，不断完善政策性农业保险补贴制度和健全农业保险法律体系，是政策性农业保险有效需求提升的保障措施。
With the promoted progress of agricultural industrialization, the uncertainties ofagricultural production and operation is increasing day by day, it makes thecharacteristics of agricultural risk being more and more complex, and is now threateningthe stability of China’s rural economy and the national food security. Agriculturalinsurance as an important tool of modern agricultural risk management has the economiccompensation function of enhancing the comprehensive agricultural production capacity,stabilizing peasants’ incomes and improving peasants’ welfare level. However，theproperties of agricultural insurance as quasi-public goods would bring about marketfailure under the conditions of government absence. From2004to2012, the NO.1Central Document and the government work report proposed to strengthen thedeveloping process of agricultural insurance for9consecutive years. In the year of2007,the Ministry of Finance launched a pilot testing of financial subsidies for agriculturalinsurance, which step China’s policy-oriented agricultural insurance development into avirtuous circle. But opposite to the world’s highest level of governmental subsidies ratio,the effective demand of agricultural insurance stay low. Therefore, the research on theissues of how to enhance the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural would havecertain theoretical and practical significance on stimulating the effective demand ofChina’s policy-oriented agricultural insurance, perfecting the operation mode ofgovernmental subsidies on agricultural insurance and realizing the sustainabledevelopment of policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
The writers from both at home and abroad have done continuous exploration on thedemand issues of agricultural insurance, promoted the brisk development to the researchof this field. But from the points which they focused, the majority of these researches arelimited in the micro-level of peasant households, having no integration with theoutcomes from the macro-governmental level, especially the motivation performance ofChina’s ongoing subsidies mode on the effective demand of policy-oriented agriculturalinsurance and the lack of in-depth research and argument on the feasibility problems ofthe subsidies mode from higher security level on the practice of China’s agricultural insurance. Based on this, this paper applied the modern insurance demand theory, welfareeconomics theory and public finance theory, combined with theoretical analysis of bothdomestic&foreign research results on agricultural insurance demand and themechanisms of agricultural insurance effective demand. Firstly, it defines the content ofpolicy-oriented agricultural insurance and the effective demand of agricultural insurance,builds the logical analysis framework of the effective demand of policy-orientedagricultural insurance and determines the research angle of view; secondly, it takes thecombination approach of both field survey and the quantitative analysis of statistics,interprets the current condition， existing problems and the causes of policy-orientedagricultural insurance; again, by implying the approach of normative analysis andquantitative analysis of statistics, it interprets the mechanism of how to stimulate theeffective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance from both the micro peasanthouseholds level and the macro governmental level; finally, by using the approach ofboth statistics quantitative analysis and numerical simulation, it analyzes the feasibilityand changes against the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance underthe mode of diversified subsidies. Based on the theoretical and empirical study, it putsforward the policy suggestions and the guarantee of implementation of promote theeffective demand of China’s policy-oriented agricultural insurance. The full text of thisresearch falls into5main parts:
The first part is about the arising of this problem and the research perspectives. Bydefining the background, significance, methods, content and etc. of this research, clearlyput forward the issues of this paper. And on this basis, put forward the possibleinnovations and deficiency; by combing both the content of existing literatures and theresearch method, it defines the concepts of agricultural insurance, policy-orientedagricultural insurance, effective demand and the effective demand of agriculturalinsurance. Through the systematic analysis against the theory of agricultural insuranceeffective demand, clarifies the researching perspective of the combination of both micropeasant households level and macro governmental level, and further analyzes themotivation theory of governmental subsidies against the effective demand of agriculturalinsurance, constructs the logical framework of policy-oriented agricultural insuranceeffective demand with the micro mechanism, macro mechanism and the mode of chosen.
The second part is about the quo interpretation of policy-oriented agriculturalinsurance effective demand.Since the implementation of policy-oriented subsidies, theeffective demand of China’s agricultural insurance have been highly motivated; theleverage effect of subsidized capital on insurance premium is obvious, the ratio of claimssettlement become lower and the operation of agricultural insurance have been improved.But the low degree of permeability suggests that the incentive of governmental subsidieson the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance is not sufficient. Theoutstanding contradictions and problems mainly are the inefficiency of subsidies, limitedpayment ability of the low-income peasant household, the substitution effect of othertraditional risk diversification mechanism, and the imperfection of incentive system.
The third part is about the interpretation of policy-oriented agricultural insuranceeffective demand mechanism from both level of micro peasant household andgovernment. Based on the empirical analysis of the influencing factors and mechanism ofpolicy-oriented agricultural insurance effective demand from the micro peasanthousehold level we conclude that, along with the increase of the peasant household’sincome, the ability of the peasant household to pay for the purchase of agriculturalinsurance is enhanced. And the education degree of peasant households, governmentalaids, assets, acreage, the awareness and satisfaction of insurance showed positive effecton the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance. But under thecondition of budget constraints, the consumption of medical and pension insurance isprior to agricultural insurance, and the willingness to purchase agricultural insurance tendto decline if the peasant households engage in non-agricultural activities. According tothe empirical analysis of policy-oriented agricultural insurance effective demandincentives from the level of macro government, the revenue effect of policy-orientedagricultural insurance is greater than the effect of substitution, but there is no substitutioneffect between policy-oriented agricultural insurance and the savings of peasanthousehold. substitution effect should not change the welfare of peasant households,whereas revenue effect would increase it, these two effects function in the same directionand the total effect would increase the effective demand of agricultural insurance. Andbecause of the dynamic endogeneity of agricultural insurance market equilibrium,governmental subsidies would advance the equilibrium. The long-term market equilibrium of China’s agricultural insurance would remain stable, but the year of2004would be a breakpoint. The effective demand of agricultural insurance have strongerability of self-improvement and self-perfection, and this is the driving power foragricultural insurance to achieve a higher equilibrium.
The fourth part is about the chosen of policy-oriented agricultural insurancesubsidies mode. According to the analysis of policy-oriented agricultural insuranceeffective demand under the mode of diversified subsidies, the implementation ofgovernmental subsidies under the cost preserving pattern has positive effect onpromoting the effective demand of governmental insurance, but the achievement is low.So duly push out the output insurance with the multiple guarantee levels under thedynamic changes of the governmental subsidies proportion is feasible, but we don’t havethe foundation for the popularity of income guarantee pattern. To the low-income peasant,no matter which kind of policy-oriented agricultural insurance under the preservingpattern, they don’t have the capacity to pay. So, how to improve the net income oflow-income peasant is the key to promote the effective demand of policy-orientedagricultural insurance.
The fifth part is about conclusions and suggestions. The low effective demand ofpolicy-oriented agricultural insurance is the compound effect of peasant household’sincome&economic position, the use of risk management, other consumption constraintsand the awareness of insurance, which ultimately based on the rational choice of thepeasant household for their utility maximization. Through enhancing the ability to payfor the policy-oriented agricultural insurance of peasant household, fostering the peasanthousehold’s willingness to purchase policy-oriented agricultural insurance, innovate thepolicy-oriented agricultural insurance product and technology to improve the servicelevel of policy-oriented agricultural insurance, these are the basic solutions for solvingthe inefficiency of policy-oriented agricultural insurance effective demand. Furtheremphasis the leading role of government, continuously proving policy-orientedagricultural insurance subsidies system and agricultural insurance legal system are theguarantee to improv the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
国内外学者对农业保险需求问题进行了不懈的探索，推动了这一领域研究的蓬勃发展。但从研究侧重来看，大多研究囿于微观农户层面，缺乏与宏观政府层面相融合的研究成果，尤其是我国现行补贴模式对政策性农业保险有效需求的激励绩效，更高保障水平的补贴模式在我国农业保险实践中的可行性等问题缺乏深入研究和论证。基于此，本文应用现代保险需求理论、福利经济学理论和公共财政理论，结合已有国内外农业保险需求研究成果和农业保险有效需求机理的理论分析，首先，界定了政策性农业保险和农业保险有效需求的内涵，并构建了政策性农业保险有效需求分析逻辑框架，确定了研究视角；其次，采用实地调研和统计学定量分析相结合的方法，对政策性农业保险有效需求现状、问题及成因进行了解读；再次，采用规范分析和统计学定量分析方法，从微观农户层面和宏观政府层面对政策性农业保险有效需求的提升进行了机理解析；最后，采用统计学定量分析和数值模拟的方法，对差异化补贴模式下政策性农业保险有效需求的变化和可行性进行分析，因地制宜地进行补贴模式选择。基于以上理论分析和实证研究，提出了我国政策性农业保险有效需求提升的政策建议和实施保障。全文研究内容主要分为5大部分：
第一部分是问题的提出和研究视角的确定。通过界定研究背景、研究意义、研究方法、研究内容等，明确提出本文研究问题。在此基础上，提出了可能的创新和不足之处；在对已有文献研究内容和研究方法进行梳理的基础上，对农业保险、政策性农业保险、有效需求和农业保险有效需求等概念进行了界定。通过系统地对农业保险有效需求理论进行分析，明确了本文微观农户层面和宏观政府层面相融合的研究视角，并进一步就政府补贴对农业保险有效需求激励理论进行分析，构建了由微观机理、宏观机理和模式选择组成的政策性农业保险有效需求分析逻辑框架。
第二部分是政策性农业保险有效需求现状解读。我国农业保险实施政策性补贴以来，尽管其有效需求被大大激励，政府保费补贴资金的杠杆效应显著，赔付率有所下降，农业保险经营得到一定程度的改善。但渗透度仍很低，表明政府补贴对有效需求激励不足。突出的矛盾是补贴效率不高、低收入农户支付能力不足、其他传统风险分散方式的替代效应、激励制度不完善等。
第三部分是微观农户层面和宏观政府层面政策性农业保险有效需求机理解析。基于微观农户层面政策性农业保险有效需求的影响因素及作用机理实证分析发现，随着农户收入水平提高，农户购买农业保险的支付能力增强。农户的受教育程度、接受政府救济、资产、种植面积、保险认知和满意度等因素对政策性农业保险有效需求具有正效应。但在预算约束条件下，农户医疗保险和养老保险消费优先于农业保险消费，从事非农可能降低农户对农业保险的购买意愿；基于宏观政府层面政策性农业保险有效需求激励实证分析发现，政策性农业保险收入效应的力度大于替代效应的力度，但政策性农业保险和其替代品农户储蓄之间并未形成替代效应。替代效应不改变农户的福利，收入效应使农户福利增加，二者效用方向相同且产生的总效应使政策性农业保险有效需求提高。由于农业保险有效需求和有效供给之间存在动态内生性，政府补贴能促使均衡水平提高。我国农业保险市场有效需求和有效供给存在长期稳定的均衡关系，但2004年为突变点。农业保险有效需求具有更强的自我发展和完善能力，是农业保险有效需求和有效供给实现更高均衡点的源动力。
第四部分是政策性农业保险补贴模式的选择。通过对差异化补贴模式下政策性农业保险有效需求分析，发现我国实施的保成本补贴模式对政策性农业保险有效需求的提高具有正效应，但绩效较低。适时推出政府补贴比例动态变化下多保障水平的产值保险具有可行性，但我国尚不具备广泛开展保收入模式的基础。对于低收入农户，无论哪一种补贴模式下的政策性农业保险，其均不具有支付能力。因此，如何提高低收入农户的纯收入水平，是提升政策性农业保险有效需求的关键所在。
第五部分是结论和政策建议。政策性农业保险有效需求低下，是农户收入和经济状况、风险管理方式采用、其他消费束约束和保险认知等的复合效应，归根结底是农户基于效用最大化的理性选择。通过提高农户政策性农业保险支付能力，培育农户政策性农业保险购买意愿，创新政策性农业保险产品和技术以及提高政策性农业保险服务水平，是解决政策性农业保险有效需求不足的根本途径。进一步强化政府主导地位，不断完善政策性农业保险补贴制度和健全农业保险法律体系，是政策性农业保险有效需求提升的保障措施。
With the promoted progress of agricultural industrialization, the uncertainties ofagricultural production and operation is increasing day by day, it makes thecharacteristics of agricultural risk being more and more complex, and is now threateningthe stability of China’s rural economy and the national food security. Agriculturalinsurance as an important tool of modern agricultural risk management has the economiccompensation function of enhancing the comprehensive agricultural production capacity,stabilizing peasants’ incomes and improving peasants’ welfare level. However，theproperties of agricultural insurance as quasi-public goods would bring about marketfailure under the conditions of government absence. From2004to2012, the NO.1Central Document and the government work report proposed to strengthen thedeveloping process of agricultural insurance for9consecutive years. In the year of2007,the Ministry of Finance launched a pilot testing of financial subsidies for agriculturalinsurance, which step China’s policy-oriented agricultural insurance development into avirtuous circle. But opposite to the world’s highest level of governmental subsidies ratio,the effective demand of agricultural insurance stay low. Therefore, the research on theissues of how to enhance the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural would havecertain theoretical and practical significance on stimulating the effective demand ofChina’s policy-oriented agricultural insurance, perfecting the operation mode ofgovernmental subsidies on agricultural insurance and realizing the sustainabledevelopment of policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
The writers from both at home and abroad have done continuous exploration on thedemand issues of agricultural insurance, promoted the brisk development to the researchof this field. But from the points which they focused, the majority of these researches arelimited in the micro-level of peasant households, having no integration with theoutcomes from the macro-governmental level, especially the motivation performance ofChina’s ongoing subsidies mode on the effective demand of policy-oriented agriculturalinsurance and the lack of in-depth research and argument on the feasibility problems ofthe subsidies mode from higher security level on the practice of China’s agricultural insurance. Based on this, this paper applied the modern insurance demand theory, welfareeconomics theory and public finance theory, combined with theoretical analysis of bothdomestic&foreign research results on agricultural insurance demand and themechanisms of agricultural insurance effective demand. Firstly, it defines the content ofpolicy-oriented agricultural insurance and the effective demand of agricultural insurance,builds the logical analysis framework of the effective demand of policy-orientedagricultural insurance and determines the research angle of view; secondly, it takes thecombination approach of both field survey and the quantitative analysis of statistics,interprets the current condition， existing problems and the causes of policy-orientedagricultural insurance; again, by implying the approach of normative analysis andquantitative analysis of statistics, it interprets the mechanism of how to stimulate theeffective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance from both the micro peasanthouseholds level and the macro governmental level; finally, by using the approach ofboth statistics quantitative analysis and numerical simulation, it analyzes the feasibilityand changes against the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance underthe mode of diversified subsidies. Based on the theoretical and empirical study, it putsforward the policy suggestions and the guarantee of implementation of promote theeffective demand of China’s policy-oriented agricultural insurance. The full text of thisresearch falls into5main parts:
The first part is about the arising of this problem and the research perspectives. Bydefining the background, significance, methods, content and etc. of this research, clearlyput forward the issues of this paper. And on this basis, put forward the possibleinnovations and deficiency; by combing both the content of existing literatures and theresearch method, it defines the concepts of agricultural insurance, policy-orientedagricultural insurance, effective demand and the effective demand of agriculturalinsurance. Through the systematic analysis against the theory of agricultural insuranceeffective demand, clarifies the researching perspective of the combination of both micropeasant households level and macro governmental level, and further analyzes themotivation theory of governmental subsidies against the effective demand of agriculturalinsurance, constructs the logical framework of policy-oriented agricultural insuranceeffective demand with the micro mechanism, macro mechanism and the mode of chosen.
The second part is about the quo interpretation of policy-oriented agriculturalinsurance effective demand.Since the implementation of policy-oriented subsidies, theeffective demand of China’s agricultural insurance have been highly motivated; theleverage effect of subsidized capital on insurance premium is obvious, the ratio of claimssettlement become lower and the operation of agricultural insurance have been improved.But the low degree of permeability suggests that the incentive of governmental subsidieson the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance is not sufficient. Theoutstanding contradictions and problems mainly are the inefficiency of subsidies, limitedpayment ability of the low-income peasant household, the substitution effect of othertraditional risk diversification mechanism, and the imperfection of incentive system.
The third part is about the interpretation of policy-oriented agricultural insuranceeffective demand mechanism from both level of micro peasant household andgovernment. Based on the empirical analysis of the influencing factors and mechanism ofpolicy-oriented agricultural insurance effective demand from the micro peasanthousehold level we conclude that, along with the increase of the peasant household’sincome, the ability of the peasant household to pay for the purchase of agriculturalinsurance is enhanced. And the education degree of peasant households, governmentalaids, assets, acreage, the awareness and satisfaction of insurance showed positive effecton the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance. But under thecondition of budget constraints, the consumption of medical and pension insurance isprior to agricultural insurance, and the willingness to purchase agricultural insurance tendto decline if the peasant households engage in non-agricultural activities. According tothe empirical analysis of policy-oriented agricultural insurance effective demandincentives from the level of macro government, the revenue effect of policy-orientedagricultural insurance is greater than the effect of substitution, but there is no substitutioneffect between policy-oriented agricultural insurance and the savings of peasanthousehold. substitution effect should not change the welfare of peasant households,whereas revenue effect would increase it, these two effects function in the same directionand the total effect would increase the effective demand of agricultural insurance. Andbecause of the dynamic endogeneity of agricultural insurance market equilibrium,governmental subsidies would advance the equilibrium. The long-term market equilibrium of China’s agricultural insurance would remain stable, but the year of2004would be a breakpoint. The effective demand of agricultural insurance have strongerability of self-improvement and self-perfection, and this is the driving power foragricultural insurance to achieve a higher equilibrium.
The fourth part is about the chosen of policy-oriented agricultural insurancesubsidies mode. According to the analysis of policy-oriented agricultural insuranceeffective demand under the mode of diversified subsidies, the implementation ofgovernmental subsidies under the cost preserving pattern has positive effect onpromoting the effective demand of governmental insurance, but the achievement is low.So duly push out the output insurance with the multiple guarantee levels under thedynamic changes of the governmental subsidies proportion is feasible, but we don’t havethe foundation for the popularity of income guarantee pattern. To the low-income peasant,no matter which kind of policy-oriented agricultural insurance under the preservingpattern, they don’t have the capacity to pay. So, how to improve the net income oflow-income peasant is the key to promote the effective demand of policy-orientedagricultural insurance.
The fifth part is about conclusions and suggestions. The low effective demand ofpolicy-oriented agricultural insurance is the compound effect of peasant household’sincome&economic position, the use of risk management, other consumption constraintsand the awareness of insurance, which ultimately based on the rational choice of thepeasant household for their utility maximization. Through enhancing the ability to payfor the policy-oriented agricultural insurance of peasant household, fostering the peasanthousehold’s willingness to purchase policy-oriented agricultural insurance, innovate thepolicy-oriented agricultural insurance product and technology to improve the servicelevel of policy-oriented agricultural insurance, these are the basic solutions for solvingthe inefficiency of policy-oriented agricultural insurance effective demand. Furtheremphasis the leading role of government, continuously proving policy-orientedagricultural insurance subsidies system and agricultural insurance legal system are theguarantee to improv the effective demand of policy-oriented agricultural insurance.
引文
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