债转股治理效应的问题研究
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摘要
国有企业和金融改革长期是我国经济转型过程中的核心问题。20世纪80年代初以来，以“放权让利”为主旋律的国有企业改革已将绝大多数的生产经营决策权从政府转移至企业，并推动我国经济快速发展，但1998年金融危机中国有企业大面积亏损和银行信贷巨额不良资产推动政府实施了以债转股为代表的国有企业改革和银行不良资产处置政策。1999年国务院公布《关于实施债权转股权的若干意见方案》，并推荐601户债转股企业，建议金额达4596亿元。债转股作为我国国有企业改制的重大配套措施，其对信贷资源配置和国有企业公司治理的效应受到政府各部门和金融机构的极大关注。本文以1999-2008年中国沪深A股上市公司为观察样本，从理论和经验上系统研究债转股对公司治理的效应，全文共分为六章，主要内容如下：
本文首先概述了与公司治理相关的代理理论、投资理论、融资理论和激励理论等，为后文分析债转股问题提供理论基础和分析思路；然后基于投资效率、融资结构和高管激励三个方面具体分析和检验了债转股的公司治理效应，既为债转股对公司治理和信贷配置的影响提供了经验证据，也为债转股是如何影响公司治理的路径提供了证据；最后则以公司价值（财务指标和市场指标）这一综合指标来检验了债转股影响公司治理的综合结果，同时也检验债转股影响公司价值的途径。
通过研究，本文发现：（1）债转股企业过度投资和投资不足的程度均要低于非债转股企业，即债转股企业的投资效率要高于非债转股企业。结果表明，债转股有利于缓和股东-债权人之间的利益冲突，从而提高投资行为的理性决策；（2）债转股企业更多依赖银行债务融资，且债务融资与投资效率的敏感度高于非债转股企业；同时，债转股企业债务融资对投资效率的约束作用大于非债转股企业。结果表明，虽然债转股企业获得了更多的债务融资，包括在中央银行紧缩型货币政策时，但并不表明银行股东对债转股公司的贷款是预算软约束的表现，相反，债转股公司的债务融资在约束非效率投资行为方面体现了更高的约束作用，即债转股改善了债务融资与投资行为之间的关系；（3）相对于非债转股企业来说，债转股企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性较高，而且，债权转股权后，公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性也得到了提高；（4）债转股企业的盈利能力得到了提高，市场投资者也获得了较高的投资回报。研究结果表明，由于股权结构的改善和代理成本的降低，相比于非债转股企业，债转股企业的投资效率和债务融资与投资效率的敏感度较高，且债务融资对公司投资效率的影响较大；同时债转股提高了公司高管的薪酬业绩敏感度，改善了盈利能力和投资者的市场回报，提高了企业的价值创造能力。综合概而言之，由于股权结构的改善和代理成本的降低，相比于非债转股企业，债转股企业的投资效率和债务融资与投资效率的敏感度较高，且债务融资对投资效率的影响较大；同时债转股提高了公司高管的薪酬业绩敏感度，改善了盈利能力和投资者的市场回报率，提高了企业价值。
本文是基于中国国有企业改制背景的一项关于上市公司债转股的经济后果的实证研究，弥补了债转股改革的实证检验文献，深入挖掘了债转股对公司价值变化的具体驱动因素，同时也在一定程度上可为我国商业银行的混业经营之改革提供初步的经验证据。上述研究发现具有如下启示作用：（1）银行直接持有企业股权作为一种与企业形成长期交易稳定型的银企关系的重要方式，可以为银行信贷决策所需信息的生产和利用提供较为持续便捷的渠道，有利于提高信贷配置与公司行为的敏感性；（2）银行直接持有企业股权可以为债权人对公司治理的相机治理作用提供更有效的保障。大股东控制、内部人控制等是我国公司治理的重要问题，若银行持股，则既有助于改变债权人无权的状况，又可以平衡公司治理结构较为单一的问题。
The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform and banking reform are a long-termcore issues in the process of China’s economic transformation. Since the early1980’s,a series of SOEs reforms, characterized by “decentralization of power and transfer ofprofits”, have transferred most of control right over businesss from the government toSOEs and promoted China’s rapid economic development. However, large losses ofSOEs and huge amounts of non-performing loans of bank credits during1998financialcrisis promoted a series of reforms, represented by Debt for Equity Swap (DES), toimplement. In1999, the State Council published the police named opinions on theimplementation of the debt-to-equity program and recommended601companies toDES, including the amount of459.6billion yuan. As an important supporting measurefor the reform of SOEs, DES was greatly concerned by government officer for itseffects of credit resources allocation and corporate governance. This paper, using thesample of1999-2008China A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, studythe effect of debt for equity swap on corporate governance from the theoretical andempirical.
This paper begins with an overview of the theory of corporate governance,including agency theory, investment theory, finance theory and incentive theory, forproviding the theoretical basis and analyze ideas in analysis of debt-equity swap forthe later; then based on the three specific fields of the efficiency of investment,financing structure and executive incentive for the analysis and examination of theeffect of debt-equity swap in corporate governance and credit allocation with empiricalevidences, also provides evidence for the path that how debt-equity swap to influencethe corporate governance; finally with the combined measures of the company value(financial indicators and market indicators) to test the combined result of the impactof the debt-equity swap on corporate governance.
This paper summarizes the main findings are as follows:(1) DES of excessiveextent of under-investment and investment are lower than the non DES companies thatinvest in corporate debt-efficient than non-debt business;(2) DES companies withmore bank debt financing, including short-term bank debt and long-term bank debtfinancing, had less to commercial credit financing, equity financing and the source offinancing is not significantly different; bank holding company debt financing and investment efficiency is higher than the sensitivity of non-bank holding company; andthe central bank’s tight monetary policies of the bank holding company's debtfinancing and investment efficiency effects is less than the sensitivity of non-bankholding company; bank holding the company's debt financing of the investmentefficiency of greater than non-bank holding company;(3) relative to non-debt business,debt-performance sensitivity of executive pay companies a high, and that debt-equityAfter the results of the sensitivity of executive compensation the company has alsobeen improved;(4) the profitability of corporate debt than non-debt business, butincreased earnings after debt capacity and estimates to obtain a higher market value,market investors get a higher return on investment; debt of the company's investmentefficiency is greater than the value of the company's positive impact on non-debtcompany. The results show that, due to the improvement and ownership structure toreduce agency costs, compared to non-debt business, debt and corporate debt financingof investment efficiency and investment efficiency is more sensitive, and the debtfinancing of investment efficiency greater impact; the same time improve thecompany’s debt-performance sensitivity of executive pay, improved profitability andthe market rate of return of investors to improve corporate value. Comprehensivesummary, due to the improvement of the ownership structure and the reduction ofagency costs, compared to the non-DES enterprise, the investment efficiency and thesensitivity of investment efficiency and debt finance of the DES corporate is higher,and debt financing plays a greater impact on the efficiency of investment; DEScompanies have improved the pay-performance sensitivity for executives and haveimproved the profitability and the market return of investors.
The revelations of this paper are:(1) bank holding company formed as along-term and stable relationship between banks and trading an important way for bankcredit information for decision-making to provide a more sustainable production anduse of convenient channels, there help to improve credit allocation and the sensitivityof corporate behavior;(2) for the creditor banks holding the camera on the governancerole of corporate governance to provide more effective protection. Shareholder control,internal control is an important issue of corporate governance in China, if the bankshares, the creditors have no right either to help change the situation, but also a morebalanced corporate governance structure of a single issue.
本文首先概述了与公司治理相关的代理理论、投资理论、融资理论和激励理论等，为后文分析债转股问题提供理论基础和分析思路；然后基于投资效率、融资结构和高管激励三个方面具体分析和检验了债转股的公司治理效应，既为债转股对公司治理和信贷配置的影响提供了经验证据，也为债转股是如何影响公司治理的路径提供了证据；最后则以公司价值（财务指标和市场指标）这一综合指标来检验了债转股影响公司治理的综合结果，同时也检验债转股影响公司价值的途径。
通过研究，本文发现：（1）债转股企业过度投资和投资不足的程度均要低于非债转股企业，即债转股企业的投资效率要高于非债转股企业。结果表明，债转股有利于缓和股东-债权人之间的利益冲突，从而提高投资行为的理性决策；（2）债转股企业更多依赖银行债务融资，且债务融资与投资效率的敏感度高于非债转股企业；同时，债转股企业债务融资对投资效率的约束作用大于非债转股企业。结果表明，虽然债转股企业获得了更多的债务融资，包括在中央银行紧缩型货币政策时，但并不表明银行股东对债转股公司的贷款是预算软约束的表现，相反，债转股公司的债务融资在约束非效率投资行为方面体现了更高的约束作用，即债转股改善了债务融资与投资行为之间的关系；（3）相对于非债转股企业来说，债转股企业的高管薪酬业绩敏感性较高，而且，债权转股权后，公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性也得到了提高；（4）债转股企业的盈利能力得到了提高，市场投资者也获得了较高的投资回报。研究结果表明，由于股权结构的改善和代理成本的降低，相比于非债转股企业，债转股企业的投资效率和债务融资与投资效率的敏感度较高，且债务融资对公司投资效率的影响较大；同时债转股提高了公司高管的薪酬业绩敏感度，改善了盈利能力和投资者的市场回报，提高了企业的价值创造能力。综合概而言之，由于股权结构的改善和代理成本的降低，相比于非债转股企业，债转股企业的投资效率和债务融资与投资效率的敏感度较高，且债务融资对投资效率的影响较大；同时债转股提高了公司高管的薪酬业绩敏感度，改善了盈利能力和投资者的市场回报率，提高了企业价值。
本文是基于中国国有企业改制背景的一项关于上市公司债转股的经济后果的实证研究，弥补了债转股改革的实证检验文献，深入挖掘了债转股对公司价值变化的具体驱动因素，同时也在一定程度上可为我国商业银行的混业经营之改革提供初步的经验证据。上述研究发现具有如下启示作用：（1）银行直接持有企业股权作为一种与企业形成长期交易稳定型的银企关系的重要方式，可以为银行信贷决策所需信息的生产和利用提供较为持续便捷的渠道，有利于提高信贷配置与公司行为的敏感性；（2）银行直接持有企业股权可以为债权人对公司治理的相机治理作用提供更有效的保障。大股东控制、内部人控制等是我国公司治理的重要问题，若银行持股，则既有助于改变债权人无权的状况，又可以平衡公司治理结构较为单一的问题。
The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform and banking reform are a long-termcore issues in the process of China’s economic transformation. Since the early1980’s,a series of SOEs reforms, characterized by “decentralization of power and transfer ofprofits”, have transferred most of control right over businesss from the government toSOEs and promoted China’s rapid economic development. However, large losses ofSOEs and huge amounts of non-performing loans of bank credits during1998financialcrisis promoted a series of reforms, represented by Debt for Equity Swap (DES), toimplement. In1999, the State Council published the police named opinions on theimplementation of the debt-to-equity program and recommended601companies toDES, including the amount of459.6billion yuan. As an important supporting measurefor the reform of SOEs, DES was greatly concerned by government officer for itseffects of credit resources allocation and corporate governance. This paper, using thesample of1999-2008China A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, studythe effect of debt for equity swap on corporate governance from the theoretical andempirical.
This paper begins with an overview of the theory of corporate governance,including agency theory, investment theory, finance theory and incentive theory, forproviding the theoretical basis and analyze ideas in analysis of debt-equity swap forthe later; then based on the three specific fields of the efficiency of investment,financing structure and executive incentive for the analysis and examination of theeffect of debt-equity swap in corporate governance and credit allocation with empiricalevidences, also provides evidence for the path that how debt-equity swap to influencethe corporate governance; finally with the combined measures of the company value(financial indicators and market indicators) to test the combined result of the impactof the debt-equity swap on corporate governance.
This paper summarizes the main findings are as follows:(1) DES of excessiveextent of under-investment and investment are lower than the non DES companies thatinvest in corporate debt-efficient than non-debt business;(2) DES companies withmore bank debt financing, including short-term bank debt and long-term bank debtfinancing, had less to commercial credit financing, equity financing and the source offinancing is not significantly different; bank holding company debt financing and investment efficiency is higher than the sensitivity of non-bank holding company; andthe central bank’s tight monetary policies of the bank holding company's debtfinancing and investment efficiency effects is less than the sensitivity of non-bankholding company; bank holding the company's debt financing of the investmentefficiency of greater than non-bank holding company;(3) relative to non-debt business,debt-performance sensitivity of executive pay companies a high, and that debt-equityAfter the results of the sensitivity of executive compensation the company has alsobeen improved;(4) the profitability of corporate debt than non-debt business, butincreased earnings after debt capacity and estimates to obtain a higher market value,market investors get a higher return on investment; debt of the company's investmentefficiency is greater than the value of the company's positive impact on non-debtcompany. The results show that, due to the improvement and ownership structure toreduce agency costs, compared to non-debt business, debt and corporate debt financingof investment efficiency and investment efficiency is more sensitive, and the debtfinancing of investment efficiency greater impact; the same time improve thecompany’s debt-performance sensitivity of executive pay, improved profitability andthe market rate of return of investors to improve corporate value. Comprehensivesummary, due to the improvement of the ownership structure and the reduction ofagency costs, compared to the non-DES enterprise, the investment efficiency and thesensitivity of investment efficiency and debt finance of the DES corporate is higher,and debt financing plays a greater impact on the efficiency of investment; DEScompanies have improved the pay-performance sensitivity for executives and haveimproved the profitability and the market return of investors.
The revelations of this paper are:(1) bank holding company formed as along-term and stable relationship between banks and trading an important way for bankcredit information for decision-making to provide a more sustainable production anduse of convenient channels, there help to improve credit allocation and the sensitivityof corporate behavior;(2) for the creditor banks holding the camera on the governancerole of corporate governance to provide more effective protection. Shareholder control,internal control is an important issue of corporate governance in China, if the bankshares, the creditors have no right either to help change the situation, but also a morebalanced corporate governance structure of a single issue.
引文
①详细文件请参见证监发[2001]102号《于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》，www.csrc.gov.cn。
13关于部分自变量之间高度相关所引起的多重共线性问题的详细讨论可参见J.M.Wooldridge：“Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data”（英文影印版，49页）或者J.M.伍德里奇：《计量经济学导论：现代观点》（中文版，91页）[81]。
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[41]蒲勇健，彭小兵．国有企业债转股运作：一个博弈观点．重庆大学学报（自然科学版），2002，5：55-58
[42]彭小兵，蒲勇健，王惠凌，陈杰．国有企业债转股中的一个委托代理分析框架．重庆大学学报（自然科学版），2003，8：135-138
[43]罗琦．日本企业的股权特征与现金持有量．中大管理研究，2006，2：135-149
[44]罗琦，邹斌．银企关系与代理冲突：基于日本上市企业现金持有量的经验证据．预测，2007，5：48-55
[45]王善平，李志军．银行持股、投资效率与公司债务融资．金融研究，2011，5：184-193
[46] Robert．International Corporate Governance. NY: Prentice Hall,1994,2
[47] Monks, Minow．Corporate Governance. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,1995,5
[48] OECD．公司治理原则．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2005，11
[49] Oliver E. Williamson．Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis ofDiscrete Structural Alternatives．Administrative Science Quarterly，1991，36：269-296
[50]亚当斯密．国民财富的性质和原因的研究．北京：商务印书馆，1974，303
[51]伯利，米恩斯．现代公司与私有财产．北京：商务印书馆，2005，97-98
[52] Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Larry H P Lang．The separation of ownershipand control in East Asian Corporations．Journal of Financial Economics，2000,58：81-112
[53] Mara Faccio，Larry H P Lang，Leslie Young．Dividends and Expropriation．TheAmerican Economic Review，2001，91：54-78
[54] Shleifer Andrei， Vishny Robert W． The Efficiency of Investment in thePresence of Aggregate Demand Spillovers． Journal of Political Economy，1988,96(6):1221-1231
[55] Noe Thomas Hand Rebello，Michael J Renegotiation．Investment Horizons,and Managerial Discretion．Journal of Business，1997,70(3):385-407
[56] Narayanan M P． Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results． Journal ofFinance，1985，40(5):1469-1484
[57] Myers Stewart C．The Capital Structure Puzzle．Journal of Finance，1984,39(3):575-592
[58] Myers Stewart C，Nicholas Majlf．Coporate financing and investment decisionswhen firms have information that investors do not have．Journal of FinancialEconomics,1984,13:187-221
[59] Narayanan M P．Debt versus Equity under Asymmetric Information．Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis，1988,23(1):39-51
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[63] Lazear, Edward P., and Rosen, Sherwin. Rank-Order Tournaments as OptimumLabor Contracts. Journal of Politics Economics，1981，89：841-864
[64] Anderson R，Mansi S，and Reeb D．Founding family ownership and theagency costs of debt．Journal of Financial Economics，2003，68：263–287
[65] Bates T W． Asset Sales, Investment Opportunities and the Use ofProceeds．Journal of Finance,2005，1：105-135
[66]李辰，张翼．现金流与资本投资．经济学（季刊），2005，1：229-246
[67] Bertrand M.，Mullainathan S．Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governanceand Managerial Preferences，Journal of Political Economy，2003，5：1043-1075
[68] Aggarwal R，Samwick A．Empire-Builders and Shirkers: Investment, FirmPerformance, and Managerial Incentives．Journal of Corporate Finance,2006，12：489-515
[69] Richardson S．Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow．Review of AccountingStudies，2006，11：159-189
[70]杨华军，胡奕明．制度环境与自由现金流的过度投资．管理世界，2007，9：99-106
[71]魏明海，柳建华．国企分红、治理因素与过度投资．管理世界，2007，4：88-95
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[74] Paula L Rechner1，Dan R Dalton．CEO duality and organizational performance:A longitudinal analysis．Strategic Management Journal，1991，12，155–160
[75]吴淑琨，柏杰，席酉民．董事长与总经理两职的分离与合一．经济研究，1998，8：21-28
[76]辛清泉，林斌，王彦超．政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资．经济研究，2007，8：110-122
[77] Davis L E，Huttenback R A．The Political Economy of British Imperialism:Measures of Benefits and Support．The Journal of Economic History,1982，1：119-130
[78]叶康涛，陆正飞，张志华．独立董事能否抑制大股东的掏空？经济研究，2007：4：101-111
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[80] Conyon M J，Murphy K J．The Prince and the Pauper? Ceo Pay in the U.S and theU.K.．The Economic Journal,2000，10：640-671
[81]伍德里奇．计量经济学导论：现代观点（第３版）．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2008，91
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[85] B Biaisz，C Gollier．Trade credit and credit rationing．Review of FinancialStudies，1997,10：903-937
[86] Daniela Fabbria，Anna Maria C Menichini．Trade credit, collateral liquidation,and borrowing constraints．Journal of Financial Economics，2010，96：413-432
[87]林毅夫，李志赟．政策性负担、道德风险与软预算约束．经济研究,2004，2：17-27
[88]田利辉．杠杆治理、预算软约束和中国上市公司绩效．经济学（季刊），2004，10：15-26
[89] Neter J，William W，Kutner MH．Applied Linear Statistical Models: Regression,Analysis of Variance, and Experimental Designs．Homewood： R.D. Irwin，1985，169
[90] Tatikonda MV， Rosenthal SR．Successful Execution of Product DevelopmentProjects: Balancing Firmness and Flexibility in the Innovation Process．Journalof Operations Management,2000，18：401–425
[91] Shyam-Sunder， Myers SC． Testing Static Trade-Off against Pecking OrderModels of Capital Structure．Journal of Financial Economics,1999,，2：219-244
[92] Frank M Z.， Goyal V K． Testing the Pecking Order Theory of CapitalStructure．Journal of Financial Economics,2003，2：217-248
[93]肖泽忠，邹宏．中国上市公司资本结构的影响因素和股权融资偏好．经济研究，2008，8：119-134
[94] Harris M，Raviv．The Theory of Capital Structure．Journal of Finance,1991，1：297-355
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[96] Smith C W，Watts R．The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing,Dividend and Compensation Policies．Journal of Financial Economics,1992，3：263-292
[97]樊纲．克服信贷萎缩与银行体系改革．经济研究，1999，1：5-10
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[106]方军雄．我国上市公司高管的薪酬存在粘性吗．经济研究，2009，3：110-124
13关于部分自变量之间高度相关所引起的多重共线性问题的详细讨论可参见J.M.Wooldridge：“Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data”（英文影印版，49页）或者J.M.伍德里奇：《计量经济学导论：现代观点》（中文版，91页）[81]。
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[38]吴有昌，赵晓．债转股：基于企业治理结构的理论与政策分析．经济研究，2000，2：26-35
[39]龙正平．试论债转股的逆向选择和道德风险．福建论坛（经济社会版），2000，3：25-26
[40]江曙霞，郭晔．债转股的风险与时机分析——为当前债转股设计最优机制安排．金融研究，2000，5：108-112
[41]蒲勇健，彭小兵．国有企业债转股运作：一个博弈观点．重庆大学学报（自然科学版），2002，5：55-58
[42]彭小兵，蒲勇健，王惠凌，陈杰．国有企业债转股中的一个委托代理分析框架．重庆大学学报（自然科学版），2003，8：135-138
[43]罗琦．日本企业的股权特征与现金持有量．中大管理研究，2006，2：135-149
[44]罗琦，邹斌．银企关系与代理冲突：基于日本上市企业现金持有量的经验证据．预测，2007，5：48-55
[45]王善平，李志军．银行持股、投资效率与公司债务融资．金融研究，2011，5：184-193
[46] Robert．International Corporate Governance. NY: Prentice Hall,1994,2
[47] Monks, Minow．Corporate Governance. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,1995,5
[48] OECD．公司治理原则．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2005，11
[49] Oliver E. Williamson．Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis ofDiscrete Structural Alternatives．Administrative Science Quarterly，1991，36：269-296
[50]亚当斯密．国民财富的性质和原因的研究．北京：商务印书馆，1974，303
[51]伯利，米恩斯．现代公司与私有财产．北京：商务印书馆，2005，97-98
[52] Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Larry H P Lang．The separation of ownershipand control in East Asian Corporations．Journal of Financial Economics，2000,58：81-112
[53] Mara Faccio，Larry H P Lang，Leslie Young．Dividends and Expropriation．TheAmerican Economic Review，2001，91：54-78
[54] Shleifer Andrei， Vishny Robert W． The Efficiency of Investment in thePresence of Aggregate Demand Spillovers． Journal of Political Economy，1988,96(6):1221-1231
[55] Noe Thomas Hand Rebello，Michael J Renegotiation．Investment Horizons,and Managerial Discretion．Journal of Business，1997,70(3):385-407
[56] Narayanan M P． Managerial Incentives for Short-term Results． Journal ofFinance，1985，40(5):1469-1484
[57] Myers Stewart C．The Capital Structure Puzzle．Journal of Finance，1984,39(3):575-592
[58] Myers Stewart C，Nicholas Majlf．Coporate financing and investment decisionswhen firms have information that investors do not have．Journal of FinancialEconomics,1984,13:187-221
[59] Narayanan M P．Debt versus Equity under Asymmetric Information．Journal ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis，1988,23(1):39-51
[60] Heinkel Robert，Josef Zechner．The role of debt and preferred stock solution toadverse Investment Incentives．Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1990,25:1-24
[61] Fazzari S. M.， R. G. Hubbard，B. C. Peterson．Financing Constraints andCorporate Investment．Brookings Papers on Economic Activity，1988，23：73-113
[62] Mark T. Leary，Michael R Roberts．Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?The Journal of Finance，2005，60：2575–2619
[63] Lazear, Edward P., and Rosen, Sherwin. Rank-Order Tournaments as OptimumLabor Contracts. Journal of Politics Economics，1981，89：841-864
[64] Anderson R，Mansi S，and Reeb D．Founding family ownership and theagency costs of debt．Journal of Financial Economics，2003，68：263–287
[65] Bates T W． Asset Sales, Investment Opportunities and the Use ofProceeds．Journal of Finance,2005，1：105-135
[66]李辰，张翼．现金流与资本投资．经济学（季刊），2005，1：229-246
[67] Bertrand M.，Mullainathan S．Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governanceand Managerial Preferences，Journal of Political Economy，2003，5：1043-1075
[68] Aggarwal R，Samwick A．Empire-Builders and Shirkers: Investment, FirmPerformance, and Managerial Incentives．Journal of Corporate Finance,2006，12：489-515
[69] Richardson S．Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow．Review of AccountingStudies，2006，11：159-189
[70]杨华军，胡奕明．制度环境与自由现金流的过度投资．管理世界，2007，9：99-106
[71]魏明海，柳建华．国企分红、治理因素与过度投资．管理世界，2007，4：88-95
[72] Shleifer A，Vishny R. W．Politicians and Firms．The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics，1994，4：995-1025
[73] Hadlock C J．Ownership, Liquidity, and Investment．Journal of Finance andEconomics，1998,3:487-508
[74] Paula L Rechner1，Dan R Dalton．CEO duality and organizational performance:A longitudinal analysis．Strategic Management Journal，1991，12，155–160
[75]吴淑琨，柏杰，席酉民．董事长与总经理两职的分离与合一．经济研究，1998，8：21-28
[76]辛清泉，林斌，王彦超．政府控制、经理薪酬与资本投资．经济研究，2007，8：110-122
[77] Davis L E，Huttenback R A．The Political Economy of British Imperialism:Measures of Benefits and Support．The Journal of Economic History,1982，1：119-130
[78]叶康涛，陆正飞，张志华．独立董事能否抑制大股东的掏空？经济研究，2007：4：101-111
[79] Vogt S T． The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship: Evidence from U.S.Manufacturing Firms．Financial Management，1994，23：3-20
[80] Conyon M J，Murphy K J．The Prince and the Pauper? Ceo Pay in the U.S and theU.K.．The Economic Journal,2000，10：640-671
[81]伍德里奇．计量经济学导论：现代观点（第３版）．北京：中国人民大学出版社，2008，91
[82] Dewartripont M.，Tirole J．A Theory of Debt and Equity：Diversity of Securitiesand Manager-Shareholder Congruence．The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994，4：1027-1054
[83] Berglof E，Roland G．Soft Budget Constraints and Banking in Transition．Journalof Comparative Economics,1998，1：18-40
[84] MA Petersenz，RG Rajan．Trade credit: theories and evidence．Review ofFinancial Studies,1997,10:661-691
[85] B Biaisz，C Gollier．Trade credit and credit rationing．Review of FinancialStudies，1997,10：903-937
[86] Daniela Fabbria，Anna Maria C Menichini．Trade credit, collateral liquidation,and borrowing constraints．Journal of Financial Economics，2010，96：413-432
[87]林毅夫，李志赟．政策性负担、道德风险与软预算约束．经济研究,2004，2：17-27
[88]田利辉．杠杆治理、预算软约束和中国上市公司绩效．经济学（季刊），2004，10：15-26
[89] Neter J，William W，Kutner MH．Applied Linear Statistical Models: Regression,Analysis of Variance, and Experimental Designs．Homewood： R.D. Irwin，1985，169
[90] Tatikonda MV， Rosenthal SR．Successful Execution of Product DevelopmentProjects: Balancing Firmness and Flexibility in the Innovation Process．Journalof Operations Management,2000，18：401–425
[91] Shyam-Sunder， Myers SC． Testing Static Trade-Off against Pecking OrderModels of Capital Structure．Journal of Financial Economics,1999,，2：219-244
[92] Frank M Z.， Goyal V K． Testing the Pecking Order Theory of CapitalStructure．Journal of Financial Economics,2003，2：217-248
[93]肖泽忠，邹宏．中国上市公司资本结构的影响因素和股权融资偏好．经济研究，2008，8：119-134
[94] Harris M，Raviv．The Theory of Capital Structure．Journal of Finance,1991，1：297-355
[95] Rajan R，Zingales L．What Do We Know About Capital Structure? SomeEvidence from International Data．Journal of Finance,1995，5：1421-1460
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