个人寿险代理制度研究
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摘要
保险公司与个人寿险代理人之间是一种典型的委托代理关系，从经济学角度可以把委托代理关系定义为一种合同安排，委托人希望激励代理人为自己的利益服务，以达到效用最大化的目标，另一方面又对代理人的行为进行监督，防止其损害自己的利益。代理人凭自己的实力与委托人谈判，代理合同是双方博弈的均衡结果。
本文采用新制度经济学的分析框架，从制度的角度对个人寿险代理制度激励机制的效率问题和监督机制约束的软化问题以及它在国内保险市场的变迁进行了分析。在分析激励和监督问题的时候，本文主要对保险公司营业部这一团队组织进行了考察。我们发现一个独立的个人寿险代理人与作为营业部团队成员的个人寿险代理人面临的激励性制度安排可能是不一样的，后者不仅可以获得离散性激励，而且他还有可能获得由增员和管理业绩决定的累积性激励。营业部的这一激励性制度安排能够诱导高效率的个人寿险代理人向低效率的个人寿险代理人传递信息，从而提高低效率个人寿险代理人的生产效率。本文对这一信息传递的诱导机制进行了分析，在信息成本很高时，对个人寿险代理人提供不同的激励合同能够有效地提高营业部的生产效率。营业部的早会为信息的传递提供了有效的方式。对营业部监督性制度安排的软化实际上是保险公司的一种机会主义行为倾向，其集中表现为保险公司声誉投资的消极性。保险公司和个人寿险代理人的双边机会主义损害了保险公司的声誉，本文构建了一个保险公司声誉损失的博弈模型，在信息不完全状态下，个人寿险代理人个人信任的丧失可以转化为保险公司的声誉损失；在引入一个第三方监督人的情况下，投保人能够获得个人寿险代理人的信息，这有助于保险公司声誉的重建。
个人寿险代理制度变迁是一个诱致性变迁模型。外部制度的引入改变了国内保险公司原来的制度选择集合，中国经济体制的转轨对保险市场提出了新的服务需求，这些都引起了国内保险市场制度的不均衡。制度变迁的动力来自于
摘要
保险公司对变迁成本与预期收益的比较，示范效用以及“搭便车”的便利推动
了个人寿险代理制度在国内的快速发展。本文讨论了个人寿险代理制度变迁与
创新面临的两个路径依赖问题:监督机制的软约束和高首付的传统佣金计划，
并建立了一个监督机制软约束的模型对这一路径依赖问题进行了论证。路径依
赖形成的重要原因是利益因素，因为一种制度形成以后，会形成现存体制中既
得利益的压力集团，他们企图巩固现有制度，哪怕新体制更有效率。因此，在
不断完善和发展个人寿险代理制度的过程中，保险公司面临着不断解决“路径
依赖”的问题。
The relationship between the insurance company and the personal life insurance agent is a classical client-agent, the relationship can be defined as a contract arrange from the point of economics, in which the client expects to stimulate the agent to work for his own benefit to achieve the largest utility, on the other hand, the client monitors the agent in order to prevent the agent from hurting the benefit of client. Agent negotiates with the client by his power, and the agent contract is the result of the game equilibrium of the two sides.
Using the frame of the economics of new institutional economics, this paper analyzes the following problems from the point of system: efficiency and intenerate supervise mechanism of personal life agent system and system change of it in our insurance market. When analyzing the problem of stimulation and supervision, this paper mainly researches the organization of the marketing department of insurance company. We discovers that the stimulation system for an individual agent and the one of the agent, who is a member of the marketing department are different, for the former not only acquires the discrete stimulation, but also acquires the cumulative stimulation of recruit and manage outstanding achievement. The stimulation system can induce the agent with the high efficiency to transform the information to the agent with the low efficiency, thus increasing the production efficiency of the agent with the low efficiency. This paper analyzes the reduction mechanism of the information transformation, drawing the f
ollowing conclusion that
under the condition of high information cost provided, different stimulation contracts for the agent can efficiently increase their production efficiency.
Change of personal life insurance agent system is a model induced and imposed change. The introduce of outer system changes choices of system of our insurance company, the shunt of China economical system arouses new demand for insurance service, these bring a non-equilibrium of system of our insurance market. The power of system change comes form the compare of expected cost and expected income, demonstration avail and the advantage of pick-up impulses the rapid development of the personal life insurance agent system. The text discusses two path-bilk of change and innovation of the personal life agent system, the soft-restrict of superintend and director mechanism and high first-payment traditional commission plan, and constitutes a model of soft-restrict of superintend. The formation of path-bilk is caused by benefit, for a succeeded system being able to become a pressure group, they attempt to solidify the system that is in existence. To perfecting and developing personal life insurance agent system, our
insurance company has to make great efforts to break off path-bilk.
Zhang, Yongsheng(Finance) Directed by-Professor Lei,Dingan
本文采用新制度经济学的分析框架，从制度的角度对个人寿险代理制度激励机制的效率问题和监督机制约束的软化问题以及它在国内保险市场的变迁进行了分析。在分析激励和监督问题的时候，本文主要对保险公司营业部这一团队组织进行了考察。我们发现一个独立的个人寿险代理人与作为营业部团队成员的个人寿险代理人面临的激励性制度安排可能是不一样的，后者不仅可以获得离散性激励，而且他还有可能获得由增员和管理业绩决定的累积性激励。营业部的这一激励性制度安排能够诱导高效率的个人寿险代理人向低效率的个人寿险代理人传递信息，从而提高低效率个人寿险代理人的生产效率。本文对这一信息传递的诱导机制进行了分析，在信息成本很高时，对个人寿险代理人提供不同的激励合同能够有效地提高营业部的生产效率。营业部的早会为信息的传递提供了有效的方式。对营业部监督性制度安排的软化实际上是保险公司的一种机会主义行为倾向，其集中表现为保险公司声誉投资的消极性。保险公司和个人寿险代理人的双边机会主义损害了保险公司的声誉，本文构建了一个保险公司声誉损失的博弈模型，在信息不完全状态下，个人寿险代理人个人信任的丧失可以转化为保险公司的声誉损失；在引入一个第三方监督人的情况下，投保人能够获得个人寿险代理人的信息，这有助于保险公司声誉的重建。
个人寿险代理制度变迁是一个诱致性变迁模型。外部制度的引入改变了国内保险公司原来的制度选择集合，中国经济体制的转轨对保险市场提出了新的服务需求，这些都引起了国内保险市场制度的不均衡。制度变迁的动力来自于
摘要
保险公司对变迁成本与预期收益的比较，示范效用以及“搭便车”的便利推动
了个人寿险代理制度在国内的快速发展。本文讨论了个人寿险代理制度变迁与
创新面临的两个路径依赖问题:监督机制的软约束和高首付的传统佣金计划，
并建立了一个监督机制软约束的模型对这一路径依赖问题进行了论证。路径依
赖形成的重要原因是利益因素，因为一种制度形成以后，会形成现存体制中既
得利益的压力集团，他们企图巩固现有制度，哪怕新体制更有效率。因此，在
不断完善和发展个人寿险代理制度的过程中，保险公司面临着不断解决“路径
依赖”的问题。
The relationship between the insurance company and the personal life insurance agent is a classical client-agent, the relationship can be defined as a contract arrange from the point of economics, in which the client expects to stimulate the agent to work for his own benefit to achieve the largest utility, on the other hand, the client monitors the agent in order to prevent the agent from hurting the benefit of client. Agent negotiates with the client by his power, and the agent contract is the result of the game equilibrium of the two sides.
Using the frame of the economics of new institutional economics, this paper analyzes the following problems from the point of system: efficiency and intenerate supervise mechanism of personal life agent system and system change of it in our insurance market. When analyzing the problem of stimulation and supervision, this paper mainly researches the organization of the marketing department of insurance company. We discovers that the stimulation system for an individual agent and the one of the agent, who is a member of the marketing department are different, for the former not only acquires the discrete stimulation, but also acquires the cumulative stimulation of recruit and manage outstanding achievement. The stimulation system can induce the agent with the high efficiency to transform the information to the agent with the low efficiency, thus increasing the production efficiency of the agent with the low efficiency. This paper analyzes the reduction mechanism of the information transformation, drawing the f
ollowing conclusion that
under the condition of high information cost provided, different stimulation contracts for the agent can efficiently increase their production efficiency.
Change of personal life insurance agent system is a model induced and imposed change. The introduce of outer system changes choices of system of our insurance company, the shunt of China economical system arouses new demand for insurance service, these bring a non-equilibrium of system of our insurance market. The power of system change comes form the compare of expected cost and expected income, demonstration avail and the advantage of pick-up impulses the rapid development of the personal life insurance agent system. The text discusses two path-bilk of change and innovation of the personal life agent system, the soft-restrict of superintend and director mechanism and high first-payment traditional commission plan, and constitutes a model of soft-restrict of superintend. The formation of path-bilk is caused by benefit, for a succeeded system being able to become a pressure group, they attempt to solidify the system that is in existence. To perfecting and developing personal life insurance agent system, our
insurance company has to make great efforts to break off path-bilk.
Zhang, Yongsheng(Finance) Directed by-Professor Lei,Dingan
引文
1、引自 Jensen and Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305
2、引自 Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, American Economic Review, 53, 1032-1057.
3、本章引用的所有数据均来自平安保险公司的《个人寿险业务人员基本管理办法》，业务员手册，B类，2002年版。
4、参见Holger Bonus，作为一个企业的合作联合会：一份交易经济学的研究，上海财经大学出版社，1976，20
5、参见 Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, third Edition, Norton and Co., New York, 1990.
6、参见 Milgrom, North and Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne fairs, Economics and Politics 2, 1-23, 1990.
7、参见林毅夫，关于制度变迁的经济学理论：诱致性变迁与强制性变迁，原载美国《卡托杂志》，Vol．9，No．1，1989，春夏季号。
8、Adapted from Carole King, Acacia Mutual is One Year into Level Commission, National Underwriter-Life and Health Edition, February 27, 1995
9、引自 Schultz, Theodore W, Distortions of Agricultural Incentives, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978, 186.
10、参见 Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, Bell Journal of economics, 10, 74-91
11、参见 Arnott and Stiglitz, Dysfunctional Non-market Institutions, Working Paper, Boston University, Forthcoming in the American Economic Review, 1987.
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2、引自 Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, American Economic Review, 53, 1032-1057.
3、本章引用的所有数据均来自平安保险公司的《个人寿险业务人员基本管理办法》，业务员手册，B类，2002年版。
4、参见Holger Bonus，作为一个企业的合作联合会：一份交易经济学的研究，上海财经大学出版社，1976，20
5、参见 Varian, Microeconomic Analysis, third Edition, Norton and Co., New York, 1990.
6、参见 Milgrom, North and Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne fairs, Economics and Politics 2, 1-23, 1990.
7、参见林毅夫，关于制度变迁的经济学理论：诱致性变迁与强制性变迁，原载美国《卡托杂志》，Vol．9，No．1，1989，春夏季号。
8、Adapted from Carole King, Acacia Mutual is One Year into Level Commission, National Underwriter-Life and Health Edition, February 27, 1995
9、引自 Schultz, Theodore W, Distortions of Agricultural Incentives, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978, 186.
10、参见 Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, Bell Journal of economics, 10, 74-91
11、参见 Arnott and Stiglitz, Dysfunctional Non-market Institutions, Working Paper, Boston University, Forthcoming in the American Economic Review, 1987.
1 奥尔森，集体行动的逻辑，上海人民出版社，1991，79～82
2 贝克尔，人类行为的经济分析，上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，1993，65～68
3 布罗姆利，经济利益与经济制度，上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，1996，96～98
4 陈国富、卿志琼，制度变迁：从人格化交换到非人格化交换，南开经济研究，1999，3 H．
5 陈郁，制度变迁、市场演进与私人契约安排，经济研究，1995，7
6 范里安，微观经济学：现代观点，费方域等译，上海人民出版社，1994．96～103
7 樊纲，渐进改革的政治经济学分析，上海远东出版社，1996，156～173
8 樊纲，市场经济与经济效率，上海人民出版社，1995，76～79
9 樊纲，现代三大经济理论的比较与综合，上海人民出版社，1994，25～26
10 黄淳，等．信息经济学，经济科学出版社，1998，34～36
11 裴光，保险业监管研究，中国金融出版社，1999，23～25
12 哈特，企业、合同与财务结构，上海三联书店，上海人民出版社，1998，99～106
13 何怀宏，契约伦理与社会正义，中国人民大学出版社，1993，124～126
14 霍奇逊，现代制度经济学宣言，北京大学出版社，1993，185～193
15 蒋先福，契约文明：法治文明的源与流，上海人民出版社，1999，245～246
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