金融体制变迁中国有商业银行不良资产的理论与实证分析
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摘要
国际金融史上银行经营失败的教训揭示了一个不容忽视的问题——银行不良资产问题。长期以来，这一问题一直困挠国际银行业，成为导致银行经营失败的主要原因。当前，我国银行不良贷款问题非常严峻，经过几年努力，不良贷款比例虽有所下降，但至2002年底仍高达25.4％，大大高于国际警戒线的水平。
银行资产负债结构分析表明由中国经济发展水平和改革路径决定，我国金融制度的改革和发展是“搞活国企和维持增长”导向性的，即表现为政府的金融控制。这种金融控制主要从金融资源动员和金融资源配置两个方面展开。所以国家在大多数年份保持了正的实际利率吸引居民储蓄，同时在金融资源配置过程中，对国有企业和非国有企业实行差别的信贷政策。国家、国有银行和国有企业间三重隐合约关系的存在是导致国有商业银行不良资产数额巨大，银行抵御风险能力低下的深层原因。
银行信贷市场的特殊行为是贷款勉强市场和以贷款需求无弹性为特征的需求陷阱市场两个分割市场的共存。对委托代理理论的进一步研究表明，用代理人监督代理人的激励机制在现实生活中运用十分普遍。为了促进民营经济的发展，解决我国信贷市场的二元分割问题，可以考虑由政府设立半公益性的银行，对组成团体的中小民营企业在符合条件的情况下提供贷款。
各国根据自己的国情，对银行不良资产的处理采用了不同的措施。我国于1999年始设立四大金融资产管理公司分别负责剥离四大国有独资商业银行1995年底以前形成的逾期、呆滞、呆帐贷款。采取的债转股为主的债务重组是化解银行金融风险，帮助国有企业脱困的重大举措。其中的难点是在资源有限的情况下，每个集团都想通过自己的某种活动谋取自身利益的最大化。通过博弈模型，表明政府的政策“刚性”、金融资产管理公司实质性的股东权利是实现预期结果的关键。
对国有商业银行体系剩余不良债权的化解，主要是借鉴国际经验，实行国际资产证券化。
解决我国银行不良贷款问题，就要解除政府、国有企业和银行之间三重隐合约关系，进行国有企业和国有商业银行的产权改革，营造优良的外部经营环境、构建完善的内部经营机制，解决银行不良贷款存量的同时，加强风险管理，杜绝不良贷款新增流量的发生。
The lesson in the history of international finance shows us a serious problem that
can't be ignored-the bank's non-performing loan, for a long period, this problem
is always a hard kont in the line of international bank, and becomes the main reason that lead the bank business to failure.Currently, the issue of non-performing loan existing in the Chinese bank is very serious, through several years' effort, the proportion of non-performing loan become lower than before, but by the year of later 2002,the proportion still up to 25.4%,geatly higher than the international guard point.
The innovation and development of Chinese finance system represent financial control by government.this kind of financial control is mainly outspread from two aspects, one is financial resource mobilisation, the other is financial resource deployment.therefore, the state can preserve plus practicality interest rate to attract citizen's deposit, and in the process of financial deployment can perform different credit policy between state-owned and non-sate-owned enterprise.the concealed agreement relationship existing in the state, the state-owned bank and the state-owned enterprise is the main deeply reason that bring on the huge amount of badness assets and the bank's low risk resistance ability.
The special action in the bank credit market is the coexist of the two division markets in the requirement trap market, through the further study of trust agent thoery, we know that the prompting system that the deputy is superintended by another one exists abundantly in our daily life, in order to advance the development of private economic and settle the problem of duality division in Chinese credit market, Chinese government should consider setting up quasi-commonweal bank, and offer a loan to the small private enterprise answering for the requirement conditions.
According to the respective backgrounds, the countries all over the world adopt different arrangement to deal with the bank's badness assets, in 1999,Chinese government began to set up four financial assets management companies take charge aspectly to peel off the overdue, slacken and bad debt loan formed by the four state-owned commercial banks before the late 1995.the debt recombine is an important way resolving bank financial risk and helping state-owned company get out from the difficulties. Every group wants to pursue the interest maximization through some action.
Resolving to the bad creditor's rights leaved by the system of state-owned commercial bank, the main idea is use for the reference of other countries, and make
assets securitization put into practice.
To tackle the badness loan existing in Chinese bank, we must unchain the concealed agreement relationship between the government, state-owned company and the bank, and make innovation to the property right system of state-owned company and state-owned bank, then we can strengthen the risk management and put an end to the badness loan when building up an excellent exterior business circumstance and constructing a perfect interior business system.
银行资产负债结构分析表明由中国经济发展水平和改革路径决定，我国金融制度的改革和发展是“搞活国企和维持增长”导向性的，即表现为政府的金融控制。这种金融控制主要从金融资源动员和金融资源配置两个方面展开。所以国家在大多数年份保持了正的实际利率吸引居民储蓄，同时在金融资源配置过程中，对国有企业和非国有企业实行差别的信贷政策。国家、国有银行和国有企业间三重隐合约关系的存在是导致国有商业银行不良资产数额巨大，银行抵御风险能力低下的深层原因。
银行信贷市场的特殊行为是贷款勉强市场和以贷款需求无弹性为特征的需求陷阱市场两个分割市场的共存。对委托代理理论的进一步研究表明，用代理人监督代理人的激励机制在现实生活中运用十分普遍。为了促进民营经济的发展，解决我国信贷市场的二元分割问题，可以考虑由政府设立半公益性的银行，对组成团体的中小民营企业在符合条件的情况下提供贷款。
各国根据自己的国情，对银行不良资产的处理采用了不同的措施。我国于1999年始设立四大金融资产管理公司分别负责剥离四大国有独资商业银行1995年底以前形成的逾期、呆滞、呆帐贷款。采取的债转股为主的债务重组是化解银行金融风险，帮助国有企业脱困的重大举措。其中的难点是在资源有限的情况下，每个集团都想通过自己的某种活动谋取自身利益的最大化。通过博弈模型，表明政府的政策“刚性”、金融资产管理公司实质性的股东权利是实现预期结果的关键。
对国有商业银行体系剩余不良债权的化解，主要是借鉴国际经验，实行国际资产证券化。
解决我国银行不良贷款问题，就要解除政府、国有企业和银行之间三重隐合约关系，进行国有企业和国有商业银行的产权改革，营造优良的外部经营环境、构建完善的内部经营机制，解决银行不良贷款存量的同时，加强风险管理，杜绝不良贷款新增流量的发生。
The lesson in the history of international finance shows us a serious problem that
can't be ignored-the bank's non-performing loan, for a long period, this problem
is always a hard kont in the line of international bank, and becomes the main reason that lead the bank business to failure.Currently, the issue of non-performing loan existing in the Chinese bank is very serious, through several years' effort, the proportion of non-performing loan become lower than before, but by the year of later 2002,the proportion still up to 25.4%,geatly higher than the international guard point.
The innovation and development of Chinese finance system represent financial control by government.this kind of financial control is mainly outspread from two aspects, one is financial resource mobilisation, the other is financial resource deployment.therefore, the state can preserve plus practicality interest rate to attract citizen's deposit, and in the process of financial deployment can perform different credit policy between state-owned and non-sate-owned enterprise.the concealed agreement relationship existing in the state, the state-owned bank and the state-owned enterprise is the main deeply reason that bring on the huge amount of badness assets and the bank's low risk resistance ability.
The special action in the bank credit market is the coexist of the two division markets in the requirement trap market, through the further study of trust agent thoery, we know that the prompting system that the deputy is superintended by another one exists abundantly in our daily life, in order to advance the development of private economic and settle the problem of duality division in Chinese credit market, Chinese government should consider setting up quasi-commonweal bank, and offer a loan to the small private enterprise answering for the requirement conditions.
According to the respective backgrounds, the countries all over the world adopt different arrangement to deal with the bank's badness assets, in 1999,Chinese government began to set up four financial assets management companies take charge aspectly to peel off the overdue, slacken and bad debt loan formed by the four state-owned commercial banks before the late 1995.the debt recombine is an important way resolving bank financial risk and helping state-owned company get out from the difficulties. Every group wants to pursue the interest maximization through some action.
Resolving to the bad creditor's rights leaved by the system of state-owned commercial bank, the main idea is use for the reference of other countries, and make
assets securitization put into practice.
To tackle the badness loan existing in Chinese bank, we must unchain the concealed agreement relationship between the government, state-owned company and the bank, and make innovation to the property right system of state-owned company and state-owned bank, then we can strengthen the risk management and put an end to the badness loan when building up an excellent exterior business circumstance and constructing a perfect interior business system.
引文
1. http://www.stats.gov.cn
2. http://www.macrochina.com.cn
3. http://www.worldbank.org
4．孔刘柳：《商业银行信贷合约行为理论》，上海财经大学出版社，2001。
5．编写组：《贷款风险分类原理与实务》，中国金融出版社，1998。
6．科思、哈特、斯蒂格利茨等：《契约经济学》，经济科学出版社，1999。
7．盛洪主编：《中国的过渡经济学》，上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，1996。
8．胡冰星：《商业银行不良贷款管理的理论与实践》，复旦大学出版社，1999。
9．王广谦：《经济发展中金融的贡献与效率》，中国人民大学出版社，1997。
10．王晋斌：《金融控制、风险化解与经济增长》，经济研究，2000年第4期。
11．王跃生：《金融压抑与金融自由化条件下的企业融资制度》，经济社会体制比较，1999年第1期。
12．张杰：《民营经济的金融困境与融资次序》，经济研究，2000年第4期。
13．王凤荣：《金融制度变迁与企业风险配置》，当代财经，2000年第11期。
14．蒋海、温思美：《制度变迁中的金融博弈与金融风险转嫁》，金融研究，1998年第9期。
15．唐双宁：《从债转股到股变现》，中国金融，2001年第2期。
16．张杰：《中国金融制度的结构与变迁》，山西经济出版社，1998。
17．张维迎：《企业的企业家——契约理论》，上海人民出版社、上海三联书店，1995。
18．费方域：《企业的产权分析》，上海人民出版社、上海三联书店，1998。
19．夏蜀：《我国银企债务重组的博弈分析》，管理世界，2002年第8期。
20．吴有昌、赵晓：《债转股：基于企业治理结构的理论与政策分析》，经济研究，2000年第1期。
21．张维迎：《博弈论与信息经济学》，上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，1996。
22．埃瑞克·菲吕博顿编：《新制度经济学》，上海财经大学出版社，2002。
23．奥斯特罗姆编：《制度分析与发展的反思》，商务印书馆，2001。
2. http://www.macrochina.com.cn
3. http://www.worldbank.org
4．孔刘柳：《商业银行信贷合约行为理论》，上海财经大学出版社，2001。
5．编写组：《贷款风险分类原理与实务》，中国金融出版社，1998。
6．科思、哈特、斯蒂格利茨等：《契约经济学》，经济科学出版社，1999。
7．盛洪主编：《中国的过渡经济学》，上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，1996。
8．胡冰星：《商业银行不良贷款管理的理论与实践》，复旦大学出版社，1999。
9．王广谦：《经济发展中金融的贡献与效率》，中国人民大学出版社，1997。
10．王晋斌：《金融控制、风险化解与经济增长》，经济研究，2000年第4期。
11．王跃生：《金融压抑与金融自由化条件下的企业融资制度》，经济社会体制比较，1999年第1期。
12．张杰：《民营经济的金融困境与融资次序》，经济研究，2000年第4期。
13．王凤荣：《金融制度变迁与企业风险配置》，当代财经，2000年第11期。
14．蒋海、温思美：《制度变迁中的金融博弈与金融风险转嫁》，金融研究，1998年第9期。
15．唐双宁：《从债转股到股变现》，中国金融，2001年第2期。
16．张杰：《中国金融制度的结构与变迁》，山西经济出版社，1998。
17．张维迎：《企业的企业家——契约理论》，上海人民出版社、上海三联书店，1995。
18．费方域：《企业的产权分析》，上海人民出版社、上海三联书店，1998。
19．夏蜀：《我国银企债务重组的博弈分析》，管理世界，2002年第8期。
20．吴有昌、赵晓：《债转股：基于企业治理结构的理论与政策分析》，经济研究，2000年第1期。
21．张维迎：《博弈论与信息经济学》，上海三联书店、上海人民出版社，1996。
22．埃瑞克·菲吕博顿编：《新制度经济学》，上海财经大学出版社，2002。
23．奥斯特罗姆编：《制度分析与发展的反思》，商务印书馆，2001。
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