基于制度创新的我国煤炭资源开发管理研究
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摘要
煤炭资源是我国稀缺的不可再生的一次性能源,产权归国家所有,属于公共品范畴。由于煤矿企业无偿使用煤炭资源,从而造成煤炭资源被过度开发,并出现了煤炭资源大量浪费、矿难事故多发和生态环境破坏的严重问题。
本论文首先从公共煤炭资源开发中的经济学与管理学的相关理论基础出发,沿着我国煤炭资源开发管理体制的更替对煤炭资源开发管理的制度变迁进行了分析;同时,分析了煤炭资源开发管理的制度创新诱致性因素,认为推动煤炭资源开发管理的制度创新是经济转型、增长方式、现行制度缺陷、供需矛盾和加入WTO五种力量共同作用的结果。然后,以制度创新理论为研究视角,以煤炭资源产权为切入点,针对政府计划配置煤炭资源、煤矿企业无偿使用煤炭资源的主要缺陷,借鉴美国煤炭资源开发管理经验,提出了煤炭资源开发管理的制度创新基本框架。其主要内容是:
第一,提出了煤炭资源价值模型和采矿权拍卖模型,对煤炭资源市场化及最优拍卖进行了分析,为政府构建煤炭资源有偿使用制度提供了理论和决策依据。首先,构建了煤炭资源价值评价模型,对煤炭资源市场化进行了分析,提出了煤炭资源市场化是煤炭资源的最优配置方式,认为煤炭资源市场化从体制上解决了煤炭资源长期滞留在市场之外的根本问题。然后,研究了采矿权拍卖模型,设置最优保留价,探讨了煤炭资源采矿权的最优拍卖,得出了政府公开保留价信息时,竞价企业会相应调整估价区间,进而调整报价,导出政府最优化收益拍卖的两种最佳选择:大于下限拍卖法与小于下限拍卖法。认为拍卖采矿权是煤炭资源市场化的有效实现方式,依据煤炭资源的价值和企业的获利空间,合理制定拍卖底价和设置最优保留价,能有效解决目前采矿权拍卖中竞价低、政府期望收益不足的问题。
第二,建立了煤矿安全监管机制的博弈模型,对政府、煤矿企业主和企业经理之间的行为分别进行了分析,认为政府制定矿工死亡高赔偿制度,煤矿安全监管制度就会从现有制度的非均衡状态逐渐演变到均衡状态。首先建立了政府对煤矿企业的简单罚款、加重罚款和矿工死亡高赔偿博弈模型,分析了对企业实施简单罚款和加重罚款时的情形,得出了在简单罚款的情况下的纯战略纳什均衡,提出了煤矿企业受利益驱动,即使政府对企业进行罚款,也同样减少煤矿安全生产投入,认为政府监管不力是造成矿难频发的主要原因之一;进而分析了对煤矿企业加重罚款时的情形,得出了混合战略纳什均衡,认为这个混合战略纳什均衡解不是这个博弈的最优解,即不是子博弈精炼纳什均衡;然后在引入矿工死亡高赔偿机制的情况下进行了分析,得出了子博弈精炼纳什均衡,认为政府可以减少不必要的监管环节,而且又能使监管更有效。最后,建立了信息对称及自然状态不可控制与不能确定的情况下企业主与经理的委托-代理模型,同时建立了企业主对经理的激励模型,对影响经理工作努力程度的相关因素进行了分析,认为煤矿开采行业是一项高风险的行业,经理作为煤矿生产的管理者,对煤矿的安全生产负有不可推卸的责任,只要政府制定一个矿工死亡高赔偿制度,加大处罚力度,强化监管,通过这一传导动力机制,煤矿企业主就会增加煤矿安全生产投入,建立完善的激励机制,充分调动经理的工作积极性。
第三,构建了生态环境补偿模型,依据资源外部性理论,运用博弈论方法,对生态环境问题进行了研究,探讨了煤炭资源开发中的生态环境补偿机制,提出了交易补偿法、控制补偿法、高门槛补偿法和转移补偿法。认为政府应对煤矿企业提高生态环境门槛,严格市场准入,实行生态环境补偿制度。
最后对重庆市煤炭资源开发管理进行了实证研究,并提出了相应的政策建议。
Coal Resources are scarce and unrenewable onetime resources in China. The property rights of them are owned by the State, and they are public goods. The coal mining enterprises use coal resources with free of charge, this results in over-exploitation of coal resources, and causes serious problems, such as a huge waste of coal resources, frequent occurrences of mining accidents and destruction of the ecological environment.
Based on the related theoretical foundation of economic and management in the exploitation of public coal resources, and follows the replacements of the development and management system of Chinese coal resources, this paper analyzes the historical changes of the development and management system of Chinese coal resources.
Meanwhile, this paper analyzes the induced factors of the institutional innovation for the development and management of coal resources, thinking that the institutional innovation for the development and management of coal resources is the result of economic transition, growth pattern, defects in the current system, contradiction between supply and demand, and the entry of WTO. It bases on the institutional innovation theory, takes the property rights of coal resources as the point. The main defects are that the government implements planned allocation of coal resources, and the coal mining enterprises use coal resources with free of charge. Against these main defects and draw on the development and management experience of American coal resources, this paper presents a basic framework of the institutional innovation for the development and management of coal resources. The main contents are as follows:
First, this paper establishes a value model of the coal resource and an auction model of mining rights, makes an analysis on the marketing of coal resources and the optimal auction, and provides a theoretical and decision-making basis for the paid use system construction of coal resources by the government. It establishes a value model of the coal resource and analyzes the marketing of coal resources, pointing out that the marketing of coal resources is the optimal allocation way and provides institutional resolutions for the fundamental problem that coal resources are long detained out of market. It also establishes an auction model of mining rights, sets optimal reserve price and discusses optimal auction for the mining rights of coal resources. When the government announces the information of reserve price, the competitive enterprises will adjust the valuation range and then the price, deducing the two best choices for the optimal profit auction of the government: more than minimum auction and less than minimum auction. It points out that the auction of mining rights is the effective way for the marketing of coal resources. Based on the value of coal resources and the profit space of enterprises, developing reasonable minimum auction price and setting optimal reserve price can provide solutions for the low price problem in the auction of mining rights and the shortfall of the government’s expect profit.
Secondly, this paper constructs a tripartite game model of mine safety monitoring mechanism, analyzing the behavior of the government, the coal mine enterprisers and the coal mine managers. If the government constructs a high compensation system for the death of miners, the non-equilibrium of mine safety monitoring system will evolves to equilibrium. This paper establishes a game model of the simple fine paid by the mine enterprises to the government, a game model of the heavier fine paid by the mine enterprises to the government, and a game model of high compensation for the death of miners. It analyzes the simple fine case and gets a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. As the coal mining enterprises are droved by benefit, even if the government fines these enterprises, they will also reduce the input for coal mine production safety. The ineffective supervision of the government is one of the main reasons for the frequent occurrences of mining accidents. It also analyzes the heavier fine case and gets a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, but said that this mixed strategy Nash equilibrium isn’t the optimal solution for this game and isn’t a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Then it makes an analysis in the high compensation system for the death of miners, gets a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and points out that the government can reduce unnecessary supervision methods but make the supervision more efficient. At last, it establishes principal-agent models of coal mine enterprisers and managers in the asymmetric information case and in the can’t be controlled and uncertain natural case, and a incentive model from enterprises’owners to managers. It analyzes the relative facts for the efforts of the managers, thinking that coal mining is a high-risk industry, and as a manager of coal mining, managers should be responsible for the coal mine production safety. The government can construct a high compensation system for the death of miners, intensify punishment and strengthen supervision. Through this dynamic conduction mechanism, coal mining enterprisers will increase the input for coal mine production safety, establish a perfect incentive mechanism and fully mobilize the enthusiasm of the managers.
Thirdly, this paper constructs an eco-environment compensation model. In terms of resource external theory, this paper makes a research on the ecological environment problem with the method of game theory, and discuss on the compensating mechanism to the ecological environment in the exploitation of coal resources. It suggests on the Law of Trade Compensation, Law of Control Compensation, Law of High Threshold Compensation and Law of Transfer Compensation. It also suggests that the government should raise the new coal mining enterprises’threshold of ecological environment, rigidify market access, and carry out a compensating system to the ecological environment.
Finally, this paper makes an empirical study for the development and management of coal resources in Chongqing, and puts forward corresponding policy recommendations.
本论文首先从公共煤炭资源开发中的经济学与管理学的相关理论基础出发,沿着我国煤炭资源开发管理体制的更替对煤炭资源开发管理的制度变迁进行了分析;同时,分析了煤炭资源开发管理的制度创新诱致性因素,认为推动煤炭资源开发管理的制度创新是经济转型、增长方式、现行制度缺陷、供需矛盾和加入WTO五种力量共同作用的结果。然后,以制度创新理论为研究视角,以煤炭资源产权为切入点,针对政府计划配置煤炭资源、煤矿企业无偿使用煤炭资源的主要缺陷,借鉴美国煤炭资源开发管理经验,提出了煤炭资源开发管理的制度创新基本框架。其主要内容是:
第一,提出了煤炭资源价值模型和采矿权拍卖模型,对煤炭资源市场化及最优拍卖进行了分析,为政府构建煤炭资源有偿使用制度提供了理论和决策依据。首先,构建了煤炭资源价值评价模型,对煤炭资源市场化进行了分析,提出了煤炭资源市场化是煤炭资源的最优配置方式,认为煤炭资源市场化从体制上解决了煤炭资源长期滞留在市场之外的根本问题。然后,研究了采矿权拍卖模型,设置最优保留价,探讨了煤炭资源采矿权的最优拍卖,得出了政府公开保留价信息时,竞价企业会相应调整估价区间,进而调整报价,导出政府最优化收益拍卖的两种最佳选择:大于下限拍卖法与小于下限拍卖法。认为拍卖采矿权是煤炭资源市场化的有效实现方式,依据煤炭资源的价值和企业的获利空间,合理制定拍卖底价和设置最优保留价,能有效解决目前采矿权拍卖中竞价低、政府期望收益不足的问题。
第二,建立了煤矿安全监管机制的博弈模型,对政府、煤矿企业主和企业经理之间的行为分别进行了分析,认为政府制定矿工死亡高赔偿制度,煤矿安全监管制度就会从现有制度的非均衡状态逐渐演变到均衡状态。首先建立了政府对煤矿企业的简单罚款、加重罚款和矿工死亡高赔偿博弈模型,分析了对企业实施简单罚款和加重罚款时的情形,得出了在简单罚款的情况下的纯战略纳什均衡,提出了煤矿企业受利益驱动,即使政府对企业进行罚款,也同样减少煤矿安全生产投入,认为政府监管不力是造成矿难频发的主要原因之一;进而分析了对煤矿企业加重罚款时的情形,得出了混合战略纳什均衡,认为这个混合战略纳什均衡解不是这个博弈的最优解,即不是子博弈精炼纳什均衡;然后在引入矿工死亡高赔偿机制的情况下进行了分析,得出了子博弈精炼纳什均衡,认为政府可以减少不必要的监管环节,而且又能使监管更有效。最后,建立了信息对称及自然状态不可控制与不能确定的情况下企业主与经理的委托-代理模型,同时建立了企业主对经理的激励模型,对影响经理工作努力程度的相关因素进行了分析,认为煤矿开采行业是一项高风险的行业,经理作为煤矿生产的管理者,对煤矿的安全生产负有不可推卸的责任,只要政府制定一个矿工死亡高赔偿制度,加大处罚力度,强化监管,通过这一传导动力机制,煤矿企业主就会增加煤矿安全生产投入,建立完善的激励机制,充分调动经理的工作积极性。
第三,构建了生态环境补偿模型,依据资源外部性理论,运用博弈论方法,对生态环境问题进行了研究,探讨了煤炭资源开发中的生态环境补偿机制,提出了交易补偿法、控制补偿法、高门槛补偿法和转移补偿法。认为政府应对煤矿企业提高生态环境门槛,严格市场准入,实行生态环境补偿制度。
最后对重庆市煤炭资源开发管理进行了实证研究,并提出了相应的政策建议。
Coal Resources are scarce and unrenewable onetime resources in China. The property rights of them are owned by the State, and they are public goods. The coal mining enterprises use coal resources with free of charge, this results in over-exploitation of coal resources, and causes serious problems, such as a huge waste of coal resources, frequent occurrences of mining accidents and destruction of the ecological environment.
Based on the related theoretical foundation of economic and management in the exploitation of public coal resources, and follows the replacements of the development and management system of Chinese coal resources, this paper analyzes the historical changes of the development and management system of Chinese coal resources.
Meanwhile, this paper analyzes the induced factors of the institutional innovation for the development and management of coal resources, thinking that the institutional innovation for the development and management of coal resources is the result of economic transition, growth pattern, defects in the current system, contradiction between supply and demand, and the entry of WTO. It bases on the institutional innovation theory, takes the property rights of coal resources as the point. The main defects are that the government implements planned allocation of coal resources, and the coal mining enterprises use coal resources with free of charge. Against these main defects and draw on the development and management experience of American coal resources, this paper presents a basic framework of the institutional innovation for the development and management of coal resources. The main contents are as follows:
First, this paper establishes a value model of the coal resource and an auction model of mining rights, makes an analysis on the marketing of coal resources and the optimal auction, and provides a theoretical and decision-making basis for the paid use system construction of coal resources by the government. It establishes a value model of the coal resource and analyzes the marketing of coal resources, pointing out that the marketing of coal resources is the optimal allocation way and provides institutional resolutions for the fundamental problem that coal resources are long detained out of market. It also establishes an auction model of mining rights, sets optimal reserve price and discusses optimal auction for the mining rights of coal resources. When the government announces the information of reserve price, the competitive enterprises will adjust the valuation range and then the price, deducing the two best choices for the optimal profit auction of the government: more than minimum auction and less than minimum auction. It points out that the auction of mining rights is the effective way for the marketing of coal resources. Based on the value of coal resources and the profit space of enterprises, developing reasonable minimum auction price and setting optimal reserve price can provide solutions for the low price problem in the auction of mining rights and the shortfall of the government’s expect profit.
Secondly, this paper constructs a tripartite game model of mine safety monitoring mechanism, analyzing the behavior of the government, the coal mine enterprisers and the coal mine managers. If the government constructs a high compensation system for the death of miners, the non-equilibrium of mine safety monitoring system will evolves to equilibrium. This paper establishes a game model of the simple fine paid by the mine enterprises to the government, a game model of the heavier fine paid by the mine enterprises to the government, and a game model of high compensation for the death of miners. It analyzes the simple fine case and gets a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. As the coal mining enterprises are droved by benefit, even if the government fines these enterprises, they will also reduce the input for coal mine production safety. The ineffective supervision of the government is one of the main reasons for the frequent occurrences of mining accidents. It also analyzes the heavier fine case and gets a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, but said that this mixed strategy Nash equilibrium isn’t the optimal solution for this game and isn’t a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Then it makes an analysis in the high compensation system for the death of miners, gets a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and points out that the government can reduce unnecessary supervision methods but make the supervision more efficient. At last, it establishes principal-agent models of coal mine enterprisers and managers in the asymmetric information case and in the can’t be controlled and uncertain natural case, and a incentive model from enterprises’owners to managers. It analyzes the relative facts for the efforts of the managers, thinking that coal mining is a high-risk industry, and as a manager of coal mining, managers should be responsible for the coal mine production safety. The government can construct a high compensation system for the death of miners, intensify punishment and strengthen supervision. Through this dynamic conduction mechanism, coal mining enterprisers will increase the input for coal mine production safety, establish a perfect incentive mechanism and fully mobilize the enthusiasm of the managers.
Thirdly, this paper constructs an eco-environment compensation model. In terms of resource external theory, this paper makes a research on the ecological environment problem with the method of game theory, and discuss on the compensating mechanism to the ecological environment in the exploitation of coal resources. It suggests on the Law of Trade Compensation, Law of Control Compensation, Law of High Threshold Compensation and Law of Transfer Compensation. It also suggests that the government should raise the new coal mining enterprises’threshold of ecological environment, rigidify market access, and carry out a compensating system to the ecological environment.
Finally, this paper makes an empirical study for the development and management of coal resources in Chongqing, and puts forward corresponding policy recommendations.
引文
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